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Introduction
In 1996, I was a student studying Law and Politics at Staffordshire University, 
England and knowing that I was attending my Cousin Richard’s wedding in August of 
that same year in Pennsylvania, United States, I decided to study a module about 
American History. As the module progressed, I learned about the American political 
system and the demography of the United States, including the history of the people 
of Pennsylvania. However, the one thing that was missing from the module was 
teaching about the peoples known as Native Americans. In order to satisfy my 
curiosity about Native America I decided that my dissertation project should examine 
some aspect of Native American history. During my research, I came across books, 
which examined legal decisions made by the United States Supreme Court about 
Native American rights. Although I was a student studying British and European law, 
for some unknown reason the thought of learning about Native American legal history 
stirred an unknown and hidden personal passion. On my pending trip to the United 
States, I decided to visit the Supreme Court. Two weeks after the wedding in 
Pennsylvania, I was standing on the steps at the entrance to the United States Supreme 
Court looking up at the words ‘Equal Justice Under Law.’ During the public tour, we 
entered the Court Chamber, the place where the nine justices hear arguments and read 
out their opinions and dissents. All I remember from the visit was the tour guide 
briefly mentioning Native Americans and from a seat in front, I overheard someone 
mutter the words ‘the Indians always win in this place!’ Although unsure whether this 
statement was true, it stimulated and reinforced my personal desire to leam about this 
area of Supreme Court case law. I needed to know whether the statement was true and 
if not, why?
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The thesis is placed within the discipline of law and does not generally offer an 
historical context to the chapters associated with the law. The fundamental basis of 
the thesis is a close analysis of the workings of the United States Supreme Court and 
an examination of the changes in Federal Indian law, Native American case law 
before the Supreme Court, from the viewpoint of the Supreme Court Justices over a 
forty-two year timeframe from 1959 to 2001. Rather than being situated outside the 
court, trying to decipher the meaning and principles of the opinions, this work situates 
itself within the offices and corridors of the Supreme Court.
Federal Indian law is an important topic within the field of Native American studies, 
as the opinions from the highest court of the land directly affect real people and the 
everyday activities and authority of Native American tribes. The opinions of the 
Supreme Court are the dominant law of the land and take precedence over state and 
tribal law. Over the last forty-two years, the actions of the Supreme Court have eroded 
significant amounts of tribal civil, criminal and taxation authority over non-members 
in the reservations and gradually allowed increasing levels of state law into the 
reservations.1 Put simply, it all depends on two questions. Will every Native 
American tribe be content with having authority only over tribal members in the 
reservations? Will the tribes be comfortable with the loss of general authority over 
non-members in the reservations and the right of the state to act within the boundaries 
of the reservations?2
1 The use of the term non-members in this thesis refers to non-Native Americans.
2 The word state refers to one or more o f the fifty States o f the Union.
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The writings and interpretations of noted scholars within the field of Federal Indian 
law and Native American studies are challenged, including those of Charles F. 
Wilkinson, David H. Getches, William C. Canby, Joseph William Singer, David E. 
Wilkins, Philip P. Frickey, Vine Deloria and Clifford M. Lytle. I argue that between 
1959 and 2001, the actions of the Supreme Court precipitated the erosion of the 
Indian sovereignty doctrine. This Indian sovereignty doctrine was based on the 
presumption that tribes had inherent sovereignty over the lands and people in the 
reservation unless Congress acted to reverse the attributes of that sovereignty by 
legislation or by treaty. I will show that from 1959 an identified and gradual trend 
based on a tangible set of principles developed within the mindset of the Supreme 
Court Justices away from the Indian sovereignty doctrine.
The writings on Federal Indian law can be divided into five discussion topics.
1. There are specialised books with in-depth analysis of Supreme Court case law.
2. The writings of two scholars who used archival materials from the private papers of 
Supreme Court Justices to examine Federal Indian law.
3. The written views of some scholars who argue that the case law of the Supreme 
Court up to the 1970s and 1980s was based on the positive use of the Indian 
sovereignty doctrine to protect tribal rights.
4. The different interpretations by scholars about the precise date when the Supreme 
Court began to move away from applying the Indian sovereignty doctrine.
5. The divisions between scholars within the legal community about whether the 
actions and opinions of the Supreme Court were based on a definitive trend or were 
unprincipled and determined in an ad hoc way.
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Although the actions of the Supreme Court from 1959 do not appear to be based on 
any one principle, this thesis identifies the development of clear signposts, which 
show the actions and interpretations of the justices to be deliberate and to move away 
from the principles of inherent tribal sovereignty and the Indian sovereignty doctrine. 
The sovereignty doctrine was a judicial principle which rested on the idea that tribes 
had inherent sovereignty until it was explicitly revoked by Congress.
I challenge the interpretations of noted scholars within the writings on Native 
American history, including Wilcomb Washburn, Robert F. Berkhofer, Vine Deloria 
and Clifford M. Lytle, Stephen Cornell, John R. Wunder, Joanne Nagel and Charles 
Wilkinson who generally observe that the 1970s marked a rebirth of tribal political 
strength within Native America itself and heralded a resurgence in the tribal voice and 
influence within the American political and legal systems. It is argued in this thesis 
that these scholars of Native American history overemphasise the resurgence of the 
1970s and do not take account of the impact of Supreme Court case law.
The writings on Federal Indian law and Native American history do not address the 
practical and everyday effects of Supreme Court taxation, civil and criminal case law 
on tribal authority within the reservations. However, this thesis discusses the real 
effects of Supreme Court case law and addresses a fundamental gap within the 
writings on Native American law and Native American history.
Personal research conducted on the private papers of six Supreme Court Justices, 
Harry A. Blackmun, Thurgood Marshall, William J. Brennan, William O. Douglas, 
Hugo Lafayette Black and Chief Justice Earl Warren, held within the Library of
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Congress, Washington, D.C., makes this thesis an original work. In addition, Supreme 
Court opinions and oral arguments contained within the Library of the United States 
Supreme Court in Washington, D.C. have been used to provide original materials in 
support of the thesis. For the first time in Native American Studies, the Harry A. 
Blackmun papers and the recently declassified William J. Brennan papers have been 
used to inform the debate regarding the erosion of the Indian sovereignty doctrine by 
the Supreme Court.3
With any written work, there is always a decision to be made about focus and with 
this in mind I have used what I describe as the key attributes of tribal power in order 
to narrow the numerous legal subject areas and the inherent complexity contained 
within the discipline of Federal Indian Law. These areas include civil law, criminal 
law, labour law, taxation law, water rights, labour rights, treaty rights, land rights and 
issues of religion. The attributes of tribal power refer to civil, criminal and taxation 
law where the tribes had inherent authority over non-members in the reservations and 
by virtue of the territorial authority of the tribes, were able to prevent the application 
of state law inside the reservations. The attributes of tribal power were made clear by 
Chief Justice John Marshall’s judgement in Worcester v. Georgia (1832)4 and for 
more than a century have remained vitally important to the tribes.
The title “The Silent Revolution” was chosen for this thesis as it seemed to me to 
reflect the cultural and ideological changes that took place within the workings of the 
Supreme Court from 1959 to 2001. The word silent refers not only to the gradual 
movement of the Supreme Court away from the idea of inherent tribal sovereignty but
3 The William J. Brennan Papers are still, in part, restricted. In 2005 the case files from 1975 to 1985 
were opened.
4 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U .S. 515 (1832).
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also to the way the Supreme Court deliberated away from public scrutiny, neither of 
which has been addressed by the writings in Native American law, Native American 
Studies or American Studies. It was only after analysis of the private papers of the 
Supreme Court Justices that one sensed a sweeping ideological change within the 
minds of the justices and the actions of the court as a whole. Between 1959 to 2001, 
the actions of the Supreme Court Justices turned the Indian sovereignty doctrine on its 
head. This sweeping and unprecedented change represented a revolution in the way 
the Supreme Court dealt with Indian sovereignty issues. Equally, the incursion of state 
law into tribal reservations can also be interpreted as a revolution.5 Thus it will be 
shown that the revolution of the Supreme Court allowed unprecedented amounts of 
state law into the reservations and fundamentally eroded key attributes of tribal power 
over non-members in the reservations.
The position of the ‘tribe’ within the framework of the United States Constitution, 
which recognises only the federal government and the States of the Union, has never 
been properly resolved. The idea of inherent tribal sovereignty has existed for 
centuries and is reflected in the hundreds of treaties conducted between Native 
American tribes and the United States and between Native American tribes and 
European nations. Furthermore, in Worcester v. Georgia (1832), the inherent 
sovereignty of the tribes in the reservations was recognised by Chief Justice John 
Marshall. The Marshall trilogy, a set of Supreme Court cases from 1823 to 1832, had 
successfully delineated the boundaries of federal, state and tribal powers inside the 
reservation but from 1832 to 1959, these boundaries were to some extent blurred. 
Although tribal sovereignty had been recognised by the Supreme Court in 1959, the
5 Robert N. Clinton, “State Power Over Indian Reservations: A Critical Comment on Burger Court 
Decisions,” South Dakota Law Review  26 (1981): 445.
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court began to weaken its own reliance on inherent tribal sovereignty and the Indian 
sovereignty doctrine. Rather than continuing to recognise tribal sovereignty as an 
independent source of power, from 1959 the Supreme Court judged cases on a federal 
versus state authority basis, thereby incorporating tribal authority within the 
parameters of federal power. This change of direction by the Supreme Court is central 
to the understanding of the emerging power struggle after 1959 between federal, state 
and tribal authority.
There were two main difficulties encountered during the research phase of this 
project. The first was the unavailability of the private papers of Supreme Court Chief 
Justices Warren Burger and William H. Rehnquist, which are closed to researchers. 
The second was in obtaining information from specific tribes, tribal museums, tribal 
governments and tribal organisations about the impact factors of Supreme Court case 
law on tribal authority within the reservations. In the quest to establish the everyday 
effects of Supreme Court case law on the tribes, I sent numerous letters and emails 
and made numerous telephone calls. However, it came obvious that there was a 
general reluctance within Native America to share information about the everyday 
effects of Supreme Court case law. Notwithstanding this setback, some information 
about the impact of taxation, civil and criminal case law on certain tribes were found 
in two United States Senate reports and a working paper by the National Congress of 
the American Indian (NCAI). The difficulty in obtaining the required responses to 
requests for information has meant that the assessment in the thesis of the effects of 
Supreme Court case law on tribal authority is limited to a few tribes rather than it 
being a comprehensive and detailed assessment of Native America. The limitations so 
imposed will provide an interesting topic for a future research project.
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Chapter 1 examines the powers of the tribes and the development of Federal Indian 
law and the Indian sovereignty doctrine from the nineteenth century to 1959. Despite 
the limitations placed on tribal authority by the United States Supreme Court up until 
1959, the tribes had retained inherent sovereignty over non-members inside the 
reservation and generally, the authority to prohibit state law from entering the 
reservation. Chapter 2 presents the foundations of the silent revolution and the 
principles which underpinned it. It traces through Supreme Court case law, the 
formation, from 1959 to 1973, of a new principle that states had authority in the 
reservation unless revoked by Congress. This process helped erode the principles of 
the Indian sovereignty doctrine established by John Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia 
(1832). Chapter 3 traces the development of the silent revolution between 1973 and 
2001 and the principles that underpinned it, termed by this thesis as the integrationist 
trend, and shows the gradual erosion of the Indian sovereignty doctrine and the key 
attributes of tribal power. Chapter 4 is divided into two. Section one discusses the 
practical effects of civil, criminal and taxation case law of the Supreme Court on the 
authority of specific tribes with the reservation. Section two argues that the writings 
on Native American history over-emphasise the renaissance of Native American 
rights from the 1970s. It also argues that the writings on the law do not discuss the 
practical effects of the case law on the tribes nor do they view the erosion of tribal 
sovereignty by the Supreme Court as a process which began in 1959, when the 
foundations were laid, and were applied from 1973 to 2001. The process of the 
erosion of the sovereignty doctrine and the erosion of the key attributes of tribal 
power have become established within the rulings of the Supreme Court and this 
research has identified signs that suggest its proliferation in Congress.
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Chapter 1
The Tribes, Federal Indian Law and the Indian Sovereignty Doctrine from the 
Nineteenth Century to 1959
This thesis will examine the development of Federal Indian law and the Indian 
sovereignty doctrine and will assess the limitations placed on the inherent sovereignty of 
the tribes and the Indian sovereignty doctrine by the United States Supreme Court from 
the nineteenth century to Williams v. Lee (1959).1 The Supreme Court established the 
Indian sovereignty doctrine in Worcester v. Georgia (1832).2 Indeed, the limitations 
placed on inherent tribal sovereignty and authority in general were a result of the 
restrictions placed directly on the Indian sovereignty doctrine. Although the Supreme 
Court removed some attributes of inherent tribal sovereignty during the 1820s and 1830s 
and in doing so, weakened the influence of the Indian sovereignty doctrine over the 127 
years from Worcester to Williams, in 1941 the Indian sovereignty doctrine was re­
affirmed in Felix S. Cohen’s seminal work, The Handbook o f Federal Indian Law, and 
subsequently applied by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Lee (1959).3 Therefore, in 
1959 the tribes had the right to tax, enforce both civil and criminal law over reservation 
lands and the people on these lands, and generally exclude state authority from the 
reservations.4 This provides an essential context for the next part of the thesis, which
1 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
2 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
3 Felix S. Cohen, Handbook o f  Federal Indian Law (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1941).
4 Ibid.
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examines the foundations of what I have termed the silent revolution and which 
developed from 1959 to 1973.
During the early nineteenth century the Supreme Court laid the foundations of Federal 
Indian law in the Marshall trilogy when the powers of the tribe and the Indian 
sovereignty doctrine within American and constitutional law were defined. Federal 
Indian law is Supreme Court case law involving Native Americans and it began with the 
three judgments handed down by Chief Justice John Marshall during the 1820s and 
1830s. As Philip F. Frickey pointed out, “In the early nineteenth century, the Marshall 
Court developed most of the foundational principles of federal Indian law in a trio of 
cases.”5 The three cases of Johnson v. McIntosh (1823), Cherokee Nation v. Georgia 
(1831) and Worcester v. Georgia (1832) placed limitations on certain aspects of inherent 
tribal sovereignty, outlined the nature of the Indian sovereignty doctrine and set out the 
legal relationship between the federal government, the states of the Union and the tribes.6 
The fundamental principle of the sovereignty doctrine was that the tribes retained 
authority over reservation lands and the people on those lands until Congress explicitly 
acted to reverse tribal authority. From 1832, the Indian sovereignty doctrine was used to 
protect the interests and rights of Native America in case law before the Supreme Court. 
The bulwark of Native American rights, was Worcester v. Georgia (1832). Under the 
rationale of Worcester, the tribes were separate and held independent sovereignty from 
the States of the Union with inherent sovereignty over the lands and people in the
5 Philip P. Frickey, “A Common Law for Our Age o f Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal 
Authority over Non-members,” Yale Law Journal 109 (1999): 9.
6 Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831); and Worcester 
v. Georgia (1832).
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reservation. These powers were dependent only on the plenary power of the United 
States.7
The status of the Native American tribes before the Marshall trilogy was one of 
independence from the United States. Tribes were outside the control of the United States 
Constitution and considered by the United States government and Supreme Court to be 
extra-constitutional. These three cases symbolised the end of the external sovereign 
powers of the tribes, except the right of Native American tribes to conduct treaties with 
the United States government. This treaty making process lasted until 1871 when the 
United States Senate unilaterally ended the treaty making process between the United 
States and Native American tribes. Federal legislation introduced by the Senate in 1871 
explained
“That hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be 
acknowledged or recognised as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the 
United States may contract by treaty: Provided, further, That nothing herein contained 
shall be construed to invalidate or impair the obligation of any treaty heretofore lawfully 
made and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe.”8
The dichotomy between the Marshall trilogy, which ended the external sovereignty of the 
tribes to interact with nations such as France or Great Britain, and the continuation of 
Native American treaty making powers up until 1871 remains one of the unexplainable 
contradictions in American politics and American law.
7 Plenary power means that the United States has unlimited control over the tribes and the potential to 
revoke part of or all of the characteristics of tribal sovereignty. However, this tribal-federal relationship was 
exclusive and did not involve state authority.
8 U.S. Statutes at Large 16 (1871): 566.
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The first case of the Marshall trilogy was Johnson v. McIntosh (1823).9 In this case, the 
Supreme Court had to determine whether Native American tribes or the United States had 
the right to grant land title to prospective buyers. Non-members purchased lands from the 
Illinois Indians in 1773 and the Piankeshaw Indians in 1775 and subsequently moved on 
to the lands. Then in 1818, William McIntosh bought the same lands, which had passed 
from the control of the colony of Virginia in 1784, from the United States government. 
The Supreme Court held that the land rights of the United States government were 
superior to those of any Native American tribe. Therefore, the non-members who had 
bought lands from the tribes lost land title to a counter-claim made by other non-members 
over forty-years later. Overall, the judgment of John Marshall generally limited the 
external sovereignty of the tribes, extinguished Indian land title (ownership of the lands) 
and ruled that Native American tribes could only sell lands to the United States 
government.10 Hope M. Babcock believed that Chief Justice John Marshall had to 
balance the interests of the United States versus tribal rights, “Marshall was caught 
between two competing interests: the desire not to disturb previously settled expectations 
about land title and the desire not to dishonour the many treaties and proclamations 
protecting Indian property rights, and by implication, tribal sovereignty.”11
Chief Justice John Marshall ruled that the United States had superior rights based on the 
doctrine of discovery, a two hundred year old European convention, which allowed a
9 Lindsay G. Robertson, Conquest by Law: How the Discovery of America Dispossessed Indigenous 
Peoples of Their Lands (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
10 David H., Getches, Charles F. Wilkinson, and Robert A. Williams, Jr., Federal Indian Law: Cases and 
Materials, 3d ed. (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1993).
11 Hope M. Babcock, “A Civic-Republican Vision o f "Domestic Dependent Nations" in the Twenty-First 
Century: Tribal Sovereignty Re-Envisioned, Reinvigorated, and Re-empowered,” Utah Law Review 2005 
(2005): 472.
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European nation the right to trade and acquire lands from the natives. The right of 
discovery by a European nation prohibited other European nations from trading with the 
same natives. Chief Justice John Marshall did not apply the conventions of the doctrine 
of discovery in its original form but instead he applied the doctrine of discovery in a 
literal way so that the discovery of lands dispossessed the Indian tribes of their land title 
and automatically vested ownership in the discovering nation. The opinion Chief Justice 
John Marshall confirmed the limitations on the inherent sovereignty of the tribes, noting 
that
“ ...the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely disregarded; but 
were necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired. They were admitted to be the 
rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, 
and to use it according to their own discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as 
independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil 
at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental 
principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.”12
Therefore, the Supreme Court circumscribed the inherent sovereignty of the tribes in their 
relations with other sovereign nations and limited tribal sovereignty over lands in favour 
of a title based on occupancy. This occupancy continued until it was purchased or 
conquered by another sovereign power, for example the United States. Philip P. Frickey 
believed that the opinion of Chief Justice John Marshall limited the external sovereignty 
of Native American tribes, commenting that the “tribes lost their status as complete 
sovereigns and, in particular, their ability to engage in external relations with any 
sovereign other than the European discovering country.”13 The Supreme Court 
considered the tribes to be the occupants and not the owners of the lands that made up
12 Johnson v. McIntosh, 574.
13 Frickey, “A Common Law,” 9.
13
North America, pointing out that “The absolute ultimate title has been considered as 
acquired by discovery, subject only to the Indian title of occupancy, which title the 
discoverers possessed the exclusive right of acquiring.”14 Despite the limitations imposed 
on the tribes by the McIntosh opinion, it was a halfway house decision. As Joseph Burke 
explained, John Marshall did not fully extinguish Native American land title nor did he 
give the Native Americans undisputed title to the lands.15 Ultimately, the limitation 
placed on Native America by Chief Justice John Marshall was justified by the superior 
Christian rights of the United States,
“ .. .On the discovery of this immense continent, the great nations of Europe were eager to 
appropriate to themselves so much of it as they could respectively acquire. Its vast extent 
offered an ample field to the ambition and enterprise of all; and the character and religion 
of its inhabitants afforded an apology for considering them as a people over whom the 
superior genius of Europe might claim an ascendancy. The potentates of the old world 
found no difficulty in convincing themselves that they made ample compensation to the 
inhabitants of the new, by bestowing on them civilization and Christianity, in exchange 
for unlimited independence...”16
Christianity justified the acquisition of Indian lands by the United States. This view was 
supported by Peter d’Errico who pointed out that the sophistry of Marshall’s opinion 
cloaked the superiority of the Christian religion over tribal rights within the rhetoric of 
American expansionism.17
14 Johnson v. McIntosh, 592.
15 Joseph C. Burke, “The Cherokee Cases: A  Study in Law, Politics, and Morality,” Stanford Law Review 
21 (1969): 502-503.
16 Johnson v. McIntosh, 572-573.
17 Peter d’Errico, “American Indian Sovereignty: Now You See It, Now you Don’t,” Legal Studies 
Department, University of Massachusetts/Amherst, unpublished paper delivered as the inaugural lecture at 
the American Indian Civics Project, Humboldt State University, California, 24 October, 1997.
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The second case of the Marshall trilogy was Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831). The 
case involved the Cherokee Nation which sought an injunction to prevent the Legislature 
of the State of Georgia from passing acts which limited Cherokee sovereignty. In a bill 
presented to the Supreme Court, the Cherokee claimed they were a foreign state under the 
United States Constitution in which their sovereignty was confirmed in the many treaties 
ratified by the United States Congress,
“This bill is brought by the Cherokee nation, praying an injunction to restrain the state of 
Georgia from the execution of certain laws of that state, which, as is alleged, go directly 
to annihilate the Cherokees as a political society, and to seize, for the use of Georgia, the 
lands of the nation which have been assured to them by the United States in solemn 
treaties repeatedly made and still in force.”18
Initially, Marshall interpreted the Cherokee to be a sovereign state with all of the 
attributes of a distinct and independent state,
“So much of the argument as was intended to prove the character of the Cherokees as a 
state, as a distinct political society, separated from others, capable of managing its own 
affairs and governing itself, has, in the opinion of a majority of the judges, been 
completely successful. They have been uniformly treated as a state from the settlement of 
our country. The numerous treaties made with them by the United States recognize them 
as a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war, of being responsible in 
their political character for any violation of their engagements, or for any aggression 
committed on the citizens of the United States by any individual of their community. 
Laws have been enacted in the spirit of these treaties. The acts of our government plainly 
recognize the Cherokee nation as a state, and the courts are bound by those acts.”19
Despite such a ringing endorsement of Cherokee sovereignty and its manifestation in 
treaties, Chief Justice John Marshall declared that the Cherokee and Native American 
tribes were not foreign nations under the American Constitution and in re-affirming his
18 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 15.
19 Ibid., 16.
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McIntosh judgement of 1823, Marshall declared that the tribes were under the general 
authority of the United States,
“Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and, heretofore, 
unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that right shall be extinguished by a 
voluntary cession to our government; yet it may well be doubted whether those tribes 
which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict 
accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be 
denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a 
title independent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their 
right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the 
United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”20
The reason that they were considered to be ‘domestic dependent nations’ was because 
they were within the boundaries of the sovereign state of the United States. Indeed, 
Robert Porter argued that Chief Justice John Marshall made sure that America took legal 
control over the tribes, noting that Marshall “was able to cement American hegemony 
over them in such a way as to ensure that this became the foundational principle of new 
American Indian subjugation jurisprudence.”21 Therefore, Porter viewed Federal Indian 
law as a process of exploitation that severely limited the rights of the tribes. In contrast to 
Porter, Joseph Burke believed that the 1831 Marshall opinion was ingenious as it fitted in 
with the climate of the time. The Supreme Court was weak, the political pressure to grant 
foreign status to the Cherokee was too dangerous and morally, Marshall could not allow 
the State of Georgia to repress Cherokee rights22 when in fact, the laws of the United 
States took precedence over Native American sovereignty and interests.
20 Ibid., 17.
21 Robert B. Porter, “The Meaning o f Indigenous Nation Sovereignty,” Arizona State Law Journal 34 
(2002): 82.
22 Burke, “The Cherokee Cases,” 514.
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Marshall explained that the United States had the right to control the external relations of 
the tribes because numerous treaties held that the tribes were under the protection of the 
United States. Therefore, as Marshall pointed out, the tribes were “completely under the 
sovereignty and dominion of the United States...”23 and the protection of the United 
States government. However, this reading of the treaties by Marshall did not take account 
of the fact that the word ‘protection’ was introduced into treaties with European nations 
long before, meaning that European nations did not lose attributes of sovereignty. Indeed, 
the protection of a stronger state over a weaker state should have meant an alliance where 
the weaker state did not surrender its sovereignty. As Justice Thompson commented, 
“Consequently, a weak state, that, in order to provide for its safety, places itself under the 
protection of a more powerful one, without stripping itself of the right of government and 
sovereignty, does not cease on this account to be placed among the sovereigns who 
acknowledge no other power.”24 Unfortunately for the Cherokee, the Thompson 
interpretation formed the dissent in the Cherokee Nation case and would form the basis of 
Marshall’s Worcester opinion in 1832. Joseph Burke explained that on the insistence of 
John Marshall, the dissenters (Justices Thompson and Story) in the Cherokee Nation case 
penned their dissents nine days after the case in order to expand on the suggestions made 
in the Marshall opinion regarding the protection of Cherokee property rights against the 
illegal acts of Georgia.25
23
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 17.
24 Ibid., 53.
25 Burke, “The Cherokee Cases,” 514.
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Only a year after Cherokee Nation came Worcester v. Georgia (1832),26 the final and 
most important case of the Marshall trilogy. The case involved a non-member minister, 
the Reverend Samuel A. Worcester who was indicted by the Superior Court for the 
County of Gwinnett, Georgia for not having a license from the Governor of Georgia or 
from an authorised person to be within Cherokee lands. The Reverend Worcester argued 
that he was a citizen of Vermont who had entered the lands of the sovereign Cherokee 
nation as a missionary under the authority of the President of the United States. In 
addition, he argued that the Cherokee Nation was not within the jurisdiction of Georgia 
and therefore the State of Georgia was acting contrary to the treaties signed between the 
Cherokee and the United States government and the United States Constitution. Once 
again, Marshal began this case, as he did in 1831, with a ringing endorsement of the 
independence and sovereignty of Native American tribes, “America, separated from 
Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited by a distinct people, divided into separate nations, 
independent of each other and of the rest of the world, having institutions of their own, 
and governing themselves by their own laws.”27
In contrast to McIntosh and Cherokee Nation, John Marshall ruled that the doctrine of 
discovery did not grant the European Nations or the United States automatic claims to 
Native American land nor limit the rights of Native America,
26 Jill Norgren, The Cherokee Cases: The Confrontation of Law and Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Inc., 1996); Petra T. Shattuck and Jill Norgren, Partial Justice: Federal Indian Law in a Liberal 
Constitutional System (Providence, London: Berg Publishers, Inc., 1993); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The 
American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourse o f Conquest (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1990); and Burke, “The Cherokee Cases.”
27 Worcester v. Georgia, 543-544.
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“It is difficult to comprehend the proposition, that the inhabitants of either quarter of the 
globe could have rightful original claims of dominion over the inhabitants of the other, or 
over the lands they occupied; or that the discovery of either by the other should give the 
discoverer rights in the country discovered, which annulled the pre- existing rights of its 
ancient possessors.”28
In 1832, Marshall believed that Native Americans were more than occupants of the land 
and reversed his interpretation in McIntosh where he believed that discovery gave the 
European and the American nations an inherent right to land title. The very basis of his 
ruling in Johnson v. McIntosh (1823) was ridiculed by Marshall himself in the Worcester 
opinion of 1832, “The extravagant and absurd idea, that the feeble settlements made on 
the sea coast, or the companies under whom they were made, acquired legitimate power 
by them to govern the people, or occupy the lands from sea to sea, did not enter the mind 
of any man.”29 Joseph Burke believed that the contradiction between the Marshall 
opinions in Worcester and Cherokee Nation was based on the view that political 
conditions in 1832 offered a more favourable legal, political and moral climate to 
advance Native American rights than in 1831.30 Vine Deloria and Clifford A Lytle 
supported this notion by arguing that the Worcester opinion aligned itself with the 
dissents of Justices Thompson and Story in Cherokee Nation in 1831.31
The Worcester opinion also contradicted the analysis of Native American treaty rights 
made by Marshall in the Cherokee Nation case. In Worcester, Marshall held that Native 
American tribes were sovereign entities capable of entering into treaties on an equal
28 Ibid, 544.
29 Ibid., 544-545.
30 Burke, “The Cherokee Cases,” 531.
31
Vine Deloria, Jr., and Clifford M. Lytle, American Indians, American Justice (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1983), 32.
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footing with the United States and preserving their sovereign qualities of tribal self- 
government. The first treaty conducted between the United States government and a 
Native American group was the Treaty with the Delaware of 1778.32 Marshall believed 
that the this treaty was akin to those treaties made between European nations, pointing 
out that, “This treaty, in its language, and in its provisions, is formed, as near as may be, 
on the model of treaties between the crowned heads of Europe.”33 Furthermore, 
Marshall’s interpretation regarding the issue of United States protection of Native 
American tribes had changed from his analysis in 1831. In Worcester, Marshall had 
pointed out that the Cherokee had not surrendered its national character by opting to be 
protected by the United States, noting that,
“This stipulation is found in Indian treaties, generally. It was introduced into their treaties 
with Great Britain; and may probably be found in those with other European 
powers...The Indians perceived in this protection only what was beneficial to 
themselves-an engagement to punish aggressions on them. It involved, practically, no 
claim to their lands, no dominion over their persons. It merely bound the nation to the 
British crown, as a dependent ally, claiming the protection of a powerful friend and 
neighbour, and receiving the advantages of that protection, without involving a surrender 
of their national character.”34
Marshall’s 1832 interpretation supported the preservation of Cherokee and Native 
American rights when they were under the protection of a European nation. In addition, 
the protection of Native American tribes by the United States meant the protection of
32 Charles J. Kappler, ed., Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, vol. 2, Treaties (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1904), 3-5.
33 Worcester v. Georgia, 550.
34 Ibid., 551-552.
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Native American rights. As Marshall explained, “Protection does not imply the 
destruction of the protected.”35
Chief Justice John Marshall’s Worcester opinion relied on two fundamental principles, 
first, the recognition of inherent tribal sovereignty and second, the recognition that 
Congress also had the right and authority, or plenary power, to protect the tribes from 
state law. Marshall clarified these two principles when he discussed the trade and 
intercourse acts passed by Congress, “All these acts, and especially that of 1802, which is 
still in force, manifestly consider the several Indian nations as distinct political 
communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and 
having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged,
o z :
but guaranteed by the United States.” The Worcester judgment openly declared that 
Native American tribes had inherent sovereignty over their lands and every person on 
those lands, and therefore, prohibited state jurisdiction over a white citizen inside 
Cherokee lands. Nell Jessup Newton challenged the interpretation that the Marshall 
opinion relied on tribal sovereignty. Instead, Newton explained that Marshall used 
congressional power to prohibit state law from the reservation, pointing out that 
“Although the Court in Worcester recognized that Indian tribes possess inherent 
sovereignty rights, the decision was really a defence of federal over state power, not a 
defence of Indian tribal sovereignty~the tribe was not even a party to the suit.”37 Despite 
the Newton view, it was clear that the Worcester opinion relied on the inherent
35 Ibid., 552.
36 Ibid., 556-557.
37 Nell Jessup Newton, “Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations,” University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 132 (1984): 202.
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sovereignty of the tribes because the court had recognised Cherokee treaties and 
Cherokee land rights. It had also confirmed that Congress had the right to bar the 
unconstitutional nature of state law inside any tribal lands. Tribal authority was 
answerable only to the United States government and not to any of the States of the 
Union. As Marshall pointed out, the relations between the Cherokee and Native America 
were regulated “according to the settled principles of our constitution, are committed 
exclusively to the government of the union.”38 The laws and jurisdiction of the State of 
Georgia had no force over a non-member inside the boundaries of Cherokee lands. In 
conclusion, Marshall held that the authority of the State of Georgia within Cherokee 
lands was repugnant to the treaties, and the Constitution and laws of the United States.39 
Despite the positive outcome of the Worcester case, Chief Justice John Marshall did not 
overrule the rulings in McIntosh or Cherokee Nation, which had confirmed the 
limitations on the external sovereignty of the tribes. However, the Indian sovereignty 
doctrine established in Worcester had re-affirmed the inherent sovereignty of the tribes 
over their own lands and protected them against the application of any kind of state law 
inside the reservations. It had also confirmed that the United States government had over­
arching sovereignty to protect the tribes against state law. As David H. Getches noted, the 
Worcester case “ ...lays the cornerstone for the legal system's continuing recognition of 
tribal sovereignty.”40
The Marshall trilogy of cases had limited the sovereignty of the tribes in three ways.
38 Worcester v. Georgia, 561.
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Worcester v. Georgia, 562-563.
40 David H. Getches, “Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in 
Indian Law,” California Law Review  84 (1996): 1582.
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1.) McIntosh limited the external sovereignty of the tribes and the right of the tribes to 
sell their lands to any number of sovereign nations by declaring that tribal lands had to be 
sold exclusively to the United States.
2.) Cherokee Nation also limited the external sovereignty of the tribes and their ability to 
act in international relations.
3.) Worcester held that tribal power was dependent on the superior or plenary authority of 
the United States.
Despite the boundaries imposed on inherent tribal sovereignty, collectively the three 
cases declared that tribes had inherent sovereignty over reservation lands and people 
within those lands unless Congress acted to reverse attributes of tribal sovereignty and 
inherent tribal sovereignty and congressional power prohibited all state law inside tribal 
reservations.
However, soon after the Marshall trilogy American governmental policy began to place 
limitations on tribal sovereignty. The Worcester ruling and the number of treaties 
conducted between the tribes and the United States government were powerless to 
prevent the removal of Native American tribes from the east to the west of the 
Mississippi River.41 Following the relocation of the tribes, United States government 
policy shifted towards assimilation and allotment. This period not only resulted in the 
Major Crimes Act of 1885, which not only began the movement of federal authority into 
the reservations and transferred responsibility for the judgement of serious crimes from
41 Although removal forced many tribes to the west of the Mississippi, some tribes stayed in the east o f the 
United States and remain there today.
23
tribal authority to Congress, but also resulted in the General Allotment Act of 1887 which 
significantly decreased the tribal land-base. Theodore Roosevelt believed that the General 
Allotment Act was designed to eviscerate the tribe and their powers, noting that it was “a 
mighty pulverizing engine to break up the tribal mass.”42 William C. Canby, writing in 
2002, agreed with the Roosevelt assessment and believed that allotment was destructive, 
“Over the ensuing years there were major movements in Indian law initiated by Congress 
or the executive branch, including.. .in the 1880’s, a policy of allotment designed to break 
up the tribal landholdings into small individual farms.”43 Linked to the policies of the 
United States government was the gradual accommodation of federal and state 
jurisdiction inside the reservations by the United States Supreme Court.
The federal policy of assimilation and allotment influenced the United States Supreme 
Court to modify the principles declared in the seminal case of Worcester v. Georgia and 
had allowed state and federal jurisdiction into the reservations. For the first time, the 
Supreme Court had begun the gradual erosion of exclusive tribal jurisdiction in the 
reservations to accommodate and facilitate the process of assimilation. Three Supreme 
Court cases during the federal government’s policy of allotment weakened Worcester and 
the Indian sovereignty doctrine. Charles F. Wilkinson referred to the three cases when he 
argued that the movement of the law away from Worcester was characterised by the 
“Kagama-McBratney-Lone Wolf line [which] implicitly conceptualised tribes as lost
42 Virgil J. Vogel, This Country Was Ours: A Documentary History o f the American Indian (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1972), 193.
43 Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, Rulings o f the U.S. Supreme Court as They Affect the Powers and 
Authorities o f the Indian Tribal Governments: Hearing on the Concerns of Recent Decisions o f the U.S. 
Supreme Court and the Future of Indian Tribal Governments in America, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., 27 
February 2002, 45.
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societies without power, as minions of the federal government.”44 The Worcester case 
was the bulwark of tribal rights and antithetical in law and policy to the process of 
assimilation. As Joseph Singer commented, the Worcester decree “ ...remained the law 
until 1881.”45 The first case to facilitate the federal policy of allotment and allow states to 
have jurisdiction in the reservation was United States v. McBratney (1881)46 This was 
soon followed by Draper v. United States (1896).47 These cases ruled that states had 
inherent sovereignty over state citizens who committed crimes against each other in 
Native American reservations. Although the lands in question were treaty made 
reservations and Worcester held that tribes had exclusive authority in the reservations, the 
Supreme Court held that the inherent rights of the state took precedence over Native
4 0   ^  ^ .
American treaties and Worcester, in particular when state citizens were involved. The 
McBratney court, for example, had conceded that the Ute reservation was outside the 
remit of state jurisdiction. This was highlighted in the treaty with the Utes and the 
original act of Congress which provided temporary government for the territory of 
Colorado. Despite these explicit exceptions, the Supreme Court held that Colorado
“.. .without any such exception as had been made in the treaty with the Ute Indians and in 
the act establishing a territorial government, has acquired criminal jurisdiction over its 
own citizens and other white persons throughout the whole of the territory within its 
limits, including the Ute Reservation, and that reservation is no longer within the sole and 
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.”49
44 Charles F. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the law  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 
24. See also, Sidney L. Harring, Crow D og’s Case: American Indian Sovereignty, Tribal Law, and United 
States Law in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 9.
45 Joseph William Singer, “Canons o f Conquest: The Supreme Court’s Attack on Tribal Sovereignty,” New  
England Law Review  37 (2003): 649.
46 United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881). See, Harring, Crow D og’s Case, 54.
47 D raper  v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896). See, William C. Canby, American Indian Law: in a
Nutshell (St. Paul, Minn.: West Group, 1998), 131-132.
48 See also Utah & Northern R. Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885) and Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898).
49 United States v. McBratney, 624.
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The Supreme Court determined that the State of Colorado had the right to prosecute 
crimes committed by non-members against non-members on tribal reservations, as 
Congress had not prohibited this action. In doing so, the Supreme Court had allowed 
federal jurisdiction into the reservations. The mling of United States v. Kagama (1886),50 
a case brought after the introduction of the Major Crimes Act of 1885, held that the 
United States had criminal authority to try the crime of murder committed by one Native 
American on another. Sidney L. Harring believed that Kagama was a low point for tribal 
sovereignty, arguing that the Kagama case was “ ...the judicial embodiment of 
Congress’s policy of forcing the assimilation of the tribes, recognising none of their 
sovereignty, none of their status as domestic nations.”51 The Supreme Court determined 
that the United States government had plenary authority over tribes because of the 
Marshall trilogy. The term "domestic dependent nations" was used by the Supreme Court 
to allow the use of federal authority to control aspects of tribal affairs, contrary to 
Worcester itself. The authority of the federal government over the tribes was also 
involved in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock (1903)52 where the Supreme Court upheld the sale of 
tribal land by the federal government despite the Medicine Lodge Treaty of 1867 
conducted between the Kiowa and Comanche tribes and the United States government. 
Once again, the Supreme Court mled that the federal government had plenary power over 
tribal land interests because the dependent nation status of the tribes. In addition, the 
United States extended federal alcohol laws into Indian country during this period.53
50 United States v. Kagama, 118 US 375 (1886).
51 Harring, Crow D o g ’s Case, 142.
52 Lone Wolfv. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
53 United States v. Forty-three Gallons o f Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188 (1876).
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Together, the cases and legislation of the assimilation and allotment period worked to 
undermine the principles of Worcester.54
Although case law and legislation removed some of the rationale behind the mlings of 
Chief Justice John Marshall, it did not overrule but actually modified Worcester and the 
Indian sovereignty doctrine. The actions of the Supreme Court showed that it upheld the 
Indian sovereignty doctrine on many occasions during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. Charles F. Wilkinson commented that the preservation of Worcester 
was based on what he termed the uWorcester-Crow Dog-Talton line...”55 of cases. These 
three cases were described by Sidney L. Harring as a “line of cases affirming 
sovereignty.”56 This view was based on the power of tribal government free from state 
control and subject only to the overriding interests of the federal government. Philip P. 
Frickey supported Wilkinson and Harring and stated that “Worcester and Talton 
constitute the conceptual high-water mark of tribal sovereignty in federal Indian law 
and...remain formidable precedents antagonistic to modem judicial efforts to undercut 
tribal authority.”57
The late nineteenth century saw the Supreme Court use Worcester and the sovereignty 
doctrine to prevent the application of state law over tribes inside the reservations.58 In 
The New York Indians (1867)59 and The Kansas Indians (1867),60 the Supreme Court
54 Harring, Crow D o g ’s Case, 143.
55 Wilkinson, Time, and the Law, 24.
56 Harring, Crow D o g ’s Case, 9.
57 Frickey, “A Common Law,” 11.
58 Cohen, Handbook.
59 The New York Indians, 72 U.S. 761 (1867).
60 The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737 (1867).
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ruled that the states did not have authority to tax tribal members and upheld the rationale 
of Worcester. In The Kansas Indians the court addressed its opinion to the three tribes 
involved; the Shawnee, the Wea and the Miami. With reference to the Shawnee, the 
Supreme Court stated,
“If the tribal organization of the Shawnees is preserved intact...then they are a 'people 
distinct from others,' capable of making treaties, separated from the jurisdiction of 
Kansas, and to be governed exclusively by the government of the Union....If they have 
outlived many things, they have not outlived the protection afforded by the Constitution, 
treaties, and laws of Congress.”61
The Supreme Court determined that the Shawnee had inherent sovereignty, independent 
of the States of the Union and that Congress had plenary power over them. However, it
p)i *
held that the State of Kansas did not have the authority to tax the tribe. In contrast to 
McBratney, The Kansas Indians court held, “While the general government has a 
superintending care over their interests, and continues to treat with them as a nation, the 
State of Kansas is estopped from denying their title to it. She accepted this status when 
she accepted the act admitting her into the Union.”62 The only means to preclude 
exclusive tribal government over a reservation was by treaty or the voluntary 
abandonment of tribal government. Until that point, the Supreme Court held that “ ...their 
property is withdrawn from the operation of State laws.”63 The Supreme Court applied 
the same rationale to both the Wea and Miami, noting that the Miami “ ...are a nation of 
people, recognized as such by the general government in the making of treaties with
61 The Kansas Indians, 755-756.
62 Ibid., 757.
63 Ibid.
28 ?
them, and the relations always maintained towards them, and cannot, therefore, be taxed 
by the authorities of Kansas.”64
The Supreme Court also used the sovereignty doctrine and Worcester to prevent the 
application of federal law in the reservation. In Ex Parte Crow Dog (1883),65 the 
Supreme Court reversed the conviction of Crow Dog (Kan-gi-shun-ca) by the First 
District Court of Dakota. The United States did not have criminal authority to prosecute 
tribal members because the inherent sovereignty of the tribes ousted federal law from the 
reservation.66 In addition, the inherent sovereignty of the tribes, pursuant to the 
sovereignty doctrine, was upheld in Talton v. Mayes (1896),
“...as the powers of local self-government enjoyed by the Cherokee Nation existed prior 
to the constitution, they are not operated upon by the fifth amendment...and the 
determination of what was the existing law of the Cherokee Nation...was solely a matter 
within the jurisdiction of the courts of that Nation, and the decision of such a question in
v'O
itself necessarily involves no infraction of the constitution of the United States.”
The Supreme Court ruled that Cherokee sovereignty pre-dated the United States 
Constitution and was inherent. Therefore, the United States Constitution could not 
control the Cherokee.
Furthermore, during the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court sanctioned the 
inherent rights of the tribe to tax a state citizen inside the reservation. This explicit use of
64 Ibid., 760.
65 Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
66 Harring, Crow D o g ’s Case.
67 Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
68 Talton v. Mayes, 384-385.
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tribal sovereignty was upheld in Morris v. Hitchcock (1904),69 where the Chickasaw 
Nation were allowed to tax non-members inside its territory,
“ ...it is also undoubted that in treaties entered into with the Chickasaw Nation, the right 
of that tribe to control the presence within the territory assigned to it of persons who 
might otherwise be regarded as intruders has been sanctioned...And it is not disputed 
that, under the authority of these treaties, the Chickasaw Nation has exercised the power 
to attach conditions to the presence within its borders of persons who might otherwise not 
be entitled to remain within the tribal territory.”70
Therefore, it can be seen that the powers of the Indian sovereignty doctrine and the 
principle of Worcester sanctioned the inherent sovereignty of the tribes over non­
members inside a reservation. The result of federal governmental policy and the 
concomitant case law of the Supreme Court did not reverse or nullify the principles of 
Worcester, and on the contrary, the Worcester principle and the Indian sovereignty 
doctrine continued to exist.
The sovereignty doctrine survived both removal and assimilation and underwent further 
change with the onset of the Indian Re-organisation Act of 1934 and The Handbook of 
Federal Indian Law, a seminal work produced by Felix S. Cohen in 1941. Although the 
Indian New Deal re-invigorated tribal sovereignty, this was not reflected by the actions of 
the Supreme Court. However, with the onset of the federal policy of termination during 
the 1940s, Felix S. Cohen produced the authoritative work on the powers and rights of 
Native Americans and the tribes within the American legal system. The Handbook of 
Federal Indian Law effectively codified Native American rights within the American
69 Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904).
70 Morris v. Hitchcock, 389.
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legal system and examined the effect of treaties, statutes and case law on Native America 
and the constituent tribes. As Philip P. Frickey explained, this work was Cohen’s 
“monumental attempt to systematize federal Indian law.”71 The section entitled, The 
Scope o f Tribal Self-Government, examined the effect of case law and governmental 
policy on Worcester. Despite federal policy and Supreme Court case law which was 
contrary to the Worcester principle, Felix Cohen explained that the principles established 
by Chief Justice John Marshall were those that had been regularly used by the Supreme 
Court, “John Marshall’s analysis of the basis of Indian self-government in the law of 
nations has been consistently followed by the courts for more than a hundred years. The 
doctrine set forth in this opinion has been applied to an unfolding series of new problems 
in scores of cases that have come before the Supreme Court and the interior federal
* *72courts.” Cohen made it clear that the sovereignty doctrine had been consistently used by 
the Supreme Court from 1832 and it remained an important factor in defending the rights 
of the tribes against federal and administrative personnel,
“The case in which the doctrine of Indian self-government was first established has a 
certain prophetic character. Administrative officials for a century afterwards continued to 
ignore the broad implications of the judicial doctrine of Indian self-government. But 
again and again, as cases came before the federal courts, administrative officials, state 
and federal, were forced to reckon with the doctrine of Indian self-government...”73
The Indian sovereignty doctrine had become an integral part of Federal Indian law and 
within the broader American legal and political system. Based on the effects of Supreme
71 Frickey, “A Common Law,” 8.
72 Cohen, Handbook, 123.
73 Ibid.
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Court case law and Federal Government policies since 1832, Felix S. Cohen defined the 
powers of the tribe as,
“The whole course of judicial decision on the nature of tribal powers is marked by 
adherence to three fundamental principles: (1) An Indian tribe possesses, in the first 
instance, all the powers of any sovereign state. (2) Conquest renders the tribe subject to 
the legislative power of the United States and, in substance, terminates the external 
powers of sovereignty of the tribe, e.g., its power to enter into treaties with foreign 
nations, but does not by itself affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe, e.g., its power of 
local self-government. (3) These powers are subject to qualification by treaties and by 
express legislation of Congress, but, save as thus expressly qualified, full powers of 
internal sovereignty are vested in the Indian tribes and in their duly constituted organs of 
government.
The sovereignty doctrine held that tribes had authority, power and sovereignty, termed 
inherent sovereignty, over all lands and people within the reservation unless authority 
was explicitly withdrawn, divested or annulled by a clear and plain act of Congress or by 
treaty. In addition, Cohen’s definition of tribal powers was a reminder to the United 
States government and the Supreme Court that the tribes had always had inherent 
sovereignty over lands and people within those lands. The Indian Re-organisation Act of 
1934 and Cohen’s Handbook o f Federal Indian Law of 1941 re-invigorated tribal 
sovereignty and the Worcester principle. However, during the late 1940s and 1950s 
America once again began the process of assimilating Native America into American 
society.
During the 1950s, the United States Congress and Supreme Court had to reconcile the 
integrationist demands arising from the de-segregation of black America and the 
continued demands for autonomy and separation from Native America. In Brown v.
Board o f Education (1954),75 the United States Supreme Court declared that the doctrine 
of ‘separate but equal,’ established in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896),76 was not applicable to 
public school education in America, and was contrary to the “equal protection of the laws 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”77 Therefore, the Supreme Court met the 
demands of 1950s black America and decreed that the separation of black and white 
students in public schools was unconstitutional. The process of integration was a 
principle pursued by black America and facilitated by the Supreme Court in 1954. 
However, the Brown decision was contrary in principle to the demands of Native 
America in the 1950s, which wanted the federal government to end the policy of 
termination and to allow more tribal autonomy. During the 1950s, the federal policy of 
termination sought to end the autonomy of tribes and assimilate Native America into 
mainstream society. Arthur V. Watkins, a strong proponent of termination, believed that 
the American government should have integrated Native Americans and the tribes into 
mainstream American culture,
“In view of the historic policy of Congress favouring freedom for the Indians, we may 
well expect future Congresses to continue to indorse the principle that "as rapidly as 
possible" we should end the status of Indians as wards of government and grant them all 
of the rights and prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship...Firm and constant 
consideration for those of Indian ancestry should lead us all to work diligently and 
carefully for the full realization of their national citizenship with all other Americans. 
Following in the footsteps of the Emancipation Proclamation of ninety four years ago, I 
see the following words emblazoned in letters of fire about the heads of the Indians -  
THESE PEOPLE SHALL BE FREE!”78
75 Brown v. Board o f Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
76 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
77 Brown v. Board o f  Education, 495.
Arthur V. Watkins, “Termination of Federal Supervision: The Removal of Restrictions over Indian 
Property and Person,” The Annals o f the American Academy of Political and Social Science 311 (1957): 55.
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Therefore, termination was a policy to undermine the Worcester principle and the Indian 
sovereignty doctrine by bringing the tribes under state law and forcing tribes to pay state 
taxes. During termination, a number of tribes lost reservation lands, tribal businesses, and 
economies. Ruth Muskrat Bronson did not consider the process of assimilating Native 
America as a pleasant federal policy for tribal rights or the future survival of the tribes. In 
1955, Bronson pointed out that if Congress pursued assimilation “the American Indian 
(like that other living creature associated with him in history, the buffalo) is likely, 
similarly, to continue to exist only on the American nickel.” The federal policy of 
termination was an important factor in the Supreme Court case of Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. 
United States (1955)80 which ruled against the tribes and held that the tribes had no right 
of compensation for tribal lands taken by the United States government.
However, in a dramatic turn about in events, the Supreme Court, as it did for black 
America in 1954, pursued a direction that established the resurgence of a separated and 
autonomous Native America in contravention to the federal government policy era of 
termination. The Supreme Court upheld the Indian sovereignty doctrine and the inherent 
sovereignty of the tribes in Williams v. Lee (1959) and re-asserted the modified principles 
of Worcester in a significantly different post-World War Two America to the society in 
which the 1832 opinion of Chief Justice Marshall was formulated. As David H. Getches 
noted, “In the end...Worcester’s barrier to state jurisdiction over reservation activities 
remained unbreached, save for this handful of cases that purportedly did not implicate
Ruth Muskrat Bronson, “Criticizes the Proposed Termination of Federal Trusteeship, 1955,” chap 13 in 
Major Problems in American Indian History, 2d ed., ed. Albert L. Hurtado and Peter Iverson (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 2001), 423.
80 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
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Indian interests.”81 The Worcester case, the sovereignty doctrine and inherent tribal 
sovereignty survived 127 years and in 1959, Williams v. Lee “ ...opened the modem era 
of federal Indian law.”82
** Getches, “Conquering the Cultural Frontier,” 1588.
2 Wilkinson, Time, and the Law, 1.
Chapter 2
The Foundations of the Silent Revolution and the Development of the Integrationist 
Trend from 1959 to 1973
This thesis looks in detail at Supreme Court case law and the way in which individual 
justices and the court reacted in addressing the power struggle between federal, state and 
tribal authority in the reservations. In 1959, the Supreme Court re-invigorated the Indian 
sovereignty doctrine and used tribal sovereignty, also referred to as inherent tribal 
sovereignty and tribal authority, to defeat the application of state authority inside the 
reservation. The Indian sovereignty doctrine was based on the principle that tribes had 
inherent sovereignty over lands and people in the reservation until Congress acted to 
reverse attributes of that sovereignty or it was done by treaty. However, from 1959 to 
1973 the Supreme Court moved away from using the sovereignty doctrine, instead 
preferring to use federal authority to assess whether state law should be prohibited from 
the reservation. The mindset of the justices moved from viewing the case law in terms of 
tribal versus state authority to one based primarily on federal versus state authority, with 
tribal authority tied up in federal interests. In order to reconcile the power struggle 
between the three branches of government the Supreme Court weakened the use of the 
Indian sovereignty doctrine.
This thesis examines the gradual shift in the thinking of the Supreme Court Justices away 
from generally excluding state law from the reservation and towards allowing the
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application of state law over tribal members and non-members inside the reservation until 
reversed by federal authority. Five Supreme Court cases, Williams v. Lee (1959), Kake v. 
Egan (1962), Metlakatla Indians v. Egan (1962) Warren Trading Post v. Tax 
Commission (1965) and Kennedy v. District Court o f Montana (1971) highlight the 
ideological movement of the Supreme Court Justices towards allowing state law into 
reservations.1 Then in the sister taxation cases of McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Comm'n (1973) and Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones (1973) the Supreme Court 
summed up this process into a workable idea. This working idea allowed state authority 
over non-members in the reservation and limited tribal sovereignty over non-members in 
the reservation, thereby fundamentally weakening the Indian sovereignty doctrine2 
established by John Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia (1832)3 and re-invigorated in 
Williams v. Lee (1959).4 However, in 1973 the Supreme Court decided that state law 
could not be applied over tribal members in the reservation unless Congress explicitly 
acted to reverse tribal sovereignty over tribal members.
The erosion of the Indian sovereignty doctrine gradually gave way to what I term the 
integrationist trend, which fitted in with the general movement of the Supreme Court 
towards judging case law on a federal versus state basis. The Supreme Court gradually 
integrated state law into the reservations and allowed the states to have more control over
1 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); Kake Village v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962); Metlakatla Indians v. 
Egan, 369 U.S. 45 (1962), Warren Trading Post v. Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965); and Kennedy v. 
District Court of Montana, 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
David E. Wilkins, American Indian Sovereignty and the U.S. Supreme Court: The Masking o f Justice 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997). David E. Wilkins defined tribal sovereignty as, “The spiritual, 
moral, and dynamic cultural force within a given tribal community empowering the group toward political, 
economic, and, most importantly, cultural integrity; as well as maturity in the group’s relationship with its 
own members, with other peoples and their governments, and with the environment,” 376.
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
Williams v. Lee.
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non-members in the reservations. This process opened up the reservations to state law, 
rather than preserving the autonomy and notion of separateness of the reservation. 
However, integration did not mean the dissolution of the tribes; instead, it served to limit 
tribal authority over non-members. The integrationist trend was named from two sources. 
First, contained in the Blackmun opinion files of McClanahan v. Arizona Tax 
Commission (1973) was the statement, “The narrowing of Worcester [from 1832] has 
reflected the growing belief that Indians should, like Negroes be integrated into American 
society.”5 Potter Stewart supported this position and observed that the “pendulum has 
swung from Worcester v. Georgia to [the] integration of Indians.”6 The integrationist 
trend contrasted significantly with the positive use of the sovereignty doctrine by the 
Supreme Court in 1959.
The re-invigoration of the Indian sovereignty doctrine by the Supreme Court in Williams 
v. Lee (1959) and the court’s reliance on the territorial sovereignty of the tribes are 
examined in this work. Generally, many legal scholars support this positive interpretation 
of the Williams case. William C. Canby pointed out that the actions of the Williams court 
were based on the broad principles of Worcester, which both supported tribal territorial 
sovereignty and prohibited state law in the reservation, even if the states interests were 
important. Alison Dussias supported this broad interpretation of tribal authority, terming
5 Box 156, Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library o f Congress, Washington, D.C., 
“Bench Memo, N o.71-834-ASX, McClanahan, et al. v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, Appeal from Arizona 
Court of Appeals, April 28, 1971; 14 Ariz. App. 452; 484 P.2d 221, Pet for review denied by Ariz Sup Ct 
on Sept 21, 1971,” RIM, December 6 1972, 11.
Box 1574, William O. Douglas Papers, Manuscript Division, Library o f Congress, Washington, D.C., 
“71-834 -  McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n, of Arizona.” W.O.D., Conference, December 15,1972, 1.
7 William C. Canby, American Indian Law: in a Nutshell (St. Paul, Minn.: West Group, 1998), 243-244.
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it “geographically-based” authority.8 The Williams decision, as Philip Frickey observed, 
affirmed the territorial sovereignty of the tribes and its reliance on the Indian sovereignty 
doctrine adhered to the principle that Congress and not the Supreme Court Justices had 
authority to diminish tribal authority. In Conquering the Cultural Frontier, David H 
Getches also argued that the Supreme Court relied on tribal sovereignty and the 
sovereignty doctrine, observing that “In its bellwether Williams decision, the Court 
vindicated tribal sovereignty in a modem context” and “confirmed the modem Court's 
adherence to foundation principles”9 of Federal Indian law. The interpretation of Charles 
F. Wilkinson also concurred with the renewed application of tribal sovereignty over 
every person and over all of the lands of the reservation, going as far as to define the 
Williams case as the one that “ ...opened the modem era of federal Indian law.”10
It is also argued that the Williams case began the weakening of the Indian sovereignty 
doctrine and Worcester, the process here termed as the foundations of the silent 
revolution. This process challenges the interpretations of Canby, Dussias, Frickey, 
Getches, and Wilkinson and builds on the interpretations of two noted scholars who re­
assessed this positive interpretation of Williams. David E. Wilkins believed that Navajo 
sovereignty was re-affirmed by the Williams court; however, the language used by the 
court “departed from the Worcester ruling of complete state exclusion from Indian 
country by holding that the states might be allowed to extend their jurisdiction into tribal
8 Allison M. Dussias, “Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: 
The Supreme Court’s Changing Vision,” University o f Pittsburgh Law Review 55 (1993): 48.
David H. Getches, “Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in 
Indian Law,” California Law Review 84 (1996): 1589.
Charles F. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the law  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987),
1.
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trust land” of the reservation, unless it did not affect tribal government.11 By allowing 
uncertainty into the law, Wilkins believed that the Supreme Court “dulled the emphatic 
Worcester holding” and along with Warren Trading Post and McClanahan, two other 
cases discussed later on this thesis, weakened, and forever changed the relationship 
between the tribes and the States of the Union.12 L. Scott Gould concurred with the 
Wilkins opinion that the Supreme Court relied on inherent tribal sovereignty but 
disagreed over the negative use of Supreme Court language. Gould argued that the 
circumstances involved in Williams weakened the broad language used by the court to re­
affirm the Indian sovereignty doctrine, namely an almost exclusive Native American 
population on the reservation and the failure of Arizona to use federally delegated power 
in the reservation. This forced Gould to conclude, “Williams's reach was limited, despite
1 o
its application of the doctrine of inherent sovereignty.” Therefore, in Gould’s opinion, if 
the reservation population had contained more non-members then the Supreme Court 
would not have relied on tribal sovereignty and the willingness of the Supreme Court to 
allow state authority into the reservation fundamentally weakened tribal sovereignty. 
Although Wilkins and Gould suggested that the Supreme Court in 1959 began to move 
away from the sovereignty doctrine, it was not supported by primary evidence or 
contained within a broader examination of Supreme Court case law up to 1973, 
specifically Kake v. Egan, Metlakatla Indians v. Egan, Kennedy v. District Court o f 
Montana and Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones. These cases all played an important part 
in the movement of the Supreme Court away from the sovereignty doctrine. In contrast to
11 Wilkins, American Indian Sovereignty, 276.
12 Ibid.
L. Scott Gould, “The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium,” Columbia Law Review 
96(1996): 823-824.
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interpretations of the aforementioned scholars, this thesis highlights the ideological 
change of the Supreme Court Justices away from the sovereignty doctrine and towards 
the use of federal authority to determine the scope of state power in the reservations from 
1959 to 1973.
I also directly challenge the interpretations of many scholars, pointed out earlier in the 
introduction to this thesis, who believe that the change in the Supreme Court’s 
philosophy away from the sovereignty doctrine began during the 1970s and 1980s. There 
is divergence within the scholarly community about the precise starting point of this 
movement.
William C. Canby dated the beginning of the judicial shift of the court to 1973, 
observing, “The first doctrinal step occurred in a case generally regarded as a victory for 
the tribes-McClanahan...but the analysis contained the seeds of a diminution of tribal 
power.”14 This weakening of tribal authority by the Supreme Court reversed the 
Worcester principle, which barred state law inside the reservation unless it was approved 
by federal authority. Canby explained that the McClanahan analysis
“...reversed a previous presumption: that States had no power in Indian country unless 
some positive reason (or legislation) existed to extend it there. Under the McClanahan 
approach, State power extended into Indian country unless a positive Federal law or 
policy excluded it. Thus pre-emption doctrine, as it has been formulated since 
McClanahan favours the extension of State power into Indian country.”15
14 Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, Rulings o f the U.S. Supreme Court as They Affect the Powers and 
Authorities o f the Indian Tribal Governments: Hearing on the Concerns o f Recent Decisions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court and the Future o f  Indian Tribal Governments in America, 107th Cong., 2d. sess., 27 
February 2002,45.
15 Ibid., 45-46.
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Jordan Burch agreed with the Canby analysis, stating that “The first major change in the 
law in regard to tribal sovereignty came in 1973 in McClanahan...”16 when the Supreme 
Court used a new presumption where “the state had the authority to act [in the 
reservation] unless pre-empted by federal statute or treaty.”17 While Vine Deloria, Jr. and 
Clifford M. Lytle agreed that 1973 was an important date, they were alarmed by the 
actions of the McClanahan court, explaining that it “...went a step further in its erosion 
of tribal sovereignty...by indicating that the clear trend had been away from the idea of 
Indian sovereignty.”
In contrast, L. Scott Gould argued that the beginning of the emasculation of tribal 
sovereignty by the Supreme Court began in 1975, stating that “By the early 1970's, the 
doctrine of inherent sovereignty was relegated to a "backdrop." Despite its dignity and 
romance, the doctrine lacked the foundation necessary to uphold the territorial authority 
of tribes on allotted reservations. As a result, when the doctrine was tested in the crucial 
years from 1975 to 1990, it often failed the tribes.”19
Many scholars have pointed to 1978 as the time when the Supreme Court moved away 
from the sovereignty doctrine.20 Peter Maxfield argued that the Supreme Court case of
16 Jordan Burch, “How Much Diversity Is The United States Really Willing to Accept?” Ohio Northern 
University Law Review 20 (1994): 965.
17 Ibid., 966.
11 Vine Deloria, Jr., and Clifford M. Lytle. American Indians, American Justice (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1983), 54.
19 Gould, “The Consent Paradigm,” 895.
See, Laurie Reynolds, “"Jurisdiction" In Federal Indian Law: Confusion, Contradiction, and Supreme 
Court Precedent,” New Mexico Law Review  27 (1997): 359-386; and Sarah Krakoff, “Undoing Indian Law
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Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe (1978) represented the “foundations]”21 of the Supreme 
Court’s erosion of tribal sovereignty, stating that “Since 1977, the United States Supreme 
Court has embarked on a course that has virtually eviscerated the sovereignty of Indian 
tribes. The beginning of this process can be traced to Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian 
Tribe...”22 Joseph William Singer agreed with Maxfield, holding that “ ...the Supreme 
Court began a process of attacking tribal sovereignty in 1978.”23 Thereafter, this process 
of attacking tribal sovereignty “expanded and depended.” 24 He also believed that the 
ideology of the Supreme Court Justices was a form of modern-day conquest, noting that 
“ ...the Court's attack on tribal sovereignty is itself a form of conquest-one that is 
happening today, not long ago.”25 In testimony to the Senate Committee on Indian
Affairs, John St. Clair, Robert T. Anderson, and Robert Yazzie all agreed that Oliphant
26(1978) began the judicial shift of the court against the presumption of tribal sovereignty. 
Frank Pommersheim and John P. LaVelle concurred with this interpretation about the 
limitation of the sovereignty doctrine, adding that 1978 was the year when “the modem 
Supreme Court began departing dramatically from fundamental principles.”27 
Furthermore, Judith V. Royster agreed that the Supreme Court in 1978 over-stepped the 
boundaries of previous precedent and devastated tribal sovereignty, “Despite these early 
inroads on tribal authority to govern all conduct within tribal territory, arguably the most
One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and Tribal sovereignty,” American University Law Review 50 
(2001): 1177-1268.
21 Peter C. Maxfield, “Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe: The Whole is Greater than the Sum of the Parts,” 
Journal o f Contemporary Law 19 (1993): 396.
22 Ibid., 393. -
23 Joseph William Singer, “Canons o f Conquest: The Supreme Court’s Attack on Tribal Sovereignty,” New 
England Law Review 37 (2003): 650.
24 Joseph William Singer, “Sovereignty and Property,” Northwestern University Law Review 86 (1991): 3.
25 Singer, “Canons of Conquest,” 645.
26 Senate Committee, Rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court, 41,44, 88.
Frank Pommersheim and John P. LaVelle, “Toward a Great Sioux Nation Judicial Support Centre and 
Supreme Court,” Wicazo Sa Review 17 (2002): 195.
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serious and far-reaching curtailment of tribal power occurred in 1978 with the decision in 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe.”28
Other scholars have determined that the Supreme Court changed its way over a period 
from 1978 to the mid-to-late 1980s. David H. Getches believed that the movement of the 
court away from tribal sovereignty had “ ...its roots in a series of cases decided between 
1978 and 1989.”29 However, these roots, Getches argued, did not develop until 1986 
when Williams H. Rehnquist became Chief Justice; “In a spate of cases beginning about 
the time Rehnquist became Chief Justice in 1986, the Court veered away from the 
foundations of Indian law.”30 David J. Bloch also interpreted the appointment of William 
Rehnquist to Chief Justice as an important factor in the limitation of tribal sovereignty,
“Since 1978, and especially after Rehnquist became its Chief Justice, the Court has 
diminished the inherent powers tribes possessed as domestic dependent nations and 
transferred them to the states at the federal government's expense but without its consent, 
indeed to the contrary of congressional and executive policy favouring tribal self- 
determination.”31
This interpretation about the transfer of authority from the tribes to the states was correct, 
in part. However, the underlying factor of this transfer was the use of congressional 
authority to determine the scope of tribal sovereignty and state authority. In addition, 
Robert N. Clinton agreed that the erosion of the sovereignty doctrine progressed with the 
appointment of Rehnquist, adding that in the 1980s “the decisions of the Supreme Court
28 Judith Royster, “The Legacy of Allotment,” Arizona State Law Journal 27 (1995): 44.
29 Getches, “Conquering the Cultural Frontier,” 1595.
30 David H. Getches, “Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States' Rights, Colour-Blind 
Justice and Mainstream Values,” Minnesota Law Review 86 (2001): 273-274.
31 David J. Bloch, “Colonizing the Last Frontier,” American Indian Law Review 29 (2004): 1.
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more frequently countenance expanding state authority in Indian country by limiting the 
historic scope of tribal authority in Indian country.”32 However, as this thesis will 
demonstrate, the process of allowing state law into the reservations had been ongoing for 
some considerable time. In Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Indian Cases, Ralph W. 
Johnson and Berrie Martinis also argued that the factor of Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist strongly influenced the way in which the court eroded tribal sovereignty.33 
These diverse interpretations about the beginnings of the fundamental shift of the 
Supreme Court also relied on the opinion that up until the early to late 1970s or the late 
1980s the court applied the sovereignty doctrine.
David Getches and Robert Yazzie contend that the Supreme Court used the sovereignty 
doctrine up to the 1980s34 while Joseph William Singer, Robert T. Anderson, and Ralph 
W. Johnson and Berrie Martinis believe that the Supreme Court applied the sovereignty 
doctrine up to 1978. Getches strongly believed that the sovereignty doctrine had been 
used from 1959 up until the 1980s, holding that
“...the modem-era cases, from Williams (1959) through McClanahan (1973) and on into 
the decisions of the early 1980s, exerted the most important influence in the revival of 
tribal governing powers. A host of major decisions based on foundation principles limited 
the scope of state law and upheld the authority of tribes to govern activity within Indian 
country.”35
32 Robert N. Clinton, “The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause,” Connecticut Law Review 27 (1995): 1057.
33 Ralph W. Johnson and Berrie Martinis, “Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Indian Cases,” Public Land Law 
Review 16 (1995): 1-25.
34 See also Bloch, “Colonizing.”
35 Getches, “Conquering the Cultural Frontier,” 1592. See also, Krakoff, “Undoing Indian Law One Case at 
a Time,” 1205.
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This positive interpretation of the Supreme Court’s use of the sovereignty doctrine was 
re-iterated by Getches in Beyond Indian Law; “Until the mid-1980s, the Court's approach 
in Indian law was to construe laws in light of the nation's tradition of recognizing 
independent tribal powers to govern their territory and the people within it.”36 Thereafter, 
in Getches’ opinion, the Supreme Court was “remaking Indian law.”37 Robert Yazzie 
concurred with the opinion regarding the Supreme Court’s use of the sovereignty doctrine 
up to the early 1980s, adding that the sovereignty doctrine was used for well over a 
century, “The application of these foundation principles had provided broad geographic 
sovereignty to Indian nations for 150 years until the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Montana v. United States. This sovereignty was meant to be limited only by specific 
showings of Congressional intent.”38 A number of other scholars have argued that the 
sovereignty doctrine was used up until 1978. Joseph William Singer believed that up until 
that point of 1978, “the 1832 case of Worcester v. Georgia remained good law.”39 Robert 
T. Anderson supported this interpretation about the court’s use of the sovereignty 
doctrine from Worcester to 1978, noting that “It is thus evident that the course followed 
by the Supreme Court from the Marshall Court up to the Oliphant decision was marked 
by judicial restraint with respect to tribal powers.”40 Anderson also believed that the 
Supreme Court had deferred to the principle of the sovereignty doctrine, which allowed 
only Congress to reverse elements of tribal authority in the reservation; “The 
development of the Court’s general doctrine up to the Oliphant decision in 1978 reveals 
considerable deference to congressional action and continuation of rules that insulated
36 Getches, “Beyond Indian Law,” 267.
37 Ibid.
38 Senate Committee, Rulings o f the U.S. Supreme Court, 88.
9 Singer, “Canons of Conquest,” 649.
40 Senate Committee, Rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court, 41.
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Indian tribes from state authority.”41 Ralph W. Johnson and Berrie Martinis concurred 
with this opinion and believed that the Supreme Court from 1832 primarily used the 
Indian sovereignty doctrine from 1832. They pointed out that the fundamental principle 
established by Worcester was “ ...accepted as fundamental doctrine in the field, and the 
Court has endorsed them innumerable times from 1832 through the 1970s.”42 By 
challenging the scholars who believe that the weakening of the Indian sovereignty 
doctrine began during the 1970s or 1980s and the scholars who thought that the Supreme 
Court used the sovereignty doctrine up to the 1970s or 1980s, this thesis helps establish 
that the foundations of the silent revolution away from the Indian sovereignty doctrine 
were laid between 1959 and 1973.
In addition, the thesis relies on the primary documents of six Supreme Court justices; 
however, only two contemporary articles have used the private papers of Supreme Court 
Justice to examine Federal Indian law 43 N. Bmce Duthu analysed the Thurgood Marshall 
papers and David H. Getches used, in part, both the Thurgood Marshall papers and the 
William J. Brennan papers. In contrast to Duthu and Getches, I interpret the private 
papers of these justices in an entirely new and original way. Duthu used the Marshall 
papers to examine the broad subject areas of taxation, criminal and civil jurisdiction case 
law from 1973 and argued that the workings of the Supreme Court were an aberration 
from the Indian sovereignty doctrine. David H. Getches used the Marshall papers in a 
limited manner to provide an insight into four key cases decided between 1978 and 1989,
41 Ibid., 40.
42 Johnson and Martinis, “Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Indian Cases,” 5.
N. Bruce Duthu, “The Thurgood Marshall Papers and the Quest for a Principled Theory of Tribal 
Sovereignty: Fueling the Fires of Tribal/State Conflict,” Vermont Law Review 21 (1996): 47-110; and 
Getches, “Conquering the Cultural Frontier.”
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observing that a 1990 memorandum from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice William J. 
Brennan, which said that Scalia was going to decide opinions on what he felt was best at 
the time, was proof that the Supreme Court was moving away from the sovereignty 
doctrine.
Before I begin to examine the foundations of the silent revolution, it should be made clear 
that tribal sovereignty was the guiding principle behind the interpretations of the Supreme 
Court Justices in 1959.
Wiliams v. Lee (1959) and the Sovereignty Doctrine
In 1959, the justices of the Supreme Court had the option to support or discard the Indian 
sovereignty doctrine in favour of using federal authority to protect the tribes from state 
law.44 The facts of the case revolved around a federally approved non-member shop 
owner on the Navajo reservation who brought an action in the Arizona State Court 
against a Navajo couple to collect payment for goods sold on credit. The Navajo couple 
appealed because they thought that the Navajo tribal court had the relevant authority to 
hear the case. The main question addressed by the Supreme Court was whether the 
Navajo or the State of Arizona had authority over the claim of the non-member. The 
justices relied on the principles of inherent tribal sovereignty and territorial sovereignty to 
strike down the contrary opinion issued by the lower court, which supported state law in 
the reservation. Furthermore, in contrast to the position adopted by the federal 
government, which wanted the Supreme Court to address questions of tribal authority
44 Williams v. Lee, 217-218.
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within a federal government versus state government framework, the interpretation of the 
Williams court allowed tribal governments to co-exist as a third branch of government 
alongside state governments and the federal government.
The Supreme Court recognised the importance of addressing the uncertainty of the law in 
the modem context by applying either the Indian sovereignty doctrine or applying the 
law, which reflected the significant changes in federal policy and Supreme Court case 
law from the late nineteenth century.45 As Philip P. Frickey explained, this was the first 
case “...in  a contemporary context in which non-Indians were involved”46 and the 
outcome was significant to the tribes and the states. The importance of the Williams case 
to the Navajo and to Native America was observed in a memorandum, “Petitioners [The 
Navajo] contend that this is the most important Indian case in ma[n]y years”47 and “It 
appears that this question has not been...decided by this Court or by Congress.”48 The 
Williams court also had to settle conflicting strands of law because as Earl Warren noted, 
“...the law is unsettled.”49 The divergent development of the law from the nineteenth 
century resulted in neither of the two parties being able to “...point to precedents in this 
Court which are decisive.”50 The Supreme Court had to rule on the issues and as Justice 
Charles Evans Whittaker pointed out, “ ...how to do it.”51 This conflict was simply 
between the application of the sovereignty doctrine, pointed out in a memorandum to
45 Philip P. Frickey, “A Common Law for Our Age o f Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian 
Tribal Authority over Nonmembers,” Yale Law Journal 109 (1999): 1-85.
46 Ibid., 29.
47 Box 1201, WOD Papers, “1957 Term No. 811, Williams v. Lee, No.39, Cert to Supreme Court of 
Arizona,” n. d.
48 Box 1201, WOD Papers, “1957 Term No. 811.”
Box 188, Earl Warren Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. “No.39, 
1958 Term, Williams v. Lee,” DMC, 1.
50 Ibid., 2.
51 Box 1201, WOD Papers, “Conference November 21, 1958, No.39 -  Williams v. Lee,” W.O.D.
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mean that “state courts have no jurisdiction over a civil action involving an Indian on a 
reservation unless Congress so authorizes,”52 and the rationale used by the Arizona 
Supreme Court (the lower court), which ruled that states had jurisdiction in the 
reservation unless federal authority existed to prohibit state law. A memorandum to Earl 
Warren explained this principle used by the lower court, “ ...unless Congress denies such 
jurisdiction, state courts have jurisdiction in civil suits involving Indians for transactions
CO
arising on reservations within the state.”
The Navajo disagreed with the ruling of the lower court and wanted the Supreme Court to 
use the sovereignty doctrine to sanction exclusive tribal authority over non-members and 
to prohibit state law in the reservation until Congress legislated to allow state authority 
into the reservation. This was described in a memorandum as the merits of the “broad 
attack” and “directed to the contention that state courts lack jurisdiction over suits 
brought against reservation Indians arising out of transactions taking place on the 
reservations.”54 The Navajo wanted tribal sovereignty to prevent state courts from having 
jurisdiction over suits brought by non-members against reservation tribal members. 
Furthermore, the Navajo wanted to see the re-invigoration of the sovereignty doctrine to 
clarify the law and to prevent any kind of state law in the reservation. As a memorandum 
explained, the tribe was more “concerned with making law [and]...is determined to win 
on the broad ground that there is no jurisdiction at all in the state courts in any case 
involving Indians on a reservation.”55 The exclusion of state law from the reservation was
52 Box 188, EW Papers, “No.39, 1958 Term,” DMC, 2.
53 Ibid, 2.
54 Box 188, EW Papers, “Bench Memo, No.39, 1958 Term, Williams v. Lee,” MAF, 2.
55 Ibid., 3.
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fundamental to the Navajo, as was the principle that explicit Congressional authority was 
required to allow state authority into the reservation. As the Navajo explained, “the state 
courts have no jurisdiction over a civil action involving an Indian on a reservation unless 
Congress so authorises.”56 Therefore, the Navajo position supported exclusive Navajo 
authority inside the reservation until it was reversed by Congress.
The legal position of the Navajo also countered the opinion of the Arizona Superior 
Court, which ruled that state courts had civil authority in the reservation unless Congress, 
turning the Indian sovereignty doctrine on its head, restricted state power. The lower 
court relied on the principle derived from Draper v. United States (1896),57 which held 
that states had authority to punish crimes committed by one non-Indian on another in the 
reservation, as Congress had not legislated to restrict it. The lower court thought it was 
reasonable to extend this principle into civil law, stating that Congress had not acted to 
prevent this extension of state law. This lower court interpretation of the law, pointed out 
in a memorandum to Earl Warren,
“...relied on a general rule...from Draper v. United States...lwhichl held that a crime 
committed by a non-Indian on a reservation was to be tried by state, not federal court. 
Congress has not denied state jurisdiction in the situation. From this case, the Ariz. SC 
determined that since Congress has never denied jurisdiction in civil suits, the state courts 
had it.”58
The understanding of the lower court was also based on other case law opinions, which 
applied the very same rationale. This was pointed out to William O. Douglas; “The court
56 Box 188, EW Papers, “No.39, 1958 Term, Williams v. Lee,” DMC, 2.
57 Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896).
58 Box 188, WOD Papers, “No.39, 1958 Term,” DMC, 2-3.
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below cited some...authorities for the proposition that...state civil law could be applieed 
[sic] to Indians unless Congress prohibits it and Congress has not sox [sic] prohibited the 
application of.. .Arizona law here.”59 The justices rejected this extension of Draper into a 
general rule,60 instead preferring to apply tribal sovereignty.
This principle of tribal sovereignty was supported by historical analysis regarding the 
veto of the Navajo Rehabilitation Bill by President Truman in 1949. A bench 
memorandum in the Earl Warren Papers explained that the passage of the 1949 bill 
allowed the states to gain authority in the reservations; “In 1949, Congress passed the 
Navajo Rehabilitation Bill which provided in part that Navajos on reservations were 
subject to state laws and that nothing was to be deemed to take away Federal or tribal 
jurisdiction but that Federal, state and tribal courts were to have concurrent jurisdiction in 
all cases.”61 However, President Truman vetoed the part of the bill, which allowed state 
law into the reservation and in doing so confirmed the sovereignty of the Navajo and 
reversed the explicit actions of Congress, which allowed state authority into the 
reservation. As a memorandum explained, the 1949 bill
“ ...was vetoed by President Truman solely because of this provision concerning 
jurisdiction. In his veto message the President stated that the bill would "extend State 
civil and criminal laws and court jurisdiction to the Navajo-Hopi Reservations which are 
now under Federal and tribal laws and courts." He noted that the Navajo were probably 
the Indian group least prepared to go out and mingle with their neighbours and be 
governed by state law. He further stated that it "would be unjust and unwise to compel 
them [Navajos] to abide by State laws written to fill other needs than theirs," and noted 
that the Navajos requested a veto for this reason.”62
59 Box 1201, WOD Papers, “1957 Term N o.811.”
Box 188, WOD Papers, “No.39, 1958 Term,” DMC, 2-3.
Box 188, EW Papers, “Bench Memo, No.39, 1958 Term, Williams v. Lee,” MAF, 5.
62 Ibid., 5-6.
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The bill became law in 1950 but it did not contain the provision sanctioning state law 
inside the Navajo reservation.
In addition, the Supreme Court’s analysis of the historical background to a 1953 act 
involved the presumption of inherent tribal sovereignty in the reservation. Tribes retained 
sovereignty in the reservation until Congress reversed it and allowed state authority into 
the reservations. A bench memorandum in the Warren Papers explained this position,
“In 1953, Congress undertook some major legislation in this area. It passed a bill giving 
state courts jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters involving Indians on reservations 
but it specified the states involved—and Arizona was not included...The legislative 
history of the bill is most informative. In discussing the bill the House Committee stated: 
As a practical matter, the enforcement of law and order among the Indians in the Indian 
Country has been left largely to the Indian groups themselves...This would appear to be 
persuasive proof of Congress’ intent and understanding of the present state of the law.”63
However, with congressional permission, the state still had to legislate to gain control in 
the reservations. If the State Legislature did not pass a relevant act then the state forfeited 
its opportunity to gain a foothold in the Navajo reservation. This principle was described 
in a memorandum; “No action has been taken by the state to comply with the provisions 
of the 1953 Congressional Act”64 and therefore “the history should control any general 
propositions such as implying jurisdiction in the absence of Congressional restriction.”65 
Individual justices supported this presumption regarding the 1953 Act.
63 Ibid., 6-7.
64 Ibid., 7-8.
65 Ibid., 8.
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Earl Warren and William J. Brennan supported the presumption of inherent tribal 
sovereignty. Without the introduction of state legislation to confirm the actions of 
Congress, Warren said, “1953 Act gave jurisdiction conditionally -  Arizona does not 
want to carry expense of that change -...goes on tribal forum.”66 Therefore, Arizona had 
to be willing to take the burdens of the 1953 act. As Warren pointed out, “ ...the 1953 
statute gives Arizona its chance if it will assume burdens that go with it.” Because the 
states did not take the responsibilities established by the 1953 Act, Warren believed that 
the question was one to be answered in favour of the tribes and tribal jurisdiction, “Come 
out with the Indians.”68 Brennan concurred with Warren, observing that the court “must 
get to 1953 Act.”69 However, the United States government cautioned the Supreme Court 
against using the principle of inherent tribal sovereignty and the ‘broad attack’ to decide 
the case.
There was conflict between the positions adopted by the Federal Government and the 
tribes. The United States government was concerned with the position taken by the tribes. 
The federal government wanted the Supreme Court to rely on federal authority to oust 
state law from the reservation rather than re-invigorate the sovereignty doctrine; “...the 
govt [sic] argues that the question of jurisdiction may well depend upon the type of 
subject matter involved and other factors so that this Court should not lay down a broad 
rule covering all possible case[s].”70 It was clear that the federal government wanted
66 Box 1201, WOD Papers, “Conference November 21, 1958,” W.O.D.
Box 1:15, William J. Brennan Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 
“Paul Williams and Lorena Williams, Husband and Wife, Petitioners vs. Hugh Lee, Doing Business as 
Ganado Trading Post,” W.J.B., n.d.
68 Box 1:15, WJB Papers, “Paul Williams and Lorena Williams,” W.J.B.
69 Box 1201, WOD Papers, “Conference November 21, 1958,” W.O.D.
70 Box 188, EW Papers, “Bench Memo, No.39, 1958 Term, Williams v. Lee,” MAF, 8.
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tribal cases to be decided within a federal versus state government framework, so that 
federal law would protect tribal claims. As well as the arguments made by the tribe, the 
case may have also relied on the attitude of some of the justices.
The opinion of the Supreme Court may have been informed by the compassionate beliefs 
and pro-Indian interpretations of a select number of justices. Hugo Lafayette Black was 
generally supportive of Native American rights as was William O. Douglas. In a letter to 
Murray Lincoln, Chief Justice of the Navajo tribe, dated June 14 of 1965, Hugo Black 
wrote, “You know, I am also sure, the great interest and sympathy I feel for the Tribes 
that seek to preserve their ways of life.”71 This pro-Indian stance from Black may have 
helped convince wavering justices such as Felix Frankfurter who did not support tribal 
sovereignty in early November 1958. However by late November he supported Hugo 
Black, noting the importance of Worcester (1832); “And I duly note your [?] against 
"rites position"...in recalling the Worcester v. Georgia affairs.”72 Hugo Black may have 
therefore helped with the resurgence of Native American rights in 1959. The position of 
Chief Justice Earl Warren also seemed to be conciliatory and considered, pointing out in 
an early Hugo Black draft that “In the middle of page 4, I am wondering if the words, 
"sufficiently high stage of economic and social development" might not be softened a bit 
so far as the Indians are concerned by saying "acceptable stage" or "acceptable standard 
of economic and social development."”73 At Conference, an internal meeting to discuss 
the case, on November 21, 1958 the court was unanimous and voted to reverse the
71 Box 34, Hugo Lafayette Black, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., “Letter 
from Hugo Black to Murray Lincoln, June 14, 1965.”
7“ Box 338, HLB Papers, “Memorandum from Felix Frankfurter to Hugo Black, December 23, 1958.”
73 Box 457, EW Papers, “Memorandum from Earl Warren to Hugo Black, January 5, 1959.”
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decision of the lower court, which applied state law rather than tribal sovereignty.74 The 
interpretations of the individual justices were reflected in the Williams opinion authored 
by Hugo Black.
The opinion outlined how the sovereignty doctrine had changed from its foundations in 
Worcester v Georgia (1832).75 From the outset, Hugo Lafayette Black praised Chief 
Justice John Marshall’s Worcester opinion, terming it “ .. .one of his most courageous and 
eloquent opinions...”76 and observed its legal importance; “Despite bitter criticism and 
the defiance of Georgia which refused to obey this Court's mandate in Worcester the 
broad principles of that decision came to be accepted as law.”77 However, the sovereignty 
doctrine from Worcester to Williams, a 127-year period, had been modified by 
congressional policies and Supreme Court case law. In 1832 the tribes had exclusive 
authority over the reservations but by 1959 this exclusivity had given way to the 
application of state law in the reservations on particular occasions, described by Hugo 
Black in the areas where “essential tribal relations were not involved and where the rights 
of Indians would not be jeopardized, but the basic policy of Worcester has remained.”78 
Only specific parts of the Worcester policy had changed but there was still deference 
shown by the Supreme Court towards tribal sovereignty, “Thus, suits by Indians against 
outsiders in state courts have been sanctioned...And state courts have been allowed to try 
non-Indians who committed crimes against each other on a reservation...But if the crime
74 Box 1201, WOD Papers, “Conference November 21, 1958.”
The ruling in Worcester v. Georgia held that the states had no jurisdiction in the reservations and only 
Congress had the power to remove attributes of tribal sovereignty. The tribe had authority over the 
reservation and all people in the reservation.
76 Williams v. Lee, 219.
77 Ibid.
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was by or against an Indian, tribal jurisdiction or that expressly conferred on other courts 
by Congress has remained exclusive.”79 Despite the modifications to Worcester, the 
sovereignty doctrine survived.
In 1959, the tribe retained inherent sovereignty inside the reservation unless Congress 
revoked parts of that sovereignty or the Supreme Court limited the legal protections 
afforded by Worcester. These principles were summed up by the introduction of the 
‘infringement test’ by the Williams court, “Essentially, absent governing Acts of 
Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of 
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.”80 In essence, the tribes 
retained sovereignty in the reservation until either Congress took it away or it was proved 
that state authority did not infringe on tribal government and only then was state authority 
applicable in the reservation. This test was not as strong as the Worcester principle but as 
William C. Canby observed, “In theory, [the test] at least.. .precludes state interference 
with tribal self-government no matter how important the state’s interest may be.”81 
Although the test did give rise to the interpretation that state law existed in the
79 Williams v. Lee, 219-220, cases omitted.
80 • ,
Ibid., 220. This was the Williams infringement test used to determine whether state law was applicable 
over both tribal members and non-members in the reservation. If congressional legislation did not oust state 
law then the question was whether state law infringed on the tribe. The infringement test was interpreted in 
two ways. First, it was read as a test which supported inherent tribal sovereignty and therefore tribes had 
inherent sovereignty unless attributes of that sovereignty were revoked by an act o f Congress. Also, the 
tribes retained sovereignty in the reservation until it was proved that state action did not affect the tribe. 
Second, it was read as a test which supported the general presence of state law in the reservation until it 
was proved that state law infringed on the tribe. The first interpretation supported the re-invigoration of 
tribal sovereignty and the second interpretation supported the seeds of what this thesis terms the silent 
revolution.
81 Canby, American Indian Law, 243-244.
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reservation until it infringed on tribal government,82 the Williams court applied the Indian 
sovereignty doctrine.
The Williams opinion overruled the primary rationale of the lower court, the Arizona 
Supreme Court83 and rejected the extension of Draper v. United States (1896) into a 
general rule to allow state jurisdiction over civil suits in the reservation.84 Alex Tallchief 
Skibine noted that tribal members were allowed to sue outsiders in state court but it did 
not follow in Williams that the states had authority in the reservation.85 Instead, tribal 
sovereignty existed unless it was removed by an explicit act of Congress, described by 
Philip P. Frickey as a process “which could be dislodged only by agreement or statute, 
not by judicial decision.”86 Hugo Black summed up the application of the sovereignty 
doctrine by the Supreme Court,
“It is immaterial that respondent is not an Indian. He was on the Reservation and the 
transaction with an Indian took place there. The cases in this Court have consistently 
guarded the authority of Indian governments over their reservations. Congress recognized 
this authority in the Navajos in the Treaty of 1868, and has done so ever since. If this 
power is to be taken away from them, it is for Congress to do it.”87
82 This will be discussed in the next section entitled, Williams v. Lee (1959) and the Seeds of the Silent 
Revolution.
83 Williams v. Lee, 217-218.
84 Ibid., 218.tty
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86 Frickey, “A Common Law,” 29.
Williams v. Lee, 223, cases omitted. Two principles arise from the summation of Justice Black. First, a 
non-member conducting business with a tribal member in a reservation directly affected the ability of the 
tribe to govern and the ability of tribal government to function. Tribal government was sanctioned by three 
factors. First, tribes enjoyed inherent powers or sovereignty. Second, in correlation with the first point, 
tribes had authority from treaties, and third, the United States Congress pursuant to the Indian Re- 
Organisation Act of 1934 explicitly recognised the sovereign powers of the tribes. Second, tribal 
governmental authority over the reservation existed regardless if a member or non-member was involved. 
This could only be revoked in an express manner by the United States Congress.
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The opinion of Hugo Black, William Canby, Jr. believed, relied heavily on Worcester to 
prevent the application of state law in the reservation and in doing so held that concurrent 
jurisdiction interfered with tribal government.88 This line of thinking adopted by the 
Supreme Court Justices linked in with the general assessment of the powers of the tribe 
undertaken by Felix S. Cohen in 1941, which were discussed in Chapter 1.
The Williams court ruled that tribal authority was concomitant with territorial 
sovereignty.89 Navajo criminal and civil authority was applicable over every person 
within the reservation, “Today the Navajo Courts of Indian Offences exercise broad 
criminal and civil jurisdiction which covers suits by outsiders against Indian defendants. 
No Federal Act has given state courts jurisdiction over such controversies.”90 Alison 
Dussias pointed out that the actions of the Supreme Court “treated tribal authority as 
being geographically-based, referring to the authority of tribal governments over their 
reservations; the lack of tribal membership of the individual being required to seek 
redress only in tribal court was irrelevant.”91 Philip Frickey agreed, stating that the court 
“foundered on the notion of territorial sovereignty and its corollary, implied consent to 
governmental authority.”92 However, despite the positive nature of the Williams opinion 
for Native America, the thinking of the Supreme Court Justices within the internal 
decision making structures of the Williams case considered moving away from the 
sovereignty doctrine. This represented the foundations of the silent revolution.
88 Canby, American Indian Law.
89 Williams v. Lee, 223.
90 Ibid., 222.
91 Dussias, “Geographically-Based,” 48.
92 Frickey, “A Common Law,” 30.
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Williams v. Lee (1959) and the Seeds of the Silent Revolution
Behind the re-invigoration of tribal sovereignty established by the justices of the Williams 
case lay the beginning of an idea, which formed the foundations of the silent revolution. 
The Supreme Court mooted the idea of weakening tribal sovereignty by focusing on 
federal authority as a way to prohibit the application of state law in the reservation. This 
would have moved the focus of deciding Indian law cases from acknowledging the 
sovereignty of the tribes to basing decisions on a purely federal versus state basis. The 
foundations of the silent revolution began with the idea that the states had sovereignty to 
enter the reservations until it was precluded by an express act of Congress. This 
assessment of Williams diverges from noted scholars such as David H. Getches, William 
C. Canby, and Charles Wilkinson.93
The Williams court considered the principle relied on by the lower court that state law 
existed in the reservation until it was prohibited by congressional authority. Therefore, 
congressional silence on the subject was interpreted to sanction state law in the 
reservation. This principle relied on one primary factor, the inherent sovereignty of the 
state in the reservation. Based against this background, a memorandum to Douglas read, 
“I do not feel any alarm at requiring Indians to submit to state court jurisdiction in civil 
suits until Congress decrees otherwise.”94 This position led Earl Warren to question the 
role of state authority in the reservation.
93 Wilkinson, Time, and the law, Getches, “Conquering the Cultural Frontier;” Frickey, “A Common Law;” 
and Canby, American Indian Law.
94 Box 1201, WOD Papers, “1957 Term N o .8 11.”
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The total exclusion of state law over non-members in the reservation was a concern to 
Earl Warren, particularly the indefinite prohibition of state authority in the reservations. 
As Warren noted, “don’t want to say never any [state] jurisdiction on the reservations”95 
and “...not for all the way and say...state can’t have any jurisdiction.”96 This general 
concern about preserving some kind of way to allow state law into tribal reservations 
actually fed into the justices thinking of using only federal authority to decide issues of 
tribal versus state authority.
Several justices of the Supreme Court mooted using congressional authority to decide the 
question of state law in the reservation. At Conference on November 21, 1958 Felix 
Frankfurter wanted to exclusively use federal regulations to prevent state law being 
applied in the reservation, noting “rely on reg [sic]...but wont [sic] go further.”97 This 
reliance on the trader statutes was based on a provision, which encouraged non-members 
to trade in the reservation at their own risk, “A trader may extend credit to Indians, but 
such credit will be at the trader’s own risk.” 25 C.F.R. 252.17.”98 This provision relating 
to non-members was also explained in a memorandum as “A regulation which applies to 
respondent (non-member) since he was granted permission to open his store on the 
reservation states that all credit shall be at the trader’s risk.”99 Therefore, congressional 
legislation automatically prohibited non-member action against the tribes because they 
consented to trade at their own risk inside the reservation. Individual justices such as 
Felix Frankfurter supported this interpretation of federal authority, stating that the
*  Box 1:15, WJB Papers, “Paul Williams and Lorena Williams,” W.J.B.
Box 1201, WOD Papers, “Conference November 21,” W .OD.
Z Ibid-
*  Box 188, EW Papers, “Bench Memo, No.39, 1958 Term, Williams v. Lee,” MAF, 2.
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“regulation holds up as did Earl Warren who “Thinks traders do so at own risk.”101 
The federal government also supported the use of federal statutes to prevent the general 
application of state law in the reservation.
A 1958 bench memorandum shows that the federal government wanted the Supreme 
Court to use congressional authority rather than inherent tribal sovereignty. The position 
adopted by the federal government was termed the “narrow attack” which was “based 
upon interpretation of the Federal regulation stating that Indian traders sold on credit at 
the trader’s own risk. This was asserted to deprive the state court of jurisdiction.”102 This 
strategy was in direct conflict with the position adopted by the Navajo, described in a 
memorandum as “an unusual position” where the tribe “has not pressed the second, 
limited attack hoping to prevail on the broad ground. However, the govt [sic]...has 
adopted the narrow attack and urges this Court to reverse on the limited ground without 
reaching the broad ground pressed by petr. [tribe].”103 Despite this conflict, a 
memorandum explained that the federal government’s reliance on statutes was a viable 
way to decide the merits of the case, “Here the federal policy is clearly set forth in the 
regulation and an argument can be made that a state court may not take jurisdiction of a 
case in which the plaintiff [non-member] is seeking relief barred by federal law.”104 
Furthermore, the federal government wanted the Supreme Court to use regulations 
because it was considered stronger than using tribal sovereignty and it fitted in with the
100 Box 1:15, WJB Papers, “Paul Williams and Lorena Williams,” W.J.B.; and Box 1201, WOD Papers, 
ioT0n e^rence November 21,” W.O.D.
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historic relationship between the federal government and the tribes. A memorandum read, 
“Indians are traditionally wards of the Federal govt and this regulation gives the Indians 
greater protection if it is interpreted as a jurisdictional bar...”105 This position was also 
favourable because numerous state courts were applying the rationale that states had 
jurisdiction in the reservation unless Congress precluded state authority.106 The federal 
government wanted the Supreme Court to move towards a system where issues of tribal 
versus state authority would be analysed only within a federal versus state context.
The federal government wanted the court to prevent the re-invigoration of the sovereignty 
doctrine, based on federal government policy concerns. The federal government believed 
that reliance on statutes would prevent broad tribal jurisdiction in the reservation. This 
position was explained in a memorandum, “the govt argues that the question of 
jurisdiction may well depend upon the type of subject matter involved and other factors 
so that this Court should not lay down a broad rule covering all possible case, [sic]”107 
Therefore the ‘narrow attack’ fitted in with the aims of the federal government, described 
in a memorandum as “ ...the policy considerations behind the regulations.”108 The 
position of the federal government was presented to the Supreme Court Justices as the 
stronger argument, because reliance on tribal sovereignty would not result in “winning 
the particular case before the Court—which involves $82.”109 Indeed many justices 
initially relied on the use of federal regulations and questioned using exclusive tribal 
authority in the reservations.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid., 5.
8 Ibid.
109 Ibid., 3.
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The Williams case contained the seeds of the silent revolution. The Supreme Court 
Justices knew the merits of congressional authority and some justices strongly considered 
using it to prohibit state law from the reservation. Indeed, some justices felt comfortable 
with this idea. Although Williams re-invigorated tribal sovereignty, the Supreme Court 
was beginning to move away from tribal sovereignty and the Indian sovereignty doctrine, 
based on the understanding of using federal authority to protect the tribes from state law.
In Kake v. Egan and Metlakatla Indians v. Egan, only three years after Williams v. Lee, 
the Supreme Court used the idea mooted by the Williams court and determined that 
congressional authority and not tribal sovereignty ousted general state law from tribal 
lands and the reservation.
Kake v. Egan (1962) and Metlakatla Indians v. Egan (1962)
These were the first cases of the modem era to apply the rationale that states had 
authority on tribal lands and reservation lands unless it was precluded by congressional 
legislation. Tribal sovereignty was not considered by either court. Kake v. Egan involved 
a conflict between federal and state authority, revolving around the question of whether 
federal law prevented the application of state law over tribal members on tribal lands. 
The facts of the case involved the incorporated communities of the Thlinget Indians of 
Alaska who operated salmon traps within the State of Alaska and whether the State of 
Alaska, pursuant to a statute, could prohibit the use of the salmon traps. The use of the
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traps was sanctioned by permits issued by the Army Corps of Engineers and the United 
States Forest Service and regulations issued by the Secretary of the Interior. The tribe 
involved did not have a designated reservation and the case therefore concerned tribal 
lands and not reservation lands. However, the Supreme Court used the ruling to extend 
the general presumption that state law applied over tribal members on reservation lands, 
in direct conflict with Worcester and Williams. The Kake court justified this process by 
using case law from the late nineteenth century. The Metlakatla Indians v. Egan110 case 
also involved the issue of federal authority versus state authority. The facts of the case 
involved whether the Secretary of the Interior had the authority to grant regulations 
allowing the Metlakatla Indian Community to build and use salmon traps on lands that 
Congress had set aside as a reservation under an 1891 Act. The presence of a reservation 
led the Supreme Court to apply the presumption that congressional authority and not 
tribal sovereignty protected tribal members from state law.
The Kake case applied the line of thinking discussed but finally rejected by the justices of 
the Williams court that congressional legislation be used to either allow or prevent claims 
of state authority within the reservation. The Supreme Court assessed the merits of this 
case purely a federal versus state level, summed up in a bench memorandum to Earl 
Warren; “ ...the basic question involved is whether the federal govt [sic] or the State of 
Alaska has the exclusive authority to regulate the fishing rights of certain Indian
° In contrast to Kake v. Egan, this case involved the question of state authority over tribal members in a
reservation.
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communities situated in Alaska.”111 The evidence presented in the case pointed towards 
the protection of the Alaskan tribes through government regulations. A memorandum 
pointed out that the tribes “ ...were organised as an Indian community under federal law, 
and have been dependent upon federal protection and regulation for many years...they 
are the type of Indians the federal govt [sic] has traditionally regulated and protected.”112 
This emphasis on federal control led to the presumption that tribal fishing rights would be 
protected against state law. A bench memorandum read that these fishing rights “ ...have 
been strictly regulated by the Sec. of Interior since the villages were organised. 
Moreover, since 1948, the Indians have been permitted to use fish traps.”113 This 
exclusive use of federal regulations meant that questions of tribal sovereignty were 
ignored.
The facts of the case did not involve addressing the issue of state law within a 
reservation; however, the Kake court argued that state law within reservations was 
justified by the development of nineteenth century case law, which fundamentally 
weakened the principle of Worcester,114 The development of case law contrary to 
Worcester forced the modern-day Supreme Court to re-assess the general presumption 
that state law was totally excluded from the reservation; “The general notion drawn from 
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Worcester v. Georgia...that an Indian reservation is a
111 Box 218, EW Papers, “Bench Memo. No. 326, 1959 Term, Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 
Appeal from DC for the State o f Alaska Timely, No. 327, 1959 Term, Organised Village of Kake v. Egan, 
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distinct nation within whose boundaries state law cannot penetrate, has yielded to closer 
analysis when confronted, in the course of subsequent developments, with diverse 
concrete situations.”115 Furthermore, the Kake court also interpreted that this general 
weakening of Worcester led the Supreme Court in 1880 to declare that reservations were 
part of the states and state law applied in the reservations unless Congress acted 
otherwise; “the Court no longer viewed reservations as distinct nations. On the contrary, 
it was said that a reservation was in many cases a part of the surrounding State or 
Territory, and subject to its jurisdiction except as forbidden by federal law.”116 The 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of historic case law undermined modern-day tribal 
sovereignty. Charles F. Wilkinson believed that Kake re-invigorated a general principle 
from three historic cases, termed the “Kagama-McBratney-Lone Wolf ’ line of cases, 
which supported the destruction of the tribes and undermined tribal sovereignty so that
1 17 , . ,jthe tribes were viewed as “fading entities moving toward extinction.” This general 
interpretation was supported by Blake A. Watson, stating that “the previously discussed 
Kagama and Lone Wolf decisions, undercuts the notion of tribal sovereignty...[which] 
also includes United States v. McBratney.”118 These three cases came from a period of 
American legal history which sanctioned the extinguishment of the concept of the tribe 
and the destruction of the Native American population. Moreover, the Supreme Court 
interpreted the development of congressional policy in the twentieth century to have also 
sanctioned state law in the reservation.
n! Kake v. Egan, 72.
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Specific congressional legislation and the federal policy of termination were interpreted 
by the Kake court to have undermined the Worcester principle. The Supreme Court 
analysed the development of congressional legislation from the 1920s to the 1950s, 
which allowed more state authority into the reservations, and noted “the influence of state 
law increased rather than decreased.”119 During the 1920s, Congress allowed the states to 
enforce both compulsory school attendance and sanitation laws in the reservations. A 
small number of states during the 1940s applied criminal jurisdiction in some of the 
reservations and in the 1950s, the federal policy of termination abolished the Klamath 
and Menominee reservations and sanctioned numerous states to have full civil and 
criminal authority in certain reservations. The Supreme Court believed that the Worcester 
principle had been weakened further by its interpretation of congressional history; “Thus 
Congress has to a substantial degree opened the doors of reservations to state laws, in 
marked contrast to what prevailed in the time of Chief Justice Marshall.” 120 Although the 
Supreme Court examined the issue of state law in the reservations, as has already been 
pointed out, the Kake case did not involve a reservation.
The Kake opinion allowed the application of state law over the tribes because there was 
no tribal reservation with defined boundaries. The Supreme Court associated this set of 
facts with a case dealing with an off-reservation setting and applied the rule that state law 
applied unless it was prohibited by Congress.121 The Supreme Court did not consider the 
purchase of tribal lands by the federal government and the presence of explicit federal
regulations and permits, sanctioning the use of tribal fishing traps on the purchased lands, 
to be relevant to the case; “Congress has neither authorized the use of fish traps at Kake 
and Angoon nor empowered the Secretary of the Interior to do so.”122 The opinion should 
have been limited in principle to cases dealing only with state law over tribes in off- 
reservation settings. However, the Supreme Court significantly broadened the case to 
include the application of state law in on-reservation settings, in contrast to Williams.
In 1962, the Supreme Court undermined Williams and its infringement test in order to 
allow state authority into Indian country. The test should have been used to protect tribal 
interests in the reservation; however, the Kake court interpreted this test in a manner 
unfavourable to the tribes and tribal sovereignty. William C. Canby believed that the 
infringement test could be interpreted to undermine tribal sovereignty, observing that the 
test “ ...was capable of being interpreted to permit increased exercise of state power 
within Indian country.”123 In fact, this test was turned on its head. The Kake court applied 
the presumption that state law was applicable in the reservation until it was proved that it 
adversely influenced tribal authority, “[state law] may be applied to Indians unless such 
application would interfere with reservation self-government or impair a right granted or 
reserved by federal law.”124 Only then would state law be nullified. As Canby pointed 
out, the Kake court “clearly suggested that state law and state court jurisdiction could be 
extended to Indians as well as non-Indians in Indian country, so long as there did not
125 rrriseem to be a direct interference with the tribal government itself. ’ The interpretation of
124 Canby> American Indian Law, 133.
125 v‘ Egan, 75.
Canby, American Indian Law, 133-134.
69
Williams by the 1962 Supreme Court created the impression that inherent state 
sovereignty existed in the reservations. This position was further underlined by the words 
chosen by Felix Frankfurter from New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin to highlight the inherent 
right of the states in the reservations; “"[I]n the absence of a limiting treaty obligation or 
Congressional enactment each state had a right to exercise jurisdiction over Indian 
reservations within its boundaries"...”126 The ruling of the Kake court dismissed the 
broad Williams decision,127 observing that “Decisions of this Court are few as to the 
power of the States when not granted Congressional authority to regulate matters
198affecting Indians.” The Williams case was not viewed by the Kake court as 
authoritative; instead, it was regarded simply as “the latest decision” in Federal Indian 
law.129
The companion case of Metlakatla Indians v. Egan revolved around the issue of 
congressional authority versus state authority to decide whether state law was applicable 
over tribal members in a reservation. The Metlakatla tribe did not want to be under state 
law. A 1961 memorandum noted that the tribe wanted “ ...freedom from state control 
inside of a properly defined reservation.”130 This freedom was going to rely exclusively 
on the primacy of congressional authority over state law; “ ...the US can exercise all of
127 v- Egan> 75, quoting New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946), 499.
7 Kake v. Egan, 74-75.
J28 Ibid., 74.
Ibid. The court also cited Thomas v. Gay where the court upheld an Oklahoma territorial tax on cattle 
owned by non-members on lands leased to them by Native Americans. Because the tax was on leased lands 
it was considered to be indirect and too remote to affect the interests o f the tribe.
Box 218, EW Papers, “Bench Memo. No. 2, 1961 Term, Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, Appeal 
from SC Alaska Timely, No. 3, 1961 Term, Organised Village of Kake v. Egan, Appeal from SC Alaska 
Timely,” RGG, December 8 1961,11.
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the regulation of the reservation.”131 The protection of the tribes from state law relied on 
federal statutes and the historic guardian/ward relationship between the United States and 
Native America. Earl Warren supported the use of federal authority to prohibit state law 
in the reservation, pointing out that the “cases come down to stat [sic] [statutory] 
construction -  US now confines its power territorially.”132 In contrast to the Kake case, 
the Supreme Court and in particular Earl Warren supported the principle of the trust 
relationship to protect the tribes from state law. The trust relationship involved an 
exclusive relationship between the federal government and Native America, which 
endorsed federal protection over the tribes. The states were excluded from this 
relationship. As Earl Warren described, “Congress intended to retain wardship over 
Indians and preserve and protect them -  to hold contrary would be to cast Indians 
adrift”133 and “Indians get rights in addition to [???] generally because of wardship. 
Think Congress intended to retain wardship and regulate them by its laws.”134 In contrast 
to the previous case, the Metlakatla successfully relied on federal authority. The primary 
reason for this success was the presence of a tribal reservation, considered to be 
dispositive. As a 1961 bench memorandum noted, the tribe “ ...claim only the freedom 
from state control inside of a properly defined reservation. This, I believe, is a reasonable 
claim regardless of the merits.”135
Box 218, EW Papers, “Bench Memo, No. 2,1961 Term,” RGG, 13.
Box 1265, W OD Papers, “No. 2 -  Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, No.3 Organised Village of
Kake v. Egan, Conference December 15, 1961,” W.O.D., 1.
i3 4 Ib id>
Box 1:60, WJB Papers, “No. 2 , Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan,” W.J.B.
Box 218, EW Papers, “Bench Memo, No. 2 ,1961 Term,” RGG, 13.
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This Metlakatla opinion, written by Felix Frankfurter, explained that the reservation was 
the fundamental difference between this and the Kake case. The Supreme Court ruled that 
a reservation allowed federal authority to protect tribal fishing rights against state law, 
“...the reservation itself was Indian property...” and congressional authority through a 
statute “...clearly preserves federal authority over both the reservation and the fishing 
right then existing.” Senator Gruening of Alaska saw the presence of a reservation as a 
unique characteristic, which directly influenced the outcome of the case; “The Court’s 
decision in the Metlakatla case differs in its conclusion from the Kake and Angoon cases 
only because of Metlakatla’s historically different and unique legal status.”137 Federal 
authority formed an important role in deciding whether state law was applicable in the 
reservation.
Despite the presence of a reservation in one case and only tribal lands in another, both 
Metlakatla and Kake relied exclusively on congressional or federal authority to prohibit 
the application of state law over tribal affairs and tribal lands. No party to these cases 
relied on tribal sovereignty. Taken together, Metlakatla and Kake ensured that state law 
was applicable over reservations and tribal lands unless it was explicitly precluded by the 
actions of Congress or the federal government.
The primacy of federal legislation and authority, considered in Williams and applied in 
Metlakatla and Kake, became an idea with which the court felt comfortable. However,
136 Box 1:62, WJB Papers, opinion of Felix Frankfurter circulated to the court on February 6 1962, 14. See 
the opinion o f  Metlakatla Indians v. Egan, 58-59.
Box 1:62, WJB Papers, Statement made by Senator Gruening of Alaska on the Kake and Metlakatla 
cases, March 6 1962. This statement was attached to a memorandum from Felix Frankfurter to the court on
March 12 1962.
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after 1962 the United States Supreme Court had the option to apply the Indian 
sovereignty doctrine or use federal authority to determine whether state law was 
applicable in the reservation. This choice of case law meant that the Supreme Court 
Justices could and would use the law to suit their own ideas about the uses of tribal 
sovereignty. As Blake A. Watson pointed out, “The ability to manipulate presumptions, 
and transform doctrinal law sub silentio, contributes greatly to the thrust and parry of 
federal Indian law.” Therefore, Williams, Kake, and Metlakatla underpinned the 
beginnings of the ideological battle between the Indian sovereignty doctrine and the 
integrationist trend. The development of this integrationist trend continued through the 
1960s and into the early 1970s.
Warren Trading Post v. Tax Commission (1965) and Kennedy v. District Court o f  
Montana (1971)
The cases of Warren Trading Post v. Tax Commission (1965) and Kennedy v. District 
Court o f Montana (1971) demonstrated that the Supreme Court was tom between the use 
of tribal sovereignty and the idea of congressional authority to determine the authority of 
the tribes or the states in the reservations. The Warren Trading Post court relied primarily 
on federal authority to prohibit the application of state law over a non-member trader 
within the reservation. The facts of the case involved whether the State of Arizona had 
the right to impose a 2% sales and income tax on a non-member trading business, Warren 
Trading Post Company, within the Navajo Reservation who was there pursuant to a 
federal license granted by the United States Commissioner of Indian Affairs. The use of
138 Watson, “The Thrust,” 466.
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federal authority by the Supreme Court established the presumption that state law existed 
in the reservation until it was removed by Congressional legislation. This turned the 
Williams infringement test on its head and thereby shifted the presumption of the test. 
Instead of state law being barred from the reservation until it was proven that state action 
would not affect tribal government, state law was allowed to function in the reservation 
until it was proved that it affected tribal government. Warren Trading Post also relied on 
the sovereignty doctrine to prevent the use of state law in the reservation and re-affirmed 
the general principles of Williams. The Kennedy court also used these two ideas to 
prevent the use of state law in the reservation.
Congressional authority predominantly informed the thinking of the justices in the 
Warren Trading Post case. Earl Warren viewed congressional legislation, also known as 
federal pre-emption, as the correct tool to decide the case, stating that “ ...there’s 
preemption in Cong[ress] legislation] which appoints Indian traders.”139 Federal 
regulations governed non-member traders in the reservation and this reliance on federal 
authority was communicated in a memorandum to William O. Douglas; “ ...the tax is 
inconsistent with a comprehensive system of.. .federal regulation of commerce with the 
Indians occupying and pre-empting the field.”140 This process of thinking appeared to 
weaken the court’s reliance on tribal sovereignty. A bench memorandum to the court 
symbolised this movement away from the sovereignty doctrine; “Since it appears that 
Congress has occupied this area, I recommend that the Court reverse the decision of SC 
Anz. on this ground, and leave, to another time, the issues...whether these state taxes
Box 1:113, WJB Papers, “No. 115. Warren Trading Post v. Arizona State Tax Commission,” W.J.B.
Box 1332, WOD Papers, “Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n/64 Term No. 115, 
Appeal from Ariz Sup Ct, Memo of US in support of applnt.,” JSC, July 24, 1964.
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interfere with Indian self-government.”141 The guardian of tribal sovereignty in the post- 
1959 period was the Williams case. So when Hugo Black omitted the single reference to 
Williams in his draft opinion it further moved the thinking of the justices towards the use 
of congressional power; “It obviously would be a marked departure from the long 
standing, firmly established federal policy in this field to allow the State to tax 
transactions on the reservation involving Indians when their most vital government 
services are provided not by the State out of state revenues, but by the Federal 
Government or out of tribal resources.”142 As David E. Wilkins observed, the Warren 
Trading Post court “based its decision on federal pre-emption grounds...[where] 
Congress had the legislative authority to control any subject matter.”143 The Supreme 
Court used the trader statutes to strike down a state tax imposed on a non-member trader 
in the Navajo reservation.
Reliance on federal authority undermined the Williams infringement test and created the 
presumption that state law existed in the reservation until removed by Congress. This 
continued the line of thinking introduced by the Kake court, which limited the broad 
interpretation of the Williams infringement test. A memorandum to Earl Warren 
described the presumption that was beginning to guide the thoughts of the justices; 
“...unless Congress has actually regulated, by specific statutory enactment, or unless
141 Box 263, EW Papers, “Bench Memo, No. 115, 1964 Term, Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State 
Tax Comm’n., Appeal from SC o f Ariz.,” DMF, March 2, 1965,11.
42 Box 1:122, WJB Papers, Warren Trading Post draft opinion, 1 April 1965, 6. This language was taken
out on 27 April 1965. The reference to Williams v. Lee, read in full, “A s this court recognized in Williams 
v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 222-223, Arizona had not, and apparently still has not, chosen to assume any burdens 
of providing for the welfare o f Indians on the reservation. It obviously would be a marked departure from 
the long standing, firmly established federal policy in this field to allow the State to tax transactions on the 
reservation involving Indians when their most vital government services are provided not by the State out
of state revenues, but by the Federal Government or out of tribal resources,” 6.
Wilkins, American Indian Sovereignty, 277.
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there is interference with tribal self-government...the state may tax a trader as it taxes all 
other businesses in the state.”144 The weakening of the Williams test and the movement of 
the Supreme Court away from the sovereignty doctrine was seized upon by the states in 
their courtroom battle over jurisdiction in the reservations. A memorandum to Earl 
Warren pointed out that the state relied on the counter-interpretation of the Williams test 
to highlight that state taxes “ .. .in no way impinges on the right of reservation Indians to 
make their own laws and be ruled by them.”145 Despite the clear reliance of the Supreme 
Court on federal authority, there was also reliance, in part, on the Indian sovereignty 
doctrine.
Individual justices were concerned about ignoring the sovereignty doctrine and the final 
Warren Trading Post opinion addressed this issue. Earl Warren was concerned about the 
idea that state taxation in the reservation was justified if the state provided for the welfare 
of the tribe. Warren’s argument explicitly revolved around the idea of tribal sovereignty 
in the reservation, which existed to prevent state taxation in the reservation until 
Congress authorised the state tax. A memorandum to Earl Warren summed up the 
concerns of the Chief Justice; “It is clear that Arizona could not impose a gross receipts 
tax on Indian traders simply by assuming responsibility for the Indians, at least not in the 
absence of additional federal legislation.”146 On April 27, 1965, Hugo Black removed the 
overriding concern of Earl Warren from his draft opinion.147 Concerns over unchecked 
state authority in the reservation ultimately led the final opinion to acknowledge the
|44 Box 263, EW Papers, “Bench Memo, No. 115,1964 Term, Warren Trading Post Co,” DMF, 7.
J5 Ibid., 8.
146 Box 526, EW Papers, “Memo to the Chief Justice. No. 115, 1964 Term, Warren Trading Post Co. v. 
Arizona State Tax Comm’n, Opinion of Black, J.,” DMF, April 7 ,1 9 6 5 ,2 .
Box 1:122, WJB Papers, Warren Trading Post v. Tax Comm’n draft opinion, 27 April 1965.
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importance of the sovereignty doctrine; “We think the assessment and collection of this 
tax would to a substantial extent frustrate the evident congressional purpose of ensuring 
that no burden shall be imposed upon Indian traders for trading with Indians on 
reservations except as authorized by Acts of Congress or by valid regulations 
promulgated under those Acts.”148 Therefore, state law was not valid until Congress acted 
to allow the states to tax.
The Warren Trading Post court relied on federal authority and acknowledged the 
importance of the sovereignty doctrine in post-1959 case law. Hugo Black addressed 
these two factors when he spoke of the changes regarding state law in the reservations. 
Black observed that the reservations were once free from state control but “Certain state 
laws have been permitted to apply to activities on Indian reservations, where those laws 
are specifically authorized by acts of Congress, or where they clearly do not interfere 
with federal policies concerning the reservations.” 149 Congressional authority and tribal 
sovereignty were present in the thinking of the justices and in the opinion of the court, a 
dual strand from which the Supreme Court could chose to prohibit the application of state 
law in the reservation.
In Kennedy, the Supreme Court primarily used congressional legislation to prevent the 
application of state law over tribal members in the reservation. In 1964, members of the 
Blackfeet tribe bought food on credit from a shop located in a town incorporated under 
the laws of the State of Montana on the exterior boundaries of the Blackfeet Reservation.
148
.. Warren Trading Post V. Tax Comm’n, 690-691.
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An action was brought in the courts of Montana against the tribal members for the debt 
incurred from the purchases. The tribal members appealed arguing that the state courts 
had no authority because the transaction took place inside the reservation. Although a 
1953 Act allowed Montana to assume civil jurisdiction inside the reservation, the state 
had not explicitly legislated to assume jurisdiction. However, in 1967 the Blackfeet 
Tribal Council passed an act allowing concurrent jurisdiction so that tribal and state 
courts were allowed to hear civil suits against tribal members. This tribal action had to 
comply with the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968. Unfortunately for the Blackfeet tribe, 
the actions of the tribal council did not follow the demands set out in the 1968 act and the 
Montana courts did not have jurisdiction over tribal members. The Blackfeet tribal 
council used tribal sovereignty and consented to the application of state law over tribal 
members in certain circumstances. However, issues concerning the impact of state law 
over tribal members on the reservation were controlled by the Williams infringement test. 
As Kennedy involved a fundamental jurisdictional and legal change to tribal authority in 
the reservation, the Supreme Court addressed the purpose of the test; “The Court in 
Williams, in the process of discussing the general question of state action impinging on 
the affairs of reservation Indians, noted that " [essentially, absent governing Acts of 
Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of 
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.””150 Due to the gradual 
movement of the court away from tribal sovereignty, the presumption was that states had 
jurisdiction in the reservation and over tribal members unless congressional legislation 
ousted state law or until state law infringed on the tribe in question. The Kennedy court 
applied the Williams test. As an act of Congress existed to prevent the tribal council from
Kennedy v. District Court o f  Montana, 426-427 quoting Williams v. Lee, 220.
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allowing concurrent jurisdiction in the reservation, the principle of the test required that 
the presence of an act automatically nullified state law over tribal members in the 
reservation, regardless of whether it affected tribal government. Although this decision 
supported tribal sovereignty and the independence of the Blackfeet from state law, the 
Supreme Court used the idea of congressional authority to oust state law from the 
reservation.
Warren Trading Post and Kennedy mainly relied on congressional authority to prevent 
the application of state law in the reservation. However, the sovereignty doctrine also 
informed the decisions of those cases. Therefore, despite the general movement of the 
court towards congressional authority and the presumption that state law applied in the 
reservation unless it was revoked by an act of Congress or until it infringed on the tribes, 
the Supreme Court continued to value the principle of the sovereignty doctrine. However, 
in 1973 it appeared that the dominant idea of the Supreme Court favoured congressional 
authority to restrict the application of state law in Native American reservations.
The Beginning of the Silent Revolution and the Integrationist Trend in 1973
In general, the beginning of the silent revolution counteracted the policies of Congress 
and the Executive. The silent revolution of the Supreme Court conflicted with the new 
federal policy era of tribal self-determination established by President Richard Nixon in 
1970 and ignored the Congressional definition of ‘Indian Country’ introduced in 1948. In 
specific terms, the sister taxation cases of McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission
19
(1973)151 and Mescalero Apache v. Jones (1973)152 began the application of this new 
principle, which allowed state sovereignty into the reservations and allowed the states to 
expand their sovereignty over non-members in the reservations.
The federal policy of tribal self-determination ended the termination period and 
symbolised a victory for Native America over the federal government. Throughout 
termination, a large amount of the Native American population wanted the federal 
government to re-invigorate tribal rights. Through political protest and legal battles, 
Native America succeeded in re-establishing tribal sovereignty and tribal rights in the 
American political system. The adoption of the tribal self-determination era was 
conformation that the federal government once again recognised the importance of tribal 
sovereignty. In 1970, President Richard Nixon recognised the need for tribes to make 
their own decisions, noting, “The time has come to break decisively with the past and to 
create conditions for a new era in which the Indian future is determined by Indian acts 
and Indian decisions.”153 The federal government sanctioned the idea of a more 
autonomous and culturally free Native America.154 By breaking away from the 
termination policy, Nixon viewed the new policy era as one that would ensure the 
protection of Native America within the United States, pointing out that it “would 
explicitly affirm the integrity and right to continued existence of all Indian tribes and 
Alaska native governments.”155 The underlying principle decreed by Congress was the
1 McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
153 ^ esca e^ro Apache Tribe v . Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
Richard Nixon, Public Papers o f  the Presidents o f the United States: Richard Nixon, 1970 (Washington 
B-C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), 565.
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preservation of the tribes within the boundaries of the United States guided by the process 
of self-determination. However, from 1973 the Supreme Court rolled back the 
development of tribal self-determination and weakened the congressional definition of 
Indian country.
In 1948, Congress introduced a definition of what constituted Indian country and 
simultaneously codified existing case law.156 The original definition of Indian country 
only covered tribal criminal jurisdiction in the reservation but in DeCoteau v. District 
County Court (1975) the Supreme Court extended it to cover tribal civil jurisdiction in 
the reservation.157 Title 18, Part I, Chapter 53, Section 1151 of the United States Code 
defines Indian country as
“(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the 
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including 
rights-of-way running through the reservation,
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether 
within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or 
without the limits of a state, and
(c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including 
rights-of-way running through the same.”158
The silent revolution undercut this definition legislated into law in 1948, which now 
comprises part of the United States legal code. The silent revolution began with the sister 
taxation cases of McClanahan and Mescalero Apache Tribe.
157 Wilkinson, Time, and the law, 91.
158 DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
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McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission (1973)
The McClanahan court continued to apply the principles developed by the Supreme 
Court from 1959, which sanctioned both the ideas of state law in the reservation and state 
law over non-members in the reservation until prohibited by Congress. The facts of the 
case involved a Navajo member living on the Navajo Reservation who had to pay $16.20 
in taxes to the State of Arizona for work done exclusively within the reservation. The 
tribal member filed for a refund and appealed. The Supreme Court ruled that the State of 
Arizona did not have jurisdiction to impose a tax on income earned by a Navajo 
exclusively within the reservation as it was forbidden by federal statutes and an 1868 
Treaty. William C. Canby believed that McClanahan began the process, which changed 
the application of the sovereignty doctrine in the reservation to the presumption that state 
law “extended into Indian country unless a positive federal law or policy excluded it.”159 
Jordan Burch concurred with the Canby interpretation and noted that 1973 “contained the 
seeds of enormous change.”160 Although Canby and Burch were correct to point out that 
McClanahan forever changed tribal and state relations and undermined the sovereignty 
doctrine, in 1973 the Supreme Court merely clarified and openly explained the 
development of the law from 1959. Therefore, McClanahan fundamentally eroded the 
once broad principle of Worcester, which sanctioned tribal authority over everyone in the 
reservation, to a principle sanctioning tribal authority over tribal members only. In 
contrast to the period from 1959 to 1973, where the Supreme Court applied the 
presumption that state law was applicable over tribal members and tribal affairs in the
i6o ^enate Committee, Rulings o f  the U.S. Supreme Courts, 45-46.
Burch, “How Much Diversity,” 965.
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reservation, from 1973 onwards state law was prohibited over exclusive tribal affairs in 
the reservation unless Congress acted to divest tribal sovereignty over tribal members.
The interpretation of the Supreme Court Justices in McClanahan supported the principle 
of general state authority in the reservation and the corollary principle that state authority 
also applied over non-members in the reservation. McClanahan was the first case of the 
modem era, post-1959, to openly discuss and actually apply the idea that state law existed 
in the reservation until it was removed by Congress. William Rehnquist supported the 
rights of the states to tax non-members in the reservation until a statute prohibited it, 
pointing out that his “...own position leaves room for State to tax non-resident Indians -  
unless stat [statute] prohibits.”161 Potter Stewart also supported the rights of the states and 
believed that the diminishment of the Worcester principle had allowed the integration of 
state and tribal land boundaries, pointing out that the “pendulum has swung from 
Worcester v. Georgia to integration of Indians -  Indian always win unless he’s against a 
[???].”162 In addition, Thurgood Marshall definitively summed up the position of the 
Supreme Court in a memorandum to Conference in 1973. The memorandum explained 
the difference between the imposition of state law over tribal members in McClanahan 
and the imposition of state law over non-members in Kahn v. Arizona State Tax 
Commission (1973).163 Marshall supported the presumption that states had authority over 
non-members in the reservation in contrast to McClanahan, pointing out that
161 Box 156, HAB Papers, “No. 71-834 -  McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona, Argued: 
December 12, 1972,” H.A.B.
Box 1574, WOD Papers, “71-834 -  McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n, of Arizona,” W.O.D., 
Conference, December 15, 1972, 1.
Kahn v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 941 (1973)
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“In McClanahan, we held that Arizona lacked jurisdiction to tax the appellant in that case 
for income earned within the reservation. However, our holding was expressly limited to 
Indians who derived their income from reservation sources. Since appellants here [in 
Kahn] are non-Indians, McClanahan is not controlling. This Court’s prior cases suggest 
that the State may tax the activity of non-Indians within a reservation except in cases 
where the federal government has acted to preempt the field.”164
The Supreme Court dismissed the Kahn case and the original verdict stood. Although 
William O. Douglas and William J. Brennan dissented, their rationale was based on the 
exact same interpretation of the case as that of Marshall. The Kahn memorandum ignored 
the sovereignty doctrine and the Williams case, which supported inherent tribal 
sovereignty in the reservation. This symbolised the movement of the Supreme Court 
towards the use of federal authority to protect tribal interests. As N. Bruce Duthu 
suggested, without the recognition of the Williams case in the Khan memorandum it was 
clear that the Supreme Court recognised “protectible state interests in Indian Country, at 
least where non-Indians are involved” and took “a surprisingly solicitous view of state 
power in Indian Country with no apparent protection for tribal sovereignty outside of 
affirmative federal legislation.”165
The appellants (the representatives of the tribes) adopted a legal position that was 
informed by the movement of the Supreme Court towards limiting the influence of 
Worcester and Williams. The appellants described how the broad rule of Worcester had 
been modified where state interests over non-members in the reservation were concerned, 
noting that the modification of Worcester “ ...upholds the power of the state to tax the 
property of non-Indians located on an Indian reservation...[and recognises] an
164 Box 156, HAB Papers, memorandum to the Conference from Thurgood Marshall, Re: No. 71-1263 -  
Kahn v. Arizona State Tax Commission, March 28 1973.
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abandonment of the notion that reservations were not physically within a state.”166 The 
weakening of Worcester also allowed the appellants to point out that the Supreme Court 
could interpret the Williams test in a way that sanctioned state law in the reservation. In 
1959, the test supported tribal authority in the reservation, however after 1959 the test 
was interpreted by the Supreme Court to sanction state law in the reservation until 
prohibited by Congress or until it infringed on tribal sovereignty. The appellants argued 
that the test was ambiguous, observing that “The-interference-with-tribal-govemment test 
is very broad, and it will lead to state inherent jurisdiction even when the Court and 
Congress have not considered the issue.”167 Although tribal sovereignty as a stand-alone 
principle was not strong enough to oust state law over non-members in the reservation, it 
was strong enough to protect tribal members from state law.
Individual justices supported the re-invigoration of the sovereignty doctrine to protect 
tribal members against state law in the reservation. Chief Justice Warren Burger was 
adamant that state law could not be used to obstruct the right of tribal governments to 
collect taxation revenues from its members, “...in depriving Indian tribes of source, this 
infringes on self government and Congress has not granted state this authority.”168 Byron 
White agreed with the fact that Congress had not granted permission for the states to tax 
tribal members, pointing out that “On reservation activities unless Congress expressly 
permits, states can’t tax.”169 Harry Blackmun summed up the questions relating to the 
application of state law over tribal members in the reservation when he noted, “precedent
!“  Box 156, HAB Papers, “Bench Memo, N o.71-834-ASX, McClanahan,” RIM, 4.
j Ibid., 14.
168 Box 1:380, WJB Papers, “No. 71-834, McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona,” W.J.B., n.d.,
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170 > I 'jfavours the Indian.” The protection of tribal members from state law did not rely on the 
application of federal authority; instead, it was inherent tribal sovereignty, pointed out in 
a memorandum to Harry A. Blackmun, “If Congressional authorisation was the test for 
state jurisdiction, there would have been no need to formulate the Williams v. Lee 
test.”171 Only congressional authority could remove the protections offered by tribal 
sovereignty against the imposition of state law over tribal members in the reservation. 
The position taken by many of the justices regarding state law over tribal members was 
summed up in a memorandum which read, the state “cannot (in the absence of specific 
congressional authorisation) tax income earned within the reservation by Indian residents 
of the reservation.” 172 The justices viewed this interpretation of the law as a way to 
balance the protections available to the tribes against state law while allowing the states 
to have more authority over non-members in the reservation where “ ...the Court and 
Congress have moved to integrate Indians into white society.”173 The protections of tribal 
sovereignty over tribal members reversed the development of a presumption from 1959 
that states had authority over tribal members in the reservation until it infringed on tribal 
government. The legal position of the justices contrasts with the interpretation offered by 
David E. Wilkins about the basis of the McClanahan opinion, who pointed out that 
“Arizona’s tax law was excluded [from the reservation] because of the doctrine of 
preemption, not because of the Navajo Nation’s inherent sovereignty.”174 Clearly, the
170 Box 1574, WOD Papers, “71-834 -  McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n, o f Arizona,” W.O.D., 
Conference, December 15 1972, 1.
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Supreme Court Justices relied on Navajo sovereignty and not federal authority to protect 
their own tribal members against state law. However, one justice wanted the Supreme 
Court to continue with the presumption developed from 1959.
William H. Rehnquist supported the right of state law to apply over tribal members in the 
reservation until prohibited by Congressional legislation. Rehnquist wanted to affirm the 
decision of the lower court, which allowed the state to tax the tribal member involved 
because no congressional legislation existed to prevent the state from doing so,175 
pointing out that “So long as State doesn’t coerce the reservations to collect tax but can 
reach every-layer if base [???] state can tax unless Congress says can’t.”176 A 
memorandum from Rehnquist to Marshall on February 23, 1973 confirmed his position 
about the rights of the state in the reservation among his fellow justices, “I voted the
177other way at Conference, but do not plan to write a dissenting opinion,” however if the 
problems of the opinion were amended, “I will reluctantly climb aboard.”178 Rehnquist 
wanted the same principle to apply to both tribal members and non-members in the 
reservation. The memorandums of the McClanahan court also supported limitations to 
the Worcester principle.
Memorandums from the Blackmun Papers highlight how the Supreme Court limited the 
broad scope of tribal sovereignty established in Worcester in order to pursue the
175 Box 1:380, WJB Papers, “No. 71-834, CA -  Ariz., Div. One, Rosalind McClanahan, Etc, Appellant v. 
State Tax Commission o f Arizona,” February 18 1972.
Box 1:380, WJB Pacers. “No. 71-834, MrClanahan v. State Tax Commission of A rizona,” W.J.B., n.d.,
2 .
Box 1:291, WJB Papers, memorandum from Rehnquist to Marshall, Re: No. 71-834 -  McClanahan v. 
^ I g j ax Commission.” February 23 1973.
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application of the integrationist trend. The limitation of Worcester, as this chapter has 
already pointed out in its analysis of earlier cases, took place between the relationship of 
tribes and non-members. Therefore, the Supreme Court recognised that tribal “relations 
with non-Indians” was “an area in which the Court has limited Worcester.”179 The 
Supreme Court limited the principle of Worcester by restricting the powers of tribal 
government over non-members, addressed as a policy issue by a 1972 memorandum, 
“...the problem becomes one of policy. An ascertainable trend is present toward limiting 
Worcester. Some lower federal courts have (at least in dicta) pared Worcester down to its 
core: tribal government.” This process was one of integration where state and 
reservation boundaries were opened up to allow the states to have greater authority over 
non-members in the reservation, “The narrowing of Worcester has reflected the growing 
belief that Indians...be integrated into American society.”181 In stark contrast to the 
Worcester principle of 1832 where tribes had territorial sovereignty within the 
reservation and state law was barred from the reservation, the modern-day Supreme 
Court wanted to integrate state law into the reservations. This process of integration 
meant, “Worcester lost its territorial case and became a doctrine related to the Indians as 
a person.”182 The application of the integrationist trend limited the Worcester principle 
and the Supreme Court underlined this new direction in the McClanahan opinion itself.
Thurgood Marshall limited the Worcester principle by using case law from the outmoded 
federal government policy of assimilation and allotment, as the Kake court had
179 Box 158, HAB Papers, “Bench Memo No 71-1031-CSX, Tonasket v. Wash., et al,” RIM, December 9,
1972,47.
1st ®ox 1^6, HAB Papers, “Bench Memo, N o.71-834-ASX, McClanahan, RIM, 11.
81 Ibid.
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previously done in 1962. The Kake case was the first of the modem era to emasculate 
Worcester based on assimilation and allotment case law. The second case to do so was 
McClanahan, which relied on similar case law and congressional history as Felix 
Frankfurter in 1962.183 The Marshall language established that Worcester and the 
sovereignty doctrine had changed so much that it could no longer prohibit state law inside 
the reservations,
“This is not to say that the Indian sovereignty doctrine, with its concomitant jurisdictional 
limit on the reach of state law, has remained static during the 141 years since Worcester 
was decided. Not surprisingly, the doctrine has undergone considerable evolution in 
response to changed circumstances [and].. .notions of Indian sovereignty have been 
adjusted to take account of the State's legitimate interests in regulating the affairs of non- 
Indians.”184
This rationale underpinned the McClanahan opinion. The limitations placed on 
Worcester by the McClanahan opinion in 1973 were significantly different to the 
limitations placed on Worcester by the Williams opinion of 1959.
The McClanahan court applied the integrationist trend and fundamentally modified and 
emasculated the rationale used by the Williams court to define the authority of Worcester 
in the post-1959 era. John Arai Mitchell believed that the McClanahan opinion severely 
weakened both Williams and Worcester by allowing state law into the reservation, noting 
that it left them “in a state of flux, as it appeared to change the direction of precluding
Again, the cases cited by the Supreme Court were those cited in Kake v. Egan. The McClanahan court 
said, “Similarly, notions of Indian sovereignty have been adjusted to take account o f the State s legitimate 
interests in regulating the affairs o f non-Indians. See, e. g., New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 
(1946); Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896); Utah & Northern R. Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28
(1885),” m .
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n , 171.
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state authority within the reservation. Thus by focusing on whether federal law 
preempted the state action, the opinion [McClanahan] reduced the capacity of the tribal 
rights of self-government to preclude state authority.”185 The McClanahan court began 
from the presumption that state law was permitted in the reservation until it affected tribal 
government, pointing out that “Over the years this Court has modified [the Worcester 
principle] in cases where essential tribal relations were not involved and where the rights 
of Indians would not be jeopardized.”186 Although the McClanahan court seemed to 
begin its analysis with Worcester, it declared that the principle did not apply in the 
modem era until state law affected ‘essential’ tribal relations. The interpretation adopted 
by the McClanahan court therefore extended the scope of state authority over non­
members in the reservation from specific to much broader circumstances. In stark 
contrast to the language of Thurgood Marshall, the Williams court began from the 
presumption that tribal sovereignty extended over the reservation and only certain cases 
limited this broad tribal authority; “Over the years this Court has modified these 
principles in cases where essential tribal relations were not involved and where the rights 
of Indians would not be jeopardized, but the basic policy of Worcester has remained.”187 
The limitation of Worcester in 1973 was dependent on the Supreme Court’s interests in 
protecting non-members in the reservation, contrasting significantly with the position
185 John Arai Mitchell, “A World without Tribes? Tribal Rights of Self-Government and the Enforcement 
of State Court Orders in Indian Country,” University o f Chicago Law Review  61 (1994): 711.
The quotation was followed by, “But if the crime was by or against an Indian, tribal jurisdiction or that 
expressly conferred on other courts by Congress has remained exclusive. . .  . Essentially, absent governing 
Acts o f Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of 
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them, McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Comm’n, 171-172 quoting Williams v Lee, 219-220.
Williams v. Lee, 219.
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taken by the Williams court in 1959.188 In Williams, the Supreme Court held that the 
broad Worcester principle applied in almost all circumstances except for the limitations 
of specific case law.189 Therefore, state law did not apply in the reservation until state 
action infringed on the tribe and its members or until congressional legislation authorised 
state authority in the reservation. As Hugo Black pointed out in the opinion,
“It is immaterial that respondent is not an Indian. He was on the Reservation and the 
transaction with an Indian took place there...The cases in this Court have consistently 
guarded the authority of Indian governments over their reservations. Congress recognized 
this authority in the Navajos in the Treaty of 1868, and has done so ever since. If this 
power is to be taken away from them, it is for Congress to do it.”190
In contrast to the language used by Hugo Black supporting tribal authority over non­
members in the reservation, McClanahan viewed tribal sovereignty as a ‘backdrop’ to 
inform the primary concerns of treaty and statutory interpretation. The interpretation of 
the Supreme Court was based on the idea that conflicts between state and tribal law were 
to be decided by using tribal sovereignty as “merely as a tool of statutory 
construction,”191 a secondary factor to federal authority. The integrationist trend was 
found in the language of the McClanahan court, which sanctioned the presence of state 
law in the reservation and state law over non-members in the reservation, based on the 
facts that tribal sovereignty was limited to tribal members only until Congress expressly 
legislated to enhance tribal authority. This integrationist trend indicated a movement
Although McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n did not involve the issue of non-members, the 
opinion discussed the shift of the court regarding tribal sovereignty and state sovereignty over non- 
members in the reservation.
I0n Williams v. Lee, 219-220.
19 Ibid., 223.
1 Box 156, HAB Papers, “No. 71-834, McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Arizona, 1st Draft; Justice 
Marshall; Feb. 7,” RIM, February 8, 1973.
91
towards the use of federal authority to decide issues of state law in the reservation, 
pointed out by Thurgood Marshall that
“...the trend has been away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state 
jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal pre-emption...The modem cases thus tend to 
avoid reliance on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and to look instead to the 
applicable treaties and statutes which define the limits of state power [and as a 
result].. .The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not because it provides a 
definitive resolution of the issues in this suit, but because it provides a backdrop against
109which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read.”
Therefore, federal pre-emption (authority) and not inherent tribal sovereignty barred the 
application of state law in the reservation.193 As N. Bmce Duthu observed, the Marshall 
opinion was “significant for pronouncing that federal preemption, not inherent tribal 
sovereignty, is the relevant inquiry in defining the limits of state power in Indian 
Country.”194 The Red Power movement during the early 1970s may have influenced the 
thoughts of the justices to favour using congressional authority rather than tribal 
sovereignty to decide conflicts between tribal and state law.
The timing of the McClanahan case coincided with the Trail of Broken Treaties and the 
occupation of the BIA headquarters in Washington D.C. on November 3, 1972 and the 
seizure of Wounded Knee on February 27, 1973, possibly influencing the opinion of the 
court. Vine Deloria and Clifford Lytle believed the Supreme Court moved away from 
inherent tribal sovereignty as a justification of territorial power over non-members 
because of Wounded Knee in 1973, noting that the application of the sovereignty doctrine
192
193 ^ c Clanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n , 172, cases and footnotes omitted.
194 ^ u t h u ,  “The Thurgood Marshall Papers,” 68.
Ibid.
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“...would have been politically explosive...for the Supreme Court.”195 The case was 
argued before the court on December 12, 1972 and the opinion was handed down on 
March 27, 1973. Given the explosive political climate of the time between the United 
States and the American Indian Movement (AIM), it is possible that the court did not 
want to allow the tribes or representatives of AIM to have authority over state citizens in 
the reservation and to have authority to prevent the assertion of state law in the 
reservation. The Supreme Court was aware of the activities in Washington and Wounded 
Knee. A memorandum to Blackmun in December 1972 read that “The recent Trail of 
Broken Treaties demonstration argued the federal government should remember its 
undertakings in these past events.”196 In addition, William O. Douglas kept an ‘Indian’ 
file with one newspaper article referring to the takeover of the BIA headquarters in 
Washington D.C. and that AIM represented, “477,000 Indians living on 263 reservations 
and 300,000 "urban Indians" who have left the reservation for the cities.”197 This Douglas 
file also contained a newspaper article discussing what should be done about the 
‘Indians’ at Wounded Knee; “.. .before we weep too much or too long for the Indians we 
should ask ourselves how much we really are prepared to do for them, at Wounded 
Knee.”198 These events may well have influenced the rationale of the opinion, which also 
fitted in with the integrationist trend used by the Supreme Court.
195
Deloria and Lytle, American Indians, 54.
Box 156, HAB Papers, “Bench Memo, No.71-834-ASX, McClanahan, et al.,” RIM, 12. 
i97 Box 592, W OD Papers, quotation from “Justice for American Indians,” Monitor, November 8, 1972.
98 Box 592, W OD Papers, quotation from “Injustice to the Red Man,” In Our Opinion... - Editorial 
Comments, n. d. Also contained in this box was a newspaper cutting by Florence Mouckley, “Tribes vs. 
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In 1973, the Supreme Court applied the federal authority idea developed between 1959 
and 1973, which allowed the states to have authority in the reservations and established a 
presumption that states had authority over non-members in the reservation unless it was 
reversed by Congress. This presumption was supported by the limitations placed on 
Worcester and tribal authority in the reservation. Furthermore, the sister taxation case of 
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones supplemented the presumption that states had authority 
over non-members in the reservation.
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones (1973)
The Mescalero Apache Tribe case concerned whether the State of New Mexico had 
authority to impose a non-discriminatory tax on a ski resort owned by the Mescalero 
Apache Tribe and located outside the reservation on adjacent lands leased from the 
United States government, pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. New 
Mexico had the right to impose a gross receipts tax on the annual sales of the ski resort. 
However, the state did not have authority to impose a use tax on certain personalty 
purchased outside of State and used in connection with the resort, such as ski lifts.199 In 
line with the development of the integrationist trend, the Supreme Court Justices used 
federal authority to decide a question of state law over tribal activities in an off- 
reservation situation. This opinion also addressed the importance of allowing state law to 
exist in the reservations.
The use tax is used by a state to tax items brought in from another state. Personalty refers to personal 
Property such as movable assets like cars and not money or investments.
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The underlying issue of the case revolved around whether congressional legislation or 
tribal sovereignty undermined state law within the boundaries of the state. As the case 
involved an off-reservation setting, the Supreme Court preferred to analyse the case in 
terms of a federal versus state conflict. A bench memorandum clarified this line of 
thinking, “...must Congress allow taxation before the state has power, or does the state 
have power unless Congress prohibits taxation.”200 The court was influenced by the 
presumption developed between Williams and Kennedy that tribal sovereignty did not 
prevent state law from applying inside the reservation. The corollary principle was that 
tribal sovereignty did not prohibit state law from applying in an off-reservation setting 
and only Congress had the authority to limit state authority. As Byron White observed, 
when the Supreme Court was “ ...dealing with off reservation activities, state can tax 
unless Congress says can.”201 A memorandum from Byron White to Thurgood Marshall 
supported the non-application of tribal sovereignty (the Williams test) outside the 
reservation. White believed the Williams test only applied to conflicts between states and 
tribes within the reservation, pointing out that “ ...I had thought the [Williams] test had 
arisen in connection with efforts to control reservation-based activities.”202 Therefore, if 
the Williams test did not apply off-reservation then it did not affect tribal government. As 
White noted, “ ...it is perfectly apparent that taxation of this off-reservation activity does 
not interfere with tribal self-government.”203 The Supreme Court limited tribal 
sovereignty outside the reservation and implicitly precluded tribal sovereignty over non­
200 Box 156, HAB Papers, “Bench Memo, No. 71-738, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, Cert to N.M. Ct 
of App (Hendley) Cert denied by N.M. Sup Ct on Oct 6 ,1971 ,” RIM, December 8, 1972, 32.
' Box 1:380, WJB Papers, “No. 71-834. McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona,” 1.
Box 156, HAB Papers, “Re: No. 71-834, McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Arizona,” memorandum 
from Byron White to Thurgood Marshall, February 21, 1973.
Box 102, Thurgood Marshall Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C.,
Judge-, 71-738,” 1ms to Marshall, n.d.
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members outside the reservation. This helped develop the idea that tribes did not have 
authority over non-members inside the reservation.
The Mescalero Apache Tribe opinion supported state authority inside the reservation and 
used the facts and language of McClanahan to sanction state authority over non-members 
in the reservation. Although Byron White believed that federal authority was the 
appropriate source of power to decide questions of state law in the reservation, federal 
law could not prevent state law from being applied in the reservation at all times;
“At the outset, we reject - as did the state court - the broad assertion that the Federal 
Government has exclusive jurisdiction over the Tribe for all purposes and that the State is 
therefore prohibited from enforcing its revenue laws against any tribal enterprise 
"[wjhether the enterprise is located on or off tribal land." Generalizations on this subject 
have become particularly treacherous.”204
The importance of state sovereignty in the reservation emasculated Worcester and tribal 
sovereignty in the reservation. White thought that the “conceptual clarity” of Worcester 
had “given way to more individualized treatment of particular treaties and specific federal 
statutes, including statehood enabling legislation, as they, taken together, affect the 
respective rights of States, Indians, and the Federal Government.”205 The Supreme Court 
used the facts of McClanahan, which involved questions of state law over tribal 
members, to hold that the limitations placed on tribal sovereignty allowed the states to 
take control of non-member activity in the reservations, “The upshot has been the 
repeated statements of this Court to the effect that, even on reservations, state laws may 
be applied unless such application would interfere with reservation self-government or
me Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 147-148.
Ibid., 148.
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would impair a right granted or reserved by federal law. Organized Village of 
Kake...Williams v. Lee...”206 It was beyond doubt that the Supreme Court sanctioned 
state authority in the reservation and state authority over non-members in the reservation. 
Tribal authority was powerless to prevent state law in the reservation as the McClanahan 
case had limited it specifically to tribal members. Set against the facts of McClanahan, 
Robert Clinton argued that the Mescalero Apache Tribe court “ ...was attempting to forge 
a greater change in federal Indian law ...”207 and allow states to gain a foothold in the 
reservations. Although Kathleen Corr said, “Courts have since relied on Mescalero to 
authorize taxation and regulation of off-reservation tribal enterprises,”208 it is also clear 
that it established a principle, set against the facts and language of McClanahan that 
allowed state authority into the reservation and over non-members in the reservation.
The Supreme Court continued with the development of the integrationist trend, which 
allowed state law into the reservation until removed by Congress and in combination with 
McClanahan further limited the scope of Worcester and tribal sovereignty.
The Effect of McClanahan and Mescalero Apache Tribe
The sister taxation cases significantly changed the way in which the Supreme Court 
viewed the application of state law in the reservation. The Supreme Court began to view
207 I b i d -
767 Clinton, “The Dormant,” 1197.
Kathleen Corr, “A Doctrinal Traffic Jam: The Role of Federal Preemption Analysis in Conflicts between 
State and Tribal Vehicle Codes,” University o f Colorado Law Review 74 (2003): 723. Also, Corr said that 
Mescalero, “did not address state regulation of nonmember activities occurring within reservation 
boundaries,” 724. However this thesis argues it did.
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conflicts between tribal versus state authority in terms of their ‘Indianness,’ dividing 
cases into ‘Indian versus Non-Indian’ and ‘Indian versus Indian.’ These two cases also 
confirmed, as has been previously discussed, that state law over tribal members in the 
reservation was prohibited unless it was authorised by Congress and the Supreme Court 
applied the idea developed in a line of cases from 1959, which allowed the application of 
state law in the reservation until it was barred by congressional authority.
The sister taxation cases began the trend of deciding Native American case law in terms 
of who was involved. The thinking processes of the justices changed when a question of 
state law involved a non-member in a reservation in comparison to one that involved a 
tribal member. A McClanahan memorandum pointed out the influence that a non­
member had on the court’s interpretation of what ‘Indianness’ was believed to be, ‘This 
is relevant to the Indianness of the case. If she [a tribal member] earned the money from 
tourists, her case is weaker than if she earned it from other Indians.” 209 This general 
understanding fitted with the process undertaken by the Supreme Court, which limited
tribal sovereignty to tribal members in the reservation. This division between tribal
210members and non-members was discussed in Tonasket v. Washington (1973), a case 
related to McClanahan.
The justices in Tonasket discussed the reasons why the application of state law in the 
reservation depended on the involvement of tribal members or non-members. The 
Tonasket case involved whether a congressional act, named Public Law 280, allowed the
^  Box 156, HAB Papers, “Bench Memo, No.71-834-ASX, McClanahan, et a l .” RIM, 16.
Tonasket v. Washington, 411 U.S. 451 (1973).
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states to tax within the reservation. The Supreme Court discussed whether Public Law 
280 allowed the states to tax tribal members. However, from the facts of the McClanahan 
case tribal sovereignty protected tribal members from state law unless Congress was 
explicit about removing this protection. In the opinion of Harry Blackmun, Public Law 
280 did not remove the protections of tribal sovereignty over tribal members, observing 
that “Congress did not intend to remove Indian tax exemptions [and]...did not intend to 
extend taxing jurisdiction to the States.”211 John Paul Stevens concurred with this 
interpretation of tribal sovereignty, pointing out those issues of “I [Indian] to I [to be] 
exempt.”212 The legislation was not specific and it did not reverse tribal sovereignty over 
tribal members.
Conversely, the opinions regarding state law over non-members in the reservation were 
different. The justices also considered whether the facts of Tonasket allowed the states to 
tax non-members. The involvement of non-members in the reservation automatically 
defined the limitations of tribal authority. A memorandum read, “This is McClanahan 
with a twist. Arguably this case deals with relations with non-Indians, an area in which 
the Court has limited Worcester.”213 Therefore, the Supreme Court’s modern-day 
interpretation of Worcester limited tribal sovereignty and allowed state law into the 
reservation and control over the non-member in the reservation. A memorandum 
explained the court’s limitation of tribal authority when cases involved tribal members 
and non-members, “A line of cases has imposed tax liability on non-Indian activities
2" Box 158> HAB Papers, “71-1031,” H.A.B., n.d., 2.
Box 158, HAB Papers, “71-1031, 12-14-1972,” H.A.B., 14 December, 1972.
Box 158, HAB Papers, “Bench Memo No 71-1031-CSX, Tonasket v. Wash., et al,” RIM, December 9,
1972,47.
99
(e.g., railroads) on Indian reservations. Crimes of non-Indians against non-Indians have 
been exempted from Worcester. This is a non-Indian buyer/Indian seller case.”214 Tribal 
authority did not apply over non-members in the reservation unlike state law, which did. 
In line with the integrationist trend, state law applied in the reservation and only federal 
authority could reverse it. The Solicitor General (SG) agreed with the interpretation of the 
Supreme Court, which was pointed out in a memorandum, “The SG notes that this case is 
unusual because appt [tribe] sells primarily to non-Indians and sells a product not related 
to Indian activities...The SG also seems to lean toward federal preemption even when 
non-Indians are the buyers.”215 The Supreme Court was comfortable with dividing the 
law between exclusive tribal matters and tribal member versus non-member cases. As 
Blackmun noted, “The I [Indian] - non I [Indian] is a good -f line” and “Leaves to 
Congress”216 the right to allow tribal authority over non-members and the right to 
prohibit state law over non-members in the reservation.
In addition, the sister taxation cases ended the presumption that allowed state law to 
apply over tribal members in the reservation. The McClanahan court confirmed the 
inherent sovereignty of the tribes over tribal members in the reservation. This principle 
was re-affirmed by the Mescalero Apache Tribe court,
“Even so, in the special area of state taxation, absent cession of jurisdiction or other 
federal statutes permitting it, there has been no satisfactory authority for taxing Indian 
reservation lands or Indian income from activities carried on within the boundaries of the
214
215
216
Ibid., 50.
Ibid., 46.
Box 158, HAB Papers, “71-1031,” 3.
100
reservation, and McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, lays to rest any doubt in this 
respect by holding that such taxation is not permissible absent congressional consent.”217
The two cases confirmed that the sovereignty doctrine protected the tribes against state 
law. In contrast, the combination of the two cases ensured that state law was applicable 
within the reservation and allowed to function over non-members in the reservation.
Even though the sister taxation cases were two separate and independent cases, the 
Supreme Court treated them as a single case in order to facilitate a change in the law. In 
their own right, McClanahan involved tribal sovereignty over tribal members in a 
reservation and Mescalero Apache Tribe involved the issue of tribal affairs outside the 
reservation. However, the two cases established the beginnings of the silent revolution 
and the integrationist trend, which permanently established the authority of the state 
inside the reservation, allowed state power over non-members in the reservation and in 
time, diminished tribal authority over non-members in the reservation.
Conclusion
The private papers of Justices Harry A. Blackmun, Thurgood Marshall, William J. 
Brennan, William O. Douglas, Earl Warren and Hugo Lafayette Black provide evidence 
to support that the foundations of what this thesis terms the silent revolution were laid 
between 1959 and 1973.
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 148.
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The memorandums and written notes of the individual justices contained in the Williams, 
Kake, Metlakatla Indians, and Warren Trading Post case files provide evidence to show 
that the Supreme Court moved away from the sovereignty doctrine and towards the use of 
congressional authority to question, whether the application of state law in the reservation 
ought to be reversed by Congress. This tied in with the general movement of the Supreme 
Court towards basing the decision making process of Native American case law on a 
federal versus state authority basis, rather than considering tribal authority as an 
independent source of power. This entire process fundamentally weakened the Worcester 
principle and the re-invigoration of tribal sovereignty by the Williams court in 1959.
Memorandums in the Williams case show how the federal government wanted the
91 RSupreme Court to use congressional authority and to suppress the sovereignty doctrine. 
Individual justices were comfortable with using congressional authority and were
91Qconcerned about the complete absence of state law from the reservations. The Kake 
and Metlakatla cases revolved exclusively around the use of congressional authority to 
oust state law from the reservation.220 The Warren Trading Post case primarily used the 
idea of congressional authority to prevent the state from taxing a non-member trader in a 
reservation.221 This idea was further developed by the Supreme Court in the Kennedy
Box 188, EW Papers, “Bench Memo, No.39, 1958 Term, Williams v. Lee,” MAF, 4, 5, 8.
19 Box 1201, WOD Papers, “1957 Term No.811;” Box 1:15, WJB Papers, “Paul Williams and Lorena 
Williams;” Box 1201, WOD Papers, “Conference November 21;” and Box 188, EW Papers, “Bench 
Memo, No.39, 1958 Term, Williams v. Lee,” MAF, 2.
Box 218, EW Papers, “Bench M emo. No. 326,1959 Term, Metlakatla Indian,” MHB, n.d., 1; Box 1265, 
WOD Papers, “No. 2 -  Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, Conference December 15, 1961,” 1; Box 
1:60, WJB Papers, “No. 2 . Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan;” and Box 218, EW Papers, “B ench 
Memo, No. 2, 1961 Term,” RGG, 13.
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case. In 1973, the shift of the Supreme Court away from the sovereignty doctrine when 
deciding questions of state law in the reservation was pointed out by Thurgood
222 rrtt
Marshall. The position of Justices Rehnquist and Stewart and the views of tribal 
counsel also supported the application of general state law in the reservation, which in 
turn sanctioned state law over non-members in the reservation.223 The limitation of 
Worcester also justified the imposition of state law in the reservation.224 The 
development of the integrationist trend was applied by the justices involved in the sister 
taxation cases of McClanahan and Mescalero Apache Tribe. This process ensured that 
Worcester was limited to cover tribal authority over tribal members, which led to the 
presumption that tribes did not have authority over non-members in the reservation. 
Conversely, the states had authority over non-members within the reservation. The 
foundations of the silent revolution dramatically influenced the thinking of the Supreme 
Court Justices and fundamentally overturned the principle of the Indian sovereignty 
doctrine.
221
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Chapter 3
The Silent Revolution, 1973 to 2001
The silent revolution was a legal process undertaken by the Justices o f the United States 
Supreme Court from 1973 to 2001, which turned the Indian sovereignty doctrine on its 
head by fundam entally eroding the key attributes o f tribal power over non-members in 
the reservation and allow ing inherent state sovereignty into the reservation and over non­
members in the reservation.
The key attributes o f  tribal power examined in this thesis concern civil, criminal and 
taxation jurisdiction. This erosion o f  tribal sovereignty relied on an ideological change in 
the mindset o f  the Justices moving away from the sovereignty doctrine towards the use o f 
federal authority, known as federal pre-emption, to protect the interests o f  the tribes. This 
change was based on the Justices’ attempts to reconcile the presence o f tribal government 
and its concomitant sovereignty within a constitutional framework, which addressed only 
the powers o f  federal governm ent and state governments.
The movement by the Supreme Court towards judging Native American case law on a 
federal versus state basis was analysed in Chapter 2 and showed the Court was m oving 
away from view ing tribes as a third branch o f government. This thesis builds on that 
analysis by showing that after 1973 the Supreme Court continued to use federal authority 
to determine both tribal authority over non-members and the application o f  state law in
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the reservation. However, this is not to say that the sovereignty doctrine was nullified as 
some Justices used it in particular circumstances. Therefore, the ideological tensions that 
existed between the Justices regarding whether the Supreme Court applied the 
sovereignty doctrine or federal authority are also examined.
In contrast to the period from 1959 to 1973, from 1973 onwards the Supreme Court 
generally protected exclusive tribal rights in the reservation against state law. As was 
explained in Chapter 2, this protection was established in McClanahan v. Arizona State 
Tax Comm ’n (1973).1 This is confirmed by the views o f Joseph Singer who believed that 
the Supreme Court after 1973 did not diminish tribal authority over tribal members, 
pointing out that the court “has not cut back much at all on the power o f  tribes over their 
own members. It is important to recall that this is perhaps the heart o f  tribal sovereignty; 
such power exists even when tribal members are on non-tribal land within reservation 
borders.”2 Although the actions o f the Supreme Court Justices protected tribal authority 
over tribal m em bers, its actions also led to the erosion o f tribal authority over non­
members from 1973.
In order to demonstrate the legal process o f the silent revolution this thesis traces the 
gradual erosion o f  the key attributes o f  tribal power and the gradual formation of, what 
this thesis term s, the integrationist trend in taxation, criminal and civil case law after the 
sister taxation cases o f McClanahan and Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones (197_>) up to
, McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm ’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
Joseph William Singer, Letter to author, April 27, 2006.
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2 0 01 / Indeed, I argue that the silent revolution was underpinned by the integrationist 
trend. The conclusion o f  the 1973 cases created a set o f Supreme Court presumptions 
limiting tribal authority over non-members and allowing state law into the reservations. 
These presumptions led the Supreme Court to question how much authority the tribes had 
over non-mem bers in the reservations and how much authority the states had over non­
members in the reservations. In addition, it also led to questions whether the sovereignty 
doctrine prohibited the application o f state law in the reservations or whether state law 
was applicable in the reservations until prohibited by Congress.
These questions dom inated the thinking o f the Supreme Court Justices during the silent 
revolution from 1973 to 2001. A distinctive line o f  thinking adopted by the Supreme 
Court Justices underpinned the silent revolution. The development o f the integrationist 
trend in the m indset o f  the justices created a clear trend in the decision making process o f 
the court. This integrationist trend is identified by four key interchangeable principles, 
which between them  turned the Indian sovereignty doctrine on its head.
The principles are:
1) If the tribes relied on congressional authority to oust state law from the reservation 
then by default the state had general authority in the reservation.
2) If the states had general authority in the reservation they also had authority over non- 
members in the reservation.
J) If the tribes had authority over only tribal members in the reservation, then by default 
they had no power over non-members inside the reservation.
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
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4) If the tribes did not have inherent sovereignty over non-members in the reservation
*- *.2*-
then the inherent sovereignty o f the state automatically applied to non-members in the 
reservation.
In contrast, Joseph Singer believed that the Supreme Court did not consider tribal 
authority over non-m em bers to be limited or state authority to be inherent in the 
reservation, explaining that “ ...th is  view  about the relation between state and tribal power 
is inaccurate and m isleading.”4 Singer argued that federal power filled the void when 
tribes did not have authority over non-members and in order for states to have power, 
Congressional legislation was required. The Singer interpretation o f  tribal and state 
relations will be directly challenged by the analysis in this thesis o f  the integrationist 
trend, which argues that in 2001, the four principles o f the trend were combined to 
completely divest tribal authority over non-members in the reservation. Thus, it followed 
that the state had inherent sovereignty over non-members in the reservation /
It is argued that the principles o f  the integrationist trend worked in tandem to overturn the 
sovereignty doctrine. From 1973, the Supreme Court Justices viewed federal authority as 
the tool, term ed federal pre-emption, which would decide questions o f  tribal authority 
over non-m em bers and questions about state law in the reservation. Therefore, the 
Justices delegated federal authority to the tribes and allowed them to have authority over 
non-members in the reservation while allowing state law to exist in the reservation and 
over non-m em bers in the reservation unless it was reversed by Congress. This approach
4 Joseph William Singer, “Canons o f  Conquest: The Supreme Court’s Attack on Tribal Sovereignty,” New 
England Law Review  37 (2003): 643.
This all occurred in Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
107
showed that the two doctrines used by the Supreme Court, known as the federal pre­
emption doctrine established in McClanahan (1973) and the implicit divestiture doctrine 
established in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe (1978),6 were not separate doctrines. 
Instead, the movement o f  the court towards federal authority underpinned them .7
This thesis’ argum ent that federal authority influenced the principles o f  the federal pre­
emption and implicit divestiture doctrines in determining the scope o f  tribal authority in 
the reservation, builds on certain parts o f  scholarly interpretation. Charles F. Wilkinson 
suggested that tribal authority after 1973 was to be “defined in the first instance by 
Congress” and in 1978, the Oliphant court “appeared to take several major strides down 
a road now  seem ing to lead inexorably toward a doctrine that would base tribal powers 
on federal de legation /^  W ilkinson’s interpretation seemed to argue that congressional 
authority was required in order for tribes to have authority over non-members in the 
reservation. In addition, Vine Deloria and Clifford M. Lytle argued that federal authority 
underpinned the rulings o f  the justices in McClanahan (1973) and Mazurie (1975) to 
determine the authority o f  the tribes in the reservation. Deloria and Lytle indicated that 
the Suprem e Court was moving away from the sovereignty doctrine, pointing out that the 
sovereignty doctrine was “ ...replaced with a more flexible philosophy o f federal pre­
6 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
7 The change o f  position taken by the Supreme Court in 1973 from the position o f the sovereignty doctrine, 
which held that tribes had inherent sovereignty over reservation lands and all peoples within those lands 
unless it was revoked by treaty or an act o f Congress, to the position referred to as Federal pre-emption, 
which held that an act o f  Congress was required for tribal authority to exist, highlighted that fundamental 
changes took place before 1978. In fact, this process undertaken by the court in 1978 was heavily informed 
by this progression o f  the law.
8 Charles F. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 
60, 60-61 (brief discussion o f  implicit divestiture), 93-99 (discussion o f  federal pre-emption).
9 Ibid., 61.
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emption o f  Indian matters and an occasional recognition o f  the congressional delegation 
o f  federal powers and responsibilities to tribal governm ent.” 10
In addition, this thesis’ interpretation o f  the federal pre-emption and implicit divestiture 
doctrines and the application o f the integrationist trend challenge parts o f scholarly 
opinion that view  these two doctrines to be separate without one influencing the other. As 
well as building on a part o f  the works written by W ilkinson and Deloria and Lytle, this 
thesis also challenges parts o f  their interpretations as well as other scholars. In contrast to 
Charles W ilkinson’s initial assessment regarding the movement o f the Supreme Court to 
federal authority, he revised this initial assessment o f the two doctrines and their 
connection with each other to one acknowledging their separate nature. Wilkinson 
explained that in the case o f  Mazurie (1975), the Supreme Court relied on the principle o f  
inherent tribal sovereignty, noting that the case “highlighted the importance o f tribal 
sovereignty as an independent source o f  authority” 11 while in the Wheeler case o f 1978, 
the Supreme Court “rendered an endorsem ent o f  the tribal sovereignty doctrine in such 
ringing term s.” 12 However, the W ilkinson interpretation o f  Mazurie was incorrect. 
Instead o f  using tribal sovereignty, the Supreme Court had relied exclusively on federal 
authority to allow  the tribes to have authority over non-members in the reservation. 
Furthermore, the Wheeler case involved state law over tribal members and unsurprisingly 
the ‘endorsem ent’ o f  tribal sovereignty fitted in with the movement o f  the court after 
1973 towards limiting tribal sovereignty to tribal members. The opinion o f Deloria and
10 V i n e  D e l o r i a  a n d  C l i f f o r d  M .  L y t l e ,  American Indians, American Justice ( A u s t i n :  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  T e x a s
P r e s s ,  1 9 8 3 ) ,  5 5 ;  5 4 - 5 7 ,  2 0 5 - 2 0 9  ( d i s c u s s i o n  o f  f e d e r a l  p r e - e m p t i o n ) ,  9 0  ( t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  Mazurie, a  
f e d e r a l  d e l e g a t i o n  c a s e ,  a n d  Oliphant, a n  i m p l i c i t  d i v e s t i t u r e  c a s e ) .
W i l k i n s o n ,  Time, and the law , 6 0 .
12 Ibid., 61.
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Lytle did not consider Oliphant to be an extension o f  the principles used to decide
mv s ~ . .  - T  -  ' •  ^  * - - - r -
Mazurie P  This thesis challenges this part o f their book and argues that the principles 
used in Mazurie informed the Oliphant decision. In Mazurie, the Supreme Court decided 
that tribal authority over non-members was authorised by a federal delegation o f power, 
thereby limiting tribal authority to tribal members. With this in mind, the Oliphant court 
began from the presumption that tribal authority over non-members could only exist if 
delegated by Congress.
William C. Canby explained that the federal pre-emption and implicit divestiture 
doctrines severely limited tribal authority within the reservation but did not consider that 
the movement o f the Supreme Court towards federal authority had an influence on them 
both, noting that “ ...there are two or three doctrines that the Supreme Court has evolved, 
and even within those doctrines, has changed over time. The present trend in use o f all o f 
those doctrines is to the detriment o f tribal power.” 14 Canby considered the two doctrines 
to be separate, pointing out that “The first doctrinal step occurred in a case generally 
regarded as a victory for the Tribes-McClanahan.. and the Oliphant court “invented a 
new limitation on tribal status,” 16 which according to Canby placed a “far greater 
doctrinal limitation on Indian tribal power.” 17 Both Stephen L. Pevar and David E. 
Wilkins discussed both the development and the effect o f federal pre-emption on tribal 
sovereignty but these discussions were separated from the doctrine developed by the
13 Deloria and Lytle, American Indians, 190.
14 Senate Committee on Indian Affairs. Rulings o f the U.S. Supreme Court as They Affect the Powers and 
Authorities o f  the Indian Tribal Governments: Hearing on the Concerns o f Recent Decisions o f the U.S 
Supreme Court and the Future o f  Indian Tribal Governments in America. 107th Cong., 2d sess., 27 
February 2002, 20.
15 Ibid., 45.
16 Ibid., 21.
17 Ibid., 46.
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. - QJiphant court in 1978, pointing to the fact that neither scholar viewed federal authority
N i
underlying principle which informed the two doctrines.18
Philip P. Frickey considered the role that congressional policy and intent played in 
Supreme Court case law after 1973. Fte believed that the limitations placed on tribal 
sovereignty by the Supreme Court were not a result o f  the court’s use o f congressional 
authority, arguing that “Congressional intent has played only a marginal role in the post- 
McClanahan decisions” 1} with later cases having “largely abandoned any reliance on 
congressional intent.”"0 Frickey also argued that the opinions o f  the Supreme Court away 
from the sovereignty doctrine were unprincipled, noting that post-1973 case law 
including Mazurie and Oliphant “may lack coherence” indicating that the Supreme Court 
“has failed to articulate a principled and coherent understanding o f  this series o f
<
• • ? 1decisions.”" This lack o f coherence in Supreme Court case law was termed by Frickey as 
“largely a collection o f ad hoc judicial assessments.”22
L. Scott Gould challenged Frickey and argued that the actions o f  the Supreme Court did 
not rely on federal authority but were based on the principle that non-members had to 
consent to be governed by tribal law. Gould explained that the Supreme Court decisions
18 S t e p h e n  L .  P e v a r ,  The Rights o f Indians and Tribes: The authoritative ACLU guide to Indian and tribal 
rights, 3 d .  e d .  ( C a r b o n d a l e  a n d  E d w a r d s v i l l e :  S o u t h e r n  I l l i n o i s  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  2 0 0 2 ) ,  1 2 9 - 1 3 5  
( d i s c u s s i o n  o f  f e d e r a l  p r e - e m p t i o n ) ,  1 4 3  ( d i s c u s s i o n  o f  i m p l i c i t  d i v e s t i t u r e  a s  a  s e p a r a t e  d o c t r i n e ) ;  a n d  
D a v i d  E . W i l k i n s ,  American Indian Sovereignty and the U.S. Supreme Court: The Masking of Justice 
( A u s t i n :  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  T e x a s  P r e s s ,  1 9 9 7 ) ,  2 7 7 - 2 7 9  ( d i s c u s s i o n  o f  F e d e r a l  p r e - e m p t i o n ) ,  1 8 6 - 2 1 4  
( d i s c u s s i o n  o f  Oliphant a n d  t h e  d i v e s t i t u r e  d o c t r i n e ) .
|q P h i l i p  P .  F r i c k e y ,  “ C o n g r e s s i o n a l  I n t e n t ,  P r a c t i c a l  R e a s o n i n g ,  a n d  t h e  D y n a m i c  N a t u r e  o f  F e d e r a l  I n d i a n  
L a w ,”  California Law Review 7 8  ( 1 9 9 0 ) :  1 1 7 3 .
20 I b i d . ,  1 1 6 1 .
:i P h i l i p  P .  F r i c k e y ,  “ A  C o m m o n  L a w  f o r  O u r  A g e  o f  C o l o n i a l i s m :  T h e  J u d i c i a l  D i v e s t i t u r e  o f  I n d i a n  
T r i b a l  A u t h o r i t y  o v e r  N o n - m e m b e r s , ”  Yale Law Journal 1 0 9  ( 1 9 9 9 ) :  2 8 .
22 F r i c k e y ,  “ C o n g r e s s i o n a l  I n t e n t , ”  1 1 4 2 .
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from 1975 “can be explained as resting on an implicit limitation o f tribal sovereignty to 
consenting members.”-J Gould viewed the two doctrines o f  federal pre-emption and the 
result o f  Oliphant, as what he termed "congressional delegation", to be separate 
functions, pointing out that his consent theory replaced tribal sovereignty; “Absent a 
congressional delegation o f  authority, federal preemption, or a finding o f inherent civil 
jurisdiction, the sovereign rights o f tribes are sufficient to prevail in disputes between 
tribes and tribal members only.”24 Counter to the views o f Gould, Frickey, Wilkinson, 
Canby, Pevar, Wilkins, Deloria and Lytle, I argue that the workings o f the Supreme Court 
Justices were informed by the Supreme Court’s use o f federal delegation to allow tribes 
to have authority over non-members and the court’s reliance on allowing state power to 
exist in the reservation until prohibited by Congress. Therefore, congressional authority 
confirmed the power o f the tribes and the limits to which state authority existed in the 
reservation.
The first cases to apply the principles o f  the integrationist trend after 1973 were United 
States v. Mazurie (1975) and Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes (1976).23 In these cases, 
the Supreme Court applied the new ideas and began the erosion o f the sovereignty 
doctrine and the fundamental erosion o f the key attributes o f tribal power.
23 L . S c o t t  G o u l d ,  ‘T h e  C o n s e n t  P a r a d i g m :  T r i b a l  S o v e r e i g n t y  a t  t h e  M i l l e n n i u m , ”  Columbia Law Review 
9 6 ( 1 9 9 6 ) :  8 1 0 .
24 I b i d . ,  8 1 4 .  G o u l d  a r g u e d ,  b a s e d  o n  c a s e  l a w  f r o m  1 9 7 5  t o  1 9 9 0 ,  t h a t  t h e r e  w a s  a  “ d e c l i n e  o f  l a n d - b a s e d  
s o v e r e i g n t y ,  a n d  t h e  r i s e  o f  s o v e r e i g n t y  b a s e d  u p o n  c o n s e n t ”  a n d  “ m a n y  o f  t h e  C o u r t ' s  d e c i s i o n s  in  t h e  p a s t  
t w o  d e c a d e s  c a n  b e  e x p l a i n e d  a s  r e s t i n g  o n  a n  i m p l i c i t  l i m i t a t i o i ^ o f  t r i b a l  s o v e r e i g n t y  t o  c o n s e n t i n g  
m e m b e r s , ”  8 1 0 .
5 United States v . Mazurie, 4 1 9  U .S .  5 4 4  ( 1 9 7 5 ) ;  a n d  Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 4 2 5  U .S .  4 6 3  
( 1 9 7 6 ) .
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United States v. Mazurie (1975)
The first test of the sovereignty doctrine against the development o f the integrationist 
trend came in 1975. This case concerned a non-member who operated a bar on fee lands 
on the outskirts o f  the Wind River Reservation and who was prohibited from selling 
alcohol in the reservation by the Wind River Tribes, pursuant to a congressional statute. 
The Supreme Court had to decide whether the congressional delegation o f power allowed 
the tribal council to have authority over the non-member and prevent him from selling 
alcohol. The Mazurie case was the first after 1973 to build on the presumption 
established by the McClanahan court and to apply the ruling in law that tribal authority 
over non-members was limited until Congress delegated the appropriate authority.26 The 
actions o f  the Supreme Court Justices had fundamentally limited the sovereignty doctrine 
and the principle o f  the Williams case by applying what was termed earlier in Chapter 2, 
as the foundations o f the silent revolution. Despite the justices being briefed on the merits 
o f tribal sovereignty and congressional authority, the development o f the integrationist 
trend determined that many Supreme Court Justices discussed only the idea o f 
congressional authority in the course o f  their deliberations and in the court’s final 
opinion.
The analysis o f the Mazurie case in this thesis challenges the Charles F. Wilkinson 
interpretation and supports the opinions o f  L. Scott Gould and Vine Deloria and Clifford 
Lytle. Wilkinson believed that the primary foundations o f the Mazurie opinion involved
~b A f t e r  t h e  s i s t e r  t a x a t i o n  c a s e s  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  l e g i s l a t i o n  w a s  r e q u i r e d  t o  o u s t  s t a t e  l a w  f r o m  t h e  
r e s e r v a t i o n  a n d  t r i b a l  a u t h o r i t y  o v e r  n o n - m e m b e r s  h a d  t o  b e  s a n c t i o n e d  b y  a  d e l e g a t i o n  f r o m  C o n g r e s s .
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the application of the sovereignty doctrine, explaining that “Mazurie highlighted the 
importance o f tribal sovereignty as an independent source o f  authority.”27 However, 
Wilkinson did not take account o f the importance o f  congressional authority in the 
decision making process o f the justices. Indeed, the Mazurie opinion explicitly held that 
the Supreme Court did not decide the case based on inherent tribal sovereignty.28 In 
contrast, Deloria and Lytle interpreted Mazurie as a congressional delegation case, noting 
that “ ...tribal sovereignty...has been relegated to a subordinate position in federal law 
and has been replaced with a more flexible philosophy o f federal pre-emption o f Indian 
matters and an occasional recognition o f  the congressional delegation o f federal powers 
and responsibilities to tribal government {UnitedStates v. Mazurie. . .).”29 This view fitted 
in with the movement o f  the court towards using congressional authority to decide 
‘Indian cases.’ Gould concurred with the opinion o f Deloria and Lytle, stating “ ...despite 
[the] invocation o f  Worcester and its recitation o f  the attributes o f authority, the decision 
delivered almost nothing to support the doctrine o f inherent sovereignty.”j0
The foundations o f  the silent revolution from 1959 to 1973 played a key role in the 
outcome o f  the Mazurie case and further weakened the broad ruling o f  Williams v. Lee, 
which held that tribes had inherent sovereignty over non-members. Tribal sovereignty 
after 1973 appeared to be limited to tribal members and the Supreme Court did not want 
to reverse this principle. A memorandum to Justice Harry A. Blackmun explained the 
limitations imposed on tribal sovereignty and the development o f congressional authority
~7 W i l k i n s o n ,  Time, and the law, 6 0 .
United States v. Mazurie, 5 5 7 .
"9 D e l o r i a  a n d  L y t l e ,  American Indians, 5 5 .
0 G o u l d ,  “ T h e  C o n s e n t  P a r a d i g m , ”  8 4 0 .
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as a bona tide principle, pointing out that “In short, the delegation o f authority seems to 
be both desirable and sufficiently limited to pass muster under this Court’s prior views o f 
Indian sovereignty.”jl The issue o f congressional delegation was the principal theme o f 
the case but there were concerns, even if Congress granted it, about delegating too much 
authority to the tribes for them to have control over non-members in the reservation. A 
memorandum read, “ What are the limits on Congress’ authority to delegate to Indians the 
power to govern non-Indians’ conduct on the Indian reservation?”32 The movement o f the 
Supreme Court away from tribal sovereignty meant that it did not want Congress to 
sanction all kinds o f  tribal control over non-members. Fundamentally, the justices limited 
the broad rationale o f  the Williams case. Indeed the seeds o f the silent revolution laid in 
Williams, were discussed in a bench memorandum explaining that the Williams case did 
not rely on tribal sovereignty but instead relied on a delegation o f congressional power; 
“ ...th is Court has approved the grant o f jurisdiction to Indians to deal with non-Indians in 
certain matter o f  importance to the reservation. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 
223.” Therefore, Williams was limited to a congressional authority case, which tied in 
with the thinking o f  the justices.
The justices o f  the Supreme Court had the option to use the sovereignty doctrine or 
congressional authority to authorise tribal authority over non-members in the reservation. 
In memoranda to the court, both options were presented as viable ways to decide the 
case. The arguments for the sovereignty doctrine were contained in references to Buster
31 B o x  1 9 7 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o  7 3 - 1 0 1 8 ,  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  v .  M a z u r i e ,  C e r t  t o  C A  1 0 ,”  A G ,  N o v e m b e r  6 ,  1 9 7 4 ,  
18.
32 I b id .
33 I b id . ,  1 7 .
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v. Wright, which held that a tribe had inherent sovereignty to tax non-members in the 
reservation. A memorandum stated that the Buster case “ ...did hold that the Creek Indian 
Nation had authority to tax non-citizens o f the Tribe for the privilege o f transacting 
business within its borders, despite the fact that the business was conducted on fee 
patented lands. The authority was said to be "one o f the inherent and essential attributes 
o f its original sovereignty."’04 The argument was also presented to the court that 
Congress had plenary power over Indian affairs, which included allowing the tribes to 
sell alcohol to non-members in the reservation. Referring to the case o f Perrin v. United 
States, a memorandum explained this principle, which allowed Congress exclusive 
control over matters involving alcohol in the reservation,
“ In that case Congress had imposed a restriction on ceded lands within the vicinity o f 
lands retained by Indians which prohibited sale o f intoxicating liquors. The Court noted 
that Congress had broad discretion to control the sale o f liquor...as part o f its protective 
concern for the Indians. That decision seems broad enough to sustain the constitutionality 
of 18U.S.C. 1154.”35
In the course o f  addressing the issues o f the case, the justices supported the movement o f 
the Supreme Court away from the sovereignty doctrine.
A number o f  justices explicitly supported the delegation o f congressional power in order 
to give the tribe authority over non-members. Harry Blackmun was one justice who 
believed that Congress had plenary power over Indian affairs, especially those involving
1 B o x  1 9 7 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ P r e l i m i n a r y  M e m o ,  C o n f .  F e b .  2 2 ,  1 9 7 4 ,  L i s t  1 , S h e e t  2 ,  N o .  7 3 - 1 0 1 8  -  U n i t e d
S ta t e s  v .  M a z u r i e , ”  F a r r ,  F e b r u a r y  1 2 ,  1 9 7 4 ,  7 .35 «•.
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alcohol, and that the outcome o f Perrin v. United States supported the facts o f the 
Mazurie case,
“Congressional power under Art. I, § 8 to regulate commerce with Indian tribes is broad 
indeed. There is little doubt left that it has the right to regulate the sale o f alcohol in 
Indian country. This is clearly established by Perrin v. United States, 232 U.S. 478 (1914) 
with respect to sales o f alcohol on non-Indian lands even though non-Indians are the 
sellers.”j6
Blackmun suggested that the plenary authority o f  Congress over Indian affairs allowed 
Congress to delegate its authority to the tribes, noting that the “ Delegation o f power may 
not be unlimited, but I am not disturbed about what delegation we have here, when it 
relates to the sale o f  liquor within the boundaries of a reservation. This is surely a 
localised concern.” ’7 However, the language used by Blackmun suggested that issues o f 
greater or broader concern involving tribes and non-members did not support tribal 
jurisdiction over non-members. He argued that the justification o f using congressional 
authority was to protect the interests and welfare o f the tribes involved. As Blackmun 
observed, “ ...the  alcohol problem among Indians, together with the desire to foster 
responsibility on the part o f  the Indian councils should support the statute.” 8^ Justice 
Potter Stewart agreed that the case only revolved around the issue o f  congressional 
authority, pointing out that “Think sufficient notice given by this statute and that’s all 
there is to this case.”39 Justice Byron White concurred with Stewart, noting that “agree
36 B o x  1 9 7 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o .  7 3 - 1 0 1 8  -  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  v . M a z u r i e ,”  H . A . B .  N o v e m b e r  1 0 ,  1 9 7 4 ,  4 .
37 I b id .
38 I b id .
B o x  1 :3 3 8 ,  W i l l i a m  J .  B r e n n a n  P a p e r s ,  M a n u s c r i p t  D i v i s i o n ,  L i b r a r y  o f  C o n g r e s s ,  W a s h i n g t o n ,  D .C . ,  
" N o . 7 3 - 1 0 8 . U n i t e d  S t a t e s  v .  M a z u r i e ,”  W . J . B . ,  n . d .
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with PS.”40 The position o f  Chief Justice Warren Burger also supported the congressional 
authority analysis, however he did not believe that the legislation involved in the case 
supported tribal authority over non-members, pointing out that “This statute is first too 
vague.”41
The Mazurie judgem ent continued the post-1973 judicial shift by the reliance on 
congressional authority and not using inherent tribal sovereignty. This case applied the 
principle from the sister taxation cases, which appeared to limit tribal authority over non­
members in the reservation, and allowed the tribes to exercise authority over non­
members under a congressional delegation o f power. The process adopted by the Mazurie 
court led directly to Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes (1976) which was the first case o f 
the ‘modem era’ (from 1959)42 to allow state law into the reservation and state law over 
non-members in the reservation.4"
Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes (1976)
The basis o f  the argument in Moe was whether the State o f Montana had the right to 
impose cigarette sales taxes on transactions between tribal members and non-members 
within the reservation and have a tribal member collect the tax for the state. In addition, 
the state wanted to impose a cigarette tax on cigarettes sold by tribal members to other
40 I b id .
4' I b id .
'  C h a r l e s  F .  W i l k i n s o n  e x p l a i n e d  t h a t  t h e  ‘m o d e r n  e r a ’ o f  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  c a s e  l a w  b e g a n  
w ith  Williams v . Lee ( 1 9 5 9 ) ,  Time, and the law , 1.
S e e  M i c h a e l  M i n n i s ,  “ J u d i c i a l l y - S u g g e s t e d  h a r a s s m e n t  o f  I n d i a n  T r i b e s :  T h e  P o t a w a t o m i s  R e v i s i t  M o e  
a n d  C o l v i l l e , ”  American Indian Law Review 1 6  ( 1 9 9 1 ) :  2 8 9 - 3 1 8 .
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tribal members and to tax the personal property o f tribal members within the reservation. 
Therefore, Moe considered the question o f state authority in the reservation and over non­
members in the reservation. Only the cigarette tax issue is examined in the context o f this 
thesis and the personal property tax issue is not considered. Although Moe was referred 
to as “an insignificant Indian tax dispute in Montana,”44 the case built on the principle o f 
the court sanctioning general state law in the reservation unless revoked by Congress. 
Thus, limiting tribal sovereignty to tribal members and further weakening the judgment 
in Williams. The decisions o f the Supreme Court towards congressional authority connect 
Moe and Mazurie. The Supreme Court believed that congressional authority defined 
tribal authority over non-members and also, defined the limitations o f state law over non­
members. In addition, the limitations o f  tribal authority over non-members resulted in 
limitations placed on tribal sovereignty to prevent the application o f state law inside the 
reservation. The Moe case had also involved questions o f state law over tribal members 
but the Supreme Court ruled that the states had no authority to tax tribal members inside 
the reservation, following the principle established in McClanahan.
Limitations placed on tribal sovereignty and the Williams principle by the Supreme Court 
Justices had allowed general state law into the reservation. This decision was firmly 
based on the foundations o f the silent revolution, which allowed state authority into the 
reservation until it encroached upon tribal government or tribal laws. This development 
limited tribal sovereignty and was summed up by Harry Blackmun, *wAs to acts between 
an Indian and a non-Indian, the state has jurisdiction where that jurisdiction does not
44 B o b  W o o d w a r d  a n d  S c o t t  A r m s t r o n g ,  The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court ( N e w  Y o r k :  S i m o n  a n d  
Schuster, 1979), 412.
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infringe on the right o f reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them. 
Having stated these principles, where do they take us? The application always is the 
difficult task.”43 The court had to consider whether a state tax over non-members in the 
reservation, which had to be collected by tribal members, affected tribal government. The 
mindset o f  the justices had moved away from the principle o f inherent sovereignty used 
by the Williams court to prohibit state law in the reservation. Harry A. Blackmun 
explained what the outcome o f  the Moe case would have been if  the court had adhered to 
the Williams principle,
“The cigarette tax on Indian to non-Indian on reservation sales. This, o f  course, is the 
tough issue. Does the tax infringe on the right o f tribal members to make their own laws 
and be governed by them? On a formal legalistic approach the answer would be that it 
does interfere. And Williams v. Lee stands for the proposition that mere involvement o f 
outsiders is not sufficient to grant jurisdiction.”46
The language used by Blackmun clarified the legal approach o f Williams but it also 
indicated the reluctance o f Blackmun to use the sovereignty doctrine, based on the case 
law after 1959 that allowed state law into the reservations. The general movement o f the 
court away from tribal sovereignty undermined, what Blackmun termed the ‘formal 
legalistic approach.’ Blackmun’s reluctance to use inherent tribal sovereignty was 
confirmed when he pointed out that “the normal solution” would have been “to hold that 
Montana does not have jurisdiction to force the Indian vendor to precollect the tax with 
respect to sales to non-Indians.”47 The interpretation o f Justice William Brennan 
supported what the law should have done if Williams still dominated the thinking o f the
4' B o x  2 2 5 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o . 7 4 - 1 6 5 6 .  M o e  v .  C o n f e d e r a t e d  T r i b e s  7 5 - 5 0  -  C o n f e d e r a t e d  T r i b e s  v .  M o e .”  
H .A .B . ,  J a n u a r y  1 9 , 1 9 7 6 , 3 .
46 I b i d . ,  5 .
47 , ,  . ,
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Supreme Court Justices. Brennan highlighted the movement o f the court away from the 
tribal sovereignty doctrine when he was thinking about ways to allow the state to have 
control inside the reservation; “As I noted in my bench memo, traditional theories would 
hold that the Indian could not be required to collect the tax ...I have no great policy 
difficulties, however, with the result reached here (although it does reduce the concept o f 
the reservation as a separate sovereignty).”48 According to Brennan, the process o f 
integration and the interests o f the state in the reservation were preferred to the traditional 
approaches o f Federal Indian law. Indeed, the ‘normal situation’ and the ‘traditional 
theories’ had not existed within the mindset o f the justices for many years. The 
movement o f the court away from the sovereignty doctrine was reflected in the court’s 
approach to devising a new theory to allow state law to apply in the reservation, “Under 
the presently accepted legal analysis the state does not appear to have the 
jurisdiction...The involvement o f the state in internal reservation affairs is too great. I 
suggest, however, a new theory to cover the situation...”49 Once the Supreme Court 
agreed not to apply the Williams principle, state law was sanctioned inside the 
reservation.
The Supreme Court adopted the practice of allowing the states to have authority over 
non-members in the reservation. The new practice revolved around the idea that the 
purchase o f  cigarettes by a non-member in the reservation was a criminal act under state 
laws. Harry Blackmun believed that once the Supreme Court justified M ontana’s interests
48 B o x  2 2 5 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ M o e  v .  C o n f e d e r a t e d  S a l i s h  a n d  K o o t e n a i  T r i b e s ,  N o s  7 4 - 1 6 5 6  a n d  7 5 - 5 0 ,  R e :  
P r o p o s e d  d r a f t  b y  J u s t i c e  R e h n q u i s t , ”  W H B ,  A p r i l  2 ,  1 9 7 6 ,  2 .
4" B o x  2 2 5 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o .  7 5 - 1 6 5 6 ,  M o e  v .  C o n f e d e r a t e d  S a l i s h  a n d  K o o t e n a i  T r i b e s ,  N o .  7 5 - 5 0  
C o n f e d e r a t e d  S a l i s h  a n d  K o o t e n a i  T r i b e s  v .  M o e ,  A p p e a l  f r o m  t h r e e - j u d g e  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  ( D .  M o n t a n a ) , ”  
B lo c k ,  J a n u a r y  1 7 ,  1 9 7 6 ,  2 - 3 .
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in the reservation then the state automatically assumed control o f the non-members, “One 
theory that might well support the tax is that the state has a definite interest, with respect 
to its general criminal jurisdiction over the reservation, in not permitting the Indian 
vendor to cause the non-Indian vendee from violating another Montana statute that 
prohibits ones use of an untaxed cigarette.’00 The process o f undermining the sovereignty 
doctrine had removed the barrier prohibiting the application o f state law inside the 
reservation boundary. The interests o f the state were now important, especially in the 
minds o f  the justices. As Blackmun observed, “O f some interest, o f  course, is the theory 
suggested above that the state may properly have an interest, and assert it...”51 William 
Brennan concurred with the interpretation o f the new theory justifying the supremacy o f 
state law over the reservation and over non-members in the reservation. He pointed out in 
a draft proposal o f  the opinion that “ In regard to the sales o f  cigarettes by Indians to non- 
Indians, I think that the draft is correct to focus on the fact that use o f unstamped 
cigarettes by non-Indians is a crime.’02 The Supreme Court blurred the distinction 
between the reservation boundary and the state line. A criminal act outside the 
reservation was interpreted by the court to involve a crime inside the reservation. As 
Brennan explained,
“Once it is extablished [sic] that the use by non-Indians is a crime, there are two ways o f 
dealing with the role o f  the Indian preventing that use. First, the Indian can be viewed as 
"causing" the non-Indian’s crime, and therefore reachable under a sort o f "aider and
' B o x  2 2 5 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o . 7 4 - 1 6 5 6 ,  M o e  v .  C o n f e d e r a t e d  T r i b e s  7 5 - 5 0  -  C o n f e d e r a t e d  T r i b e s  v .  M o e .”  
H .A .B ,  5 .
51 I b id .
‘ B o x  2 2 5 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ M o e  v .  C o n f e d e r a t e d  S a l i s h  a n d  K o o t e n a i  T r i b e s ,  N o s  7 4 - 1 6 5 6  a n d  7 5 - 5 0 . . . , ”  
W H B ,  1.
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abetter" theory. Second, the Indian can simply be made an "agent" o f the state in this 
particular circumstance and required to prevent the crime from occurring.”53
The state had authority over the activities o f a non-member in two ways and the Supreme 
Court had to choose one o f them.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court used this new interpretation to allow state tax into the 
reservation on the grounds that state law applied in the reservation because no 
congressional legislation existed to preclude state authority. Therefore, in order to 
prevent state taxation o f non-members in the reservation, Congress had to legislate. Thus, 
the court held that the states had authority over non-members in the reservation because 
Congress did not regulate the area o f tribal cigarette selling to non-members54 and the 
state tax did not burden federal legislation.55 The authority o f the state in the reservation 
was considered “a minimal burden” which did not “frustrate tribal self-government or run 
afoul o f any federal statute dealing with reservation Indians' affairs.”56 Furthermore, the 
tribe had to collect the state tax from the sales to non-members.57 This case opened the 
floodgates and once state law was applied in certain circumstances, it was also applied in 
other instances.
Even though the Moe case did not involve tribal authority over non-members, the 
developments in law from McClanahan (1973) over whether the ruling involved 
questions o f state authority or tribal authority turned on the intent o f congressional
54Ibid-4 T h e  c o u r t  r e j e c t e d  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  Warren Trading Post v. Tax Comm ’n, 3 8 0  U .S .  6 8 5  ( 1 9 6 5 ) .
" Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 4 8 2 .
I b id . ,  4 6 5 .
57
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authority. The connection between Moe and Mazurie was shown by arguments made by 
the State o f Washington about the limitations o f tribal sovereignty over non-members 
from 1973, unless Congress sanctioned the relevant authority over non-members,
“ [the state] argues that "Indian sovereignty" is not inherent in the tribes, but is something 
bestowed by Congress. It reads McClanahan as stating that the particular statutes and 
treaties there "read against the background of traditional Indian sovereignty" required tax 
immunity... "tribal sovereignty" is something within the control and creation o f Congress, 
and that therefore the burden is on the Indians to show that Congress intended to give 
them the particular sovereignty claimed.’08
Therefore, in 1976 the Supreme Court believed in the primacy o f congressional 
legislation to decide the issue o f tribal authority over non-members and relied on the 
principle that state law existed inside the reservation until prohibited by specific 
congressional legislation. However, in contrast to the position o f non-members, tribal 
members did not have to pay state taxes.
A majority o f the justices in the deliberations o f the case re-affirmed the principle 
established by McClanahan that tribal sovereignty protected tribal members against state 
law; however, a few justices wanted to reverse this principle. Harry Blackmun supported 
the rule established by the McClanahan court, pointing out that “The cigarette tax on 
Indian to Indian on reservation sales. This seems clearly to be barred by McClanahan. It 
is an attempt to force something on the Indian buyer that is governed by tribal law unless 
the state has assumed jurisdiction.”59 William Brennan concurred with the Blackmun
38 B o x  2 2 5 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o .  7 5 - 1 6 5 6 ,  M o e  v .  C o n f e d e r a t e d  S a l i s h  a n d  K o o t e n a i  T r i b e s ,  N o .  7 5 - 5 0  
C o n f e d e r a t e d  S a l i s h  a n d  K o o t e n a i  T r i b e s  v .  M o e , ”  B l o c k ,  1 0 - 1 1 .
59 B o x  2 2 5 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o . 7 4 - 1 6 5 6 .  M o e  v .  C o n f e d e r a t e d  T r i b e s  7 5 - 5 0  -  C o n f e d e r a t e d  T r i b e s  v . M o e ,”  
H .A .B ,  4 .
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interpretation and pointed out that this was a settled principle o f Supreme Court case law; 
“the general and settled principles are that a state has no jurisdiction to enforce a civil tax 
law with respect to an act purely between Indians on the reservation.”60 Justices 
Rehnquist and Powell prevaricated about protecting tribal members from state tax. 
Rehnquist believed that because the reservation population contained so many non­
members that in instances like this case the Supreme Court should reverse the 
McClanahan rule. He noted that “Some day [the court] may want to reconsider the 
law ...as applied to reservations like this one...which is reservation only in a technical 
sense.”61 Lewis Powell believed that all Native Americans were part o f the state and 
supported this position, “Could reconsider own cases on th is...as Is [Indians] really 
assimilated.”62 Powell disagreed with the McClanahan principle as it treated tribal 
members and non-members differently under state law, observing that “ I’d be willing to 
reconsider exemptions there [sic] Indians from state taxes. But makes no sense to exempt 
sales by Indians to Indians but not to non-Indians.”63 However, despite these 
considerations the final opinion on the Moe case was unanimous on the right o f the state 
to tax tribal members.
The Supreme Court ruled that the state cigarette tax was barred in relation to tribal 
cigarette sales to tribal members in the reservation. The Moe opinion confirmed the 
principles resulting from McClanahan. The involvement o f exclusive tribal issues
60 I b i d . ,  3 .
61 B o x  1 :3 6 9 ,  W J B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o . 7 4 - 1 6 5 6 .  7 5 - 5 0 .  M o e  v .  C o n f e d e r a t e d  S a l i s h  &  K o o t e n a i  T r i b e s  o f  F l a t h e a d  
R e s e r v a t i o n .”  W . J . B . ,  n . d .
6: B o x  2 2 5 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o .  7 4 - 1 6 5 6  M o e  v .  C o n f e d e r a t e d  S a l i s h  a n d  K o o t e n a i  T r i b e s  o f  F l a t h e a d  
R e s e r v a t i o n ,  N o . 7 5 - 5 0  C o n f e d e r a t e d  S a l i s h  a n d  K o o t e n a i  T r i b e s  o f  F l a t h e a d  R e s e r v a t i o n  v .  M o e , ”  H .A .B . ,  
J a n u a r y  2 3 ,  1 9 7 6 .
63 B o x  1 :3 6 9 ,  W J B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o . 7 4 - 1 6 5 6 .  7 5 - 5 0 ,  M o e  v .  C o n f e d e r a t e d  S a l i s h  &  K o o t e n a i  T r i b e s  o f  F l a t h e a d  
R e s e r v a t i o n . ”  W . J . B . ,  n . d .
125
resulted in the application o f  the sovereignty doctrine. The Moe court held that tribal 
inherent sovereignty protected tribal members until Congress legislated to remove this 
barrier to state law, explaining that “ ...M cC lanahan...lays to rest any doubt in this 
respect by holding that such taxation is not permissible absent congressional consent.”64 
The state was also federally pre-empted from asserting a tax on the sale o f  cigarettes from 
tribal members to tribal members only.6;>
The silent revolution within the Supreme Court continued to weaken the Indian 
sovereignty doctrine and the principles that underpinned the Mazurie case were used only 
three years later to end tribal criminal authority over non-members in the reservation. The 
next section shows how the Supreme Court Justices used the development o f  the 
principles in taxation and criminal case law to nullify tribal criminal authority over non­
members inside the reservation.
Criminal Case Law, 1978
The erosion o f  the sovereignty doctrine in criminal case law was built on the foundations 
of the silent revolution and followed the principles established by the Supreme Court 
from McClanahan (1973) that tribal authority over non-members had to be sanctioned by 
a congressional delegation o f  power. In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe (1978), the 
Supreme Court extinguished tribal criminal authority over non-members inside the
64 Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 4 7 6  q u o t i n g  Mescalero Apache Tribe v . Jones, 1 4 8 .
°  Moe v . Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 4 8 0 - 4 8 1 .
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reservation and in United States v. Wheeler (1978),66 the Supreme Court allowed tribal 
criminal authority to operate over tribal members only. The primary consideration o f  the 
court was using the power o f  Congress to determine the outcome o f the cases. The issue 
o f state law was not involved in the two cases.
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe (1978)
In 1973, the Suquam ish tribe adopted a Law and Order Code, which extended its inherent 
criminal authority over both tribal members and non-members inside the Port Madison 
reservation. Then in 1978, the tribe claimed jurisdiction over the criminal actions o f  two 
non-members inside the reservation. M ark David Oliphant assaulted a tribal police officer 
and Daniel B. Belgrade collided with a tribal police car after a high-speed chase through 
the reservation. The Oliphant case examined whether the tribe had inherent criminal 
authority over non-m em bers in the reservation. The Oliphant court relied on the principle 
that tribal authority extended over tribal members but it did not extend over non-members 
unless explicitly delegated by Congress.67 W ithout the necessary legislation, the tribes 
did not have sovereignty over non-members in tribal court.68 Despite the movement o f 
the court away from the use o f  the sovereignty doctrine, two justices in the Oliphant case 
applied the sovereignty doctrine and dissented with this interpretation.
The Oliphant case was one o f  a num ber o f cases, which eroded the Indian sovereignty 
doctrine. Many scholars view  Oliphant as the first case where the court moved away
66 United States v . Wheeler,  4 3 5  U . S .  3 1 3  ( 1 9 7 8 ) .
United States v . Mazurie.
Oliphant v . Suquamish Indian Tribe.
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from the sovereignty doctrine.6) Philip P. Frickey argued that the Supreme Court had 
moved away from the sovereignty doctrine, pointing to the fact that the court had 
“ ...identified no treaty in which the tribe had ceded away its authority nor any federal 
statute that abrogated the tribe's police power. Under the traditional constructs, that 
should have ended the matter—the tribe retained its inherent territorial sovereignty.”70 In 
addition, Russell Lawrence Barsh and James Youngblood Henderson believed that 
Oliphant represented a new era for the court, commenting that the judgment o f Justice 
Rehnquist was “indicative o f  a dangerous intellectual trend.”71 The process o f 
undermining the sovereignty doctrine had begun with the foundations o f the silent 
revolution in 1959. The development o f the integrationist trend continued the process.
The Supreme Court used part o f the integrationist trend to prevent tribal authority over 
non-members in the reservation. The limitation o f tribal sovereignty to tribal members 
and the movement o f the court towards only allowing tribal authority over non-members 
through the delegation o f congressional power were combined by the court to decide the 
issues o f  the case. Justice Harry Blackmun believed that these two factors were integral 
in the court’s modern-day thinking, noting that
“I am satis[fied] [sic] that hi story... does not support the Indians.
1. The assumption 1850-1950 just the other way.
2. Modern “thought” ., .has changed, but that does not change the history.
69 N o r d a u s ,  R o b e r t  J . ,  G .  E m l e n  H a l l ,  a n d  A n n e  A l i s e  R u d i o ,  “ R e v i s i t i n g  M e r r i o n  v . J i c a r i l l a  A p a c h e  T r i b e :  
R o b e r t  N o r d h a u s  a n d  S o v e r e i g n  I n d i a n  C o n t r o l  o v e r  N a t u r a l  R e s o u r c e s  o n  R e s e r v a t i o n s . ”  Natural 
Resources Journal 4 3  ( 2 0 0 3 ) :  2 6 0 - 2 6 1 ;  a n d  S t e v e n  P a u l  M c S l o y ,  “ B a c k  T o  T h e  F u t u r e :  N a t i v e  A m e r i c a n  
S o v e r e i g n t y  in  T h e  2 1 s t  C e n t u r y , ”  New York University Review o f Law and Social Change 2 0  ( 1 9 9 3 ) :  2 1 7 -  
3 0 2 .
70 F r i c k e y ,  “ A  C o m m o n  L a w ,”  3 4 - 3 5 .
71 R u s s e l l  L a w r e n c e  B a r s h  a n d  J a m e s  Y o u n g b l o o d  H e n d e r s o n ,  “ C o n t r a r y  J u r i s p r u d e n c e :  T r i b a l  I n t e r e s t s  in  
N a v i g a b l e  W a t e r w a y s  b e f o r e  a n d  A f t e r  M o n t a n a  v .  U n i t e d  S t a t e s , ”  Washington Law Review 5 6  ( 1 9 8 1 ) :  
6 2 8 .
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3. Congress, probably, could effect a change if it so deserved...
5. Fax here are tough...
6. No inherent Indian sovereignty...
7. No clear Congress action.”72
This interpretation clearly linked the limitation o f tribal sovereignty to the need for 
congressional legislation in order to sanction tribal authority over non-members. 
Therefore, without legislation the tribes did not have authority over non-members. Based 
on this interpretation o f historical events, Blackmun concluded that the “Indians no 
deserve to win.” The Blackmun reference to modem thought may have been to 
Williams and tribal sovereignty or it may have been to the development o f the idea that 
tribal sovereignty now relied on congressional legislation. However, it was pointed out in 
a memorandum to Blackmun that the modern-day court had moved away from tribal 
sovereignty and now relied on the primacy o f congressional authority, “The trend 
o f ...McClanahan is unmistakably away from former concepts o f residual sovereignty.”74 
The combination o f  McClanahan and Mazurie influenced the interpretation o f the court. 
A memorandum to Blackmun discussed the similarity between Mazurie and the facts o f  
Oliphant, noting that Mazurie delegated federal authority whereas the facts o f Oliphant 
did not suggest that there was legislation to allow the tribes to have authority over non­
members,
“Perhaps the closest case is United States v. M azurie...in  which the Court upheld the 
enforcement o f a federal law that incorporated by reference a tribal ordinance that had 
prohibited theoperation [sic] o f the nonlndian [sic] defendant’s liquor store on the 
reservation. This case as well as being the closest factually, includes the strongest
'  B o x  2 7 0 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ 7 6 - 5 7 2 9 ,  S u q u a m i s h , ”  H . A .B . ,  J a n u a r y  5 ,  1 9 7 8 .
73 i u  jI b id .
1 B o x  2 6 8 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ P r e l i m i n a r y  M e m o ,  S u m m e r  L i s t ,  9 ,  S h e e t  1 , N o .  7 6 - 1 6 2 9 ,  U .S .  W h e e l e r ” , 
C a m p b e l l ,  A u g u s t  8 ,  1 9 7 7 ,  7 .
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statement in favour o f the the [sic] tribes’ independent authority over matters that affect 
the internal and social relations o f tribal life. But the case is distinguishable on two very 
significant points: Congress was said to have delegated to the tribe the regulatory power 
exercised, and the case involved enforcement o f Indian law by the federal courts, not by 
Indian courts.”73
Despite the acknowledgment about the independent authority o f the tribes, it was clear 
that the reliance o f  the court on congressional authority was the decisive factor in the 
court’s interpretation o f the case. As a memorandum to Blackmun observed, “The case 
therefore boils down to the strength o f the presumption o f retained power by the Indian 
tribes in the face o f  evidence to the contrary, I do not think it is strong enough.”76
The viewpoints o f  many justices supported the use o f congressional authority to 
determine the outcome o f the case and their acceptance that Congress had to delegate 
power to the tribes. Justice Byron White believed that tribal sovereignty was limited and 
only Congress could address this issue, pointing out that “ ...[I] do not buy residual 
sovereignty [and] Congress has the power.”77 Justice Lewis Powell agreed with the 
interpretation o f  congressional power, noting, “Let Congress carve out the exceptions. 
This case a farce factually, a non-case.”78 The opinion o f a Justice Potter Stewart 
explained that without congressional or treaty power, tribes did not have any control over 
non-members, “ ..."unless sighted by Treaty," neatly left Parker and AS opinions. 
Therefore no power to try non-Indians for offences on reservation not unless Is
75 B o x  2 7 0 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ 7 6 - 5 7 2 9 ,  O l i p h a n t  a n d  B e l g r a d e  v . S u q u a m i s h  I n d i a n  T r i b e , ”  C r a n e ,  J a n u a r y  3 ,  
1 9 7 8 .
76 I b id .
7 B o x  2 7 0 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o . 7 6 - 5 7 2 9 , O l i p h a n t  v .  S u q u a m i s h  I n d i a n  T r i b e ,”  H . A .B . ,  J a n u a r y  1 1 , 1 9 7 8 ,  1 .
78 I b i d ,  2 .
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[Indians]."77 Justice John Paul Stevens thought that it was a good idea if Congress 
addressed this issue and not the court. The interpretations o f the justices relied on the 
presence o f concrete and visible acts o f Congress rather than a concept or the principle of 
the sovereignty doctrine. In the Oliphant oral arguments, the court wanted evidence o f a 
relevant statute which authorised tribal power over non-members and it wanted to know 
what other sources the tribe relied on other than opinions o f the Supreme Court,
“MR. ERNSTOFF: It is impossible to point -  
QUESTION: Then actually, you do not have anything.
MR. ERNSTOFF: The answer is that Congress has never -  
QUESTION: The answer is, you do not have anything.
MR. ERNSTOFF: That is correct because, Your Honour, it is very difficult to prove a 
negative. Congress has never enacted a statute giving a Tribe power and this Court has 
recognized the power, how can I point to a statute which gave the Tribe that power? All I 
can point to is this Court’s analysis o f the fact that one does not need a statute or a treaty 
in order to determine that there is a power.”80
The principles involved in the oral argument o f the Oliphant case mainly, the presence o f 
congressional authority to sanction tribal power over non-members, underpinned the final 
opinion o f  the court.
Tribal sovereignty did not authorise criminal authority or tribal court authority over non­
members in the reservation. Justice Rehnquist believed that only Congress could delegate 
such power and wrote in the final Oliphant opinion that the tribes “did not have such 
jurisdiction [over non-members] absent a congressional statute or treaty provision to that
79 I b id ,  l .
80 O r a l  a r g u m e n t  o f ,  M a r k  D a v i d  O l i p h a n t  a n d  D a n ie l  B . B e l g r a d e ,  P e t i t i o n e r s  v .  T h e  S u q u a m i s h  I n d i a n  
T r i b e ,  e t  a l ,  R e s p o n d e n t s ,  N o .  7 6 - 5 7 2 9 ,  M o n d a y  9 ,  1 9 7 8  b e f o r e  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  
4 6 - 4 7 .
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effect.”81 Without congressional permission then the “ Indian tribal courts do not have 
inherent criminal jurisdiction to try and to punish non-Indians, and hence may not assume 
such jurisdiction unless specifically authorized to do so by Congress.”82 In contrast to a 
majority o f  the justices, Justice Thurgood Marshall declined to accept the concept o f 
congressional authority.
Thurgood Marshall accepted the presumption that tribes had sovereignty over non­
members unless specifically removed by Congress. The application o f the Indian 
sovereignty doctrine by Marshall was guided by a historical duty to protect the tribes, 
“Could go either way. Is[Indians] need sovereignty manhood -  have to protect selves. 
Therefore with the St. [Suquamish Tribe] - matter o f decency.”8^  M arshall’s resolute 
opinion about the principles o f the sovereignty doctrine was reflected in a memorandum 
to conference on March 3, 1978,
j
“I have sent to the printer the following short statement o f my reasons for dissenting in 
this case...M R  JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting. I agree with the court below that the 
“power to preserve order on the reservation... is a sine qua non o f the sovereignty that the 
Suquamish originally possessed.” 544 F. 2d 1007, 1009 (CA9 1976). In the absence o f 
affirmative withdrawal by treaty or statute, I am o f the view that Indian tribes enjoy as a 
necessary aspect o f  their retained sovereignty the right to try and punish all persons who 
commit offences against tribal law within the reservation. Accordingly, I dissent.”84
Xl Oliphant v . Suquamish Indian Tribe, 1 9 1 .
82 I b i d . ,  1 9 1 .
s B o x  2 7 0 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o . 7 6 - 5 7 2 9 , O l i p h a n t  v .  S u q u a m i s h  I n d ia n  T r i b e ,”  H . A .B . ,  J a n u a r y  1 1 ,  1 9 7 8 ,  2 .  
M B o x  2 7 0 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ M e m o r a n d u m  t o  t h e  C o n f e r e n c e ,  N o .  7 6 - 5 7 2 9 ,  O l i p h a n t  v .  S u q u a m i s h  I n d i a n
T r i b e .”  f r o m  T h u r g o o d  M a r s h a l l  o n  M a r c h  3 ,  1 9 7 8 .
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This statement was also the final Marshall dissent with whom C hief Justice Burger
85joined. Marshall agreed with the opinion o f the lower court and with the traditions o f 
the sovereignty doctrine. Despite the clear ideological difference between certain 
members o f  the court, only sixteen days after Oliphant, the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Wheeler upheld the principle o f  inherent tribal sovereignty. The Wheeler case 
involved the question o f whether the tribe and/or the United States had authority to 
prosecute a tribal member.
United States v. Wheeler (1978)
The case revolved around whether a Navajo man could be prosecuted for an offence 
against a minor in federal court after being sentenced by the Navajo court for the same 
crime. The Supreme Court had to assess whether the Double Jeopardy Clause o f the Fifth 
Amendment o f  the United States Constitution barred a subsequent federal prosecution. In 
order to do this, the Supreme Court had to examine the source o f  Navajo sovereignty and 
whether it was delegated by Congress or was inherent and independent o f federal 
authority. The Supreme Court ruled that the Navajo had inherent sovereignty to prosecute 
tribal members, which pre-dated the United States Constitution. As Navajo sovereignty 
over tribal members was independent o f federal authority, the Supreme Court also 
determined that the subsequent federal prosecution o f the tribal member was allowed. 
Even though the Wheeler case did not involve non-members, it did not prevent the 
Supreme Court from clarifying and expanding the Oliphant rationale, which held that
85 Oliphant v . Suquamish Indian Tribe,  2 12 - 2 1 3 .
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tribes had no inherent criminal authority to try non-members, to include the general 
limitation o f  tribal authority over non-members in the reservation.
The Supreme Court Justices applied the principle that inherent tribal sovereignty had 
existed over tribal members for many centuries and had not been reversed by Congress. 
Justice Thurgood Marshall explained that Indian sovereignty over tribal members pre­
dated the creation o f the United States Constitution and was still enforceable today; “ ...I 
believe that tribes retain certain rights o f self-government through residual sovereignty 
not deriving from the federal Constitution but pre-existing it.”86 Warren Burger concurred 
that there were no limitations placed on this historic sovereignty, pointing out that this 
“200 year old sovereignty still exists.”87 Justice Potter Stewart also agreed that the tribes 
had inherent sovereignty over tribal members, noting that “ Indians do not come by grant 
of power but keep until taken away.”88 These interpretations were re-iterated in the 
opinion, which explained that the tribes “still possess those aspects o f  sovereignty not 
withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result o f  their dependent 
status.”89 In the minds o f the justices, this Indian sovereignty over tribal members was 
considered a lesser form o f sovereignty, describing it as “primeval sovereignty.”90 This 
type o f sovereignty did not apply to non-members.
8(1 B o x  2 6 8 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ M e m o r a n d u m  t o  t h e  C o n f e r e n c e ,  R e :  N o .  7 6 - 1 6 2 9 ,  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  v .  W h e e l e r , ”  
f r o m  T h u r g o o d  M a r s h a l l ,  J a n u a r y  1 6 ,  1 9 7 8 .
87 B o x  2 6 8 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o .  7 6 - 1 6 2 9 .  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  v .  W h e e l e r , ”  H . A .B . ,  J a n u a r y  1 3 ,  1 9 7 8 ,  1.
88 I b id .
89 United States v. Wheeler, 3 1 3 .  S e e ,  A l l i s o n  M . D u s s i a s ,  “ G e o g r a p h i c a l l y - B a s e d  a n d  M e m b e r s h i p - B a s e d  
V ie w s  o f  I n d i a n  T r i b a l  S o v e r e i g n t y :  T h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t ’ s  C h a n g i n g  V i s i o n , ”  University o f Pittsburgh Law 
Review 5 5  ( 1 9 9 3 ) :  2 8 .
° United States v. W h e e l e r ,  3 2 8 .
134
Although non-members were not involved in the facts o f the Wheeler case, the Supreme 
Court declared that tribes did not have any authority over non-members. Whereas 
Oliphant limited tribal sovereignty over non-members in the area o f criminal law, the 
Wheeler court expanded this principle into a general rule limiting all tribal sovereignty 
over non-members in the reservation. This general rule was explained by Potter Stewart 
in the Wheeler opinion, “The areas in which such implicit divestiture o f sovereignty has 
been held to have occurred are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe and 
nonmembers o f  the tribe.”91 The reasoning was based on the court’s interpretation o f 
external and social relations. Tribal relations with non-members were considered to be 
external relations while social or internal relations were considered to be the powers o f 
tribal government over tribal members. The division between these relations and the 
corresponding limitations on tribal power were explained by the court,
“These limitations rest on the fact that the dependent status o f Indian tribes within our 
territorial jurisdiction is necessarily inconsistent with their freedom independently to 
determine their external relations. But the powers o f self-government, including the 
power to prescribe and enforce internal criminal laws, are o f a different type. They* • 09involve only the relations among members of a tribe.” ~
The development o f the integrationist trend allowed the Supreme Court to draw 
distinctions between the meaning o f external and social relations. The definitions for 
internal and social affairs changed within the modern era from 1959. The new 
interpretation allowed external relations to be defined broadly as those between tribal 
members and non-members. As William C. Canby observed, the Wheeler case “ ...began
91 I b id . ,  3 2 6 .
92 I b id .
93
D u s s i a s ,  “ G e o g r a p h i c a l l y - B a s e d , ”  4 8 .
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a shift in emphasis from trrbal power as governmental power over a territory to tribal 
power as a function o f membership.”94 However, historically and certainly up to 1959 
external relations were those specifically related to foreign relations with, for example, 
France or the United Kingdom and tribal social and internal relations included authority 
over non-members.93 In 1959, the Supreme Court supported this interpretation o f internal 
relations over non-members but soon after, the justices o f the court determined otherwise.
The two cases applied parts o f the integrationist trend but it was not applied in full 
because the state authority was not involved and there had not been a ruling whether the 
states did, or did not have inherent criminal authority over non-member activity in the 
reservation.
Both Wheeler and Oliphant reversed the inherent rights o f the tribe to prosecute non­
members in the reservation and continued the trend towards a broader erosion o f tribal 
authority in civil and taxation case law.96 As Peter Maxfield explained, “ ...during the 
period between 1978 and 1990, relying on its holding in Oliphant, the United States 
Supreme Court has eviscerated the doctrine o f tribal sovereignty in both civil and
04 S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e ,  Rulings o f the U.S. Supreme Court, 4 8 .  S e e  a l s o ,  D u s s i a s ,  “ G e o g r a p h i c a l l y - B a s e d , ”  
17.
5 R a l p h  W .  J o h n s o n  a n d  B e r r i e  M a r t i n i s ,  “ C h i e f  J u s t i c e  R e h n q u i s t  a n d  t h e  I n d i a n  C a s e s , ”  Public Land Law 
Review 1 6  ( 1 9 9 5 ) :  1 - 2 5 ;  a n d  A l e x  T a l l c h i e f  S k i b i n e ,  “ R e c o n c i l i n g  F e d e r a l  a n d  S t a t e  P o w e r  i n s i d e  I n d i a n  
R e s e r v a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  R i g h t  o f  T r i b a l  S e l f - G o v e r n m e n t  a n d  t h e  P r o c e s s  o f  S e l f - D e t e r m i n a t i o n , ”  Utah Law 
Review 1 9 9 5  ( 1 9 9 5 ) :  1 1 0 5 - 1 1 5 6 .
% D a n i e l  I .S . J .  R e y - B e a r ,  “ T h e  F l a t h e a d  W a t e r  Q u a l i t y  S t a n d a r d s  D i s p u t e :  L e g a l  B a s e s  f o r  T r i b a l  
R e g u l a t o r y  A u t h o r i t y  O v e r  N o n - I n d i a n  R e s e r v a t i o n  L a n d s , ”  American Indian Law Review 2 0  ( 1 9 9 6 ) :  1 5 1 -
2 2 4 .
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criminal areas. For this reason, a close re-examination o f  Oliphant by the Supreme Court 
is warranted.”97
The thesis now turns to examine the development o f  the integrationist trend and the 
erosion o f  the Indian sovereignty doctrine in taxation case law as well as the influence o f 
criminal case law on the taxation opinions o f the Supreme Court:
Taxation Case Law, 1980 up to 2001
Issues concerning state law over non-members in the reservation and tribal authority over 
non-members in the reservation defined taxation case law from 1980 to 2001. This 
section examines case law from 1980 to 1989, which includes six cases concerning the 
question o f  state authority over non-members, Washington v. Confederated Tribes 
(Colville) (1980), White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker (1980), Central Machinery 
Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n (1980), Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau o f Revenue 
(1982), California v. Cabazon Band o f Mission Indians (1987) and Cotton Petroleum 
Corp. v. New Mexico (1989) and three cases concerning tribal authority over non­
members, Colville (1980), Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe (1982) and Kerr-McGee 
Corp. v. Navajo Tribe (1985).98 This section’s in-depth analysis o f case law ends in 1989 
as the principles used by the court after 1989 did not change until 2001 in Atkinson
7 Peter C. Maxfield, “Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe: The Whole is Greater than the Sum o f the Parts,” 
Journal o f  Contemporary Law  19(1993): 440.
8 Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 
U.S. 136 (1980); Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980); Ramah Navajo 
School Bd. v. Bureau o f  Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982); California v. Cabazon Band o f Mission Indians,
480 U.S. 202 (1987); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989); Merrion v. Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); and Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195 (1985).
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Trading Co., v. Shirley. The analysis o f Atkinson is contained in the section on civil law. 
The silent revolution meant that the Supreme Court generally used Congressional 
authority and not inherent tribal sovereignty to prohibit state law over non-members and 
non-member companies in the reservation. This is sometimes termed congressional pre­
emption by the court. In addition, from 1980 to 1987 the language of court appeared to 
re-invigorate the principle of inherent tribal sovereignty as an independent source of 
power to prohibit state law over non-members in the reservation. However, the Supreme 
Court never used this principle and instead used congressional pre-emption to prohibit 
state law over non-members in the reservation. Moreover, in stark contrast to the 
foundations of the silent revolution of allowing general state law to exist inside the 
reservation, and the case law up to 1980 where the Supreme Court delegated authority for 
the tribes to have control over non-members, in 1980 the court declared that tribes had 
inherent sovereignty to tax non-members. This was in direct conflict with the main 
assumptions of the court, which had limited tribal sovereignty. Taxation case law opened 
a period of division within the decision-making structures of the Supreme Court between 
using the sovereignty doctrine or using congressional authority, termed the integrationist 
trend in this thesis. The first Supreme Court case to address these key issues was 
Washington v. Confederated Tribes (1980).
Washington v. Confederated Tribes (Colville) (1980)
The development of the integrationist trend informed the principles used by the 
Washington v. Confederated Tribes court as did the traditional principle of the
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sovereignty doctrine. As Harry &lackm3n^bserved, the Colville was a “complicated and 
“messy” case.” )9 Throughout the discussion, the case is referred to as Colville. The 
Colville case involved the Colville, Lummi, Makah and Yakima Tribes who were 
challenging a range of taxes and laws imposed by the State of Washington over tribal 
members and non-members within tribal reservations. The state wanted to apply a 
cigarette sales tax and a motor vehicle excise tax as well as civil and criminal jurisdiction 
over certain reservations. The tribes contended that the imposition of a tribal tax 
prohibited the states from taxing inside the reservations. Only the conflict between state 
and tribal sovereignty over the sale of cigarettes to tribal members and non-members will 
be examined. The Supreme Court held that the state could not tax tribal cigarette sales to 
tribal members but ruled that the state, as well as the tribe, had authority to tax tribal sales 
to non-members. The examination of the court’s interpretation of the conflict between 
tribal and state sovereignty in Colville is divided into three. First, the court’s discussions 
about whether state law applied in the reservation are examined. Second, based on the 
general move towards the limitation of tribal sovereignty, this section highlights the 
court’s discussion about the merits of a delegation of congressional authority to allow the 
tribes to tax non-members in the reservation.100 Third, the court’s use of the sovereignty 
doctrine rather than congressional authority to justify inherent tribal authority over non­
members in the reservation is analysed. In addition, why the justices of the court did not 
think that the sovereignty doctrine was strong enough to oust state law from the 
reservation will also be examined. The Colville case was a halfway house opinion
”  B o x  3 0 1 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ R e :  N o  7 8 - 6 3 0  -  W a s h i n g t o n  v .  C o n f e d e r a t e d  T r i b e s , ”  m e m o r a n d u m  f r o m  
B l a c k m u n  t o  B r e n n a n ,  D e c e m b e r  1 4 ,  1 9 7 9 .
100 T h i s  p r e s u m p t i o n  w a s  f o r m e d  in  t h e  s i s t e r  t a x a t i o n  c a s e s  o f  McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm ’n 
a n d  Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones a n d  c o n t i n u e d  in  United States v. Mazurie a n d  Oliphant v. Suquamish 
Indian Tribe.
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between the integrationist trend and the application of the traditions of the sovereignty 
doctrine. The halfway house was a compromise that allowed the states to tax non­
members in the reservation unless it was prohibited by Congressional legislation and it 
allowed the tribes to tax non-members in the reservation. The application of the 
integrationist trend by the Supreme Court carried on the development of principle 
developed from 1959, which allowed the states to enter the reservations.
Colville - State law in the Reservation
Justices Byron White, John Paul Stevens, Lewis Powell, and Chief Justice Warren Burger 
supported the position that state law applied in the reservation and over non-members in 
the reservation until reversed by Congress. They did not believe that tribal authority 
could bar state law from the reservation. Justice Harry Blackmun had been briefed on the 
merits of tribal sovereignty and initially supported its use. However, instead he supported 
the merits of state law over non-members in the reservation. Justice William Rehnquist 
resolutely believed in the inherent right of state law inside the reservation, which 
fundamentally differed from Justice William Brennan who supported the sovereignty 
doctrine as a bar to state law.
The new integrationist trend influenced Justice White. This relied on congressional 
authority to oust state law from the reservation as well as the placing of limitations on 
tribal sovereignty. White was adamant in his belief that Congress had to legislate in an
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explicit manner to oust state law form the reservation, noting in the first draft of his 
partial concurrence/dissent that
“...the majority opinion proceeds on the assumption that federal law requires state tax 
laws to give way to Indian taxes on transactions between Indians and non-Indians on 
Indian reservations. I find nothing in our prior cases to support this result. Of course, the 
tribal tax involved here is a valid tax, but that alone does not warrant pre-empting state 
taxing power absent more definitive guidance from Congress than we have.”101
White’s interpretation came at a time when a tentative majority of justices were thinking 
about prohibiting the state tax. However, he remained steadfast in his beliefs about the 
imposition of the state tax, pointing out that “Until or unless Congress clearly construes 
and applies the Indian Commerce Clause to bar state taxes on reservation sales to non- 
Indians, I would sustain state revenue measures such as the cigarette and sales taxes 
involved here.” 102 Throughout its duration, the entire Supreme Court struggled with the 
intricacies of the case but in the end, the majority of the court supported White’s initial 
stance. Writing for a majority of seven justices White noted that “We do not believe that 
principles of federal Indian law, whether stated in terms of pre-emption, tribal self- 
government, or otherwise, authorize Indian tribes thus to market an exemption from state 
taxation to persons who would normally do their business elsewhere.” A general 
delegation by Congress pursuant to the Indian Financing Act of 1975, the Indian Self- 
Determination and the Education Assistance Act of 1975 and the Federal Trader Statutes 
was not relevant to grant power to the tribes.104
101 B o x  3 0 1 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  F i r s t  D r a f t  o f  M r .  J u s t i c e  W h i t e ,  c o n c u r r i n g  in  p a r t  a n d  d i s s e n t i n g  in  p a r t ,  
J a n u a r y  2 1 ,  1 9 8 0 ,  1 .
102 I b i d . ,  2 .
103 Colville, 1 3 6 .
104 I U : .
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Stevens concurred with the White interpretation that the principle of tribal sovereignty 
was not strong enough to oust state law from the reservation. He believed that a state tax 
was valid even though the tribe also taxed the same transaction, noting that “It is 
perfectly clear that Washington’s taxation of the tribal sales of cigarettes to non-Indians 
would be valid if the Tribes did not also tax those sales.” Therefore, the limitations 
imposed on tribal sovereignty by the Supreme Court meant that in Stevens’ opinion tribal 
authority was not strong enough to oust state law from the reservation, “I am unable to 
accept the Court’s conclusion that the Tribes have the power, by their own action, to 
render an otherwise valid state tax invalid.”105 Stevens was fundamentally opposed to the 
principle of inherent tribal sovereignty and he favoured the interests of the states.
Rehnquist supported the right of the state to tax in the reservation until reversed by 
Congress. His support was based on a strong belief regarding the inherent right of the 
states to control all lands, including reservation lands inside the boundaries of the state. 
The Rehnquist position was summed up in a memorandum to Harry Blackmun; “WR 
[Rehnquist] says that the state can do anything it wants.” 106 The presumption about state 
rights coupled with the fact that Rehnquist considered tribal sovereignty to be anathema, 
led Rehnquist to explain, “It is even more difficult to see why the state must necessarily 
reduce the scope of its taxing authority to accommodate any such taxing authority by the 
tribes.” 107 According to Rehnquist, tribal authority was exclusively “dependent upon
105 B o x  3 0 1 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ 7 8 - 6 3 0  -  S t a t e  o f  W a s h i n g t o n  v .  C o n f e d e r a t e d  T r i b e s  o f  t h e  C o l v i l l e  I n d i a n  
R e s e r v a t i o n ,  M r .  J u s t i c e  S t e v e n s ,  d i s s e n t i n g  in  p a r t , ”  J a n u a r y  1 7 ,  1 9 8 0 ,  2 .
106 B o x  3 0 1 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ M r .  J u s t i c e , ”  m e m o r a n d u m  f r o m  D T C  t o  B l a c k m u n ,  A p r i l  1 8 ,  1 9 8 0 ,  2 .
107 B o x  3 0 1 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ F i r s t  D r a f t  o f  M r .  J u s t i c e  R e h n q u i s t ,  d i s s e n t i n g  in  p a r t , ”  J a n u a r y  16 ,  1 9 8 0 ,  1 2 .
142
congressional intent”108 and the tax existed until Congress said otherwise. The 
importance of state rights and the limitations placed on tribal sovereignty by the Supreme
• * -i
Court from 1959 were explained by Rehnquist in a memorandum to Brennan, “1, for one, 
am simply unwilling to see this Court step in as a surrogate for Congress unless the state 
taxation is discriminatory or subjects tribes to undue interference with tribal self- 
government—neither of which are present in this case.”109 This Rehnquist interpretation 
would only prohibit a legal state tax if it affected tribal government or if it was 
interpreted to be discriminatory against the person.
The Rehnquist belief of allowing state law into the reservation was found in the 
foundations of the silent revolution, allowing state law into the reservations, and the 
beginning of the silent revolution in 1973.'10 This Rehnquist viewpoint has been termed 
“The Rehnquist test” by Ralph Johnson and Berrie Martinis111 and Alex Skibine termed it 
“Justice Rehnquist’s view.”112 Although Johnson and Martinis said the test was “contrary 
to the Indian law doctrine disfavouring the application of state laws on a reservation 
where Congress has expressed no clear intent,” 113 it clearly highlighted the movement of 
the Supreme Court away from the sovereignty doctrine. The principles or doctrine of 
state law in the reservation that Rehnquist spoke of in his first draft was based on 
congressional power and had developed before 1973 and been applied subsequently in 
the cases of McClanahan, Mescalero Apache Tribe and Moe,
108 I b i d . ,  1 .
109 B o x  3 0 1 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ R e :  7 8 - 6 3 0  -  S t a t e  o f  W a s h i n g t o n  v .  C o n f e d e r a t e d  T r i b e s ,  ”  m e m o r a n d u m  f r o m  
R e h n q u i s t  t o  B r e n n a n ,  J a n u a r y  1 5 ,  1 9 8 0 ,  I .
110 Colville, 1 5 6 .
111 J o h n s o n  a n d  M a r t i n i s ,  “ C h i e f  J u s t i c e  R e h n q u i s t  a n d  t h e  I n d i a n  C a s e s , ’ ' 2 1 .
112 A l e x  T a l l c h i e f  S k i b i n e ,  “ T h e  C o u r t ' s  U s e  o f  t h e  I m p l i c i t  D i v e s t i t u r e  D o c t r i n e  t o  I m p l e m e n t  I t s  I m p e r f e c t  
N o t i o n  o f  F e d e r a l i s m  in  I n d i a n  C o u n t r y , ”  Tulsa Law Journal 3 6  ( 2 0 0 0 ) :  2 7 7 .
113 J o h n s o n  a n d  M a r t i n i s ,  “ C h i e f  J u s t i c e  R e h n q u i s t  a n d  t h e  I n d i a n  C a s e s ”  2 2 .
%
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“Since early in the last century, this Court has been struggling to develop a coherent 
doctrine by which to measure with some predictability the scope of Indian immunity 
from state taxation. In recent years, it appeared such a doctrine was well on its way to 
being established. That doctrine, I had thought, was at bottom a pre-emption analysis 
based on the principle that Indian immunities are dependent upon congressional 
intent.”114
The sister taxation cases of McClanahan and Mescalero Apache Tribe (1973) showed 
how the development of the integrationist trend had been transformed into a set of 
principles allowing state law into the reservations unless prohibited by Congress. 
Rehnquist noting in his final opinion that “The principles necessary for the resolution of 
this case are readily derived from our opinions in McClanahan and Mescalero. 
McClanahan confirmed the trend which had been developing in recent decades towards a 
reliance on a federal pre-emption analysis. Congress has for many years legislated 
extensively in the field of Indian affairs.”113 He believed that these two cases had 
confirmed the principle that allowed state law into the reservation until prohibited by 
Congress. The corollary principle was that Congress could act to protect tribal interests 
and sanction tribal authority through congressional legislation. Rehnquist described the 
connection of McClanahan and Mescalero Apache in his final concurrence/dissent,
“The companion case to McClanahan, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones...established the 
corollary principle: When tradition did not recognize a sovereign immunity in favour of 
the Indians, this Court would recognize one only if Congress expressly conferred one. In 
Mescalero, the State of New Mexico asserted the right to impose a tax on the gross 
receipts of a ski resort owned and operated by an Indian tribe.” 116
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In summation, his belief was that congressional power controlled the application of tribal 
authority over non-members and also allowed state law into the reservation unless 
legislated otherwise by Congress, explaining that “...I am satisfied that McClanahan and 
Mescalero were doctrinally correct, I dissent from the Court's failure to adhere to their 
teaching.” 117
The Rehnquist position directly conflicted with Justice William Brennan who supported 
the Indian sovereignty doctrine. In a memorandum to Brennan, Rehnquist wrote, “I agree
that our differences on the principles applicable to adjudication of Indian tax immunities
118are fundamental.” These differences were made all too clear by the Rehnquist first 
draft, which in part dissented from Brennan’s position. Rehnquist noted,
“It must, therefore, be solely by judicial intuition that the Court finds that Congress 
prohibited the States from taxing (at least to the full extent) cigarette purchases by non- 
Indian purchasers on the reservation. Just at the point of doctrinal development...[the 
court]... pul Is out of the closet a judicial immunity wand which may be used at will 
without regard to the intent of Congress.”119
The attack by Rehnquist on the beliefs and original opinion of Brennan was scathing and 
he ended his tirade by explaining that Brennan and the court “had no choice but to devise
1 90a new set of rules in order to reach the result it does in this case.” ~ In Rehnquist’s mind, 
the idea of inherent tribal sovereignty was redundant.
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Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger concurred with Rehnquist and did not think that 
the sovereignty doctrine was strong enough to oust state law from the reservation. 
Instead, they believed that state law existed in the reservation until it was reversed by 
congressional legislation. Although Powell appeared to agree with Brennan in January 
1980, he was clearly uncomfortable with the application of tribal sovereignty ousting 
state law and he also wanted clarification of the relevant federal legislation that could be 
utilised to oust state law. Powell said,
“While I continue to agree with most of what you have written, 1 think that WHR’s 
dissent makes a point when it says that the Court has not fully identified the source of the 
pre-emption in this case. Since it is no mere stroke of the tribal pen, but federal power 
that ousts the state tax, perhaps it would be well to address the gap that Bill 
identifies...” 121
The Powell view was clarified when he completely rejected the use of the sovereignty 
doctrine used by Brennan to oust state law from the reservation, explaining “I had rather 
thought the Indians had the better of it on the preemption argument. I have not thought, 
however, that the principle of tribal self-government was strong enough in itself to
prevent the state from taxing cigarette sales to non-Indians. I note that Bill Brennan now
121rests his view primarily on this ground."
Supporting the views of Powell, Chief Justice Warren Burger also dismissed the 
relevance of tribal sovereignty. Burger explained that the states had the right to tax inside
121 B o x  3 0 1 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ 7 8 - 6 3 0  W a s h i n g t o n  v .  C o n f e d e r a t e d  T r i b u e s  [ s i c ] , ”  L e w i s  F .  P o w e l l ,  1.
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the reservation because the tribes had tax revenue gained from their ability to tax their 
own tribal members, noting that “Moe controls...Indians can still tax their own.”123
Justice Harry Blackmun followed the same process as Justice Powell and prevaricated 
between the application of the sovereignty doctrine and the integrationist trend but in the 
end, he joined the majority and allowed state law into the reservation. Harry Blackmun 
knew about the case for tribal sovereignty and initially supported the exclusive rights of 
the tribe over non-members in the reservation. Support of the sovereignty doctrine relied 
on using the principle derived from Williams. In a memorandum to Blackmun, the 
position of Williams and the sovereignty doctrine was set out, “the "economic” activity of 
the tribe might be more reasonably be considered [sic] "governmental" within the 
meaning of Williams— especially in light of the tribes’ desperate need for revenue.”124 
Furthermore, in order to justify using the sovereignty doctrine Blackmun had to 
distinguish the facts of the Colville case from the Moe judgement, which neglected to use 
the sovereignty doctrine and allowed the application of a state tax inside the reservation. 
The biggest difference between the Moe case and the Colville case was the involvement 
of tribal government trying to set up a tax system. A memorandum to Blackmun 
explained the situation, “I think there is an important distinction between this case 
[Colville] and Moe...In this case, we have a clear indication of the intent of the tribal 
government, acting in its legislative capacity, to develop an exclusive tribal taxing
123 B o x  3 0 1 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o .  7 8 - 6 3 0 ,  W a s h i n g t o n  v .  C o n f e d e r a t e d  t r i b e s  o f  t h e  C o l v i l l e  I n d i a n  
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systenVjTot my.knowledge, there was no such tribal attempt to preempt in Moe.”12r> The 
tribes argued that the involvement of tribal government in the case automatically ousted 
the state tax because it interfered with the process of tribal government. A memorandum 
to Blackmun explained that the state tax “ ...is an invalid interference with tribal 
autonomy, since the tribe has moved to create its own exclusive sovereign taxing 
program in the field of cigarette sales.”1"6 On this evidence, Blackmun was initially going 
to support the use of congressional authority and tribal sovereignty to oust state law from 
the reservation, noting that “I am inclined and say preemption...Tax is interference -  
tribes need all...help they can get -  it impinges to a degree on self-government.”127 
However, Blackmun understood the merits of state law inside the reservation and 
eventually changed his mind about the application of the sovereignty doctrine.
Blackmun elected to join the majority Colville opinion of Justice White based on three
reasons. First, he wanted to follow the principle he helped encourage in the Moe case,
1noting that “Moe may control but I am not settled yet.” Second, Blackmun was also 
influenced by a memorandum he received, which was concerned about the exact federal 
legislation that ousted state law from the reservation, “I continue to be troubled by
129exactly what law provides the basis of the decision in these cases.” The concerns over 
legislation were similar to those expressed by Justice Powell. Third, Blackmun’s biggest 
fear was that if the state tax was prohibited it would allow the tribes to set up all kinds of
125 B o x  3 0 1 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ M e m o  r e  D r a f t  o p  ( p e r  W B )  in  W a s h i n t o n  [ s i c ]  v .  C o n f e d e r a t e d  T r i b e s ,  N o . 7 8 -
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businesses within the reservation boundary, depriving the states of much needed 
revenues. This was reflected in the questions to be asked by Blackmun of the Colville 
case, “If the tribes prevail here on the tax issues, will they not be able to immunize any 
business from state taxation within the borders of the reservation?”130 The dangers of 
removing the inherent right of the state to tax inside the reservation was made clear to 
Blackmun, “The danger of such a holding is that tribes might start marketing tax 
exemptions on every saleable item -e^g., cars, trucks, helicopters. In light of this danger, 
you may see things differently than I, and wish to await the dissent...” ljl Therefore, for 
Blackmun the over-riding interest was the right of the state to enter the reservation. A 
memorandum Blackmun received from his clerk outlined the way to decide the issues of 
the case, “ ...the Court should strive to retain as much of Wash’s (sic) law as is legally
132possible.” " In the end, Blackmun believed in the right of the state to tax and supported 
Byron White’s majority opinion because he “handles the problem that most concerned 
you -  i.e., the tribe’s argument that even a de minimus tribal tax could completely
1 'K'Keradicate the whole state tax.” The Colville court ruling was based on the principle, 
which sanctioned state authority in the reservation and its authority over non-members in 
the reservation.
After addressing the merits of state law, the court turned to examine the merits of tribal 
authority over non-members. The Supreme Court’s viewpoint about the inherent right of
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the tribes to tax non-members in the reservation was significantly different to its rulings 
in criminal case law.
Colville -  The Use of Congressional Authority to Sanction Tribal Authority over 
Non-Members
The limitation of tribal sovereignty from 1973 appeared to influence the position of the 
justices regarding inherent tribal sovereignty over non-members in the reservation. In 
McClanahan, tribal authority was limited to tribal members and it appeared that the 
Colville court would apply the principle adopted in Mazurie of giving tribes’ authority 
over non-members, pursuant to a delegation of congressional power. A memorandum 
from Justice Lewis Powell confirmed that the court had the choice to apply the precedent 
of Mazurie and delegate congressional authority,
“Our decisions show that such expressions of federal authority and policy can confer 
additional authority upon the Tribes and pre-empt inconsistent state laws. United States v. 
Mazurie. 419 U.S. 544 (1975), recognises that the federal government can give the 
Indians authority over non-Indians who come within the reservation because the tribes 
traditionally have had substantial independent authority over non-Indians within their 
territory.” 1 4
Powell recognised that Congress could ban state law from the reservation and allow tribal 
authority over non-members. The development of the principles contained in the 
foundations of the silent revolution, of allowing state law into the reservation, influenced 
Powell and he explained that the court had to address these principles, “ ...perhaps some
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referen«a?4o<hese factors would emphasise the continuity in our Indian law decisions.” lj0 
This was an acknowledgement that recognised the movement of the court away from 
allowing tribal sovereignty over non-members. Furthermore, the position of the tribes 
recognised the shift in the courfs thinking and supported the Powell interpretation, 
“...tribal power to tax on-reservation transactions with non-members is federally 
delegated and an essential element of tribal sovereignty.” Ij6 However, despite the support 
of federal authority, the majority of Justices in the Colville opinion did not adopt this 
position and used Mazurie to confirm that only congressional authority was strong 
enough to oust state law, “ ...the Tribes themselves could perhaps pre-empt state taxation 
through the exercise of properly delegated federal power to do so...United States v. 
Mazurie.”137 Rather than apply the presumption used in Mazurie (1975) and Oliphant 
(1978), the court applied the sovereignty doctrine, which allowed tribal taxation of non­
members in the reservation.
Colville - The Sovereignty Doctrine
Only William J. Brennan and Thurgood Marshall supported the exclusive use of the 
sovereignty doctrine to tax non-members and to oust state law from the reservation. Both 
justices used the sovereignty doctrine in an attempt to limit and counter the movement of 
the court towards the integrationist trend. In addition, the majority opinion supported the
135 I b i d . ,  2 .
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inherent sovereignty of the tribes to tax non-members but as has been previously 
discussed, tribal sovereignty did not oust state law from the reservation.
Brennan applied the sovereignty doctrine and began from the presumption that the tribe 
had inherent sovereignty until it was divested by Congress. The imposition of the state 
tax endangered tribal authority. As Brennan observed in his third draft of the original 
Colville opinion, “When the tribal government chose to tax the distribution of cigarettes, 
the Washington taxing scheme was brought into conflict with the Tribes federally 
sanctioned functions and activities. The effect was to jeopardise tribal authority...5,1 j8 In 
Brennan’s mind the Colville case was simply one where the action of the state interfered 
with tribal government and it did not call for an in-depth analysis of the history of federal 
Indian law, “In our view, these questions are considerably more narrow than some of the 
briefs suggest. We are not required to reconstruct the foundations of Indian sovereignty, 
locate the precise source of Indian power to assess taxes on non-Indians or finally define 
the relationship between State and Indian revenue-raising authority.” lj9 Reliance on the 
sovereignty doctrine acknowledged the exclusivity of tribal jurisdiction inside the 
reservation. Brennan viewed the state tax as an impediment to tribal government that 
“leads to an actual conflict of jurisdiction and sovereignty because the imposition of the 
Washington tax would inject state law into an on-reservation transaction which the 
Indians have chosen to subject to their own laws.”140 He interpreted the facts of Colville
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to be similar to those in Williams and therefore the outcome should be the same. Justice 
Thurgood Marshall also supported this position.141
The principles adopted by Brennan and Marshall conflicted with those used by the other 
Supreme Court Justices. Brennan acknowledged the movement of the court away from 
using the tribal sovereignty argument but he was not prepared to discard the sovereignty 
doctrine. Brennan noted that the development of the integrationist trend, which limited 
tribal sovereignty over non-members and allowed state law into the reservation, was 
applied in the sister taxation cases and Moe and had eroded tribal sovereignty, “1 do not 
read McClanahan. Mescalero and Moe to seal off [the] evolution of the sovereignty 
doctrine at some arbitrary point in the past or to deprive it of any effect in new situations. 
Accordingly, I do not intend to alter my position on the cigarette tax.”142 Despite an 
acknowledgement of the limitations on tribal sovereignty, which he himself developed in 
Mazurie and Moe for example, he refused to dismiss the principles of it. The conflict 
between the two camps was symbolised by the divisions between Rehnquist and 
Brennan, with the latter pointing out that “Bill [Rehnquist] and I disagree substantially as 
to the applicable legal principles.” 143 Rehnquist’s position stemmed from the presumption 
that the tribe had authority when sanctioned by Congress and until Congress delegated 
power, any doubts on tribal authority were to be resolved against tribal interests. This 
principle infuriated Brennan, who considered it due to be ignorance of the deep-seated 
traditions of the sovereignty doctrine used by the Supreme Court,
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“I find the suggestion that until we do we should resolve doubtful cases against the 
Indians extraordinary. Rather, 1 would think, we must attempt to fill in the interstices in 
existing laws and treaties as best we can. That process inevitably involves appropriate 
reference to broad federal policies and notions of Indian sovereignty, however 
amorphous.” 144
The Brennan position reflected the ideas of tribal sovereignty and deference to federal 
policy and formed the basis of his partial dissent and concurrence in the Colville opinion.
In the final Colville opinion, Brennan confirmed his view that the sovereignty doctrine 
prohibited state law in the reservation. Territorial sovereignty was an important element 
of tribal authority and this argument was presented by Brennan in the partial dissent, 
“...there is a significant territorial component to tribal power...and tribal laws will often 
govern the on-reservation conduct of non-Indians.”145 This was taken from his original 
opinion which was not supported by a majority of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, 
Brennan believed that the underlying reasons of the decision had to be based upon “a 
presumption of sovereignty or autonomy that has roots deep in aboriginal 
independence.”146 In Brennan’s view, the majority opinion had taken no consideration of 
tribal interests and in fact “ ...erodes the Tribes' sovereign authority and stands the special 
federal solicitude for Indian commerce and governmental autonomy on its head.”147 
Despite the internal differences within the Colville court regarding inherent tribal 
sovereignty versus state law in the reservation, the court had ruled that tribes had inherent 
sovereignty to tax non-members in the reservation.
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The Colville court had applied the sovereignty doctrine to allow the tribes to tax inside 
the reservation. Although some justices wanted to apply a delegation of congressional 
power to sanction tribal authority over non-members, the Colville court applied the 
opposite principle, “The power to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and 
significantly involving a tribe or its members is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty 
which the tribes retain unless divested of it by federal law or necessary implication of 
their dependent status.” 148 This opinion was in stark contrast to the underlying principles 
used by the Supreme Court in Oliphant and Mazurie. The Colville rationale in part, held 
that tribal powers were not implicitly divested because of the dependent status of the 
tribes and Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe held that tribal powers over non-members 
were precluded because they were “inconsistent with their [dependent] status.”149 This 
contrast was actually pointed to by the Colville opinion, “In these respects the present 
cases differ sharply from Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe.” '50 Although the Supreme 
Court recognised the dichotomy, it has never resolved the issue.151 One thing was certain, 
the right of the tribes to tax was considered more important than the tribes’ right to 
prosecute non-members as shown in Oliphant.
The difficulties o f the Colville case were resolved with what had been termed a halfway 
house compromise. The Supreme Court sanctioned general state authority in the 
reservation and over non-members in the reservation until reversed by Congress. It also
148 I b i d . ,  1 3 5 - 1 3 6 .
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ruled that tribes had the inherent right to tax non-members in the reservation. Therefore, 
the principles of state and tribal taxation of non-members in the reservation were 
confirmed by the court. These principles would be put to the test in a series of taxation 
cases from 1980 to 1989.
Taxation Case Law, 1980-1989
This section examines taxation cases involving the application of state law over non­
members and the inherent sovereignty of the tribes over non-members and non-member 
companies inside the reservation. From 1980 to 1989, the Supreme Court variously 
applied congressional authority to prohibit state law over non-members in the reservation. 
The taxation cases continued the movement of the court in determining such cases 
involving both state and tribal issues, in terms of a federal versus state government 
framework. Some justices determined that general legislation prohibited state law while 
others believed in the rights of the states and only an explicit act of Congress would 
prohibit state law from the reservation. Between 1980 and 1987, these latter views, which 
supported the integrationist trend, were formed by a select number of dissenting justices. 
In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker (1980), it was Stevens, Stewart and 
Rehnquist. In Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n (1980), it was Stewart, 
Powell, Rehnquist and Stevens. The retirement of Justice Potter Stewart in 1981 slowed 
the development of the integrationist trend in taxation case law. In Merrion v. Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe (1982), it was Stevens, Burger and Rehnquist. In Ramah Navajo School Bd. 
v. Bureau o f Revenue (1982), it was Rehnquist, White and Stevens and in California v.
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Cabazon Band o f  Mission Indians (1987), it was Stevens, O'Connor and Scalia. However, 
in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico (1989) the court rejected the principles 
developed up to 1987 and ruled that state law was applicable in the reservation and over 
non-members in the reservation until Congress explicitly reversed state authority. As well 
as determining questions about state law, from 1980 to 1989, the Supreme Court also re­
affirmed the principle of the sovereignty doctrine that tribes had inherent sovereignty to 
tax non-members in the reservation. This principle did not change throughout the period 
from 1980 to 1989.152
This section now turns to assess the way in which the Supreme Court Justices dealt with 
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker (1980), a case that examined whether state law 
applied over the activities of a non-member company in a reservation.
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker (1980)
A non-member company called Pinetop Logging Company was employed by the White 
Mountain Apache Tribe to fell trees on the Fort Apache Reservation. The State of 
Arizona imposed its taxes on the activities of Pinetop within the reservation. Pinetop paid 
the taxes under protest from 1971 and brought an action claiming that the state could not 
tax it while it worked on tribal and Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) roads and exclusively 
inside the reservation. The Supreme Court held that congressional authority prohibited 
the state from taxing the non-member company while it travelled on tribal and BIA roads.
1 " T h e  s o v e r e i g n t y  d o c t r i n e  w a s  p r e d o m i n a n t l y  u p h e l d  b y  B r e n n a n ,  M a r s h a l l  a n d  B l a c k m u n  a n d  t h e  
r e t i r e m e n t  o f  B r e n n a n  in  1 9 9 0 ,  M a r s h a l l  in  1 9 9 1  a n d  B l a c k m u n  in  1 9 9 4  r e p r e s e n t e d  t h e  e r o s i o n  o f  t h e  
s o v e r e i g n t y  d o c t r i n e .
The Blackmun Papers reveal that discussions between the justices in the lead up to the 
decision of the court rested on the use of congressional authority and not the sovereignty 
doctrine to oust state law from the reservation; in fact, some references to the sovereignty 
doctrine were deleted from the opinion. The opinion of the majority of justices barred 
state law based on general congressional authority whereas the dissenting view was that 
state law was allowed into the reservation until explicitly revoked by Congress. However, 
despite the movement of the Supreme Court away from the sovereignty doctrine, 
Thurgood Marshall appeared to revive the notion that tribal sovereignty remained but this 
was in language only.
This thesis’ analysis of Bracker contrasts with the views of noted scholars. Vine Deloria 
and Clifford Lytle noted that after the McClanahan ruling, the Supreme Court appeared 
to place tribal sovereignty “on a back shelf, hoping that it would be lost in the dust of 
time” but noted also that the Bracker case “was extremely important” as it validated the 
“role of tribal sovereignty” 1 as a bona fide doctrine to prohibit state authority in the 
reservation. While it is true that certain parts of the Bracker opinion did appear to re- 
invigorate tribal sovereignty by referring to Williams, these references by the majority 
opinion corresponded to the limited interpretation of Williams after 1973, which severely 
limited inherent tribal sovereignty. Moreover, the majority opinion in Bracker relied 
almost exclusively on the use of congressional authority to bar state law.
The primary focus of the Supreme Court was on the use of the integrationist trend arising 
from the actions of justices, which relied on congressional authority to oust state law
153 D e l o r i a  a n d  L y t l e ,  American Indians, 2 0 6 .
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from the reservation. Thurgood Marshall confirmed the court’s use of federal authority in 
a memorandum to Byron White, noting that “ ...it is the Federal regulatory scheme in 
general, that leads to the result we reach.” '34 This reliance on federal statutes by Marshall 
was in Harry Blackmun’s view similar to the facts of the Warren Trading Post, pointing 
out that “Preemption... Warren TP [Trading Post] again controls.”153 Blackmun based his 
interpretation on a memorandum he received from his clerk, which confirmed the 
similarity of Bracker with Warren Trading Post, “This case, like Warren Trading Post 
and the pending decision in Central Machinery, involves preemption by a federal statute 
specifically addressing the subject matter taxed by the state.” '36 In addition, Blackmun 
was concerned that his viewpoint in the case contradicted the position he took in Colville. 
A memorandum from Blackmun’s clerk confirmed that he was not to worry because the 
current case involved the power of Congress and not issues of tribal sovereignty, 
“...nothing in this opinion would seem to run against your positions in Confederated 
Tribes. [Colville] That case involves only the Williams principle of tribal self- 
government. This case, like Warren Trading Post and the pending decision in Central 
Machinery, involves pre-emption by a federal statute...” '37 Byron White also agreed that 
the court could use congressional authority to oust state law from the reservation and 
considered the use of tribal sovereignty to be redundant. He was concerned about 
language used in a draft opinion, which he believed appeared to support the use of the 
sovereignty doctrine, “While I agree that federal policies are relevant, this statement
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might suggest an inquiry into the broad policies of encouraging Indian self-government 
and strengthening reservation economies without due attention to the specific language 
and provision of the relevant statutes.”138 The statement to which White referred was a 
quotation taken from Bryan v. Itasca County (1976)139 which related to inherent tribal 
sovereignty and the presumption that states did not have the authority to tax reservations 
unless Congress passed specific legalisation.160 This position influenced Marshall to 
delete this reference to inherent tribal sovereignty from the final opinion. Byron White 
believed that “This statement was unexceptional in Bryan” and because the Supreme 
Court in Moe allowed the states to tax non-members, he pointed out that it influenced the 
Bracker case,
“it is questionable whether the same rule [in Bryan] applies in cases involving State 
taxation of non-Indians doing business on the reservation. Indeed, Moe seems to the 
contrary, since the State was there permitted to tax non-Indian purchasers from Indian- 
operated reservation smoke shops despite the absence of federal statutes clearly intended 
to allow State taxation.”161
In the end, White dissented from the majority opinion because he believed that the 
Supreme Court should have followed the Moe judgement and ruled that an explicit 
congressional act was required to oust state law from the reservation.
The Justice White viewpoint contrasted with Justice Marshall and the opinion itself, 
which relied on congressional authority and was also informed by the court’s recognition
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of tribal sovereignty. Marshall agreed with the court’s use of federal pre-emption, which
r ~ * '
was informed by the traditions of tribal sovereignty, and underlined that Williams was 
also relevant in cases concerning tribal versus state power, “...a number of our cases 
recognise the principle that the exercise of state authority over the reservation may be 
impermissible, not because it is “preempted” in the ordinary sense, but because it 
infringes on tribal self-government. See Williams v. Lee...” 162 However this 
interpretation of Williams did not support the inherent sovereignty of the tribes but 
instead, supported the interpretation used by the Supreme Court after 1959 which allowed 
state law into the reservation unless the tribes could prove that it infringed on their rights. 
In the final opinion, Marshall appeared to re-invigorate the sovereignty doctrine, 
however, it was in language only; “...the "semi-independent position" of Indian tribes” 
gave rise to a barrier that prevented, “the assertion of state regulatory authority over tribal 
reservations and members” if it unlawfully infringed, “"on the right of reservation Indians 
to make their own laws and be ruled by them."”16^ This barrier was “a sufficient basis for 
holding state law inapplicable to activity undertaken on the reservation or by tribal 
members.” 164 Although this statement was true, the Williams test had changed drastically 
from that in 1959 and it no longer prohibited state law from the reservation. Marshall 
himself acknowledged in his McClanahan opinion of 1973 that, the only mention of 
tribal sovereignty was when it was used within the broader context of federal pre­
emption. Federal pre-emption worked on the presumption that “...traditional notions of 
Indian self-government are so deeply engrained in our jurisprudence that they have
162 B o x  3 0 4 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ R e :  N o .  7 8 - 1 1 7 7  -  W h i t e  M o u n t a i n  A p a c h e  T r i b e  v .  B r a c k e r . ”  m e m o r a n d u m  
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provided an important "backdrop"...against which vague or ambiguous federal 
enactments must always be measured.” 16:1 Considerations of tribal sovereignty helped 
inform the federal pre-emption process which prohibited state law over non-members, “In 
a number of cases we have held that state authority over non-Indians acting on tribal 
reservations is pre-empted even though Congress has offered no explicit statement on the 
subject.”166 This Marshall analysis reduced the arguments of the state “to a claim that 
they may assess taxes on non-Indians engaged in commerce on the reservation whenever 
there is no express congressional statement to the contrary” 167 of which Marshall said 
“That is simply not the law.”168 This statement also appeared to re-invigorate the tribal 
sovereignty argument but the opinion of the court was only considered within the 
framework of federal pre-emption. The opinion did not consider the use of the 
sovereignty doctrine. The Bracker opinion held that federal pre-emption was a barrier 
which prohibited the application of state law in the reservation169 and in order for state 
law to be pre-empted there needed to be not only congressional legislation but also broad 
considerations for the interests of the tribe.170 In the end, the Bracker court held that the 
state tax did not apply to a non-member company.
Rehnquist, Stewart, and Stevens dissented from this view and believed that state law 
existed in the reservation until explicitly removed by Congress. This was a re-affirmation 
of the position adopted by a majority of the court in Colville. As Stevens said, “Shouldn’t
165 Ibid.
1 Ibid., 151. The court cited Warren Trading Post v. Tax Comm’n; Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); 
and Kennerly v. District Court o f  Montana, 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
167 White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 150-151.
168 Ibid., 151.
169 . . .  , .
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let people who do business with Indians escape state tax5’171 This principle of the 
inherent right of the states to tax influenced the position of the dissenters.
The Central Machinery case followed the same rationale as the Bracker case and the 
Supreme Court Justices were similarly divided.
Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm’n (1980)
This case considered whether a non-member company who sold eleven tractors to an 
enterprise operated by the Gila River Indian Tribe, called Gila River Farms, had to pay a 
state tax. All business transactions between the non-member company and the tribe were 
completed exclusively within the reservation, involving the initial business dealings to 
obtain the tractors, contracts, payment and delivery. The State of Arizona sought to tax 
these transactions. The Supreme Court ruled that because the business deal took place 
within the reservation and it was controlled by federal regulations then the state tax was 
prohibited. All nine Supreme Court Justices agreed that congressional authority was the 
appropriate tool which prohibited state law in the reservation. However, the court was 
divided six to three on the manner in which this principle was applied. The majority of 
the court used the principle that general federal legislation was enough to oust state law. 
However, Justices Rehnquist, Stevens and Stewart dissented from this view and relied on 
the integrationist trend which was based on the presumption that state law existed in the 
reservation unless explicitly removed by Congress.
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Despite the influence ot the integrationist trend being recognised by the majority of 
justices, they used the same principle used in Bracker that state law did not apply, using 
congressional pre-emption as justification to prohibit a state tax over a non-member 
company. However, the influence of the integrationist trend adopted by the dissent was 
recognised. The key difference between the two positions was that the majority had used 
tribal sovereignty to influence its analysis and was intent on protecting the interests of the 
tribe. In fact, a memorandum to Justice Blackmun criticised the majority for the lack of 
evidence to support its position, pointing out that “The opinion is barebones.”172 The 
majority recognised the impact of the sister taxation cases, McClanahan and Mescalero 
Apache Tribe, and Moe and Colville on the law but refused to apply the integrationist 
trend,
“It may be that in light of modern conditions the State of Arizona should be allowed to 
tax transactions such as the one involved in this case. Until Congress repeals or amends 
the Indian trader statutes, however, we must give them "a sweep as broad as [their] 
language"...and interpret them in light of the intent of the Congress that enacted 
them...” 173
The majority relied on the broad holding of Warren Trading Post, which declared that 
congressional statutes ousted a state tax over a non-member trader. Even though Warren 
did acknowledge tribal sovereignty, the Central Machinery case did not. Marshall
followed the advice of a bench memorandum, which read that a state tax was
“...impermissible because...it interferes with tribal self-government by taxing tribal 
conduct on the reservation. There is no need for the Court to reach...these
172 B o x  3 0 7 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ M e m o  t o  H A B  f r o m  D T C ,  r e :  C e n t r a l  M a c h .  C o .  v .  A r i z o n a  S t a t e  T a x
C o m m ’ n ,  N o .  7 8 - 1 6 0 4 ,  d r a f t  o p i n i o n , ”  n .d .
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contentions."174 Powell agreed with the outcome but believed that the court should 
protect the tribe’s right to do business inside the reservation, noting that the “ ...interest of 
Indians is not to be taken advantage of by whites... Don’t see why conduct of transactions 
on reservation should be different...” 173
In contrast, the positions of Justices Rehnquist, Stevens and Stewart throughout the case 
relied on the integrationist trend and fundamentally rejected the sovereignty doctrine and 
tribal sovereignty. Rehnquist determined simply that congressional authority was not 
explicit, noting that “Congress has not preempted this.”176 Stevens concurred with this 
viewpoint and added that nothing in the legislation prevented the state from taxing, 
pointing out that “State can tax even versus a federal statute”177 and “Preemption arg. 
[sic] -  no merit -  no evidence of federal interests to preempt. Warren not pertinent here
178because no federal license here.” The majority took issue with the “existence of the
179 •Indian trader statutes, not their administration” to pre-empt state law. For the dissent, 
this was not explicit evidence of congressional authority as there was in Warren Trading 
Post. As Stewart said, “Warren relates to licensing of 1 [Indian] traders -  none such 
here.”180 Stewart confirmed his position when he wrote in dissent that “The Court's 
construction of the trader statutes” was too sweeping and “no portion of [them] indicates
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a congressional intention to immunize anybody from state taxation.”181 The dissent 
argued that the Central Machinery opinion contradicted the philosophy and decree of 
Moe and Colville,18“ cases that used the integrationist trend. Based on the movement of 
the Supreme Court towards congressional authority and the rulings in those two cases, the 
dissent argued that allowing states to tax inside the reservation was commonplace, “The 
Court has on more than one occasion sustained state taxation of transactions occurring on 
Indian reservations.” 18j
Only two years after Central Machinery, the Supreme Court Justices again had to decide 
a case that involved the right of the state to tax a non-member company inside a 
reservation.
Rama It Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau o f Revenue (1982)
The Ramah court followed a similar path to the Bracker case.184 In this case, the Supreme 
Court had to decide whether Federal law prohibited the State of New Mexico from taxing 
a non-member company, Lembke Construction, who received funds from the Ramah 
Navajo Chapter of the Navajo Indian Tribe and the federal government to build a tribal 
school within the reservation. From 1974 to 1977, the non-member company paid the
181 Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 1 6 8 .
l8: I b i d . ,  1 7 2 .  P o w e l l  r e c o g n i s e d  t h e  d i v i s i o n  b e t w e e n  t h i s  c a s e  a n d  Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes a n d  
Colville. In  Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n t h e  m a j o r i t y  w o r k e d  f r o m  t h e  p r e s u m p t i o n  t h a t  
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18' Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 1 6 9 .
14 T h e  p r i n c i p l e s  u s e d  b y  t h e  Ramah Navajo School Bd. v . Bureau o f Revenue c o u r t  w e r e  v i r t u a l l y  
id e n t i c a l  t o  t h o s e  f o l l o w e d  i n  White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker.
state tax and the tribe reimbursed these payments of $232,264.38. Both Lembke and the 
tribe protested over the imposition of state taxes. The Supreme Court held that Federal 
law pre-empted the state tax imposed on the non-member company. Once again, the 
justices focused on using congressional authority to oust state law from the reservation, 
rather than tribal sovereignty. The divisions between the majority of six Justices and the 
three dissenting Justices were drawn along the same lines as the Bracker case. The 
majority used congressional pre-emption, which was influenced by the traditions of tribal 
sovereignty while the dissenting view held that state law was not prohibited because it 
had not been explicitly removed by Congress. In addition, the dissent argued that the 
sovereignty doctrine alone was powerless to prevent state law over non-members in the 
reservation.
A memorandum in the Blackmun Papers discussed the general movement of the court 
away from the sovereignty doctrine and towards the integrationist trend. The 
memorandum discussed the views of the Solicitor General (SG), who argued that the 
justices should use the sovereignty doctrine to pre-empt state law over non-members in 
the reservation, “The SG’s suggestion, which relies strongly on the tradition of Indian 
sovereignty, is almost as unsatisfactory. As the Court noted some years ago, "the trend 
has been away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction 
and toward a reliance on federal preemption...." McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172.,,18:) 
However, the movement of the Supreme Court away from the sovereignty doctrine 
undermined the opinion of the Solicitor General. The limitations put on tribal sovereignty
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meant that the court as it had before 1959 and in Williams, could not use the sovereignty 
doctrine argument as a rule prohibiting state law in the reservation, “1 am not much 
impressed by the parties’ suggestions that the Court develop a broad rule that will dispose 
of a substantial number of cases. It may well be that this area of the law is confused, and 
that the Court therefore is forced to hear entirely too many Indian cases.”186 Therefore, 
congressional authority was the only appropriate tool to protect the tribes from state law. 
The shift of the court away from the sovereignty doctrine did not show any signs of being 
diminished or reversed, “I would not adopt the general rule proposed by the SG, which 
seems inconsistent with several of the Court’s decisions.”187
Many justices viewed congressional authority as the principle to be adopted by the 
Ramah court as shown by the memorandums of the Ramah court. These showed that 
certain justices relied specifically on federal pre-emption to prohibit state law over non­
members in the reservation. The presence of general legislation was enough for Justice
Blackmun to support the preclusion of the state tax, noting that “ ...regulation not so
188pervasive as in WM [White Mountain]...but Preemption...federal supervision.” Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor agreed that White Mountain Apache was the relevant case and 
supported the use of federal regulations; “WM [White Mountain Apache] depends on fed 
regul [federal regulation] if we stick with that we -  [apply federal regulations in 
Ramah\”m  In addition, Justice Brennan was explicit about using congressional authority
186 I b id .
187 I b i d . ,  1 9 .
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as had previously been done in White Mountain Apache and Central Machinery, “WM 
[White Mountain Apache] + Central Mach[Central Machinery] reg use.”190 Although the 
opinion of the court relied on federal authority, it again underlined the principle of tribal 
sovereignty as a principle to prohibit state law in the reservation.
Once again, the Ramah court declared that inherent tribal sovereignty and the Williams 
test of 1959 were principles capable of prohibiting state law in the reservation, but the 
Ramah court only used them to inform the process of federal pre-emption.191 The 
language used to support tribal sovereignty was based on the ‘infringement test’ from 
Williams (1959). However, as the section in this chapter on the Bracker case made clear, 
the court’s interpretation of this test changed dramatically after its use in Williams and 
had not relied on inherent tribal sovereignty. The court’s use of tribal sovereignty was 
contained within its federal pre-emption analysis of the case, “...ambiguities in federal 
law should be construed generously, and federal pre-emption is not limited to those 
situations where Congress has explicitly announced an intention to pre-empt state 
activity.”192 Therefore, the presumption of tribal sovereignty, where tribal authority 
prevailed unless specifically removed by Congress, continued to be used within the 
framework of federal pre-emption. This interpretation of tribal sovereignty was 
highlighted in the Marshall opinion, “The Bureau of Revenue argues that imposition of 
the state tax is not pre-empted because the federal statutes and regulations do not
190 Ibid., l.
191 Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau o f Revenue, 8 3 7 .  F e d e r a l  p r e - e m p t i o n  w a s  b a s e d  o n  a  t e s t  a n d  t h e  
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specifically express the intention to pre-empt this exercise of state authority. This 
argument is clearly foreclosed by our precedents. In White Mountain we flatly rejected a 
similar argument.” 19’ Limitations placed on tribal sovereignty by the Supreme Court, 
especially when issues of state law were involved, meant that the majority opinion did 
not interpret or use this statement to support the independence of the sovereignty 
doctrine.
In contrast, the position of the three justices in the Ramah dissent showed the movement 
of the court towards congressional authority and the redundancy of the sovereignty 
doctrine which prohibited state law over non-members in the reservation. The 
presumption of the dissent was that tribal sovereignty applied only to tribal members. The 
Ramah dissent written by Rehnquist was virtually identical to that position and stance he 
adopted in Colville. Once again, Rehnquist believed that the Supreme Court was 
following an identified trend, which allowed the state to tax non-members in the 
reservation unless explicitly prohibited by Congress and ultimately eviscerated the 
sovereignty doctrine,
“I believe the dominant trend of our cases is toward treating the scope of reservation 
immunity from nondiscriminatory state taxation as a question of pre-emption, ultimately 
dependent on congressional intent. In such a framework, the tradition of Indian 
sovereignty stands as an independent barrier to discriminatory taxes, and otherwise serves 
only as a guide to the ascertainment of the congressional will.”194
193 I b id . ,  8 4 3 .  T h i s  w a s  a l s o  h e l d  t o  b e  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  in  a  c i v i l  j u r i s d i c t i o n  c a s e ,  New Mexico v. Mescalero 
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p r e - e m p t  s t a t e  l a w  a s  t h e  s o l e  t o u c h s t o n e .  T h e y  h a v e  a l s o  r e j e c t e d  t h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  t h a t  p r e - e m p t i o n  r e q u i r e s  
" a n  e x p r e s s  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  s t a t e m e n t  t o  t h a t  e f f e c t , ”  3 3 4 .
3 Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau o f Revenue, 8 4 7 - 8 4 8 .
In the minds of Rehnquist and the dissenters, the sovereignty doctrine and inherent tribal 
sovereignty were irrelevant and redundant in the face of “the sovereign prerogatives of 
ivt’the S.t^te of-New Mexico.”193 Rehnquist believed that the limitations placed on tribal 
sovereignty resulted from the involvement of the states and their laws, “in some instances 
a state law may be invalid because it infringes "'the right of reservation Indians to make 
their own laws and be ruled by them."’”196 However, this only applied in instances where 
“the State attempts to interfere with the residual sovereignty of a tribe to govern its own 
members, the "tradition of tribal sovereignty" merely provides a "backdrop" against 
which the pre-emptive effect of federal statutes or treaties must be assessed.”197 
Therefore, the principle of tribal sovereignty was insufficient to prevent state law over 
non-members in the reservation. In fact, Rehnquist connected the limitations of tribal 
sovereignty when confronted with state power with the limitations of tribal authority over 
non-members. This defined nearly all of the aspects of the integrationist trend.
Although Rehnquist did not consider tribal sovereignty as a bona fide  principle to govern 
non-members within reservations, this was the critical issue in Merrion (1982) where the 
question was established whether the Jicarilla Apache Tribe had inherent sovereignty to
• • * 198tax a non-member company who extracted oil and gas inside the reservation.
195 I b i d . ,  8 5 5 .
196 I b i d . ,  8 4 8 .
197 I b i d . ,  8 4 8 .
198 A r t i c l e s  o n  Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe i n c l u d e ,  N o r d h a u s ,  H a l l  a n d  R u d i o ,  “ R e v i s i t i n g  M e r r i o n  
v . J i c a r i l l a  A p a c h e  T r i b e ; ”  B r a d l e y  S c o t t  B r i d g e w a t e r ,  “ T a x a t i o n :  M e r r i o n  v .  J i c a r i l l a  A p a c h e  T r i b e :  W i n e  
o r  V i n e g a r  f o r  O k l a h o m a  T r i b e s ? ”  Oklahoma Law Review 3 7  ( 1 9 8 4 ) :  3 6 9 - 3 9 6 ;  D a v i d  G o l d s t e i n ,  " I n d i a n  
L a w —I n d i a n  T a x a t i o n  o f  N o n - I n d i a n  M i n e r a l  L e s s e e s , ”  Tennessee Law Review 5 0  ( 1 9 8 3 ) :  4 0 3 - 4 2 3 ;  a n d  
D a v id  B .  W i l e s ,  “ T a x a t i o n :  T r i b a l  T a x a t i o n ,  S e c r e t a r i a l  A p p r o v a l ,  a n d  S t a t e  T a x a t i o n -  M e r r i o n  a n d  
B e y o n d , ”  American Indian Law Review 1 0  ( 1 9 8 3 ) :  1 6 7 - 1 8 5 .
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Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe (1982)
In J 953, a non-member company was given a number of leases by the Jicarilla to remove 
oil and gas from the reservation. However, the tribal constitution did not allow the tribe 
to impose a tribal tax. This changed in 1969 when the Jicarilla amended their 
Constitution to allow the imposition of a tribal tax and in 1976 the Jicarilla imposed a tax 
on the non-member company. The Supreme Court held that the Jicarilla Apache had 
inherent power to impose its tax. In contrast to Bracker, Central Machinery and Ramah, 
this case did not involve any state interests of authority over the non-member company. 
The Supreme Court Justices had difficulties reconciling the movement of the court away 
from tribal sovereignty with the precedent of Colville, allowing tribes to tax non­
members. The Merrion court came perilously close to prohibiting the right of the tribe to 
tax but in the end, the ideological differences were reflected in a six to three majority 
opinion, in favour of inherent tribal sovereignty.199 The dissent applied the integrationist 
trend, which relied on congressional authority to sanction tribal authority over non­
members in the reservation. Tribal sovereignty after McClanahan (1973) was limited to 
tribal members only and therefore in Mazurie (1975), the Supreme Court applied the idea 
that tribal sovereignty over non-members had to be authorized by congressional 
authority. In Oliphant (1978), the Supreme Court relied on the same idea and found no 
congressional authority to sanction tribal authority over non-members.
IQ9 N .  B r u c e  D u t h u ,  “ T h e  T h u r g o o d  M a r s h a l l  P a p e r s  a n d  t h e  Q u e s t  f o r  a  P r i n c i p l e d  T h e o r y  o f  T r i b a l  
S o v e r e i g n t y :  F u e l l i n g  t h e  F i r e s  o f  T r i b a l / S t a t e  C o n f l i c t , ”  Vermont Law Review 2 1  ( 1 9 9 6 ) :  8 1 - 8 8 ;  a n d  
N o r d h a u s ,  H a l l  a n d  R u d i o ,  “ R e v i s i t i n g  M e r r i o n . ”
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In contrast to the case law which had weakened the sovereignty doctrine, many justices 
re-affirmed the sovereignty doctrine as a viable source of tribal governmental power over 
non-members in the reservation. Justice William J. Brennan considered taxation to be an 
integral part of tribal government, noting that “ ...the power to tax derives from their 
retained power of sovereignty. The power to tax is necessary to the vestiges which 
remain of Indian self-government.”-00 Justice Blackmun concurred with the importance 
of raising revenue from non-member taxes, “I agreed with Thurgood [Marshall] at 
Conference that the Jicarilla possess the sovereign power to levy the challenged tax.”201 
Justice Thurgood Marshall began from the presumption he adopted in his Oliphant 
dissent that tribes retain sovereignty until divested by Congress; “I am convinced that the 
Tribe retained the power to impose the severance taxes involved here...” and “I would 
confirm the Tribe’s authority to tax as necessary to self-government and territorial 
management.”- - These principles formed the basis of the Merrion majority opinion.
The presumption made by Marshall in formulating the opinion was the underlying 
principle used by the Merrion court. Marshall re-iterated that only Congress could 
reverse the tribes’ inherent right to tax, explaining that the tribes,
“...did not surrender its authority to tax the mining activities of petitioners, whether this 
authority is deemed to arise from the Tribe's inherent power of self-government or from 
its inherent power to exclude nonmembers. Therefore, the Tribe may enforce its
200 B o x  1 :5 6 3 ,  W J B  P a p e r s ,  “ A m o c o  P r o d u c t i o n  C o .  a n d  M e r r i o n  v .  J i c a r i l l a  A p a c h e  T r i b e ,  8 0 - 1 1 ;  8 0 - 1 5 ,  
A r g u e d  1 1 / 4 / 8 1 , ”  W . J .B .
201 B o x  3 4 1 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ M e m o r a n d u m  t o  t h e  C o n f e r e n c e ,  N o .  8 0 - 1 1  -  M e r r i o n  v .  J i c a r i l l a  A p a c h e  T r i b e .  
N o .  8 0 - 1 5  - A m o c o  P r o d u c t i o n  C o m p a n y  v .  J i c a r i l l a  A p a c h e  T r i b e ,”  m e m o r a n d u m  f r o m  H a r r y  A .  
B l a c k m u n  t o  t h e  c o n f e r e n c e ,  J u n e  1 7 , 1 9 8 1 .
202 B o x  3 4 1 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ 8 0 - 1 1 ;  8 0 - 1 5  - A m o c o  P r o d u c t i o n  C o m p a n y  v .  J i c a r i l l a  A p a c h e  T r i b e ;  M e r r i o n  
v . J i c a r i l l a  A p a c h e  T r i b e ,  M e m o r a n d u m  o f  J u s t i c e  M a r s h a l l , ”  J u n e  2 5 ,  1 9 8 1 ,  1 , 6 .
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severance tax unless and until Congress divests this power, an action that Congress has 
not taken to date.”203
This was a strict application of the sovereignty doctrine, which contrasted significantly 
with the development of the integrationist trend and in particular, the rulings of Mazurie 
and Oliphant. In those cases, criminal authority over non-members was not considered 
important to tribal government and was not protected by the sovereignty doctrine. 
However, the majority of the Supreme Court Justices in Merrion considered taxing non­
members as a fundamental right in order to raise essential governmental revenue,
“The power to tax is an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty because it is a necessary 
instrument of self-government and territorial management. This power enables a tribal 
government to raise revenues for its essential services. The power...derives from the 
tribe's general authority, as sovereign, to control economic activity within its jurisdiction, 
and to defray the cost of providing governmental services by requiring contributions from 
persons or enterprises engaged in economic activities within that jurisdiction.”204
The Supreme Court considered the principle of tribal sovereignty as well as the every day 
economic pressures put on the tribes. Tax revenue was therefore important for tribal 
government to provide services to both tribal members and non-members.
The entire court did not share these principles. Within the Supreme Court, there were 
definitive movements to support the integrationist trend and to limit the Colville 
precedent. Justice Rehnquist believed that tribal authority over non-members and the use 
of tribal authority to prohibit state law from the reservation were no longer viable 
principles to be supported by the Supreme Court. Rehnquist viewed these two aspects of
703
~ ' Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 1 5 9 .
04 I b i d . ,  1 3 0 .  S e e  D u t h u ,  “ T h e  T h u r g o o d  M a r s h a l l  P a p e r s , ”  8 3 .
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tribal sovereignty to be connected and tribal authority, regardless of the facts of the case, 
to be now, dependent on congressional intent,
“1 wonder if you could cite somewhere in the opinion Byron’s Mescalero Apache Tribe 
v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973), and Thurgood’s McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Commission. 411 U.S. 164 (1973). They are more or less the "flip side" of this case, but 
since they are fairly recent opinions dealing with state authority to tax income of a tribe 
or individual Indians residing on a reservation 1 think they are consistent with your 
analysis...”206
Rehnquist believed that tribal authority in any situation was limited to tribal members and 
therefore Congress had to sanction tribal authority over non-members, pointing out that 
it, “Takes something more than residual sovereign power to tax non-members”206 and it 
“Takes > residual sovereign power for Is [Indians] to tax non Is.”207 This position was 
supported by Chief Justice Warren Burger who believed that Congress had to delegate 
authority to the tribes and noted that “Is there inherent authority? None reserved in 
lease.”208 Knowing that Marshall’s view was attracting a majority following, Justice John 
Paul Stevens was adamant about the limitations placed on tribal sovereignty by Supreme 
Court case law, explaining that the “cases clarify a def. btro [breakthrough] powers of 
Tribe over its members and over nonmembers.”209 Stevens disagreed with the principles 
of tribal sovereignty used by Marshall, noting that “It will come as no great surprise that I 
intend to circulate a dissent.” The reason for the dissent was made clear by Stevens in a
205 B o x  3 4 1 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ R e :  N o s .  8 0 - 1 1  &  8 0 - 1 5  A m o c o  P r o d u c t i o n  C o .  v .  J i c a r i l l a  A p a c h e  T r i b e :  
M e r r i o n  v .  J i c a r i l l a  A p a c h e  T r i b e ,”  m e m o r a n d u m  f r o m  R e h n q u i s t  t o  S t e v e n s ,  J u n e  1 , 1 9 8 1 .
20(' B o x  1 :5 5 4 ,  W J B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o .  8 0 - 1 1  &  1 5 . M e r r i o n  &  A m o c o  P r o d u c t i o n  v .  J i c a r i l l a  A p a c h e  T r i b e .”  
W .J .B . ,  n . d . , 2 .
207 B o x  3 4 1 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o .  8 0 - 1 1 ,  M e r r i o n  v .  J i c a r i l l a  A p a c h e  T r i b e ,  N o .  8 0 - 1 5 ,  A m o c o  P r o d u c t i o n  
C o m p a n y  v .  J i c a r i l l a  A p a c h e  T r i b e , ”  H . A . B . ,  A p r i l  1 1 ,  1 9 8 1 , 2 .
208 B o x  1 :5 5 4 ,  W J B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o .  8 0 - 1 1  &  1 5 , M e r r i o n  &  A m o c o  P r o d u c t i o n  v .  J i c a r i l l a  A p a c h e  T r i b e ,”  n .d .
209 B o x  3 4 1 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ 8 0 - 1 1 ,  M e r r i o n  v .  J i c a r i l l a  A p a c h e  T r i b e ,  8 0 - 1 5 ,  A m o c o  P r o d u c t i o n  C o .  v .  
J i c a r i l l a  A p a c h e  T r i b e , ”  H . A . B . ,  2 .
memorandum to Marshall, pointing out that the opinion did “not adequately confront the 
critical distinction between an Indian tribe’s power over its own members, which is a 
good deal greater than the power possessed by many sovereigns, and its much more 
limited power over nonmembers.”210 Stevens believed that tribal powers were limited to 
tribal members, noting that there was a “Real difference between [tribal] powers over 
tribe and powers over non-members.”2" The interpretation of Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor agreed with the three justices who would form the Merrion dissent but she had 
issues regarding the Colville case, pointing out that “Do not like the broad conclusions in 
This [sic] draft”212 but “Colville said tax can be levied and not positive I can do that.”2"  
In the end, O’Connor joined the majority opinion in the Merrion case but the three 
dissenters applied the presumption that the tribe did not have power over non-members 
until delegated authority by Congress. As Stevens said, “[this was] consistent with this 
Court's recognition of the limited character of the power of Indian tribes over 
nonmembers in general.”214 This position built on the integrationist trend that followed 
the judgments in Mazurie and Oliphant.
Although Merrion re-affirmed the inherent right of the tribes to tax non-members in the 
reservation, it was not supported by the entire court and was weakened by the position 
taken by the three dissenters. Towards the latter part of the 1980s the Supreme Court
210 B o x  3 4 1 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ R e :  8 0 - 1 1 ;  8 0 - 1 5  -  M e r r i o n  e t  a l .  v .  J i c a r i l l a  A p a c h e  T r i b e .”  m e m o r a n d u m  
f r o m  J o h n  P a u l  S t e v e n s  t o  T h u r g o o d  M a r s h a l l ,  D e c e m b e r  1 , 1 9 8 1 .
211 B o x  1 :5 5 4 ,  W J B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o .  8 0 - 1 1  &  1 5 , M e r r i o n  &  A m o c o  P r o d u c t i o n  v .  J i c a r i l l a  A p a c h e  T r i b e ,”  
H .A .B . ,  2 .
212 I b i d .
213 B o x  1 :5 5 4 ,  W J B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o .  8 0 - 1 1  &  1 5 . M e r r i o n  &  A m o c o  P r o d u c t i o n  v .  J i c a r i l l a  A p a c h e  T r i b e ,”  
W . J .B . ,  2 .
14 Merrion v . Jicarilla Apache T r i b e ,  1 8 3 - 1 8 4 .
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once again addressed the question of inherent tribal sovereignty and the rights of state 
authority inside the reservation.
Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe (1985) and California v. Cabazon Band o f Mission 
Indians (1987)
The Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe case relied on the sovereignty doctrine and the 
presumption that tribes enjoyed the sovereign right to tax non-members until reversed by 
Congress. In 1978, the Navajo Tribe enacted ordinances taxing tribal members and non­
member companies with leasehold interests in the reservation and taxing the receipts of 
the property extracted from the reservation. These ordinances had been submitted for 
federal approval but, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) told the Navajo that no federal 
act required the BIA to approve them. A non-member company which extracted minerals 
from the reservation disapproved of these ordinances and appealed against their 
imposition. In the Kerr-McGee opinion, the Supreme Court confirmed that the tribes did 
not require the consent of the Secretary of the Interior to tax non-members in the 
reservation. Only two years after Kerr-McGee, the Supreme Court had to decide another 
case which involved state authority over non-members inside the reservation.
In California v. Cabazon Band o f Mission Indians (1987), the Supreme Court had to 
decide whether to prohibit a state from taxing inside a reservation. The Cabazon and 
Morongo Bands of Mission Indians operated federally approved reservation bingo games 
and card games within its reservation in Riverside County, California. However, the State
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of California and Riverside County wanted to impose their statutes governing bingo and 
card games inside the reservation because the tribal gaming enterprises attracted large 
numbers of non-member users to the reservation. The ruling of the court followed a 
similar path to the cases of Bracker, Central Machinery and Ramah and prohibited the 
state tax on federal pre-emption grounds. This process was informed by the historical 
traditions of tribal sovereignty. However, the three dissenters in the Cabazon case argued 
that there was no explicit congressional authority prohibiting the states right to tax non­
members. Once again, the integrationist trend influenced the thinking of the justices in a 
case dealing with state law over non-members and confirmed that state law applied over 
non-members inside a reservation until reversed by Congress.
However, after Cabazon, the personnel of the Supreme Court changed and the principles 
of the court became more unified in following the integrationist trend. Justice Rehnquist 
replaced Warren Burger as Chief Justice and Antonin Scalia filled the empty seat on the 
court. Justice Scalia applied the integrationist trend with vigour. During the late 1980s 
and into the 1990s Justice Sandra Day O’Connor consistently applied the integrationist 
trend and in 1988, following the appointment of Anthony Kennedy, the Supreme Court 
was further shifted away from the ideas of tribal sovereignty to the integrationist trend.
In 1989, the Supreme Court demonstrated this shift towards the integrationist trend in its 
handling of the Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico case.
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Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico (1989)
The Cotton case again tested the principle whether a state could tax a non-member 
company inside the reservation. The Jicarilla Apache Tribe leased lands to the Cotton 
Petroleum Corporation, a non-member company, for the production of oil and gas, which 
were subject both to tribal and states taxes. The company paid the states taxes under 
protest and appealed, arguing that they were pre-empted by federal law. The Cotton case 
was the first to apply the integrationist trend in the 1980s, the opinion applying the 
principles found in the Rehnquist concurrence/dissent in Colville and the Bracker, 
Central Machinery, Ramah and Cabazon dissents were applied. The majority of six 
Justices ruled that a state could tax a non-member company in the reservation, as no
• • •  91 Sexplicit congressional legislation existed to prevent the tax." The Cotton majority 
opinion used federal pre-emption to decide the outcome of the case but it was not used in 
the same way as it had been in the majority opinions in Bracker, Ramah and Cabazon, 
which had relied on the traditions of tribal sovereignty to inform its decisions. Instead, 
the Cotton majority relied on the interests of the states and the idea that states had the 
right to tax non-member companies unless it was removed by explicit congressional 
legislation.
' l3 J u d i t h  V .  R o y s t e r ,  “ M i n e r a l  D e v e l o p m e n t  in  I n d i a n  C o u n t r y :  T h e  E v o l u t i o n  o f  T r i b a l  C o n t r o l  o v e r  
M in e r a l  R e s o u r c e s , ”  Tulsa Law Journal 2 9  ( 1 9 9 4 ) :  5 4 1 - 6 3 7 ;  C h a r l e y  C a r p e n t e r ,  “ P r e e m p t i n g  I n d i a n  
P r e e m p t i o n :  C o t t o n  P e t r o l e u m  C o r p .  v .  N e w  M e x i c o , ”  Catholic University Law Review 3 9  ( 1 9 9 0 ) :  6 3 9 -  
6 7 1 ;  D a n i e l  G l u c k ,  “ A  T a l e  o f  T w o  T a x e s - - P r e e m p t i o n  o n  t h e  R e s e r v a t i o n :  C o t t o n  P e t r o l e u m  C o r p .  v .  
M e x i c o , ”  Tax Lawyer 4 3  ( 1 9 9 0 ) :  3 5 9 - 3 7 3 ;  K r i s t i n a  B o g a r d u s ,  “ C o u r t  P i c k s  N e w  T e s t  I n  C o t t o n  
P e t r o l e u m ,”  Natural Resources Journal 3 0  ( 1 9 9 0 ) :  9 1 9 - 9 2 8 ;  C h a r l e s  B r e e r ,  “ A r e  S t a t e  S e v e r a n c e  T a x e s  
P r e e m p t e d  W h e n  I m p o s e d  o n  N o n - I n d i a n  L e s s e e s  E x t r a c t i n g  O i l  a n d  G a s  F r o m  I n d i a n  R e s e r v a t i o n s  L a n d ?  
C o t t o n  P e t r o l e u m  C o r p o r a t i o n  v .  N e w  M e x i c o , ”  Land and Water Law Review 2 5  ( 1 9 9 0 ) :  4 3 5 - 4 4 5 ;  a n d  
K a t h e r i n e  B . C r a w f o r d ,  “ S t a t e  A u t h o r i t y  t o  T a x  N o n - I n d i a n  O i l  &  G a s  P r o d u c t i o n  o n  R e s e r v a t i o n s :  C o t t o n  
P e t r o l e u m  C o r p .  v .  N e w  M e x i c o , ”  Utah Law Review 1 9 8 9  ( 1 9 8 9 ) :  4 9 5 - 5 1 9 .
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The movement of the court towards the integrationist trend was discussed by a number of 
justices and used by six justices in the Cotton majority opinion. Justice William 
Rehnquist who had been demanding some consistency in the tax cases believed that no 
federal legislation existed to bar the state tax, noting to “Reject fed. preemption point.”216 
Justice John Paul Stevens concurred with Rehnquist and argued that the case law during 
the early to late 1980s had been too 'pro-Indian,’ pointing out that the “1 [Indians] have 
been out of step in 1 [Indian] cases. Some R and B necessary helps Is [Indians] here.”217 
Stevens reinforced his views and the application of the integrationist trend in his opinion, 
explaining that “Under this Court's modern decisions, on-reservation oil and gas 
production by non-Indian lessees is subject to nondiscriminatory state taxation unless 
Congress has expressly or impliedly acted to pre-empt the state taxes.”218
The Cotton case involved the issue of federal pre-emption but it did not follow the
9 1 Q •principles laid down in the precedent of Bracker, which required federal pre-emption
to be informed by tribal sovereignty. Alex Tallchief Skibine argued that the principle 
adopted by Justice Thurgood Marshall in Bracker gave way to the Justice Rehnquist view 
or test articulated in Colville, which required an explicit congressional act to limit state 
power in the reservation.220 Although this interpretation was correct; the Rehnquist view 
had been developing prior to Colville and through the 1980s, further developed in the 
form of dissents. The use of federal pre-emption in Cotton, relied exclusively on whether
216 B o x  5 2 1 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ 8 7 - 1 3 2 7 .  C o t t o n  P e t r o l e u m  C o r p .  v .  N e w  M e x i c o ,”  H . A . B . ,  F e b r u a r y  1 2 ,  1 9 8 8 .
217 I b id .“) j g
' Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 1 6 3 .
’ ’ ’ T h e  f e d e r a l  p r e - e m p t i o n  t e s t  a p p l i e d  in  Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico w a s ,  a s  M a r s h a l l  s a i d  in  
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, “ s i m p l y  n o t  t h e  l a w ,  1 5 1 .
S k i b i n e ,  “ R e c o n c i l i n g , ”  1 1 5 2 - 1 1 5 6 .
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specific congressional legislation existed which prohibited state law over non-members 
inside a reservation. Ultimately, the Cotton majority of six justices applied the rationale 
of the Ramah dissent, which included Rehnquist, White and Stevens.221 As Stevens 
explained, federal pre-emption was “primarily an exercise in examining congressional 
intent.”"  The Supreme Court had examined whether a congressional act limited state 
sovereignty over non-member activity in the reservation. In the opinion of the Supreme 
Court, there were no explicit regulations which prohibited state law and therefore, 
congressional silence on the issue meant that state sovereignty was not pre-empted by 
federal legislation. This process did not allow tribal sovereignty to influence the 
court’s assessment of congressional legislation. The Cotton court viewed tribal 
sovereignty, as had the Ramah dissent, merely as a test to prevent the imposition of a
2^ 4
discriminatory tax, therefore reducing tribal authority over tribal members." In the view 
of the Cotton majority, the state tax on a non-member company was lawful and not 
considered to be discriminatory. Limitations on tribal sovereignty fitted in with the 
court’s philosophy that the boundary between the reservation and the state no longer 
existed. The court, explaining that this was “an area where two governmental entities
t 225share jurisdiction,” summed up this process of integration."
221 T h e  Ramah d i s s e n t ,  c o m p o s e d  o n l y  o f  R e h n q u i s t ,  W h i t e  a n d  S t e v e n s ,  e x p l a i n e d  t h a t  “ t h e  d o m i n a n t  
t r e n d  o f  o u r  c a s e s  is  t o w a r d  t r e a t i n g  t h e  s c o p e  o f  r e s e r v a t i o n  i m m u n i t y  f r o m  n o n d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  s t a t e  
t a x a t i o n  a s  a  q u e s t i o n  o f  p r e - e m p t i o n ,  u l t i m a t e l y  d e p e n d e n t  o n  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  i n t e n t , ”  8 4 7 - 8 4 8 .  T h i s  t r e n d  
w a s  c o n f i r m e d  b y  t h e  Ramah d i s s e n t  w h i c h  n o t e d  t h a t  “ t h e r e  m u s t  b e  s o m e  a f f i r m a t i v e  i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t
C o n g r e s s  d i d  n o t  i n t e n d  t h e  S t a t e  t o  e x e r c i s e . . . s o v e r e i g n  p o w e r , ”  8 5 5 .
222 Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 1 7 6 .
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e  c o u r t  a p p l i e d  t h e  r a t i o n a l e  o f  Moe, w h e r e  f e d e r a l  s t a t u t e s  d i d  n o t  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  o u s t  
s t a t e  a u t h o r i t y  o v e r  n o n - m e m b e r s  in  t h e  r e s e r v a t i o n ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  r a t i o n a l e  u s e d  i n  Central Machinery 
w h e r e  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  a n d  n o t  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  f e d e r a l  t r a d e r  s t a t u t e s  o u s t e d  s t a t e  l a w .
224 T h e  Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau o f  Revenue d i s s e n t  s a i d ,  “ t h e  t r a d i t i o n  o f  I n d i a n  s o v e r e i g n t y  
s t a n d s  a s  a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  b a r r i e r  t o  d i s c r i m i n a t o r y  t a x e s ,  a n d  o t h e r w i s e  s e r v e s  o n l y  a s  a  g u i d e  t o  t h e  
a s c e r t a i n m e n t  o f  t h e  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  w i l l , ”  8 4 8 .
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 1 8 9 .
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After 1989, the Supreme Court did not once rule in favour of exclusive tribal jurisdiction
over non-members or prohibit state taxation authority over non-members in the
226  •  • •  - 1  reserv a tio n .T h e  integrationist trend sanctioned state law in the reservation as well as
state authority over non-members in the reservation. Therefore, the concurrent tribal and 
state taxation of non-members in the reservation became the accepted standard by the 
court. However, in 2001 the integrationist trend, informed by criminal and civil case law, 
directly affected the inherent right of the tribe to tax non-members in the reservation. 
This issue will be examined in the section on civil case law.
Civil Jurisdiction Case Law, 1981 to 2001
The shift of the Supreme Court away from the sovereignty doctrine and towards the 
integrationist trend happened gradually as shown in civil case law between 1981 and 
2001. The cases included Montana v. United States (1981), Brendale v. Confederated 
Yakima Indian Nation (1989),227 South Dakota v. Bourland (1993),228 Strate v. A-l
~~b Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Potawatomi Tribe, 4 9 8  U .S .  5 0 5  ( 1 9 9 1 )  ( s t a t e s  t a x  n o n - m e m b e r s  in  t h e  
r e s e r v a t i o n ) ;  County o f Yakima v. Yakima Nation, 5 0 2  U .S .  2 5 1  ( 1 9 9 2 )  ( s t a t e s  a n d  l o c a l  g o v e r n m e n t  h a d  
a u t h o r i t y  t o  i m p o s e  r e a l  p r o p e r t y  t a x e s  -  a d  v a l o r e m  t a x e s  - o n  f e e  l a n d s  a l i e n a t e d  u n d e r  t h e  G e n e r a l  
A l l o t m e n t  A c t  o f  1 8 8 7  a n d  o w n e d  b y  t r i b a l  m e m b e r s  o r  t h e  t r i b e .  H o w e v e r  t h e  c o u n t y  d i d  n o t  h a v e  
a u t h o r i t y  t o  i m p o s e  e x c i s e  t a x e s  o n  t h e  s a l e  o f  t h e  s a m e  l a n d s ) ;  Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox 
Nation, 5 0 8  U . S .  1 1 4  ( 1 9 9 3 )  ( s t a t e s  h a d  n o t  a u t h o r i t y  t o  t a x  t r i b a l  m e m b e r s  e a r n i n g  i n c o m e  in  I n d i a n  
c o u n t r y  -  o n  t r i b a l  l a n d s  o r  a l i e n a t e d  l a n d s  -  a n d  d id  n o t  h a v e  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  t o  i m p o s e  a  s t a t e  v e h i c l e  e x c i s e  
ta x  a n d  r e g i s t r a t i o n  f e e s  o n  t r i b a l  m e m b e r s . ) ;  Department o f Taxation and Finance o f New York v. Milhelm 
Attea & Bros., Inc., 5 1 2  U .S .  6 1  ( 1 9 9 4 )  ( t h e  S t a t e  o f  N e w  Y o r k  h a d  a u t h o r i t y  t o  r e q u i r e  t h e  p r e c o l l e c t i o n  o f  
s t a t e  t a x e s  o n  c i g a r e t t e s  s o l d  b y  t r i b a l  m e m b e r s  t o  n o n - m e m b e r s .  T h e  w h o l e s a l e r  w a s  t h e r e f o r e  r e s p o n s i b l e  
f o r  t h e  p r e c o l l e c t i o n  a n d  p a y m e n t  o f  t h e  t a x ) ;  Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 5 1 5  U .S .  4 5 0  
( 1 9 9 5 )  ( s t a t e  d i d  n o t  h a v e  a u t h o r i t y  t o  i m p o s e  a  f u e l  t a x  o n  f u e l  s o l d  b y  t h e  t r i b e  o n  t r i b a l  t r u s t  l a n d s .  A l s o ,  
t r i b a l  m e m b e r s  w o r k i n g  f o r  t h e  T r i b e  b u t  l i v i n g  o u t s i d e  t h e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  t h e  t r i b e  w e r e  s u b j e c t  t o  a  s t a t e  
i n c o m e  t a x ) ;  a n d  Arizona Dept, o f Revenue v. Blaze Construction. Co., 5 2 6  U . S .  3 2  ( 1 9 9 9 )  ( s t a t e s  h a d  
a u t h o r i t y  t o  i m p o s e  a  t a x  o n  a  p r i v a t e  c o m p a n y  p r o f i t s  f r o m  c o n t r a c t s  w i t h  t h e  U .S .  g o v e r n m e n t ) .
J G e n e r a l  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  t h i s  c a s e  a r e  c o n t a i n e d  in ,  J u d i t h  V .  R o y s t e r ,  “ T h e  L e g a c y  o f  A l l o t m e n t , ”  
Arizona State Law Journal 2 7  ( 1 9 9 5 ) :  5 0 - 5 7 ;  J o s e p h  W i l l i a m  S i n g e r ,  “ S o v e r e i g n t y  a n d  P r o p e r t y . ”  
Northwestern University Law Review 8 6  ( 1 9 9 1 ) :  1 - 5 6 ;  J u d i t h  V .  R o y s t e r ,  “ E n v i r o n m e n t a l  P r o t e c t i o n  a n d  
N a t i v e  A m e r i c a n  R i g h t s :  C o n t r o l l i n g  L a n d  U s e  T h r o u g h  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  R e g u l a t i o n , ”  Kansas Journal of
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$S&rqctors (1997),-"“} Atkinson Trading Company v. Shirley (2001) and Nevada v. Hicks
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(2001)." Although the archival evidence of the Blackmun Papers ends in 1994, the 
general trend of the court was still apparent in the court opinions after 1994. Therefore, 
the three final civil cases are based on the opinions of the court and not on any private 
papers. In civil case law, the Supreme Court Justices applied the integrationist trend used 
by the Supreme Court in the Mazurie and Oliphant opinions, which ruled that a 
congressional delegation of authority was required in order for tribes to have authority 
over non-members inside a reservation. This principle was unanimously applied by the 
Supreme Court in Montana (1981) but only to non-members on non-member or fee lands 
in the reservation: Conversely, the Montana court also applied the principle of inherent 
tribal sovereignty over non-members on tribal or trust lands in the reservation. The status 
of land was important to determine jurisdiction. Between 1989 and 1993, the diverse 
views of the Justices of the Supreme Court regarding tribal sovereignty over non­
Law & Public Policy 1 - S U M  ( 1 9 9 1 ) :  8 9 - 9 6 ;  T h o m a s  W .  C l a y t o n ,  “ B r e n d a l e  v .  Y a k i m a  N a t i o n :  A  D i v i d e d  
S u p r e m e  C o u r t  C a n n o t  A g r e e  O v e r  W h o  M a y  Z o n e  N o n m e m b e r  F e e  L a n d s  W i t h i n  t h e  R e s e r v a t i o n , ”  South 
Dakota Law Review 3 6  ( 1 9 9 1 ) :  3 2 9 - 3 5 7 ;  C r a i g h t o n  G o e p p e l e ,  “ S o l u t i o n s  f o r  U n e a s y  N e i g h b o u r s :  
R e g u l a t i n g  t h e  R e s e r v a t i o n  E n v i r o n m e n t  A f t e r  B r e n d a l e  v .  C o n f e d e r a t e d  T r i b e s  &  B a n d s  o f  Y a k i m a  I n d i a n  
N a t i o n , ”  Washington Law Review 6 5  ( 1 9 9 0 ) :  4 1 7 - 4 3 6 ;  a n d  C .  G .  H a k a n s s o n ,  “ I n d i a n  L a n d - U s e  Z o n i n g  
J u r i s d i c t i o n :  A n  A r g u m e n t  in  F a v o u r  o f  T r i b a l  J u r i s d i c t i o n  O v e r  N o n - M e m b e r  F e e  L a n d s  W i t h i n  
R e s e r v a t i o n  B o u n d a r i e s , ”  South Dakota Law Review 7 3  ( 1 9 9 7 ) :  7 2 1 - 7 4 0 .
::8  G e n e r a l  d i s c u s s i o n s  a r e  f o u n d  i n ,  F r i c k e y ,  “ A  C o m m o n  L a w , ”  4 5 - 4 8 ;  V e r o n i c a  L . B o w e n ,  “ T h e  E x t e n t  
o f  I n d i a n  R e g u l a t o r y  A u t h o r i t y  O v e r  N o n -  I n d i a n s :  S o u t h  D a k o t a  v .  B o u r l a n d , ”  Creighton Law Review 2 7  
( 1 9 9 4 ) :  6 0 5 - 6 5 9 ;  R o b e r t  L a u r e n c e ,  “ T h e  U n s e e m l y  N a t u r e  O f  R e s e r v a t i o n  D i m i n i s h m e n t  B y  J u d i c i a l ,  A s  
O p p o s e d  T o  L e g i s l a t i v e ,  F i a t  A n d  T h e  I r o n i c  R o l e  O f  T h e  I n d i a n  C i v i l  R i g h t s  A c t  In  L i m i t i n g  B o t h , ”  
North Dakota Law Review 71  ( 1 9 9 5 ) :  3 9 3 - 4 1 3 ;  a n d  S k i b i n e ,  “ T h e  C o u r t ' s  U s e  o f  t h e  I m p l i c i t  D i v e s t i t u r e  
D o c t r i n e . ”
229 F o r  a  g e n e r a l  o v e r v i e w  o f  t h e  l e g a l  h i s t o r y  a n d  d e c i s i o n  s e e ,  J a m e l l e  K i n g ,  “ T r i b a l  C o u r t  G e n e r a l  C iv i l  
J u r i s d i c t i o n  O v e r  A c t i o n s  B e t w e e n  N o n - I n d i a n  P l a i n t i f f s  a n d  D e f e n d a n t s :  S t r a t e  v .  A - l  C o n t r a c t o r s , ”  
American Indian Law Review 2 2  ( 1 9 9 7 ) :  1 9 1 - 2 2 1 ;  W a m b d i  A w a n w i c a k e  W a s t e w i n ,  ‘ S t r a t e  v .  A - l  
C o n t r a c t o r s :  I n t r u s i o n  I n t o  t h e  S o v e r e i g n  D o m a i n  o f  N a t i v e  N a t i o n s , ”  North Dakota Law Review 1A 
( 1 9 9 8 ) :  7 1 1 - 7 3 6 ;  a n d  S k i b i n e ,  “ T h e  C o u r t ' s  U s e  o f  t h e  I m p l i c i t  D i v e s t i t u r e  D o c t r i n e . ”
230 G e n e r a l  d i s c u s s i o n s  a r e  f o u n d  in ,  S i n g e r ,  “ C a n o n s  o f  C o n q u e s t ; ”  M e l a n i e  R e e d ,  “ N a t i v e  A m e r i c a n  
S o v e r e i g n t y  M e e t s  a  B e n d  in  t h e  R o a d :  D i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  N e v a d a  v .  H i c k s , ”  Brigham Young University Law 
Review 2 0 0 2  ( 2 0 0 2 ) :  1 3 7 - 1 7 4 ;  A m y  C r a f t s ,  “ N e v a d a  v .  H i c k s  a n d  i t s  i m p l i c a t i o n  o n  A m e r i c a n  I n d i a n  
S o v e r e i g n t y , ”  Connecticut Law Review 3 4  ( 2 0 0 2 ) :  1 2 4 9 - 1 2 8 0 ;  C a t h e r i n e  S t r u v e ,  “ H o w  B a d  L a w  M a d e  a  
H a r d  C a s e  E a s y :  N e v a d a  v .  H i c k s  a n d  t h e  S u b j e c t  M a t t e r  J u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  T r i b a l  C o u r t s , ”  University o f 
Pennsylvania Journal o f Constitutional Law 5 ( 2 0 0 3 ) :  2 8 8 - 3 1 7 ;  a n d  R o b e r t  N .  C l i n t o n ,  " T h e r e  I s  N o  
F e d e r a l  S u p r e m a c y  C l a u s e  f o r  I n d i a n  T r i b e s , ”  Arizona State Law Journal 3 4  ( 2 0 0 2 ) :  1 1 3 - 2 6 0 .
183
members on non-member lands led to an ideological battle within the court. Some 
justices wanted to apply the sovereignty doctrine while others wanted to apply the 
integrationist trend to resolve the question of tribal authority over non-members on non­
member lands. Moreover, in 1993 the Supreme Court was still bound by its own Montana 
precedent, which ruled that tribes had inherent civil authority over non-members on tribal 
and trust lands and set about circumventing this principle. The court extracted an idea 
from Montana, whereby any tribal or trust land appropriated by Congress or any 
involvement of non-members on the lands in question resulted in the divestiture of 
exclusive tribal authority and therefore the loss of tribal trust status and inherent tribal 
sovereignty over those lands. This eroded the sovereignty doctrine and influenced the 
application of the integrationist trend over tribal lands. In 2001, the court applied the 
integrationist trend in full for the first time in civil case law. This meant that tribes were 
prevented from exercising civil authority over non-members on tribal lands in the 
reservation and as a result, the state had inherent sovereignty over non-members in the
• • 231reservation. This process all began in the case of Montana v. United States (1981). 
Montana v. United States (1981)
The application of the integrationist trend in Mazurie (1975) and Oliphant (1978), tribal 
authority over non-members required a delegation of congressional power, and the 
revival of inherent tribal sovereignty in Colville (1980) directly influenced Montana. In 
this case, the Crow Tribe of Montana introduced a regulation preventing non-member 
hunting and fishing in the reservation, which included non-member/fee lands and tribal
~ 1 Montana v. United States, 4 5 0  U .S .  5 4 4  ( 1 9 8 1 ) .
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lands. The tribe retied on its ownership of the bed of the Big Horn River, its treaties and 
on its inherent sovereignty to prove that it had civil authority over non-members inside 
the entire reservation. In contrast to the arguments of the Crow Tribe, the State of 
Montana contended that it had authority to regulate non-member hunting and fishing. The 
Montana court unanimously ruled that unless granted by Congress, the tribes did not have 
inherent sovereignty over non-members on non-member lands of the reservation. 
Consequently, the state had authority over non-members on those lands in question. 
However, the Montana case held that the tribes had inherent sovereignty over non­
members on tribal and trust lands of the reservation. L. Scott Gould believed that the 
Montana court diminished tribal sovereignty “only to their members, unless Congress 
chose to augment them.”  ^ “ However, this interpretation did not take account of the 
explicit fact that the tribes retained inherent civil authority over non-members on trust 
lands. The decision of the Justices in Montana reflected a mid-way point between the 
nullification o f inherent tribal sovereignty in criminal case law and the re-affirmation of 
the inherent right of the tribes to tax.
During deliberation, several justices dismissed inherent tribal sovereignty as a principle 
which allowed the tribes to have regulatory power over non-member activity on the non­
member and fee lands of the reservation. The basis of tribal authority had to be 
sanctioned by Congress. Justice Byron White believed that the tribe did not have the right 
to control non-members, noting that the “Indians can’t regulate fee owner residents/^ 
This interpretation was supported by Justice John Paul Stevens who argued that non­
232
~ ~ G o u l d ,  “ T h e  C o n s e n t  P a r a d i g m , ”  8 9 5 .
233 B o x  1 :5 2 4 ,  W J B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o . 7 9 - 1 1 2 8 ,  M o n t a n a  v .  U n i t e d  S t a t e s , ”  W . J . B . ,  n . d . ,  1.
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members had a right to act on their own lands, observing that the tribes “Can’t regulate 
[fishing and hunting] done by non-Indians on their own land.”234 Justice Potter Stewart’s 
view went further, arguing that the tribes had no authority over any person on the lands in 
question, “[the tribe] doesn’t have it [authority] over land of allottees whether Indian or 
non-Indian and whether resident or non-residents.”2j° There was a clear distinction drawn 
by the justices between tribal authority over tribal members and non-members and the 
types of land involved. The Supreme Court Justices believed that the tribes did not have 
authority over non-members on non-member and fee lands in the reservation but did have 
authority over tribal members on non-member and fee lands in the reservation. In 
addition, the tribes had authority over tribal members and non-members on tribal and 
trust lands in the reservation. Lewis Powell stated that the tribe had authority over its own 
members but not over non-members on fee lands, pointing out that the “Tribe has some 
regulatory authority power but not to regulate non-members on own land.”2^ 6 Stewart 
found the dividing line between the two to be a comfortable idea, noting that the tribe had 
authority to “regulate H[unting] and F[ishing] over its members” but “no regulate 
H[unting] and F[ishing] over allotees (Wfhites] on I[ndians]).”2j7 He summed up the idea 
of the court when he said “Tribe has sovereignty over own members and own property, 
not over fee owners.”238 Without inherent sovereignty over non-members on fee lands, 
the tribes had to rely on the goodwill of Congress. Chief Justice Warren Burger believed 
in the use of congressional authority, noting that the “Indians do not have [authority]
234 Ibid., 2.
235 Ibid., 1.
236 Ibid., 2.
237 Box 325, HAB Papers, “N o.79-1128, Montana v. United States,” H.A.B., December 5, 1980, 1.
238 Ibid.
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}}239 •absent act.”- In the mindset of the justices, the principle of inherent tribal sovereignty 
over non-members on non-member lands was redundant.
Justice Harry Blackmun was briefed by his clerks on the arguments for inherent tribal 
sovereignty but instead he applied the integrationist trend because of concerns regarding 
tribal authority over non-members on fee lands. The position of the tribe supported the 
use of the sovereignty doctrine and argued that the federal government supported tribal 
authority over non-members. A memorandum from Blackmun’s clerk to Blackmun 
explained the position relied upon by the tribe; “...federal authorities consistently have 
upheld the right of Indian tribes as sovereigns to regulate the conduct of non-Indians 
within the boundaries of a reservation, even if those non-Indians own land within the 
reservation.”240 Therefore, given this prior federal knowledge supporting broad tribal 
authority, the tribes argued that “It may be that persons who purchase land within an 
Indian reservation should be on notice that the Indian tribe will exert governing authority 
over it.”241 Despite the merits of tribal sovereignty, Blackmun decided to support the 
interests of non-members and the states. This position was influenced by advice given to 
Blackmun in a memorandum; “I am troubled, however, by the situation faced by some 
amici states in which there are reservations where 80 or 90 percent of the land is owned 
by non-members of the Tribe. It seems difficult to find any justification for allowing 
those tribes to exercise sovereignty over such lands.”*'4"' In the end, Blackmun was 
concerned about allowing large populations of non-members on a number of reservations
239 Ibid.
240 Box 325, HAB Papers, “TMo.79-1128, Montana, et. al, v. U.S.,” from Dean to Blackmun, December 2,
1980, 13-14.
to be governed *tegr $-ibal law. Blackmun ruled against the tribes, stating that the tribal 
“Regulation is troublesome and may not be valid.”243
The limitations placed on tribal sovereignty allowed the Supreme Court to support the 
right of the state to regulate non-members on non-member lands. Justice William 
Rehnquist, a staunch proponent of states rights within the reservation, pointed out that the 
state “can regulate hunting and fishing by allottees and people who can hunt and fish 
without trespassing on Indian land.”244 State authority filled the vacuum left by the 
removal of tribal authority over non-members. Justice Potter Stewart believed that state 
authority filled the void, noting that “Montana owns property, can say ah can come 
in.”"43 This idea was supported by Chief Justice Burger who stated that “Montana has the 
authority and regul[ate] freely.”246 Without tribal control of the land, Powell observed 
that the state “can control fishing on it.”247 The state had primary authority over non­
members on non-member fee lands. Justice Byron White considered the Court of Appeals 
decision to be “silly” and pointed out that the state controlled non-members but not tribal 
members, “State can set seasons and limits on non-members, but not for Indians.”248 The 
internal position of the court heavily suggested that the state had sovereignty over non­
members on non-member lands in the reservation.
;43 Box 1:524, WJB Papers, “N o.79-1128, Montana v. United States,” W.J.B., 2.
J44 Ibid; and Box 325, HAB Papers, “N o.79-1128, Montana v. United States,” H.A.B., 2.
245 Box 325, HAB Papers, “No.79-1128, Montana v. United States,” H.A.B., 1.
~46 Ibid.
247 Box 1:524, WJB Papers, “N o.79-1128, Montana v. United States,” W.J.B., 2.
248 Box 325, HAB Papers, “No.79-1128, Montana v. United States,” H.A.B., 1.
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For a short time, Justices Brennan and Marshall believed that it was not the states but the 
tribes that had inherent sovereignty over non-members. On December 5, 1980, Blackmun 
noted that the position of the court on the issue of tribal regulation was “7-2 Regs,”249 
indicating that Brennan and Marshall supported inherent tribal sovereignty. However, the 
final Montana opinion was unanimous with Brennan and Marshall supporting the 
principle that Congress had to enact legislation in order to allow the tribes to have 
authority over non-members on non-member lands of the reservation.
In the Montana opinion, the Supreme Court relied on the principle used in criminal case 
law to justify its movement towards the integrationist trend in civil case law. In Oliphant 
and Wheeler, the Supreme Court had held that generally, the tribes had no inherent 
authority over non-members unless delegated by Congress. Alex Skibine argued that this 
principle was transferred from the criminal to the civil context, pointing out that the 
Supreme Court’s Wheeler opinion was “Crucial to the Montana Court's formulation of its 
general rule.”" The general rule laid down by the Supreme Court imported the 
integrationist trend from criminal case law, “Though Oliphant only determined inherent 
tribal authority in criminal matters, the principles on which it relied support the general 
proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the 
activities of nonmembers of the tribe.”231 However, unlike criminal law, this trend did not 
apply to tribal authority over non-members on tribal lands. The rule over non-members 
was qualified by two exceptions,
;49 ibid.
~ Skibine, “The Court's Use o f the Implicit Divestiture Doctrine,” 297. 
Montana v. United States, 565.
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“ I o be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil 
jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe 
may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers 
who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial 
dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. Williams v. Lee...Morris v. 
Hitchcock...Buster v. Wright... Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian 
Reservation...A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the 
conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or 
has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or 
welfare of the tribe. See Fisher v. District Court... Williams v. Lee...Montana Catholic 
Missions v. Missoula County...Thomas v. Gay...”232
The tribe had to prove one of these exceptions in order to be granted authority over non­
members on non-member lands. Although the exceptions appeared to contradict the 
general rule, it was within the rubric of the integrationist trend, which sanctioned tribal 
authority over non-members through a delegation of congressional authority. This 
interpretation o f inherent sovereignty turned the definition of inherent sovereignty on its 
head. During the Montana case, the Supreme Court Justices devised a new test and a 
general rule to erode the sovereignty doctrine and this legal precedent was something that 
the tribes did not know about until the Montana decree itself.23’ As Alex Skibine 
explained, “Montana's "general rule" was in fact not a general rule at all until the Court 
decided to make it so.”234 The Montana court re-affirmed the development of the 
integrationist trend and further limited tribal sovereignty when it explained “...exercise 
of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control 
internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot
; Ibid., 565-566.
The tribe did not base any o f  their time on the premise that regulating non-member fishing and hunting 
on non-member fee land harmed tribal government or had an adverse effect on the economy or the health 
of the tribe.
4 Skibine, “The Court's Use o f  the Implicit Divestiture Doctrine,” 298.
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survive without express congressional delegation.”255 Therefore, the Montana court 
required explicit legislation by Congress to authorise tribal authority and without this, 
there could be no authority over non-members, “There is simply no suggestion in the 
legislative history that Congress intended that the non-Indians who would settle upon 
alienated allotted lands would be subject to tribal regulatory authority.”236 The Montana 
court made it clear that the tribes did not have authority over non-members on non­
member and fee lands until Congress authorised such power.
By comparison, the Supreme Court ruled that the tribes retained inherent sovereignty 
over non-members on tribal and trust lands of the reservation. The Supreme Court 
clarified the sovereignty of the tribes on tribal lands when it re-affirmed the opinion of 
the Court of Appeals,
“The Court o f Appeals held that the Tribe may prohibit nonmembers from hunting or 
fishing on land belonging to the Tribe or held by the United States in trust for the Tribe, 
and with this holding we can readily agree. We also agree with the Court of Appeals that 
if the Tribe permits nonmembers to fish or hunt on such lands, it may condition their
2S7entry by charging a fee or establishing bag and creel limits.”
The confirmation of the Court of Appeals decision by the Supreme Court Justices, which 
protected tribal sovereignty over tribal and trust lands, led the Supreme Court to address 
only “...the power of the Tribe to regulate non-Indian fishing and hunting on reservation
235 Montana v. United States, 564. See, McSloy, “Back To the Future;” and Laurie Reynolds, “Indian 
Hunting and Fishing Rights: The Role o f Tribal Sovereignty and Preemption,” North Carolina Law Review 
62(1984): 762.
Montana v. United States, 560.
2 5 7 , , . ,
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land owned in fee by nonmembers of the Tribe.”238 Despite the application of inherent 
tribal sovereignty by the Supreme Court, the Montana court also ruled that it was 
possible to overturn the protections of tribal sovereignty over tribal lands.
The Montana opinion held that the General Allotment Act of 1887 had opened up tribal 
and trust reservation lands to non-members and in doing so removed the exclusive 
authority of the tribes over parts of the reservation.239 The justices’ interpreted non­
member owned lands to be fee land that was not subject to tribal jurisdiction. Therefore, 
the movement of non-members on to the land, precipitated by the 1887 Act, was an 
important factor of the opinion, “ ...what is relevant in this case is the effect of the land 
alienation occasioned by that policy.”260 The removal of inherent tribal sovereignty over 
those lands resulted in the status of the lands being removed from the tribal and trust 
status. Consequently, without the protections of tribal sovereignty, the tribes required a 
delegation of congressional power to have authority over those lost lands. In direct 
contrast to the interpretation of the Montana court, future Supreme Court cases extracted 
a general principle whereby any congressional act, which affected the exclusive authority 
of the tribes over their lands, could remove the tribal status of the lands. It did not matter 
whether the act was designed to specifically remove the tribal and trust status of the 
lands; if the act generally applied inside the reservation then it was considered to 
automatically take away exclusive tribal control. This line of thinking tied in with the 
movement of the Supreme Court away from inherent tribal sovereignty.
?5g
' Montana v. United States, 557.
239 The General Allotment Act o f 1887 broke up communally owned tribal reservation lands. Specified 
acres o f land were allotted to tribal members and the United States government sold the surplus lands to 
non-Indians. However, not all reservations were allotted and broken up.
(>0 Montana v. United States, 559.
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A memorandum to conference from Justice Potter Stewart highlighted the effect of the 
integrationist trend in civil case law and the effect of Montana on civil case law. The 
memorandum concerned the decision made by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
in New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe.261 This case involved whether the tribe could 
assume authority over non-member hunting and fishing on tribal and trust lands of the 
reservation, in which the tribe had invested years of planning and funding and designed 
tribal regulations around tribal needs. In addition, the federal government had heavily 
supervised the project. The case was factually similar to Montana but in contrast, the 
decision of the Appeals Court was that the tribe had inherent sovereignty over their 
territory. Potter Stewart believed that the difference in viewpoint between the Appeals 
Court and the Supreme Court regarded inherent tribal sovereignty as a principle to allow 
tribal authority over non-members, “Nevertheless, in discussing several of the grounds 
for its decision, the CA here takes views of tribal authority at odds with Montana. For 
example, the CA found inherent authority to regulate hunting and fishing without strong 
evidence of the tribe’s dependence on wildlife for its subsistence...”262 This 
interpretation supported the movement of the Supreme Court away from inherent tribal 
sovereignty and towards congressional authority. Despite the limitations put on tribal 
sovereignty, in civil case law tribal sovereignty still applied over tribal lands. Stewart 
believed that the fundamental difference between New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache 
Tribe and Montana was the status of the lands involved; “In Montana, the issue was the 
power of the Tribe to regulate hunting and fishing on lands technically within the
261 Box 325, HAB Papers, “Memorandum to the Conference,” memorandum from Potter Stewart, April 1, 
1981, 1.
262 Ibid., 2.
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reservation, but alienated in fee simple to nonlndians...Nothing in the present case 
suggests that any of the reservation lands at issue have been allotted or alienated out of 
tribal or federal hands.”“6j The Montana case became the standard through which the 
Supreme Court would consider whether tribes had authority over non-members. Despite 
the presence of tribal lands, Potter Stewart considered Montana to be the relevant case 
against which to judge whether tribes had authority over non-members; “The Mescalero 
Apache Tribe’s claim of exclusive authoity [sic] may therefore pass muster under the 
language in Montana recognising tribal authority over matters demonstrably affecting the 
economic welfare of the Tribe or the proper exercise of its self-government.”264 This 
memorandum showed how important the integrationist trend and Montana were to the 
ideology of the Supreme Court.
The Montana opinion established three contradictory holdings.
1.) The tribes did not have general jurisdiction over non-members.
2.) Tribes did not have inherent sovereignty over non-members on non-member lands of 
the reservation unless it was authorised by Congress or it was proved within one of the 
exceptions.
3.) The tribes had inherent sovereignty over non-members on tribal and trust lands of the 
reservation.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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Although the status of lands in Montana was crucial to the application of the sovereignty 
doctrine or the integrationist trend, from 1989 to 2001 the Supreme Court Justices moved 
towards the integrationist trend and eroded the sovereignty doctrine.
Civil Case Law, 1989 to 2001
The ruling of the Montana case set the precedent for five cases that followed; Brendale v. 
Confederated Yakima Indian Nation (1989), South Dakota v. Bourland {1993), Strate v. 
A-l Contractors (1997), Atkinson Trading Company v. Shirley (2001) and Nevada v. 
Hicks (2001),265 all of which fundamentally eroded tribal civil jurisdiction over non­
members in the reservation.
From 1989 to 2001, the Supreme Court Justices applied the integrationist trend and 
eroded tribal authority over fee lands and in theory rescinded tribal authority over tribal 
and trust lands. The justices considered inherent tribal sovereignty over non-members to 
be no longer relevant and from 1993 established a new principle to circumvent the 
Montana precedent, which held that the tribes had inherent tribal sovereignty over non­
members on tribal lands.266 Gradually the Supreme Court applied the same principle to 
cover both fee and trust lands and as a result, tribal authority over non-members required 
legislation by Congress. The battle between the integrationist trend and the sovereignty
Brendale v. Confederated Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 
U.S. 679 (1993); Strate v. A -l Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997); Atkinson Trading Co., v. Shirley, 532 
U.S. 645 (2001); and Nevada v. Hicks.
266 John Fredericks III, “America’s First Nations: The Origins, Flistory and Future o f American Indian 
Sovereignty,” Journal o f Law and Policy 7 (1999): 403.
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doctrine ended in 1994 with the retirement of Justice Harry A. Blackmun. Thereafter the 
court applied the integrationist trend and abandoned the sovereignty doctrine.
Brendale v. Confederated Yakima Indian Nation (1989)
The Brendale case involved whether the Yakima tribe or Yakima county within 
Washington State had zoning authority over non-member lands in what were defined as 
the ‘open’ and ‘closed’ areas of the reservation. Over half of the open area consisted of 
fee lands, which contained commercial and residential developments, and agricultural 
lands. The population of the open area was also overwhelmingly non-Indian. The closed 
area was mainly 807,000 acres of forestlands, including 25,000 acres of fee lands. This 
area had been closed to the public by the tribes since 1972. The Brendale case was an 
“extremely important case for Native Americans” because the standard for tribal 
authority over non-members was “in flux.”  ^ Therefore, the difficulty of the case meant 
that the Brendale court was divided into three separate opinions. The first consisted of 
four justices, White, Rehnquist, Scalia and Kennedy. The second consisted of two 
justices, Stevens and O’Connor and the third consisted of three justices, Blackmun, 
Brennan and Marshall. It was a 4-2-3 division. The justices were split into two 
ideologically opposed camps. Six of the justices supported the development of the 
integrationist trend and believed that tribal authority over non-members was not inherent 
and existed only through a delegation of authority by Congress. Three justices, headed by 
Blackmun, supported the sovereignty doctrine and viewed the tribes as sovereign entities
7 B o x  4 5 3 ,  T M  P a p e r s ,  “ B e n c h  M e m o r a n d u m , ”  T . M . ,  J a n u a r y  1 0 ,  1 9 8 9 ,  4
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until the relevant authority was reversed by Congress, which had the effect of 
undermining the integrationist trend and Montana.
Originally, the Brendale court was composed of a majority of six against the three 
dissenters of Blackmun, Marshall and Brennan. This was highlighted by text that had 
been pencilled out in the third draft of the Blackmun dissent, “Because 1 believe that the 
majority’s reading of Montana is at odds with our jurisprudence of tribal sovereignty...I 
dissent.”*" However, in the final Brendale court there were three camps of judges, two 
opinions, and two opposing presumptions regarding tribal sovereignty.
The majority o f the Supreme Court had supported the general presumption established in 
Montana that congressional authority was required for the tribes to have authority over 
non-members on non-member and fee lands. As this authority was absent, the tribe did 
not have authority over non-members, over which, the integrationist trend dictated that 
the state had authority. Chief Justice William Rehnquist believed tribal authority had 
been replaced, noting that the county within the state had “authority to zone fee lands 
owned by non-I[ndians].”269 Justice Byron White concurred with the position that the 
county and state had zoning authority over non-members, observing that “Zoning means 
exclusive.”270 Therefore, the county and not the tribes had zoning authority over non­
members.
; B o x  5 2 4 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  T h i r d  D r a f t  D i s s e n t  b y  B l a c k m u n ,  J a n u a r y  6 ,  1 9 8 9 .
B o x  5 2 4 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o .  8 7 - 1 6 2 2 )  B r e n d a l e  v .  C o n f e d e r a t e d  T r i b e s ,  Y a k i m a ,  N o .  8 7 - 1 6 9 7 )  
W i lk in s o n  v .  C o n f e d e r a t e d  T r i b e s ,  Y a k i m a ,  N o .  8 7 - 1 7 1 1 )  Y a k i m a  v .  C o n f e d e r a t e d  T r i b e s .  Y a k i m a , ”  
H - A .B .,  J a n u a r y  1 3 ,  1 9 8 9 ,  1 .
270 Ibid.
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Although the positions of Justices Stevens and O’Connor supported the presumption that 
the tribes had no inherent authority over non-members, they believed that the tribes could 
exclude non-members from the reservation. Stevens was unequivocal in his belief that the 
tribes did not have inherent sovereignty over non-members, pointing out that the 
Brendale case was “not controlled by Montana, [as that case] depended on inherent
271sovereignty.’
.
Despite Stevens’ view about the redundant nature of tribal sovereignty, he believed that
%
the tribes still had the right to exclude non-members from the reservation, “Is [Indians] 
have power to exclude non-Is from Reservation. Therefore can control what happens on
272 •the land.”*" " Essentially tribal sovereignty only amounted to the power to exclude and 
was therefore not territorial or inherent.27j This power of exclusion only applied to the 
closed part of the reservation. In the open area, Stevens agreed with Rehnquist and White 
that the county and state had authority over non-members. This Stevens interpretation 
was based on his Merrion dissent from 1982.274 Sandra Day O’Connor wanted to apply 
the integrationist trend but was initially unsure whether to support the Stevens position or 
the position of Rehnquist and White, noting “...may go with CJ [Chief Justice] but for 
now sympathetic to JPS.”273 This position rejected the principle of inherent tribal 
sovereignty.
271 I b id ,  2 .
272 Ib id .
273 rv
 ^ D u th u ,  “ T h e  T h u r g o o d  M a r s h a l l  P a p e r s , ”  9 4 .
Stevens held that the authority o f  the tribes was not inherent sovereignty but instead it was based solely 
on the power o f the tribes to exclude non-members from the reservation.
B o x  5 2 4 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o .  8 7 - 1 6 2 2 )  B r e n d a l e  v .  C o n f e d e r a t e d  T r i b e s ,  Y a k i m a ,  N o .  8 7 - 1 6 9 7 )  
W i lk in s o n  v .  C o n f e d e r a t e d  T r i b e s ,  Y a k i m a ,  N o .  8 7 - 1 7 1 1 )  Y a k i m a  v .  C o n f e d e r a t e d  T r i b e s .  Y a k i m a , ”  
H .A .B . ,2 .
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Justices Harry A. Blackmun, Thurgood Marshall and William J. Brennan applied the 
sovereignty doctrine to sanction tribal authority over non-members in the reservation. 
Brennan was adamant about his position, noting that the “Tribe retains its inherent 
authority” and “no checkerboard.”276 His opinion indicated that the tribes had exclusive 
authority to zone all of the reservation lands unless explicitly revoked by Congress. In 
1989, Blackmun made a laudable attempt to undermine the radical change, which he 
helped establish in Montana?11 A bench memorandum explained the difference between 
the court’s interpretation of tribal sovereignty in civil case law before and after Montana, 
noting that tribal sovereignty before Montana existed “unless affirmatively limited by a 
special treaty provision or federal statute. In Montana v. United States (1981), however, 
the Court reversed the inference.” 7^8 Although Blackmun voted against inherent tribal 
sovereignty in Montana and was of the same opinion as Justice Potter Stewart, in 1989 he 
recognised the impact o f  Montana and attempted to reverse its influence. A memorandum 
from Blackmun’s clerk to Blackmun explained that Blackmun’s and the court’s position 
in Montana disregarded tribal sovereignty, “with respect to the inherent sovereignty
• 9 7 Qissue, the Court was unanimous.” However, Blackmun determined that this 
discrepancy did not pose any problems for his dissent. The Montana case Blackmun 
wrote was “only 1 v. many cases and I am not sympathetic to it, PS [Potter Stewart] went 
too far.”280 Blackmun had to find a way to distinguish and diminish the effect of Montana 
and he did this by analysing case law after Montana and concluded that post-Montana
77 ft
' B o x  5 5 2 ,  T M  P a p e r s ,  “ 8 7 - 1 6 2 2 - B r e n d a l e  v .  C o n f .  T r i b e s , ”  T . M . ,  J u n e  2 0 ,  1 9 8 8 .
F r a n k  P o m m e r s h e i m ,  Braid o f Feathers: American Indian Law and Contemporary Tribal Life 
( B e r k e l e y ,  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  C a l i f o r n i a  P r e s s ,  1 9 9 5 ) .
* B o x  4 5 3 ,  T M  P a p e r s ,  “ B e n c h  M e m o r a n d u m , ”  T . M . ,  5 .
'  ’ B o x  5 2 4 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ M r .  J u s t i c e :  R e :  N o s .  8 7 - 1 6 2 2 ,  8 7 - 1 6 9 7 ,  8 7 - 1 7 1 1 ,  C o n s o l i d a t e d  I n d i a n  C a s e s , ”  
f ro m  E d d i e  t o  B l a c k m u n ,  M a y  3 0 ,  1 9 8 9 ,  1.
° B o x  5 2 4 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ 8 7 - 1 6 2 2 ,  1 6 9 7 ,  1 7 1 1  B r e n d a l e  v .  Y a k i m a  N a t i o n , ”  H . A . B . ,  J a n u a r y  8 ,  1 9 8 9 ,  3 .
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case law supported tribal sovereignty. A memorandum pointed out the way Blackmun 
approached his dissent, “Montana is only one of many opinions dealing with civil 
jurisdiction and inherent tribal authority to exercise that jurisdiction over fee lands and 
over non-Indians...None of the cases post-dating Montana make reference to that 
opinion’s presumption against inherent tribal authority.”281 Therefore, in order for 
Blackmun to excuse himself from “Montana’s anomalous presumption against finding 
inherent tribal authority”282 it was apparent that he had to re-invigorate the sovereignty 
doctrine. Blackmun circumvented the Montana ruling by arguing that once tribal interests 
were implicated and affected in any way then the tribes automatically had authority. A 
memorandum pointed out the basis of his interpretation, “Montana should be read as a 
case in which the tribe made no showing, indeed did not even allege, that the non-Indian 
conduct sought to be regulated in any way interfered with the political or economic 
interests of the tribe, or the tribe’s health and welfare.”28’ In the end Blackmun declared
784support for inherent sovereignty and that the “Montana case should not control.”^
The ideological differences between the justices of the integrationist trend and the 
sovereignty doctrine were shown by the divergent positions adopted by Justice White and 
Justice Blackmun in their reading and interpretation of the Wheeler case of 1978. Justice 
Byron White attacked the dissent circulated by Blackmun and the ideological conflict 
was discussed in a memorandum between Blackmun and his clerk,
:Hi Box 524, H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o s  8 7 - 1 6 2 2 ,  8 7 - 1 6 9 7 ,  8 7 - 1 7 1 1 ,  B r e n d a l e  v. Y a k i m a  I n d i a n  N a t i o n ,  W i l k i n s o n  
v. Y a k i m a  I n d i a n  N a t i o n ,  C o u n t y  o f  Y a k i m a  v. Y a k i m a  I n d i a n  N a t i o n ,  C e r t  t o  C A 9  ( S k o p i l ,  F l e t c h e r , 
P o o le ) ,  L a z a r u s ,  J a n u a r y  7 ,  1 9 8 9 ,  2 3 .
282 I b i d . ,  2 5 .
283 I b id . ,  2 4 .
2X3 B o x  5 5 2 ,  T M  P a p e r s ,  “ 8 7 - 1 6 2 2 - B r e n d a l e  v .  C o n f .  T r i b e s , ”  T . M .
2 0 0
“...[in] the revised majority, Justice White accuses the dissent of ignoring relevant 
passages in Wheeler to the effect that all tribal authority over non-Indians is inconsistent 
with their dependent status and, therefore, necessarily divested. Frankly, 1 am surprised 
and disappointed that Justice White has given this reading to Wheeler. His interpretation 
rests on a single clause, severed from a single sentence, wrenched totally out of 
context.”283
Whereas White applied the integrationist trend, which rested tribal authority over non­
members exclusively on congressional legislation, Blackmun applied the sovereignty 
doctrine and declared that Wheeler did not divest all inherent tribal sovereignty over non­
members but instead clarified the circumstances where tribal sovereignty had been 
divested from the tribe and non-members, it did not limit all tribal authority over non­
members. Blackmun argued that the Supreme Court had merely misinterpreted Wheeler, 
in accordance with the position adopted by White in the Brendale case.
The Brendale court was divided into three camps of judges and two opinions. Justice 
Byron White from the first camp delivered the first opinion of the court. This relied 
exclusively on the integrationist trend. In order to make a majority Stevens and O’Connor 
from the second camp joined them. The rationale of the first opinion was supported by 
the general proposition that tribes did not have civil jurisdiction over non-members on fee 
lands unless the tribe could prove one of the two Montana exceptions or, provide 
evidence of congressional authorisation, as had occurred in Mazurie. The development of 
the integrationist trend meant that tribal sovereignty “generally extends only to what is 
necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations...unless there
285 B o x  5 2 4 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ M r .  J u s t i c e :  R e :  N o s .  8 7 - 1 6 2 2 ,  8 7 - 1 6 9 7 ,  8 7 - 1 7 1 1 ,  C o n f e d e r a t e d  T r i b e s  
( c o n s o l i d a t e d  c a s e s ) , ”  f r o m  E d d i e  t o  B l a c k m u n ,  J u n e  5 ,  1 9 8 9 ,  1.
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has been an express congressional delegation of tribal power to the contrary.”286 The 
Mazurie case first changed the presumption of tribal authority over non-members from 
inherent tribal sovereignty to a delegation of congressional power, prior to it being used 
in civil case law. Therefore, in order for the tribe to have authority over non-members, a 
congressional delegation was required and according to White, “There is no contention 
here that Congress has expressly delegated to the Tribe the power to zone the fee lands of
^287n o n m e m b e r s . T h e  second camp sanctioned tribal authority over non-members within 
a portion of the reservation called the closed area288 but did not allow tribal authority over 
non-members in the open area of the reservation. The second camp began from the 
presumption that the powers of the tribe did not include inherent sovereignty and were 
restricted to the power to exclude non-members from the reservation. The second camp 
determined that the tribe had authority to exclude non-members from the closed area. 
This part of the decision was joined by the third camp. The third camp held that tribes 
had inherent sovereignty over non-members in the reservation. The two opinions and 
presumptions regarding tribal sovereignty were based on adherence to the integrationist 
trend and the sovereignty doctrine. The first and second camps applied the integrationist
^ O Q
trend while the third camp applied the sovereignty doctrine.
A majority of the Supreme Court began from the presumption that tribes did not have 
inherent sovereignty unless it was delegated by Congress and without inherent
~86 Brendale v. Confederated Yakima Indian Nation, 4 0 9 - 4 1 0 .
787 I b id . ,  4 1 0 .
~SS T h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  h e l d  t h a t  t h e  t r i b e  h a d  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  d e f i n e  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h a t  p a r t  o f  t h e  
r e s e r v a t i o n  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  h a d  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  t o  e x c l u d e  n o n - m e m b e r s  f r o m  t h a t  p a r t  o f  t h e  r e s e r v a t i o n .
8 ' T h e  c o u r t  c o n t i n u e d  t o  a p p l y  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  t r i b e s  h a d  a u t h o r i t y  o v e r  n o n - m e m b e r s  o n  t r i b a l  a n d  t r u s t  
l a n d s  in  t h e  r e s e r v a t i o n .
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sovereignty, the corollary principle was that the state assumed jurisdiction over non­
members in the reservation. This followed the pattern of the law established in criminal 
case law - Oliphant and Wheeler -  and civil case law -  Montana.
Only four years after Brendale, a majority of the Supreme Court Justices applied the 
integrationist trend and limited the application of the sovereignty doctrine in civil case 
law.
South Dakota v. Bourland (1993)
This case revolved around whether the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe still maintained 
authority over 104,420 acres of tribal lands that were conveyed to the United States, 
pursuant to the Cheyenne River Act, for the Oahe Dam and Reservoir Project. The 
dispute started when the tribe no longer recognised the right of the state to regulate non­
members, declaring that only the tribe could regulate non-member hunting. The state 
argued that the taking of the lands by congressional act transferred the status of the lands 
from tribal to fee and therefore the tribe lost its inherent authority to regulate non­
member hunting and fishing on the taken lands. The Bourland case highlighted the 
divergence between Blackmun and the rest of the court regarding the extent of the 
movement away from the sovereignty doctrine. In addition, the majority of the Justices 
also established a broad principle whereby any lands appropriated from the tribes by 
Congress automatically transferred the status of the lands from tribal to fee lands and
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consequently the tribes lost sovereignty over them.290 As Philip Frickey observed, the 
rulings ot the Supreme Court determine that “congressional action should be broadly 
construed to immunize nonmembers from unilateral tribal regulation.”291
The presumption used by the majority of the justices in their deliberations was that an 
explicit congressional delegation was required to allow the tribe to have authority over 
the taken lands. Justice Antonin Scalia believed that the court had to examine whether 
Congress allowed tribal authority to exist over non-members, pointing out that the 
“Regulation issue if before us.”~9- Originally, Scalia had agreed that federal regulations 
allowed tribal authority over non-members, noting that “"Local" includes "tribal" for 
now.”“>J However, in the end he voted against the tribe’s right to claim authority over the 
taken lands. Chief Justice William Rehnquist also changed his position about the use of 
federal regulations. A memorandum to Justice Blackmun pointed out that “The Chief 
[Rehnquist] has, not surprisingly, changed his vote in this case...”294 A majority of 
justices believed that tribal sovereignty over non-members on non-member lands was in 
fact redundant and dependent on a delegation of congressional power.
The Bourland opinion applied the integrationist trend and relied on the general 
proposition of Montana that prohibited tribal sovereignty over non-members. Justice
290 A f t e r  Montana v. United States, t h e  p r e s u m p t i o n  w a s  t h a t  t r i b e s  h a d  i n h e r e n t  a u t h o r i t y  o v e r  n o n ­
m e m b e r s  o n  t r i b a l  a n d  t r u s t  l a n d s  in  t h e  r e s e r v a t i o n .  H o w e v e r ,  o n c e  t r i b a l  o r  t r u s t  l a n d s  w e r e  t r a n s f e r r e d  
in to  f e e  l a n d s  t h e  t r i b e s  d i d  n o t  h a v e  i n h e r e n t  s o v e r e i g n t y  o v e r  t h e  l a n d s  in  q u e s t i o n .  T h e r e f o r e ,  in  o r d e r  t o  
c i r c u m v e n t  Montana v . United States a n d  l i m i t  i n h e r e n t  t r i b a l  s o v e r e i g n t y  o v e r  n o n - m e m b e r s ,  t h e  s t a t u s  o f  
la n d s  h a d  t o  b e  r e m o v e d  f r o m  t r i b a l  t o  f e e  l a n d s .  T h i s  w a s  d o n e  in  South Dakota v. Bourland.*)Q1 _ .
“ F r i c k e y ,  “ A  C o m m o n  L a w , ”  5 0 - 5 1 .
292 B o x  6 1 9 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o .  9 1 - 2 0 5 1 ,  S o u t h  D a k o t a  v .  B o u r l a n d , ”  H . A . B . ,  M a r c h  5 ,  1 9 9 3 ,  2 .
, 93 'k'T
2 4 B o x  6 1 9 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ M r .  J u s t i c e :  R e :  N o .  9 1 - 2 0 5 1 ,  S o u t h  D a k o t a  v .  B o u r l a n d , ”  M a r c h  8 ,  1 9 9 3 ,  f r o m
B ill t o  B l a c k m u n .
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Clarence Thomas believed that tribes did not have inherent sovereignty over non­
members and declared “...the reality...after Montana, [is] tribal sovereignty over 
nonmembers "cannot survive without express congressional delegation,"...and is 
therefore not inherent.”“9;) Inherent tribal sovereignty had become a term dependent on a 
congressional delegation of power and in order for the tribes to have authority over non­
members; a relevant treaty or congressional delegation was required.296
Although the final opinion did not rule on whether state law applied over non-members, 
the Blackmun papers reveal that the Supreme Court had wanted to sanction state 
authority over non-members on the lands in question.297 This ruling followed the 
integrationist trend where state authority replaced tribal authority. As a direct result of the 
tribes being denied inherent sovereignty over non-members on fee lands, the private view 
of the court believed that it was the state which had the sovereign right over non­
members. Justice Kennedy believed that state law replaced tribal authority, noting that 
“State access to all.”298 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor agreed with this interpretation and 
pointed out that “State law applies.”299 With the application of state law, Justice Byron 
White believed that non-member rights were no longer limited and that “non-Is [Indians] 
have complete rights.”300 This position was supported by Justice Stevens who merely 
added that he agreed “with BRW [Byron White].”j()l Despite this support for state law, 
the Bourland court could not address or rule on this issue because it was not a question
'  °  South Dakota v . Bourland, 6 9 7 .
;  I b i d . ,  6 9 4 - 6 9 5 .  A l t h o u g h  J u s t i c e  T h o m a s  c o n c e d e d  t h a t  t h e  t r i b e  h a d  ‘ f o r m e r  r i g h t s , ’ C o n g r e s s  h a d  t o  a c t  
e x p l i c i t l y  in  o r d e r  t o  g r a n t  r i g h t s  t o  t h e  t r i b e  o v e r  n o n - m e m b e r s ,  6 9 3 .
'  South Dakota v. Bourland, 6 9 1 .
298 B o x  6 1 9 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o .  9 1 - 2 0 5 1 ,  S o u t h  D a k o t a  v .  B o u r l a n d , ”  H . A . B . ,  2 .
i u -  j  t
205
that the Supreme Court Justices had to decide, indeed the issue was not even before the 
court.
Once any lands were removed from tribal and trust status and thereby, out of tribal 
control, the Supreme Court would not allow tribal authority to exist over non-members. 
Justice O’Connor argued that once lands were designated fee lands then the status of the 
lands could not be changed, “If you let them [tribes] change a fee, this is contrary to the 
statute.'o0“ The transfer of land status meant that the tribes lost authority over non­
members. This view was supported by Justice Byron White who believed that a general 
rule should be applied to deny any kind of tribal authority over non-members on fee 
lands, noting that it was “Silly to give Tribes this fee right.”j0j Therefore, White wanted 
tribal authority to cease completely once the status of tribal and trust lands were changed 
to fee lands.
The Bourland opinion applied the integrationist trend and inferred a broad rule that lands 
appropriated by Congress, regardless if it was for the process of allotment or not, 
automatically transferred in status from tribal to fee lands and thus, the tribes lost 
inherent sovereignty over non-members on those lands/04 Despite the general movement 
of the court away from tribal sovereignty, the Montana ruling still protected tribal 
authority over non-members on tribal lands. Therefore, the Supreme Court began the 
process of changing the status of lands from tribal to fee lands in order to circumvent the
302 I b id .
303 I b id .
304 South Dakota v . Bourland, 6 9 1 - 6 9 3 .  S e e ,  T o d d  M i l l e r ,  “ E a s e m e n t s  o n  T r i b a l  S o v e r e i g n t y , ”  American 
Indian Law Review 26 (200 1 ): 1 1 2 .
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Montana holding. Whereas Montana v. United States used the process of allotment to 
justify the removal of tribal authority over lands, the South Dakota v. Bourland court 
reasoned that a modern day congressional act justified, which required the lands for a 
damn project, the removal of tribal control over the lands. Essentially, the tribe lost 
exclusive control and therefore lost the tribal and trust status of the lands. The Bourland 
court declared that congresses action had deprived the tribe of exclusive authority and 
this was enough to transfer the status of lands from tribal to fee; it was no longer the 
underlying principle (for example allotment) which changed the status of the lands. After 
Bourland, any appropriation of lands by Congress was sufficient to transfer the status of 
lands from trust to fee, regardless of the underlying rationale, “ ...when Congress has 
broadly opened up such land to non-Indians, the effect of the transfer is the destruction of 
preexisting Indian rights to regulatory control...”305 This was a reversal of the Montana 
ruling, which had protected tribal sovereignty.
In stark contrast to the viewpoints of other Supreme Court Justices, Harry A. Blackmun 
supported the sovereignty doctrine and justified his position by re-affirming his partial 
concurrence and dissent from the Brendale case. The ideological differences between 
Justice Blackmun and the majority of the court regarding the interpretation of Montana 
and the sovereignty doctrine was summed up in a memorandum, “Given your 
understanding of Montana and your view of tribal authority over non-members generally, 
as expressed in your concurring and dissenting opinion in Brendale, I recommend you
South Dakota v . Bourland, 6 9 2 .
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vote to affirm CA8 [Court of Appeals].’”06 In direct contrast with the movement of the 
Supreme Court towards the integrationist trend, Blackmun had begun from the 
presumption that the tribes had inherent sovereignty unless removed by Congress. 
Blackmun considered the application of the sovereignty doctrine as the appropriate way 
to weaken the integrationist trend, “This would be the best way to respond to Justice 
Thomas’...which accuses the dissent of shutting its eyes to the fact that inherent tribal 
sovereignty is subject to complete defeasance.’”07 The divergence between the majority 
and the dissent was profound, with no middle ground. Indeed, with the insistence that 
Congress had to act in order to revoke tribal sovereignty, Blackmun explained that within 
the congressional act there was “No clear Explanation of Congress intent to divest tribal 
authority.” Furthermore, the position adopted by Blackmun in Brendale was once 
again used in Bourland. A memorandum from Blackmun’s clerk outlined the Blackmun 
interpretation of the law, “Your views on tribal civil jurisdiction are well spelled out in 
your Brendale opinion.”309 Therefore, the Blackmun dissent in Bourland was premised 
on the sovereignty doctrine arguments made in Brendale. Once again, Blackmun relied 
on the interpretation that case law before and after Montana supported tribal authority 
over non-members unless removed by Congress, pointing out that “In Brendale, you 
noted that Montana was part of a long line of cases establishing that “tribes retain their 
sovereign powers over non-Indians on reservation lands unless the exercise of that 
sovereignty would be ‘inconsistent with the overriding interests of the National
306 B o x  6 1 9 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o . 9 1 - 2 0 5 1  S . D .  v .  G r e g g  B o u r l a n d ,  e t  a l ,  C e r t  t o  C A 8  ( B o w m a n , H e a n n e y  
[S r ] ,  B r i g h t  [ S r ] , ”  f r o m  B i l l  t o  B l a c k m u n ,  F e b r u a r y  2 6 ,  1 9 9 3 ,  2 2 .
7 B o x  6 1 9 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ M r .  J u s t i c e :  R e :  S o u t h  D a k o t a  v .  B o u r l a n d ,  N o .  9 1 - 2 0 5 1 , ”  f r o m  B i l l  t o  
B l a c k m u n ,  J u n e  1 0 ,  1 9 9 3 .
’ s B o x  6 1 9 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ 9 1 - 2 0 5 1 ,  S o .  D a k .  v .  B o u r l a n d , ”  H .A .B ,  M a r c h  1, 1 9 9 3 .
309 B o x  6 1 9 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ M r .  J u s t i c e :  R e :  N o .  9 1 - 2 0 5 1 ,  S o u t h  D a k o t a  v .  B o u r l a n d , ”  f r o m  B i l l  t o  
B la c k m u n ,  M a r c h  8 ,  1 9 9 3 .
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Government.,,,J 10 In his dissent, Blackmun explained that the sovereignty doctrine was a 
"fundamental principle"011 and because of this tribal authority had been limited only in 
specific circumstances,
"...only "where the exercise of tribal sovereignty would be inconsistent with the 
overriding interests of the National Government, as when the tribes seek to engage in 
foreign relations, alienate their lands to non-Indians without federal consent, or prosecute 
non-Indians in tribal courts which do not accord the full protections of the Bill of 
Rights."”312
Therefore, despite the cases that followed, Montana did not preclude inherent tribal 
sovereignty over all external relations between tribal members and non-members/1 J In 
order to attach greater significance to his position, Blackmun was advised to add a 
quotation from Wheeler, which summed up the principle of the sovereignty doctrine, 
“Inherent tribal sovereignty "exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to 
complete defeasance. But until Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign 
powers. In sum, Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by 
treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status."”314
10 B o x  6 1 9 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o . 9 1 - 2 0 5 1  S . D .  v .  G r e g g  B o u r l a n d ,  e t  a l ,  C e r t  t o  C A 8  ( B o w m a n , H e a n n e y  
[ S r ] ,  B r i g h t  [ S r ] , ”  2 3 ,  q u o t i n g  Brendale v. Confederated Yakima Indian Nation, 4 5 0 .
" South Dakota v. Bourland, 6 9 8 - 6 9 9 .
South Dakota v. Bourland, 6 9 9  q u o t i n g  Colville, 1 5 3 - 1 5 4 .  B l a c k m u n  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  s t a t e  “ n o r  t h e  
m a j o r i t y  i s  a b l e  t o  i d e n t i f y  a n y  o v e r r i d i n g  f e d e r a l  i n t e r e s t  t h a t  w o u l d  j u s t i f y  t h e  i m p l i c i t  d i v e s t i t u r e  o f  t h e  
T r i b e 's  a u t h o r i t y  t o  r e g u l a t e  n o n - I n d i a n  h u n t i n g  a n d  f i s h i n g .  I n  r e j e c t i n g  t h e  T r i b e 's  i n h e r e n t  s o v e r e i g n t y  
a r g u m e n t ,  t h e  m a j o r i t y  r e l i e s  o n  t h e  s u g g e s t i o n  in  M o n t a n a  v .  U n i t e d  S t a t e s . . . t h a t  " t h e  ' e x e r c i s e  o f  t r i b a l  
p o w e r  b e y o n d  w h a t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  p r o t e c t  t r i b a l  s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t  o r  t o  c o n t r o l  i n t e r n a l  r e l a t i o n s  i s  
i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  d e p e n d e n t  s t a t u s  o f  t h e  t r i b e s ,  a n d  s o  c a n n o t  s u r v i v e  w i t h o u t  e x p r e s s  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  
d e l e g a t i o n . " ’ . . . I  a l r e a d y  h a v e  h a d  o c c a s i o n  t o  e x p l a i n  t h a t  t h i s  p a s s a g e  in  M o n t a n a  is  c o n t r a r y  t o  1 5 0  y e a r s  
o f  I n d i a n  l a w  j u r i s p r u d e n c e ,  a n d  i s  n o t  s u p p o r t e d  b y  t h e  c a s e s  o n  w h i c h  i t  r e l i e d , ”  6 9 9 .
' B o x  6 1 9 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o . 9 1 - 2 0 5 1  S . D .  v .  G r e g g  B o u r l a n d ,  e t  a l ,  C e r t  t o  C A 8  ( B o w m a n , H e a n n e y  
[ S r ] ,  B r i g h t  [ S r ] , ”  2 4 .
14 B o x  6 1 9 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ M r .  J u s t i c e :  R e :  S o u t h  D a k o t a  v .  B o u r l a n d ,  N o .  9 1 - 2 0 5 1 , ”  q u o t i n g  United 
States v. Wheeler, 3 2 3 .
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Justice Harry Blackmun had fought against the integrationist trend but after his retirement 
in 1994, the integrationist trend became the primary rationale of the Supreme Court in 
civil case law. The redundant nature of the sovereignty doctrine in civil case law was 
shown by the unanimous application of the integrationist trend by the Supreme Court 
Justices in a 1997 case.
Strate v. A -l Contractors (1997)
The unanimous opinion of the Strate court continued the movement of the Supreme 
Court Justices away from the sovereignty doctrine and towards the integrationist trend.313 
The case revolved around whether the tribe or the state had authority to rule on an 
accident that occurred between two non-members on a 6.59-mile part of a North Dakota 
state highway within the Fort Berthold Reservation. The stretch of road was open to the 
public and maintained by the state under a federally granted right of way, however, the 
road was trust land held by the United States for the Three Affiliated Tribes. The opinion 
re-affirmed the rationale of Montana and severely weakened the application of Williams 
in civil case law. The Supreme Court Justices ruled that the tribes did not have authority 
over non-members and consequently they declared that state authority took its place. This 
was further confirmed when the Supreme Court by explicitly countering the position and 
language used by Justice Blackmun in Brendale and Bourland again weakened the 
sovereignty doctrine. The Strate court also used the rule developed in Bourland that once
"  W a l l a c e  C o f f e y  a n d  R e b e c c a  T s o s i e ,  “ R e t h i n k i n g  t h e  T r i b a l  S o v e r e i g n t y  D o c t r i n e :  C u l t u r a l  S o v e r e i g n t y  
a n d  t h e  C o l l e c t i v e  F u t u r e  o f  I n d i a n  N a t i o n s , ”  Stanford Law and Policy Review 12 ( 2 0 0 1 ) :  1 9 4 .
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lands were out of exclusive tribal control the status of the lands changed feqm tribal to fee 
and the tribes lost authority over those lands.
The Strate opinion re-defined the way in which the Supreme Court decided future civil 
cases. The justices unanimously agreed that cases involving tribes and non-members 
must begin with analysis of the Montana principles and not Williams (1959), indicating 
the dramatic shift towards the integrationist trend. Montana was central to the thinking of 
the justices in the Strate case, terming it “the pathmarking case concerning tribal civil 
authority over nonmembers.”j16 Therefore, the Supreme Court agreed that Montana was 
correct when it enunciated that tribes lack authority over non-members on fee lands, 
noting that after Montana “ ...the civil authority of Indian tribes and their courts with 
respect to non Indian fee lands generally "do[es] not extend to the activities of 
nonmembers of the tribe."”jl7 The only way in which tribes would have authority over 
non-members was if Congress delegated power or the tribes provided evidence to support 
one of the Montana exceptions, “absent a different congressional direction, Indian tribes 
lack civil authority over the conduct of nonmembers on non Indian land within a
010 9
reservation, subject to two exceptions.” The integrationist trend in Strate became a lot 
stronger and in general, tribal authority over non-member conduct was allowed “only in 
limited circumstances”319 without express congressional legislation. This restriction on
tribal authority also applied to tribal court authority over non-members.320 The principles
'l6 Strate v. A -l Contractors, 4 4 5 .
7 Strate v. A -l Contractors, 4 5 3 ,  q u o t i n g  Montana v. United States, 5 6 5 .
318
Strate v. A -l Contractors, 4 3 9 .
3‘9 I b id .
2" T h e  Strate v. A -l Contractors c o u r t  d e d u c e d  f r o m  Montana v. United States t h a t  t h e  i n h e r e n t  j u r i s d i c t i o n  
o f  t r i b a l  c o u r t  d i d  n o t  e x c e e d  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t a l  c a p a c i t y  o f  t h e  t r i b e ,  “ A s  t o  n o n m e m b e r s . . . a  t r i b e ' s  
a d j u d i c a t i v e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  d o e s  n o t  e x c e e d  i t s  l e g i s l a t i v e  j u r i s d i c t i o n .  A b s e n t  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  d i r e c t i o n
211
relied upon by the Strate court were a direct contrast to the language used by Hugo Black 
in Williams v. Lee (1959) and explicitly demonstrated how the thinking of the Supreme 
Court Justices had changed over a thirty-eight year period. The Williams court judged 
that any state authority would impinge on tribal court authority and tribal government and 
therefore, tribal sovereignty existed unless divested of it by Congress,
“...to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would undermine the authority of the 
tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians 
to govern themselves. It is immaterial that respondent is not an Indian. He was on the 
Reservation and the transaction [accident] with an Indian took place there...this Court 
have consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments over their reservations... If 
this power is to be taken away from them, it is for Congress to do it.”321
Over only thirty-eight years, the Supreme Court had moved from support of the 
sovereignty doctrine to supporting the precedent o f Montana and the integrationist trend.
The Strate opinion undermined the Blackmun position that civil case law both before and 
after Montana relied explicitly on the sovereignty doctrine and the presumption that 
inherent tribal sovereignty applied over non-members until legislation by Congress 
precluded such authority. In the Strate case, the argument of the tribe was based on the 
position taken by Blackmun in Brendale and Bourland. The tribe argued that the cases of
enlarging tribal court jurisdiction...,”  440. The lands in question were tribal trust lands before the federal 
right of way. It could be argued that the Strate v. A-l Contractors opinion, based on the authority o f state 
law on a state highway, applied the concession contained in footnote six o f the White Mountain Apache 
Tribe v. Bracker opinion; “ For purposes of this action petitioners have conceded Pinetop's liability for both 
motor carrier license and use fuel taxes attributable to travel on state highways within the reservation,”  140. 
If the state taxed a state highway in Bracker then it followed that the state had exclusive jurisdiction in 
Strate v. A -l Contractors.p i
~ Williams v. Lee, 222.
~ Blackmun specifically cited Colville-, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe-, National Farmers Union Ins. 
Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985); and Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987) for the 
general proposition that tribes enjoy civil jurisdiction over non-members absent any congressional action to 
the contrary.
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National Farmers and Iowa Mutual3“4 explicitly sanctioned inherent tribal sovereignty 
over non-members until removed^Ky^gSongress. The Strate court disagreed with the 
arguments of the tribe and decided that the two cases of National Farmers and Iowa 
Mutual were consistent with the principles of the integrationist trend. Therefore, the 
argument of the Supreme Court Justices was that the two cases did not sustain tribal court 
authority over non-members in the reservation. John Fredericks argued that the Supreme 
Court in Montana, Brendale, Bourland and Strate reversed the sovereignty doctrine for 
good, pointing out that the Supreme Court
‘"...reversed the historic presumption against the loss of tribal sovereignty established by 
Chief Justice Marshall in the Cherokee cases~a presumption that essentially held that 
Indian tribes retain all attributes of their sovereign authority over lands which constitute 
their reservation, unless Congress explicitly limits the exercise of that sovereignty by 
treaty or statute.”325
The loss of tribal sovereignty and tribal court authority over non-members on fee lands 
resulted in the state assuming authority over non-members. The states assumed authority 
over non-members based on the court’s interpretation regarding the transfer of tribal
323 The tribe relied on a statement from National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe that purported to 
highlight tribal court jurisdiction over non-members in civil matters. The statement was highlighted by the 
Strate v. A -l Contractors court when it said, “ "the existence and extent o f a tribal court's jurisdiction will 
require a careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which that sovereignty has been altered, 
divested, or diminished, as well as a detailed study of relevant statutes, Executive Branch policy as 
embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and administrative or judicial decisions,"” 449, quoting National 
Farmers, 855-856. However, the Strate court reconciled National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe 
with Montana v. United States. I f  there was no express legislation or treaty the court used the two Montana 
exceptions to determine the question of tribal inherent sovereignty.
24 The Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante court said, “Civil jurisdiction over such activities presumptively 
lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute,”  18. The 
Strate v. A -l Contractors court addressed the quotation and said, “ ...the statement stands for nothing more 
than the unremarkable proposition that, where tribes possess authority to regulate the activities of 
nonmembers, "[cjivil jurisdiction over [disputes arising out of] such activities presumptively lies in the 
tribal courts,"”  453, quoting Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 18. Although Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. 
LaPlante cited cases that relied on inherent sovereignty, these were reconciled within the framework of 
Montana v. United States.
325' Fredericks III, “ America’s First Nations,” 396.
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lands to fee lands. The justices applied the rule used in Bourland that once exclusive 
tribal authority over lands was lost, the status of the lands automatically transferred from 
tribal to fee and the tribes lost inherent sovereignty over the lands. Todd Miller explained 
that the justices in Strate had to find a way to transfer the status of the lands from tribal to 
fee in order to use the precedent of Montana, pointing out that the court “...had to find 
that the Tribe had alienated the land underlying the highway right-of-way to fit the case 
into the non-member fee property model that would allow for the use of the Montana
326 • •rule.”  ^ The land at issue in Strate was a 6.59-mile road running through the reservation, 
which had been given a federal grant of way pursuant to an act of Congress/27 The 
Supreme Court believed that the federal right of way removed the exclusive rights of the 
tribe over the road and so changed the status of the lands involved from tribal to fee; 
“However, the right of way North Dakota acquired for its highway renders the 6.59 mile 
stretch here at issue equivalent, for non-member governance purposes, to such alienated, 
non Indian land.”328 Consequently, the tribe lost authority over the lands and non­
members on the lands unless Congress delegated them authority or the tribes found
evidence to support one of the Montana exceptions. Furthermore, the Strate court 
struggled to fit the facts of the case into one that denied inherent tribal sovereignty over 
the tribal lands in question/29 This struggle was simply based on the Supreme Court’s 
misjudged interpretation about the status of the right of way. Todd Miller stated that an
Miller, “ Easements,”  112. Furthermore, Miller said, “ Following Strate the only tribal sovereign power 
that remained relatively intact was a tribe's ability to tax nonmembers within the boundaries of the 
reservation,”  113. However, this was fundamentally eroded in Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley.
Although the Strate v. A -l Contractors involved a 6.59-mile road surrounded by trust lands, the court 
ignored the rationale used in Brendale v. Confederated Yakima Indian Nation where a tribe had authority 
over non-member fee lands, which were, not only open to the public but also were surrounded by trust 
lands. In Strate v. A -l Contractors, the 6.59-mile road constituted much less than the 1% of fee lands 
referred to in Brendale v. Confederated Yakima Indian Nation.
‘ Strate v. A-l Contractors, 440.
King, “ Tribal Court,”  212.
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easement interest in land, which the state of North Dakota had, should not have affected 
tribal authority over the land, “the easement holder has neither the permanent possession 
of even a single molecule of the land itself, nor the exclusive time-bound possession 
granted by a lease. Instead the easement holder has the right to make or control a 
particular use of the land that remains owned by another.”3j0 However, the Supreme 
Court ruled that once the tribe lost exclusive authority over the lands in question they lost 
authority in general, “[the] state forum [was] open to all who sustain injuries on North 
Dakota's highway. Opening the Tribal Court...is not necessary to protect tribal self
331government” and “this commonplace state highway accident claim in an unfamiliar
332court” “ was unnecessary. The justices believed that it was imperative for non-members 
to be tried in state courts rather than tribal courts. Overall, the effect of Strate reinforced 
the general presumption of Montana and the integrationist trend in civil case law.
The strength of the integrationist trend in the thinking of the Supreme Court Justices was 
demonstrated when they announced their decisions in Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley 
(2001) and Nevada v. Hicks (2001). As Sarah Krakoff observed, the Strate justices 
“opened the door to Hicks and Atkinson by taking the tack that Montana was the
333'pathmarking' case involving all questions of jurisdiction over non-Indians.”
.
M il l e r ,  “ Easements,”  122.
Strate v. A -l Contractors, 459.
332 Ib id .
333 Sarah Krakoff, “ Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and Tribal sovereignty,” 
American University Law Review 50 (2001): 1262-1263.
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The Integrationist Trend in Atkinson and Hicks (2001)
In 2001, the integrationist trend was applied in the tax case o f Atkinson and the civil case 
of Hicks. The tax case appears in this section, and not in the tax section, because it is 
important to show the influence that Atkinson had on previous civil case law and the 
fundamental impact that civil case law played on this tax case. The two cases 
demonstrated the dramatic shift of the Supreme Court towards the integrationist trend, 
fundamentally eroding inherent tribal civil and taxation authority over non-members on 
fee and tribal lands of the reservation and thus reversing the principle of Montana. The 
Atkinson court first mooted the idea of extending the integrationist trend to cover tribal 
lands and Hicks applied the rationale that tribes did not have inherent sovereignty over 
non-members on tribal and trust lands in civil cases. The loss of tribal sovereignty over 
non-members was subsequently replaced by inherent state sovereignty.
Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley (2001)
This case questioned whether the Navajo Nation had the authority to impose a hotel 
occupancy tax over non-members in the exterior boundaries of the reservation, classified 
by the Supreme Court as fee-lands. The Atkinson Trading Company, Inc. owned the 
hotels and collected the tax for the tribes. However, Atkinson challenged the authority of 
the Navajo Nation to impose the tax. The Atkinson case did not rely on the principles 
used in previous tax cases but instead, relied specifically on the civil case of Montana to 
determine the outcome. Taxation case law after 1989 applied both the integrationist trend
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and the sovereignty doctrine which allowed concurrent tribal and state taxation of non­
members in the reservation. The Atkinson court ruling moved away from the established 
principle of concurrent taxation to the presumption that tribes did not have inherent 
sovereignty to tax non-members on non-member lands of the reservation. This reversed 
the broad assumptions of historic and modern day case law which determined that tribes 
had inherent sovereignty over non-members in any part of the reservation/34
The influence of civil case law on the decision of the Supreme Court Justices allowed the 
Atkinson court to abandon the principle of concurrent tribe and state taxation of non­
members on fee lands in the reservation. The court applied the integrationist trend, where 
tribal authority over non-members relied on a congressional delegation of power, and 
removed the inherent right of the tribes to tax non-members on fee lands unless 
sanctioned by Congress/0 Before 2001, the Supreme Court had readily applied the 
sovereignty doctrine and allowed the tribes to tax non-members in the reservation. 
However, this principle was changed because the Atkinson justices considered Montana 
to be the dominant precedent,
4 Cases which sanctioned inherent tribal sovereignty and the inherent right o f the tribes to tax non­
members included Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico; Kerr-McGee v. Navajo Tribe; Merrion v. 
Jicarilla Apache Tribe; Washington v. Confederated Tribes {Colville); Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 
F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958), cert, denied, 358 U.S. 932 (1959); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 
(CA8 1956) (tribes had inherent sovereignty until it was reversed by Congress); Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 
947, 950 (CA8 1905), appeal dism'd, 203 U.S. 599 (1906) (the Creek Nation's power to tax non-members 
“was one of the inherent and essential attributes of its original sovereignty,”  950); and Morris v. Hitchcock, 
194 U.S. 384(1904).
Although taxation fell within the broad area of civil jurisdiction, before Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. 
Shirley the Supreme Court separated civil and taxation case law into two distinct areas of law. Even though 
the Montana proposition was established in 1981, it was not applied by Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 
Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe or Cotton Petroleum 
Corp. v. New Mexico.
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“Montana's general rule applies to tribal attempts to tax nonmember activity occurring on 
non-Indian fee land. Tribal jurisdiction is limited: For powers not expressly conferred 
them by federal statute or treaty, tribes must rely upon their retained or inherent 
sovereignty. Their power over nonmembers on non-Indian fee land is sharply 
circumscribed.”336
From the outset, the justices applied the Montana ruling because the tax in question fell 
on non-members on fee lands.337 The status o f the lands was crucial to the case and 
because fee-lands were involved, it implicated the “Montana-Strate line of authority’” 38 
and precluded tribal authority over non-members. Despite the existence of case law that 
supported the inherent right of the tribes to tax non-members based on the judgements of, 
Colville, Merrion and Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe,339 an unanimous Atkinson 
court applied the integrationist trend; “Congress has not authorized the Navajo Nation's 
hotel occupancy tax through treaty or statute...it is incumbent upon the Navajo Nation to 
establish the existence of one of Montana's exceptions.’”40 Consequently, the actions of 
the tribe were not able to be reconciled with one of the exceptions and the ability of the 
Navajo to tax was prohibited.341
The use of Montana and the application of the integrationist trend had also limited the 
sovereignty doctrine and the ruling of Merrion, which held that tribes had inherent 
sovereignty to tax non-members anywhere in the reservation. Although Merrion did not 
fit within the line of civil cases that followed Montana, the Atkinson court ruling had
Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 645.
Ibid., 650-652.
778 Ibid., 645.
’ For example, the Colville court held that tribes had inherent power to tax non-members within the 
reservation, “No federal statute...shows any congressional departure from this view. To the contrary, 
authority to tax the activities or property o f non-Indians taking place or situated on Indian lands, in cases 
where the tribe has a significant interest in the subject matter...,’’ 153.
Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 654.
Nordhaus, Hall and Rudio, “ Revisiting Merrion,”  283.
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reconciled and re-aligned Merrion to fit the framework of the integrationist trend, 
“incorporating Merrion's reasoning here would be tantamount to rejecting Montana's 
general rule.’04- The Atkinson decision confirmed the movement of the court away from 
inherent tribal sovereignty which had been established as the principle of Merrion. In 
order to reconcile the two cases the Supreme Court examined the status of the lands 
involved. The Merrion case had involved only trust lands while Atkinson involved fee 
lands. Trust lands were owned and controlled by the tribes while fee lands were not 
controlled by the tribes. Therefore, this clear division between the status of the lands in 
the two cases allowed the justices to conclude that “An Indian tribe's sovereign power to 
tax-whatever its derivation-reaches no further than tribal land.”343 In fact, the Atkinson 
court pointed out that the views of the Merrion justices supported a tribal tax on tribal 
lands, “[the Merrion court]...was careful to note that an Indian tribe's inherent power to 
tax only extended to " transactions occurring on trust lands and significantly involving a 
tribe or its members."'”344 It was clear to the justices that tribal authority was precluded 
over fee lands as the Merrion case “did not address assertions of tribal jurisdiction over 
non-Indian fee land.”345 The conclusion of the justices was made despite the concession 
that tribal power to tax was derived from an “Indian tribe's "general authority, as 
sovereign, to control economic activity within its jurisdiction."”346 Moreover, the 
Atkinson opinion also considered the Merrion dissent, which held that tribes only had the
34' Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 657.
343 Ibid., 653.
344 Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 653, quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 137, quoting 
Colville, 152. However, Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley conceded that “There are undoubtedly parts 
of the Merrion opinion that suggest a broader scope for tribal taxing authority than the quoted language 
above. But Merrion involved a tax that only applied to activity occurring on the reservation..., 653.
5 Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 657.
346 Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 652, quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 137.
right to exclude non-members from the reservation, rather than the Merrion opinion.’47• **•-
The re-assessment of Merrion by the Supreme Court Justices in the Atkinson case limited 
tribal sovereignty over fee lands.
The movement of the Supreme Court from inherent tribal sovereignty influenced the 
Atkinson court to question the Montana ruling that protected tribal sovereignty over non­
members on tribal lands.348 The concurrence of Justice David Souter, joined by Justices 
Kennedy and Thomas, expanded and explicitly incorporated tribal and trust lands into the 
Montana ruling so that tribes did not have any authority over non-members unless 
authorised by Congress or evidence was found to support the Montana exceptions,
“If we are to see coherence in the various manifestations of the general law of tribal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians, the source of doctrine must be Montana v. United 
States... Under Montana, the status of territory within a reservation's boundaries as tribal 
or fee land may have much to do (as it does here) with the likelihood (or not) that facts 
will exist that are relevant under the exceptions to Montana's "general proposition" that 
"the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of 
nonmembers of the tribe." That general proposition is, however, the first principle, 
regardless of whether the land at issue is fee land, or land owned by or held in trust for an 
Indian tribe.”j49
17 To limit the broad principle of Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, the Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. 
Shirley court cited a passage from that case to support this point of view, “ [the tribe]"...has no authority 
over a nonmember until the nonmember enters tribal lands or conducts business with the tribe,"”  653, 
quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 566. The Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley court misapplied 
the context o f this statement. The Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe opinion not only re-affirmed both the 
territorial sovereignty o f the tribe over the reservation and the inherent sovereignty of the tribe to tax non­
members in the reservation but it explicitly rebuked the Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe dissent and held 
that the power to exclude was a lesser power of territorial sovereignty. The Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache 
Tribe statement read, “ We do not question that there is a significant territorial component to tribal power: a 
tribe has no authority over a nonmember until the nonmember enters tribal lands or conducts business with 
the tribe. However, we do not believe that this territorial component to Indian taxing power, which is 
discussed in these early cases, means that the tribal authority to tax derives solely from the tribe's power to 
exclude nonmembers from tribal lands,”  142.
Up until 2001, the Supreme Court applied the Montana rule only over fee lands, even though the court 
found a process to transfer tribal or trust lands into fee lands in order to be governed by the Montana rule. 
This process of land transfer influenced the broadening of the Montana rule into tribal lands.
Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 659-660, quoting Montana v. United States, 565.
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These views established a new precedent to define future cases involving tribal 
sovereignty over non-members in the reservation. Regardless of the status of the lands, in 
order for tribes to have authority over non-members it had to be legislated for by 
Congress.
Only twenty-seven days after Atkinson, the Supreme Court Justices decided Nevada v. 
Hicks and applied the integrationist trend in full for the very first time.
Nevada v. Hicks (2001)
This case concerned whether the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone tribal court had jurisdiction to 
hear civil claims against state officials who entered tribal lands to execute a state-court 
and tribal-court search warrant against Floyd Hicks, a tribal member, for an off- 
reservation crime. The considerations of the Supreme Court Justices rested on the 
application of inherent tribal sovereignty versus state sovereignty within tribal lands of 
the reservation. The criminal cases of Oliphant and Wheeler and the general Montana 
presumption heavily influenced the decision of the court. The justices set a precedent that 
virtually ended tribal sovereignty over non-members on non-members lands (fee lands) in 
the reservation and significantly eroded tribal sovereignty over non-members on tribal 
lands. Without tribal authority, the tribal court did not have authority over non-members, 
defined as state wardens in pursuit of their official duties, in tribal court. Furthermore, the 
limitations on tribal sovereignty resulted in the state having jurisdiction over fee and
221
tribal and trust lands and therefore, authority over non-members in the reservation. This 
Hicks opinion changed the way the Indian sovereignty was applied by the Supreme 
Court. As Joseph Singer explained, the Hicks court reversed “the presumption of 
Worcester v. Georgia entirely, concluding that states have "inherent" powers in Indian 
country.”"00
The integrationist trend established in criminal case law heavily influenced the thinking 
of the justices in the Hicks case. The Oliphant and Wheeler cases had not looked at the 
status of lands involved but instead had looked at the people involved, tribal members 
versus non-members, and had subsequently ruled that tribes did not have authority over 
non-members. Therefore, the use of tribal sovereignty by the Oliphant and Wheeler 
courts was based on the person rather than on the status of the lands involved. This 
rationale was used by the Hicks court to undermine Montana, which determined the 
application of tribal authority over non-members on the type of lands involved. The Hicks 
court believed that the general trend established in civil case law by Montana was created 
by the Oliphant court, noting “"...the general proposition that the inherent sovereign
i r i
powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe."” 
The Supreme Court Justices saw Oliphant as a critical case in the development of civil 
case law /32 As Stacy Leeds explained, the Hicks court had incorporated “many of 
Oliphant's rationales into the context of civil jurisdiction.”353 The Hicks court applied the
”° Singer, “Canons o f Conquest,” 659.
Nevada v. Hicks, 358-359 quoting Montana v. United States, 565.
Richard E. James, “Sanctuaries No More: The United States Supreme Court Deals another Blow to 
Indian Tribal Court Jurisdiction,” Washburn Law Journal 41 (2002): 347-364. Discusses that Nevada v. 
Hicks built on the rationale used in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe.
Stacy Leeds, “The More Things Stay the Same: Waiting on Indian Law's Brown v. Board o f Education,” 
Tulsa Law Review 38 (2002): 82.
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Oliphant rationale to inform its interpretation of the Montana case and thereby, had 
eroded tribal authority over non-members on tribal lands.
This reliance on Oliphant by the Hicks court signalled the intent of the Supreme Court 
Justice to undermine the protection offered to tribal authority on tribal lands by the 
Montana precedent. This application of the integrationist trend in civil case law tied in 
with the general movement of the court away from using tribal sovereignty when non­
members were involved. As Joseph Singer explained, the Hicks court “goes substantially 
beyond the Montana line of cases to hold that the tribe has no jurisdiction over a non­
member who enters tribal land. This comes close to extending Oliphant to civil 
jurisdiction, limiting tribal regulatory power to tribal members and non-members who 
agree to such jurisdiction.”354 The Hicks court believed that it was up to Congress to 
allow tribal authority over non-members, noting that “Where non-members are 
concerned, the "exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self- 
government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of 
the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation."”355 The 
court’s interpretation of internal relations did not constitute tribal authority over non­
members and was therefore dependent on Congress. Generally, tribal sovereignty applied 
only to tribal members,
“...internal relations can be understood by looking at the examples of tribal power to 
which Montana referred: tribes have authority "[to punish tribal offenders,] to determine 
tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations among members, and to prescribe rules
’^ 4 Singer, “Canons o f Conquest,” 652.
” Nevada v. Hicks, 359, quoting Montana v. United States, 564.
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of inheritance for members,"...These examples show, we said, that Indians have " 'the 
right... to make their own laws and be ruled by them.' "”356
In contrast to the Williams broad interpretation of tribal internal relations, the language 
used by the Hicks court continued to limit the Williams test. The Hicks court believed that 
the views expressed by the Montana court in its general presumption regarding tribal 
authority over non-members, actually undermined the Montana ruling, which protected 
tribal authority over non-member on tribal lands. Justice Scalia pointed out that directly 
after the Montana proposition the court “cautioned that “"[t]o be sure, Indian tribes retain 
inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on 
their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands,"...-clearly implying that the general rule 
of Montana applies to both Indian and non-Indian land.”357 The undermining of tribal 
sovereignty over non-members on fee and tribal lands in civil case law confirmed the 
attempts by the Supreme Court to reconcile civil case law and to move away from the 
principle of tribal sovereignty established in other areas of the law.
The Supreme Court Justices clarified that the limitations placed on tribal sovereignty 
since 1981 by the Supreme Court in civil case law had all but ended tribal authority over 
non-members on fee lands and severely eroded tribal authority over non-members on 
tribal lands. In effect, this opinion overruled Williams v. Lee and the sovereignty 
doctrine358 and conflicted with the precedent and ‘parthmarking case’359 of Montana. In 
fact, since that time the Supreme Court had not supported tribal authority over non­
' b Nevada v. Hicks, 360-361, quoting Montana v. United States, 564, and quoting Williams v. Lee, 220.
_ Nevada v. Hicks, 360, quoting Montana v. United States, 565.
™ Nevada v. Hicks, 391-396.
Strate v. A-1 C ontractors, 445.
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members on fee lands even when the tribes have attempted to prove one of the Montana 
exceptions. The Hicks court concluded that if the tribes did not have ownership of the 
lands then it was not possible for the Supreme Court to allow tribal authority over non­
members; “Hitherto, the absence of tribal ownership has been virtually conclusive of the 
absence of tribal civil jurisdiction; with one minor exception, we have never upheld under 
Montana the extension of tribal civil authority over nonmembers on non-Indian land.”j6° 
This interpretation of the law was tantamount to ending tribal authority over non­
members on fee lands in the reservation. In addition, the Hicks court was influenced by 
the Justice Souter interpretation of Atkinson and applied the integrationist trend over 
tribal lands. The justices believed that the involvement of non-members anywhere in the 
reservation required the general presumption of Montana be applied to fee and tribal 
lands; “The rule that, where nonmembers are concerned, "the exercise of tribal power 
beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal 
relations...cannot survive without express congressional delegation," Montana v. United 
States...applies to both Indian and non-Indian land.”j61 For the first time in civil case law 
during the modem era (post-1959), inherent tribal sovereignty did not apply to non­
members on trust lands, “...tribal ownership is not alone enough to support regulatory 
jurisdiction over nonmembers.”j62 Once again, Souter echoed his previous concurrence in 
Atkinson. He explained that under the Montana principle tribal authority over non­
members on fee and tribal lands did not exist,
0 Nevada v . Hicks, 3 6 0 .  T h e  e x c e p t i o n  w a s  Brendale v. Confederated Yakima Indian Nation.
Nevada v. Hicks, 3 5 3 ,  q u o t i n g  Montana v . United States, 5 6 4 .
'  Nevada v . Hicks, 3 6 0 .
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“I would go right to Montana's rule that a tribe's civil jurisdiction generally stops short of 
non-member defendants...Montana applied this presumption against tribal jurisdiction to 
non-member conduct on fee land within a reservation; I would also apply it where, as 
here, a non-member acts on tribal or trust land, and 1 would thus make it explicit that land 
status within a reservation is not a primary jurisdictional fact, but is relevant only insofar 
as it bears on the application of one of Montana's exceptions to a particular case.”363
This Souter interpretation of the law in civil cases was supported by William C. Canby 
who declared that the Hicks court “took the last step”364 and applied Montana to deny 
inherent tribal sovereignty over non-members on both fee and trust lands.
Without general civil authority over non-members, neither did the tribe have tribal court 
authority over non-members. The Hicks court deferred to the application of the Montana- 
Strate line of authority/63 As inherent tribal sovereignty over non-members was limited, 
it followed that the adjudicatory power of the tribe was limited in the equivalent 
manner/66 As Justice Souter observed, “The path marked best is the rule that, at least as a 
pre-sumptive matter, tribal courts lack civil jurisdiction over nonmembers.”367 The 
Supreme Court ruled that tribal courts did not have authority to hear civil cases in relation 
to the misconduct of state officials (non-members) in pursuit of an off-reservation crime. 
Although the civil suit was against “state officials in their individual capacities,” the court 
explained that “the distinction between individual and official capacity suits is 
irrelevant.”368 This statement supported the principle pursued by the Supreme Court that 
precluded inherent tribal sovereignty over all non-members in the reservation. The
’ Nevada v . Hicks, 3 7 5 ,  c i t i n g  Montana v . United States, 5 6 5 .
4 S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e ,  Ridings o f the U.S. Supreme Court, 4 7 .
365 A l t h o u g h  t h e  c o u r t  a p p l i e d  t h e  Strate v . A-l Contractors r a t i o n a l e ,  t h e  G i n s b u r g  c o n c u r r e n c e  w a n t e d  
l im i t s  o n  b o t h  Strate  v . A -l Contractors a n d  t h e  Nevada v. Hicks o p i n i o n .
Nevada v . H i c k s ,  3 5 7 - 3 5 8 .
367 I b id . ,  3 7 6 - 3 7 7 .
',s Ibid., 3 6 4 -3 6 5 .
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implication was that an individual state officer acting either in official capacity or 
individually, pursuant to state authority, could enter the reservation without tribal consent 
and did not need to consult the tribal government or tribal court/69 The limitations placed 
on tribal court, Souter argued, not only applied “the animating principle behind our 
precedents, but fits with historical assumptions about tribal authority and serves sound 
policy.”370
These principles and assumptions were based on the application of the integrationist trend 
by the justices of the Supreme Court and had resulted in tribal authority being replaced 
with inherent state sovereignty inside the reservation. The use of state law in the 
reservation had been developing within the decision-making structures of the Supreme 
Court since 1959 and the application of state law inside the reservation by the Hicks court 
significantly eroded the Indian sovereignty doctrine. The Hicks court made it clear that 
the sovereignty doctrine no longer protected the reservation from state law,
“Our cases make clear that the Indians' right to make their own laws and be governed by 
them does not exclude all state regulatory authority on the reservation. State sovereignty 
does not end at a reservation's border. Though tribes are often referred to as "sovereign" 
entities, it was "long ago" that "the Court departed from Chief Justice Marshall's view 
that 'the laws of [a State] can have no force' within reservation boundaries. Worcester v. 
Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 561 (1832),"..."Ordinarily," it is now clear, "an Indian reservation is 
considered part of the territory of the State."...see also Organized Village o f Kake v. 
E gan..”37]
369 T h e  c o u r t  e x p l i c i t l y  s t a t e d  t h a t  i f  t h e  c o n c u r r i n g  j u d g m e n t  o f  O ’C o n n o r  w a s  i m p l e m e n t e d  “ i t . . . w o u l d ,
f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e ,  h o l d  a  n o n - I n d i a n  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  o f  a  t r i b a l  c o u r t , ”  3 7 4 .  T h i s  w a s  p a t e n t l y  n o t  
t r u e .  T h e  c a s e  o f  Williams v. Lee e x p r e s s l y  h e l d  t h a t  a  n o n - m e m b e r  h a d  t o  p u r s u e  a  c l a i m  in  T r i b a l  C o u r t  
n o t  in  S t a t e  C o u r t .  
f  Nevada v. Hicks, 3 8 2 .
371 Nevada v. Hicks, 3 6 1 - 3 6 2 ,  q u o t i n g  W h i t e  M o u n t a i n  A p a c h e  T r i b e  v .  Bracker, 1 4 1 ,  a n d  q u o t i n g  
Organized Village o f  Kake v .  Egan, 7 2 .
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The development of the integrationist trend allowed the integration of state law into the 
reservation and allowed state authority over non-members in the reservation. 
justification for using inherent state sovereignty in the reservation was based on the right 
of the state to assert jurisdiction for “off-reservation violations of state law.”372 Using the 
integrationist trend, the Hicks court argued that Congress had not withdrawn inherent 
state sovereignty on the reservations for pursuing off-reservation crimes,
"The States' inherent jurisdiction on reservations can of course be stripped by Congress, 
see Draper v. United States...But with regard to the jurisdiction at issue here that has not 
occurred. The Government's assertion that "[a]s a general matter, although state officials 
have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute crimes on a reservation that exclusively 
involve non-Indians, . . . they do not have jurisdiction with respect to crimes involving 
Indian perpetrators or Indian victims,"...is misleading.”373
The actions of the Supreme Court had fundamentally prevented the application of the 
sovereignty doctrine in the face of state sovereignty. The presumption of the sovereignty 
doctrine had also been reversed and in order to remove the inherent right of the state from 
the reservation an explicit act of Congress was required. Therefore, analysis of federal 
legislation by the Supreme Court did not preclude state law, “Nothing in the federal 
statutory scheme prescribes, or even remotely suggests, that state officers cannot enter a 
reservation (including Indian-fee land) to investigate or prosecute violations of state law 
occurring off the reservation.”374 The Hicks court concluded from the evidence that the
' : I b i d . ,  3 5 4 .  T h e  c o u r t  q u a l i f i e d  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  o f  t h e  s t a t e  a n d  s a i d  t h a t  s t a t e s  d i d  n o t  “ e x e r t  t h e  s a m e  
d e g r e e  o f  r e g u l a t o r y  a u t h o r i t y  w i t h i n  a  r e s e r v a t i o n  a s  t h e y  d o  w i t h o u t , ”  3 6 2 .  I n t e r e s t s  in  t h e  r e s e r v a t i o n  h a d  
to  b e  b a l a n c e d  b e t w e e n  “ " . . . t h e  T r i b e s  a n d  t h e  F e d e r a l  G o v e r n m e n t ,  o n  t h e  o n e  h a n d ,  a n d  t h o s e  o f  t h e  
S ta t e ,  o n  t h e  o t h e r "  Washington v .  Confederated Tribes o f Colville Reservation, 4 4 7  U .  S .  1 3 4 ,  1 5 6  ( 1 9 8 0 ) ;  
s e e  a l s o  id., a t  1 8 1  ( o p i n i o n  o f  R e h n q u i s t ,  J . ) , ”  3 6 2 .
373 Nevada v. Hicks, 3 6 5 ,  q u o t i n g  B r i e f  f o r  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  as Amicus Curiae 1 2 - 1 3 ,  n .  7 .
4 Nevada v. Hicks, 3 6 6 .
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• • ■'•'7C # #“State's interest in [the] execution of process is c o n s i d e r a b l e . I n  addition, Justice 
Antonin Scalia specifically supported general limitations on tribal authority, “We do not 
say state officers cannot be regulated; we say they cannot be regulated in the performance 
of their law-enforcement duties. Action unrelated to that is potentially subject to tribal 
control depending on the outcome of Montana analysis.”'’76 The last sentence appeared to 
preclude any kind of inherent tribal sovereignty over non-members in the reservation 
unless the tribes met one of the two Montana exceptions and therefore Congress had to 
legislate to preclude state sovereignty in the reservation.
The Hicks decision fundamentally eroded tribal authority over non-members on tribal and 
trust lands in the reservations and affected the ability of the tribes to tax non-members on 
tribal lands because taxation law after Atkinson was governed by Montana. Therefore, 
taken together, the actions of the Supreme Court Justices in Hicks and Atkinson can be 
construed to have dramatically undermined the authority of the tribes to tax non-members 
on fee and tribal lands and to have caused the loss of tribal civil authority over non­
members in the reservation.
Conclusion
The private papers of Justices Harry A. Blackmun, Thurgood Marshall and William J. 
Brennan provide evidence to support the argument in this work that the actions of the 
Supreme Court in civil, criminal and tax case law moved away from the Indian
7’ I b i d . ,  3 6 4 .
376 I b i d . ,  3 7 3 .
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sovereignty doctrine towards the integrationist trend. The evidence presented in this 
thesis has challenged the published views of scholars in the field of Federal Indian law, 
including Philip P. Frickey, Joseph William Singer, Charles F. Wilkinson and David H. 
Getches, who have taken the opposing view and do not consider the actions of the 
Supreme Court Justices from 1959 to be based on a trend which had limited and 
overturned the sovereignty doctrine. Neither do they interpret the undermining of the 
sovereignty doctrine as being based on the movement of the Supreme Court towards 
using federal and congressional authority to remove tribal authority over non-members or 
to settle conflicts between tribal authority and state authority inside the reservation. The 
private papers show a move away from the presumption that tribes had inherent 
sovereignty over non-members in the reservation unless reversed by Congress to the 
presumption that the tribes did not have authority over non-members in the reservation 
unless granted by Congress. The corollary of this was that unless expressly reversed by 
Congress, the state was presumed to hold inherent authority in the reservations and 
likewise, as the tribes had lost sovereignty over non-members in the reservations then, the 
state assumed authority over non-members in the reservations. However, the Supreme 
Court could be seen to have generally applied the sovereignty doctrine to protect tribal 
members from state law and had allowed the tribes to maintain authority over tribal 
members in the reservations. Joseph Singer believed that in 2001 the ruling of the 
Supreme Court had fundamentally destroyed the presumption of tribal sovereignty, 
noting that the “loss of tribal sovereignty is not something that happened long ago; it was 
accomplished by the nine Justices of the United States Supreme Court in their 2001 
ruling in Hicks.”377 In contrast to Singer’s assertion, it has been demonstrated that the
77 S i n g e r ,  “ C a n o n s  o f  C o n q u e s t , ”  6 5 9 .
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processes leading to the loss of the Indian sovereignty doctrine and the key attributes of 
tribal power had been evident in the rulings of the United States Supreme Court since 
1973 and culminated in 2001 with the determination of the Hicks case and its 
implications on the survival of tribal sovereignty.
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Chapter 4
The Effects of the Silent Revolution
This chapter divides into two sections. Section one discusses the practical effects of the 
tax, civil and criminal opinions handed down by the United States Supreme Court on the 
day-to-day lives of a few Native American tribes. Section two, shows how in this thesis, 
what has been termed and interpreted as the silent revolution of the United States 
Supreme Court, differs from the writings in Native American history and the writings on 
Federal Indian law, which are divided between books and articles.
Section 1 
The Effects of the Silent Revolution on the Tribe within the Reservation
The case law opinions of the Supreme Court have dramatically affected the day-to-day 
authority of tribes within the reservations. With specific evidence from Native Americans 
and non-Native Americans, this section examines the real and damaging effect of tax, 
civil and criminal case law opinions on the authority of certain tribes inside their own 
reservations. As John St. Clair, Chief Justice of Supreme Court of the Wind River 
Reservation, observed, the general impact of the rulings of the United States Supreme 
Court “...on the powers and authorities of Indian tribal governments is that it severely
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restricts the ability to exercise basic regulatory and adjudicatory functions when dealing 
with everyday activities on reservations.”1
Taxation Case Law
Taxation is a key attribute of tribal government and allows the tribes to raise essential 
revenue for the provision of governmental services to a reservation population. However, 
the silent revolution of the Supreme Court affected the taxation authority of the tribes 
inside the reservation in two ways. First, from 1980 to 2001 case law sanctioned the idea 
of concurrent tribal and state taxation of non-members and non-member businesses in the 
reservations. The effect of concurrent taxation resulted in a loss of tribal revenue to 
certain States of the Union and the Tulalip Tribe of Washington, the Wind River 
Reservation in Wyoming and the tribes of Oklahoma serve as examples to highlight this 
process.*- The effect of concurrent taxation is also evidenced by two cases from the 1980s 
which focus on the Colville Tribe, the Lummi Tribe, the Makah Tribe, the Yakima and 
the Jicarilla Apache Tribe.J Concurrent taxation also provided little incentive for inward 
investment.4 Second, in Atkinson Trading Co., v. Shirley (2001) the Supreme Court
' S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e  o n  I n d i a n  A f f a i r s ,  Rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court as They Affect the Powers and 
Authorities o f the Indian Tribal Governments: Hearing on the Concerns o f Recent Decisions o f  the U.S 
Supreme Court and the Future o f Indian Tribal Governments in America, 1 0 7 t h  C o n g . ,  2 d  s e s s . ,  2 7  
F e b r u a r y  2 0 0 2 ,  9 1 .
N a t i o n a l  C o n g r e s s  o f  t h e  A m e r i c a n  I n d i a n ,  Concept paper, 2003 Legislative Proposal on Tribal 
Governance and Economic Enhancement 25 July 2002 ( W a s h i n g t o n  D .C . :  N a t i o n a l  C o n g r e s s  o f  t h e  
A m e r i c a n  I n d i a n ,  2 0 0 2 ) ,  2 ;  a n d  J o s e p h  P . K a l t  a n d  J o s e p h  W i l l i a m  S i n g e r ,  “ M y t h s  a n d  R e a l i t i e s  o f  T r i b a l  
S o v e r e i g n t y :  T h e  L a w  a n d  E c o n o m i c s  o f  I n d i a n  S e l f - R u l e , ”  H a r v a r d  P r o j e c t  o n  A m e r i c a n  I n d i a n  E c o n o m i c  
D e v e l o p m e n t  J o i n t  O c c a s i o n a l  P a p e r s  o n  N a t i v e  A f f a i r s  2 0 0 4 - 0 3 ,  2 0 0 4 .
Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 4 4 7  U .S .  1 3 4  ( 1 9 8 0 ) ;  a n d  Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 
4 9 0  U .S .  1 6 3 ( 1 9 8 9 ) .
S t e p h e n  P .  M c C l e a r y ,  “ A  P r o p o s e d  S o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  P r o b l e m  o f  S t a t e  J u r i s d i c t i o n  t o  T a x  o n  I n d i a n  
R e s e r v a t i o n s , ”  Gonzaga Law Review 2 6  ( 1 9 9 1 ) :  6 2 8 ;  Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 2 0 8 ;  a n d  
S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e ,  Rulings o f the U.S. Supreme Court, 9 .
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moved away from the idea of concurrent taxation on non-member lands of the reservation 
to the idea that tribes did not have inherent taxation authority over non-members on non­
member lands of the reservation.^ The effect of Atkinson further decreased the revenues 
of particular tribes to support tribal governmental programs and services to both tribal 
members and non-members,6 resulted in the non-payment of tribal taxes by non-member 
businesses to the Pueblo of Laguna and the Navajo Nation7 and created disorder and 
uncertainty in some reservations.8
Taxation serves as an important revenue-raising tool for any government to provide for 
the health, welfare, and survival of society. Taxation provides revenue to support the 
protection of tribal history as well as the future survival of tribal culture and helps 
provide a government with income to spend on infrastructure, welfare and social 
programs as well as to invest in and sustain an economy. Todd Miller explained that the 
ability to tax was fundamental to the ongoing process of government, pointing out that 
“...without the revenue raised through taxation the sovereign is unable to carry out any of 
its other functions.”9 Therefore, the right of the tribe to tax was fundamental to enable 
tribal governments and councils to raise revenue for the reservations. As Justice 
Thurgood Marshall observed in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe (1982),10 “The power 
to tax is an essential attribute of Indian sovereignty...[and] This power enables a tribal
Atkinson Trading Co., v. Shirley, 5 3 2  U .S .  6 4 5  ( 2 0 0 1 ) .
" S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e ,  Rulings o f  the U.S. Supreme Court, 3 - 4 ,  9 ,  2 8 - 3 8 ,  51  - 5 4 ,  5 8 ;  a n d  S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e  o n  
In d ia n  A f f a i r s ,  Tribal Government Amendments to the Homeland Security Act o f2002: S. 578 to Amend the 
Homeland Security Act o f  2002 to Include Indian Tribes Among the Entities Consulted with Respect to 
Activities Carried out by the Secretaiy o f Homeland Security, 10 8 t h  C o n g . ,  1 s t  s e s s . ,  3 0  J u l y  2 0 0 3 ,  3 3 - 3 6 .
S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e ,  Tribal Government Amendments, 3 3 - 3 5 ;  S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e ,  Rulings o f the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 9 1 - 9 2 .
S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e ,  Rulings o f the U.S. Supreme Court, 9, 3 0 - 3 2 .
T o d d  M i l l e r ,  “ E a s e m e n t s  o n  T r i b a l  S o v e r e i g n t y , ”  American Indian Law Review 2 6  ( 2 0 0 1 ) :  1 1 4 .
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 4 5 5  U .S .  1 3 0  ( 1 9 8 2 ) .
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government to receive revenues for its essential services...by requiring contributions 
from persons or enterprises.’' 11 However, the silent revolution sanctioned concurrent 
tribal and state taxation of non-members inside the reservation and limited the exclusive 
right of the tribes to tax inside the reservation.
Two Supreme Court cases from the 1980s demonstrated, that concurrent taxation resulted 
in the loss of tribal revenues to the s t at es . In Washington v. Confederated Tribes (1980), 
also known as Colville, the Supreme Court held that both the tribes and the state had 
authority to tax non-members in the reservation. This opinion severely limited the profits 
made by tribally owned reservation cigarette businesses. The Supreme Court noted that 
the majority of tribal profits were made from taxing the sale of cigarettes to non­
members. As Byron White noted, the taxation revenue of the four tribes involved in the 
case was made from “ ...non-Indians - residents of nearby communities who journey to 
the reservation... ” lj The profits made by each individual tribe varied. From 1972 to 
1976, the Colville Tribe earned approximately $266,000 from cigarette taxes, the Lummi 
Tribe earned $54,000 and the Makah Tribe earned $13,000.14 In addition, in 1975 the 
Yakima earned $278,000.15 The justices believed that the involvement of non-members 
justified the imposition of a state tax as well as the tribal tax in the reservation. Therefore, 
the opinion of the Supreme Court significantly reduced much needed tribal revenues. The
11 Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 1 3 0 .
I: A l t h o u g h  White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 4 4 8  U .S .  1 3 6  ( 1 9 8 0 ) ,  Central Machinery Co. v. 
Arizona Tax ComnTn, 4 4 8  U . S .  1 6 0  ( 1 9 8 0 ) ,  Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau o f Revenue, 4 5 8  U . S .  8 3 2  
(1 9 8 2 ) ,  a n d  California v. Cabazon Band o f  Mission Indians, 4 8 0  U .S .  2 0 2  ( 1 9 8 7 )  p r e v e n t e d  c o n c u r r e n t  
t r i b a l /  s t a t e  c o n c u r r e n t  t a x a t i o n  o f  n o n - m e m b e r  b u s i n e s s e s  in  t h e  r e s e r v a t i o n ,  a f t e r  1 9 8 9  c o n c u r r e n t  t a x a t i o n  
w a s  t h e  n o r m .
Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 1 4 5 .
4 Ib id . ,  1 4 4 .
15 Ib id . ,  1 4 5 .
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effect of concurrent taxation was again highlighted in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New.^  
Mexico (1989). This case involved a non-member company who wanted the Supreme 
Court to prohibit the imposition of a state tax on its on-reservation oil and gas business 
operations. In its arguments to the court, the non-member company presented evidence to 
show how much money had been paid in state taxes for on-reservation business 
operations. From 1981 to 1985, the State received $47,483,306 in taxation revenues from 
the on-reservation non-member oil and gas producers.16 For those five years, the Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe had lost significant amounts of taxation revenue for which they would not 
be reimbursed. Furthermore, this opinion would result in future tax earnings of the 
Jicarilla Apache Tribe being lost to the State of New Mexico.
A National Congress of the American Indian concept paper addressed the financial affect 
of concurrent taxation on a number of tribes. The reality of concurrent taxation adversely 
affected the economic enterprises established by the Tulalip Tribe,
“For example, the Tulalip Tribe of Washington has established Quil Ceda Village, which 
includes a business park, parkland, and watershed. The tribe provides comprehensive 
municipal services, but the state receives a windfall of $11 to $50 million each year in 
sales taxes while the Tribe—which has 25% unemployment—receives no tax revenue 
due to the economic impossibility of adding a tribal tax on top of the state tax.”17
The result of the imposition of the State of Washington tax was twofold. First, it took 
needed revenue away from the reservation and second, it limited the rights of the tribe to 
tax non-members and further reduced tribal revenue for its reservation members. The 
negative effect of concurrent taxation was supported by evidence from the Wind River
* Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. Ne^v Mexico, 1 7 0 .
N a t i o n a l  C o n g r e s s  o f  t h e  A m e r i c a n  I n d i a n ,  Concept paper, 2 .
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Reservation in Wyoming. The State of Wyoming was allowed to take a disproportionate 
amount of taxes from the reservation, which helped contribute to a high unemployment 
level, “...an economic study has found that the state collects $185 million in severance 
and property taxes from the reservation, but returns only $85 million in services—on a 
reservation with 70% unemployment.”18 In 2001, concurrent taxation forced the tribes in 
the State of Oklahoma to pay $8.4 million to the state from the tribal collection of 
tobacco taxes and thirty tribes divided motor fuel tax collections with Oklahoma.19 In 
addition, concurrent taxation led tribes to negotiate more than two-hundred compacts 
with the states to govern state excise taxes that included cigarettes, petrol and alcohol and
• i  • • 2 0vehicle registration." The overall impact of concurrent taxation allowed the states to take 
tribal revenue away from the reservations.
Concurrent taxation also affected potential investment by non-member businesses within 
the reservation. The prospect of double taxation provided no incentives for non-member 
businesses to invest in the reservations. As Justice Harry Blackmun explained, 
“Assuming that the Tribe continues to tax oil and gas production at present levels, on- 
reservation taxes will remain 75% higher (14% as opposed to 8% of gross value) than 
off-reservation taxes within the State.”21 Generally, profits drive business and if a non­
member business had to pay 75% more in taxes by investing on-reservation, thereby 
unnecessarily reducing its profits, by default, it would naturally look to invest off- 
reservation. Stephen P. McCleary believed that the underlying factor of double taxation
'* I b id . ,  2 .
K a l t  a n d  S i n g e r ,  “ M y t h s  a n d  R e a l i t i e s  o f  T r i b a l  S o v e r e i g n t y , ’ 3 3 .
20 I b id . ,  3 2 .21
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 2 0 8 .
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forced businesses to invest elsewhere, pointing out that “ ...where a state and a tribe have 
concurrent jurisdiction to tax reservation activity, the resulting double taxation can drive 
many businesses and transactions away from the reservation.”"  Although concurrent 
taxation dominated taxation case law from 1980 to 2001, in Atkinson2j the Supreme 
Court changed principles and disallowed concurrent taxation.
In 2001, the Supreme Court Justices limited the right of tribal governments to tax non­
members and to collect revenues in order to provide programs and services to the 
reservation population.“4 The National Congress of the American Indian (NCAI) 
explained that the 2001 decision was disastrous, noting that the “...tribes nationally are 
now prohibited from raising revenues to provide residents with governmental services.”23 
W. Ron Allen, Chairman for the Jamestown S’Klallam Tribe, agreed with this 
interpretation, and stated that all non-tribal businesses were now outside of the taxation 
authority of the tribes; “The Atkinson case with regard to, can we tax? And it’s saying 
absolutely not, you cannot tax non-Indian businesses on Indian lands.”26 Without the 
right to tax non-member businesses, the tribes were losing much needed revenues. As 
Allen pointed out, “If the Congress says, you need to become self-sufficient but we can’t 
tax, where does Congress think that we’re going to start getting revenues?”27 In addition, 
without revenue the tribes were finding it more difficult to provide reservation based
‘2 M c C l e a r y ,  “ A  P r o p o s e d  S o l u t i o n , ”  6 2 8 .
23 Atkinson Trading Co., v. Shirley. T h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t ,  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e  in  t h e  m o d e m  e r a ,  p r o h i b i t e d  
tr ib a l  t a x a t i o n  o v e r  n o n - m e m b e r s  o n  n o n - m e m b e r  l a n d s  in  t h e  r e s e r v a t i o n .
4 S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e ,  Rulings o f the U.S. Supreme Court, 2 - 4 ,  9 ,  2 8 - 3 8 ,  5 1 - 5 4 ,  5 8 ;  a n d  S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e ,  
Tribal Government Amendments, 3 3 - 3 6 .
5 N a t i o n a l  C o n g r e s s  o f  t h e  A m e r i c a n  I n d i a n ,  Concept paper, 2.
' 6 S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e ,  Rulings o f the U.S. Supreme Court, 3 1.
27 Ib id .
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services, Allen stated that “ ...we have no revenues for those fundamental services that we 
are providing.”28
The Atkinson case dramatically affected the economies of the tribes, including the 
Navajo. Robert Yazzie, Chief Justice of the Navajo Nation, pointed out that the Atkinson 
opinion fundamentally changed the Navajo economy, observing that Atkinson 
“...adversely impacted the economic stability of the Navajo Nation government by 
jeopardizing future tax returns. The decreased revenues have a direct correlation on the 
level of essential governmental services that the Navajo government can or is able to 
provide to all residents and travellers of the Navajo Nation.”29 The effect on the Navajo 
economy required that it had to reduce governmental services or not provide any at all. 
Furthermore, the NCAI specifically addressed the effects of Atkinson on the Navajo 
Nation, as the facts of the case had involved the Navajo. The NCAI explained that the 
Supreme Court had prevented the Navajo from raising monies to support and sustain a 
large reservation population, “As at Navajo, where the Atkinson case prevents the Navajo 
Nation from taxing nonmembers to support a reservation population in excess of 200,000 
people, tribes nationally are now prohibited from raising revenues to provide residents 
with governmental services.”30 Although Atkinson only involved the Navajo, the effect of 
the law applied to all Native Americans. Overall, the National Congress of the American 
Indian summed up the impact of Atkinson on the provision of tribal governmental 
services throughout Native America,
28 I b id . ,  3 2 .
29 I b id . ,  9 1 .
30 Ib id .
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•‘Indian tribes are full-service governments, offering Indians and non-Indians alike a 
broad range of recreational, economic, education, and health services. Yet this new 
direction in the Supreme Court’s Indian law cases poses a very serious threat to the 
ability of tribal governments to provide needed governmental services on Indian 
lands...”31
This threat imposed on Native America by the Supreme Court had placed limitations on 
the capacity of tribal governments to look after the reservation populations and may have 
threatened the future of tribal governments in general. Ultimately, Ben Nighthorse 
Campbell explained that tribes without the power to tax will not survive as “An Indian 
tribal government that is unable to levy a tax on a hotel or things of that nature that enjoy 
the benefits and the amenities of the tribe with the things that the tribe provides certainly 
cannot survive very long.,,J>2
Furthermore, the effect of Atkinson resulted in non-member businesses refusing to pay 
tribal taxes, creating disorder and uncertainty in the reservation. Roland E. Johnson, 
Governor of the Pueblo of Laguna, explained the practical effect that Atkinson had on 
incidents involving non-members inside the reservation, suggesting that after Atkinson 
“the validity o f the [tribal] tax has come into question.”3’ In 2003, the Pueblo Laguna 
responded to a train crash on the reservation with all of the necessary emergency 
services, thinking nothing of the limitations imposed by the case law of the Supreme 
Court. Johnson pointed out that the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad company 
(BNSF) refused to pay tribal taxes to the tribe in light of Atkinson, even after being 
helped by them,
' N a t i o n a l  C o n g r e s s  o f  t h e  A m e r i c a n  I n d i a n ,  Concept paper, 2.
S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e ,  Rulings o f the U.S. Supreme Court, 3 .
S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e ,  Tribal Government A m e n d m e n t s ,  3 5 .
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(BSNF) now asserts that these cases would allow them not to pay the tax that Laguna 
uses to provide essential governmental services when needed. We assert that this is 
unconscionable and wrong. Congress and Federal agencies have long encouraged tribal 
governmental and economic self determination but now the Judicial Branch is crippling 
exercise of this determination by judicial fiat.,,j4
Johnson held that the unilateral decisions of the Supreme Court were devastating tribal 
economies and tribal governmental authority within the reservation. Robert Yazzie 
supported this position and stated that the non-payment of tax by non-members was 
morally wrong,
“...also adversely impact economic development within the Navajo Nation. Businesses 
located on fee land are able to avoid paying tribal taxes while businesses located on trust 
lands continue to pay. The fee land businesses, for all practical purposes receive, a free 
ride and the benefits of a civilized society that are assured by the provision of 
governmental services by the Navajo Nation.”33
The safety and welfare of non-member companies are provided by tribal services and 
normally the costs of providing tribal provisions are offset by tribal taxes. However, the 
tribes now have to find extra money to provide free services to non-member companies. 
Robert Yazzie confirmed the impact of Atkinson during the question and answer session 
conducted by the Chairman of the Senate Indian Affairs Committee. The transcript read,
“The CHAIRMAN. Now you have indicated that the Navajo Nation provides services to 
these utility companies, such as fire protection, police protection, et cetera?
Mr. YAZZIE. Yes; the Navajo Nation does provide emergency services in case of 
accidents, services such as medical, fire protection, and police services to both Indians 
and non-Indians.
The CHAIRMAN. And they are refusing to pay for those services through taxation?
35 lb 'd -
S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e ,  Rulings o f  the U.S. Supreme Court, 9 2 .
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Mr. YAZZIE. To our knowledge, that’s the case today .”j6
The ruling of the Supreme Court Justices has created a situation inside the reservations 
where there is uncertainty over whether non-member companies have to pay tribal taxes. 
W. Ron Allen believed that the uncertainty caused by Atkinson had forced businesses 
away from the reservation, pointing out that “ ...if the Court starts saying that we can’t 
provide order within our reservation borders, how are we going to invite investors to 
come into our reservations and invest, if they feel that they have no due recourse or they 
have no confidence over the order that is supposed to be maintained within the 
reservation borders?”j7
The problems caused by the silent revolution of the Supreme Court in tribal tax matters 
also affected the area of tribal civil authority.
Civil Jurisdiction Case Law
Civil jurisdiction protects the welfare of society and provides an essential bulwark against 
the erosion of culture in a defined geographical territory/8 However, the impact of the 
silent revolution of the Supreme Court on tribal civil authority inside the reservations 
affected the tribe in two ways. First, from 1981 to 2001 the case law of the silent 
revolution eroded tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members on non-member reservation 
lands and therefore limited the rights of the tribe to protect elements of tribal culture and
36 I b id . ,  3 3 .
33 'b i d . ,  3 1 .
8 S t e p h e n  L . P e v a r ,  The Rights o f  Indians and Tribes: The authoritative ACLU guide to Indian and tribal 
r ig h ts ,  3 d  e d .  ( C a r b o n d a l e  a n d  E d w a r d s v i l l e :  S o u t h e r n  I l l i n o i s  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  2 0 0 2 ) ,  1 6 7 .
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welfare on those lands/9 However, tribes still retained civil authority on tribal and trust 
lands. Second, Nevada v. Hicks (2001) eroded tribal civil authority over non-members on 
tribal and trust lands in the reservation. The impact of Hicks had affected the Navajo 
reservation and the Jamestown S’Klallam Tribe40 and caused an increase in the number 
of incidents where state police forces entered their reservations without tribal consent.41
Civil jurisdiction protects the culture, identity and welfare of a society within a defined 
area of land. Steven Pevar pointed out that civil authority was an important attribute of 
tribal government as it maintains “a society’s culture and values” and “A government that 
loses its right to regulate civil matters eventually loses its identity.”42 Therefore, tribal 
civil jurisdiction over reservation lands is important to preserve the culture and identity of 
tribal peoples and their lands. Frank Pommersheim explained that land is an essential part 
of many tribal cultures and religions4’ and the exercise of civil authority protects the 
culture relating to those lands. For many tribes, the connection with the land is cultural as 
well as ancestral. As Hope M. Babcock explained, the link between the tribe and their 
lands is crucial to their survival as tribes “...have a multi-generational, cultural bond to 
their land that makes that land unique and nonfungible,”44 and “Without this land base, 
Indian tribes quite simply cease to exist as culturally distinct societies. Full, undiminished
39 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Brendale v. Confederated Yakima Indian Nation, 492 
U.S. 408 (1989); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993); and Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 
438 (1997).
40 Senate Committee, Rulings o f the U.S. Supreme Court, 26-28, 30-32, 88-90.
4‘ Ibid., 33, 35-36, 53, 93-95.
42 Pevar, The Rights o f Indians and Tribes, 167. Civil jurisdiction includes family matters (marriage, 
divorce, child custody and adoptions) and property matters (taxation, land use, inheritance) and the sales of 
goods and services.
43 Frank Pommersheim, Braid o f Feathers: American Indian Law and Contemporary Tribal Life (Berkeley: 
University o f California Press, 1995).
44 Hope M. Babcock, “ A Civic-Republican Vision of "Domestic Dependent Nations" in the Twenty-First 
Century: Tribal Sovereignty Re-Envisioned, Reinvigorated, and Re-empowered,”  Utah Law Review 2005 
(2005): 489.
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sovereignty over tribal lands and those who occupy or use those lands is thus essential to 
the continuation of Indian tribes in the United States.”471 The importance of tribal civil 
authority over reservation lands was fundamental to maintaining tribal cultures and 
histories as well as the future identity of the tribes. Yvonne Mattson stated that tribal civil 
authority was important to maintain the link between tribal cultures and lands, “ ...these 
cultural and religious ties to the land make the issue of civil regulatory jurisdiction even 
more crucial. Without the power to zone, tribal governments are stripped of their ability 
to define a reservation's essential characters based on their cultural and religious ties.”46 
However, tribal civil authority was weakened by the ideology of the Supreme Court 
Justices in the case law from the silent revolution.
From 1981 to 2001, the Supreme Court held that tribes’ generally lost civil authority over 
non-member reservation lands. Without authority, the tribes did not have the right to 
define the culture of those lands or protect tribal members on those lands. This process 
began with Montana v. United States (1981), where the Supreme Court ruled that tribes 
did not have inherent civil authority to control hunting and fishing by non-members on 
non-member fee lands of the reservation. The Supreme Court extended the limitations 
placed on tribal civil jurisdiction in 1989 when Montana was used to prohibit exclusive 
tribal zoning jurisdiction over the reservation.47 Zoning ensures that a government has a 
comprehensive land management policy to define the uses and culture of land. As the 
Court of Appeals observed, zoning “promote[d] the health and welfare of the
45 Ibid., 490.
4,1 Yvonne Mattson, “ Civil Regulatory Jurisdiction over Fee Simple Tribal Lands: Why Congress is not 
Acting Trustworthy,”  Seattle University Law Review 27 (2004): 1064-1065.
47 Brendale v. Confederated Yakima Indian Nation (1989).
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^ 4 8  •community.” 1 Without zoning power over certain reservation lands, the tribes lost the 
right to define what happened on those lands. Harry Blackmun argued that the tribes were 
threatened by not having the right to zone and therefore lost the right “ ...of the general 
and longer term advantages of comprehensive land management.”49 These advantages 
included the protection of tribal culture associated with those reservation lands. This 
erosion of tribal civil authority by the Supreme Court continued in South Dakota v. 
Bourland (1993)50 and Strate v. A -l Contractors (1997).^1 Once tribes lost exclusive 
authority over lands in the reservation, they lost the right to define the character of those 
lands. Robert Yazzie stated that Strate affected the right of the Navajo to regulate and 
control what non-member businesses did inside the reservation, “businesses with right- 
of-ways or leases of Navajo Nation land, such as utilities and pipeline, are now claiming 
that the Navajo Nation has no authority to regulate or sue them.”32 The effect of Strate 
also limited tribal court jurisdiction over non-members and limited tribal protection over 
tribal members in the reservation. If a situation in the reservation involved a tribal 
member and a non-member the rationale of the Supreme Court held that the state court 
had the necessary jurisdiction to decide the issue. As John St. Clair pointed out, tribal 
members are no longer protected by tribal court when the issue involves a non-member; 
“In the civil area...the non-Indian is at an advantage because he could take the Indian 
into either the tribal court or the State court, whereas the Indian can only take the non- 
Indian into the State court, but not into the tribal court. So there’s two choices for him or
48 Ibid., 421.
49 Ibid., 460.
° In South Dakota v. Bourland (1993), the Montana rationale was used to prohibit tribal authority over 
non-members on lands removed from tribal status by the federal government.
51 In Strate v. A -l Contractors (1997), the Montana rationale was used to prohibit tribal jurisdiction and 
tribal court jurisdiction over a road accident which occurred on a reservation road. There was a federal right
of way over the land in question.
~ Senate Committee, Rulings o f the U.S. Supreme Court, 26.
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her.”3j Up until 2001, the Supreme Court continuously limited tribal authority over non­
members on non-member lands.
However, in 2001 the Supreme Court extended the limitation of tribal civil authority on 
non-member lands to cover tribal lands. In Nevada v. Hicks (2001), the Supreme Court 
declared that tribes did not have civil authority over non-members on tribal and trust 
lands and lost the exclusive right to culturally define, protect and control those lands.34 
Instead, the state had inherent sovereignty to enter tribal lands in pursuit of an off- 
reservation crime. Representatives from the Navajo Nation and the Jamestown S’Klallam 
Tribe discussed the impact of the Hicks decision. Robert Yazzie believed that the 
Supreme Court had severely diminished the power of the Navajo to govern inside the 
reservation, pointing out that “In sum, recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have made it 
impossible to maintain a functioning civil government in the Navajo Nation to safeguard 
the public.’03 W. Ron Allen supported this interpretation relating to the impact of 
Supreme Court case law, noting that “Indian governments are supposed to be provided 
the authority, based on our sovereignty, to govern ourselves, to provide for the needs of 
our people, and to protect our cultures, our unique ways of life that are very unique to our 
society.”36 The impact of Hicks had limited the governmental power of the Jamestown 
S’Klallam inside their reservation, particularly the issue of cultural protection. Allen 
feared for the loss of their culture, noting that they cannot “...maintain the culturally
°  Ibid., 35.
'4 The rule up until Nevada v. Hicks (2001) was that tribes had authority to define and protect tribal culture 
and identity on lands exclusively owned by the tribe.
55 Senate Committee, Rulings o f  the U.S. Supreme Court, 27.
56 Ibid., 30.
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separate identities of Indian communities.”57 The impact of Supreme Court case law on 
tribal civil authority on non-member lands and tribal and trust lands does not bode well 
for the future. As Joseph P. Kalt and Joseph William Singer stated, without the cultural 
protections associated with civil jurisdiction “the social, cultural, and economic viability 
of American Indian communities and, perhaps, even identities is untenable over the long 
run.” The erosion of tribal civil jurisdiction over all reservation lands had further 
weakened the strong tribal cultural and religious ties to the lands.39
The loss of tribal control in the reservations also increased the numbers of state police 
forces entering the reservation without tribal consent, a direct result of Hicks. This issue 
was addressed in an exchange between Robert Yazzie and Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman of 
the Senate Indian Affairs Committee, during a Senate Hearing in 2002. The dialogue 
confirmed that the issue of state law in the reservation was a concern for the 
representative of the Navajo but also for the Jamestown S’Klallam Tribe and the 
Shoshone and Arapahoe,
“The CHAIRMAN. All three of you have testified that, as a result of the Nevada v. Hicks 
case, more and more State and local police departments are coming into reservations. Are 
you documenting these instances, so we can use it as evidence in our reports? Yes, Chief 
Justice?
Mr. YAZZIE. Mr. Chairman, it would be nice to document, give you numbers, but we do 
not have the ability to do that. We just don’t have the resources to maintain, to get 
statistics. It takes money to buy computers and to develop the data necessary to tell us 
something.
The CHAIRMAN. But would you say that these incidents are commonplace?
Mr. YAZZIE. Yes.”60
57 Ibid., 53.
8 Kalt and Singer, ‘'Myths and Realities of Tribal Sovereignty,” 4.
Pommersheim, Braid o f  Feathers.
0 Senate Committee, Rulings o f  the U.S. Supreme Court, 35-36.
The effect of increasing levels of state law and state law agencies inside the reservation, a 
problem created by Hicks, was not only specific to the three tribes represented at the 
hearing. The law did not only affect certain tribes but it affected all tribes. As W. Ron 
Allen observed, the Hicks opinion was adversely affecting the whole of ‘Indian country,’
“ ...the Hicks decision is causing some of the greatest concerns in Indian country today. 
Although we think this is a limited decision, there are a number of state and local police 
departments who have interpreted the decision for themselves. They have decided that 
they have the authority to come onto reservations and enforce state law. We have a 
growing number of reports of this happening throughout Indian country, and it is a 
monumental concern.”61
The fallout from the Hicks case had caused concerns for Native America and threatened
fOtribal interests within the reservation. W. Ron Allen explained the fear within Native 
America about Supreme Court case law, noting that there were concerns for “ ...tribal 
leaders, our lawyers, our counsels, and our people regarding the future of our 
governments, our reservations, and the welfare of our communities.”6^  The effect of civil 
case law from the silent revolution had detrimentally affected the civil authority of the 
tribes within the reservation. As Hope M. Babcock observed, the erosion of tribal 
sovereignty was “taking its toll on the ability of tribes to survive as unique cultural and 
political communities and is diminishing their contribution to the vitality of our country 
as a whole.”64
(>l Ibid., 53.
62 Ronald Eagleye Johnny, “ Nevada v. Hicks: No Threat to Most Nevada Tribes,”  American Indian Lcnv 25 
(2002): 381-385. Johnny did not consider Nevada v. Hicks to be of concern to his own tribe.
' Senate Committee, Rulings o f the U.S. Supreme Court, 30.
4 Babcock, “ A Civic-Republican Vision,”  445.
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The case law rulings from the Supreme Court’s silent revolution also affected the 
criminal authority of the tribes inside the reservations.
Criminal Jurisdiction Case Law
Criminal jurisdiction protects a society within a territorial domain from crime and the 
fear of crime and sanctions the prosecution of individuals or groups who commit illegal 
acts contrary to criminal law. However, in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe (1978) the 
Supreme Court abolished tribal criminal authority and tribal court authority over non­
members in the reservation.65 The Oliphant case had a devastating effect on Native 
America. The jurisdictional gap created by Oliphant limited tribal criminal authority and 
created a sense of tribal powerlessness,66 it contributed to the significant amount of crime 
committed by non-members in the reservation67 and state governments and the federal 
government did not automatically fill the jurisdictional void created by Oliphant and 
prosecute non-member crime. In a reaction to the limitation of tribal criminal authority 
over non-members, many Native American tribes have partially circumvented the
65 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
66 Senate Committee, Tribal Government Amendments, 23, 186; Senate Committee, Rulings o f the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 31-32, 42, 44; and Christopher B. Chaney, “ The Effect of the United States Supreme 
Court’s Decisions During the Last Quarter of the Nineteenth Century on Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction,” 
Brigham Young University Journal o f Public Law 14 (2000): 180.
67 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, American Indians and Crime, by Lawrence A. 
Greenfeld and Steven K. Smith (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1999); U.S. Department 
of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, A BJS Statistical Profile, 1992-2002: American Indians and Crime, 
by Steven W. Parry (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2004); National Congress of the 
American Indian, Concept paper, Senate Committee, Rulings o f the U.S. Supreme Court, 26-38, 92-95; and 
Senate Committee, Tribal Government Amendments, 23, 37,42-43, 50.
s U.S. Department of Justice, American Indians and Crime, by Lawrence A. Greenfeld and Steven K. 
Smith; U.S. Department o f Justice, A BJS Statistical Profile, 1992-2002: American Indians and Crime, by 
Steven W. Parry; Senate Committee, Tribal Government Amendments, 42-45, 209; Senate Committee, 
Rulings o f the U.S. Supreme Court, 32, 53; Larry Cunningham, “ Deputisation of Indian Prosecutors: 
Protecting Indian Interests in Federal Court,” Georgetown Law Journal 88 (2000): 2187-2210; and 
National Congress of the American Indian, Concept paper.
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problems of Oliphant69 and elements of Native America have called for the reversal of 
Oliphant and the restoration of tribal court authority over non-members.70
Criminal jurisdiction allows a society to punish individuals or groups who act contrary to 
a defined rule of law. As Stephen Pevar explained, “Criminal jurisdiction is the power of 
a government to establish rules of conduct and to punish those who violate the 
rules...everywhere within its borders.”71 Therefore, criminal authority operates over a 
specified territory and helps protect a society from crime. However, after Oliphant, 
Native American tribes did not have the authority to punish non-members in the 
reservation or protect society from crime, thus removing an important attribute of tribal 
sovereignty. Christopher B. Chaney believed that the Oliphant opinion had “a significant 
impact on day-to-day life in Indian country” because it affected “one of the most basic 
tenets of sovereignty: the ability of a government to exercise criminal jurisdiction within 
its own territory.”72
The nullification of tribal criminal authority over non-members created a jurisdictional 
gap and left the tribes powerless to prosecute non-member crime. Thomas B. 
Heffelfinger, U.S. Attorney for the State of Minnesota, argued that the 1978 decision was 
detrimental to tribal authority over non-members, “In the view of many, the Oliphant 
decision has created a gap in Indian country law enforcement and negatively impacts
69 Senate Committee, Tribal Government Amendments, 23; Chaney, “ The Effect,” 185-188; and Robert 
Yazzie, “ "Watch Your Six": An Indian Nation Judge’s View of 25 Years of Indian Law, Where We Are 
and Where We Are Going,”  American Indian Law Review 23 (1999): 502-503.
70 National Congress of the American Indian, Concept paper; Senate Committee, Tribal Government 
Amendments, 186; and Senate Committee, Ridings o f the U.S. Supreme Court, 32, 44, 53.
71 Pevar, The Rights o f Indians and Tribes, 142.
7' Chaney, “ The Effect,”  174.
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tribes’ abilities to respond effectively to terrorist incidents and other crimes which may 
be committed by non-Indians in Indian country.”75 Christopher B. Chaney concurred 
with this negative assessment of Oliphant, pointing out that it “has proven to be a large 
stumbling block to effective law enforcement and has had an adverse impact on public 
safety on the reservations for both Indians and non-Indians.”74 Without criminal authority 
over non-members, the tribes were powerless to protect tribal members from non­
member crime. As Geoffrey C. Heisey observed, the jurisdictional gap left by Oliphant 
“leaves the tribes powerless to protect tribal property, interests, and members from the 
criminal conduct of non-Indians.”75 Many tribes have highlighted this sense of tribal 
powerlessness. W. Ron Allen from the Jamestown S’Klallam Tribe felt that tribes could 
not prevent non-member crime, pointing out that “Based on the way the Supreme Court 
decisions are heading, we are supposed to govern our reservations, but we can’t prevent 
non-Indians from committing crimes.”76 John St. Clair summed up the powerlessness of 
the Shoshone and Arapahoe on the Wind River Reservation when issues of domestic 
violence and drug and alcohol abuse involving non-members had arisen,
“When both Indians and non-Indians are involved in domestic violence, alcohol and/or 
drug-related disturbances, or other criminal activity, the tribes can only adjudicate the 
Indians while non-Indians, even when detained and turned over to State officials, go 
unpunished. This double standard of justice creates resentment and projects the image 
that non-Indians are above the law in the area where they choose to live or choose to 
enter into.”77
73 Senate Committee, Tribal Government Amendments, 23.
74 Chaney, “ The Effect,”  180.
75 Geoffrey C. Heisey, “ Oliphant and Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction over Non-Indians: Asserting Congress’s 
Plenary Power to Restore Territorial Jurisdiction,”  Indiana Law Journal 73 (1998): 1055.
76 Senate Committee, Rulings o f the U.S. Supreme Court, 31.
77 Ibid., 44.
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Powerlessness for the Wind River Reservation and its tribal members was seeing non­
members escape criminal prosecutions for illegal acts inside the reservation. In fact, the 
situation created by Oliphant, as Earl Old Person from the Blackfeet tribe explained, had 
“Practically speaking...created a mess. People living on the reservation do not know who 
to turn to for help.”78 Many tribes had felt the real and everyday effects of the Oliphant 
ruling on the ground in tribal reservations, leaving the tribes powerless in the face of non­
member crime.
The nullification of tribal criminal law and tribal court authority over non-members in the 
reservation had contributed to the substantial amount of crime committed by non­
members in the reservation. The volume of non-member lawlessness was identified in 
two Bureau of Justice Statistics publications in 1999 and 2004. The first publication 
authored by Lawrence A. Greenfeld and Steven K. Smith in 1999 identified non­
members as the principal perpetrators of crime against Native Americans; “At least 70% 
of the violent victimizations experienced by American Indians are committed by persons 
not of the same race — a substantially higher rate of interracial violence than experienced 
by white or black victims.”79 This report also evidenced figures for specific crimes, 
including rape, sexual assault and robbery, committed by non-Native Americans against 
Native Americans. Greenfeld and Smith explained that the percentage of rape, sexual 
assault and robbery committed against Native Americans by non-members in the United 
States between 1992 and 1996 was significant,
78 Senate Committee, Tribal Government Amendments, 186.
74 U.S. Department of Justice, American Indians and Crime, by Lawrence A. Greenfeld and Steven K. 
Smith, vi.
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"American Indian victims of rape/sexual assault most often reported that the 
victimization involved an offender of a different race. About 9 in 10 American Indian 
victims of rape or sexual assault were estimated to have had assailants who were white or 
black. Two-thirds or more of the American Indian victims of robbery, aggravated assault, 
and simple assault describecl the offender as belonging to a different race.”80
Therefore, between 1992 and 1996, the incidents of rape or sexual assault committed 
against Native American women by non-members in the United States were 
approximately 90% and the incidents of robbery and assault committed by non-members 
against Native Americans in the United States were approximately 66%. These are 
ominously high figures. In addition, this evidence was supported by a Bureau of Justice 
Statistics publication in 2004, A BJS Statistical Profile, 1992-2002 American Indians and 
Crime, which listed figures regarding non-member crime between 1992 and 2001. Steven 
W. Parry, the author of the publication, explained that non-member crime against Native 
Americans between 1992 and 2001 was very high; “White or black offenders committed 
88% of all violent victimizations, 1992-2001. Victims identified Asians or American 
Indians...as the offender in 13% of the violent acts.”81 The rate of crimes committed by 
non-members against Native Americans far exceeded that committed by Asian or Native 
Americans on Native Americans. The total amount of crime committed against Native 
Americans by an ethnic classification of black or white was substantial,
“In 66% of the violent crimes in which the race of the offender was reported, American 
Indian victims indicated the offender was either white or black. Nearly 4 in 5 American 
Indian victims of rape/sexual assault described the offender as white. About 3 in 5 
American Indian victims of robbery (57%), aggravated assault (58%), and simple assault 
(55%) described the offender as white.”8-
80 Ibid., 7.
81 U.S. Department o f Justice, A BJS Statistical Profile, 1992-2002: American Indians and Crime, by 
Steven W. Parry, 8. *
82 Ibid., 9.
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These levels and percentages o f rape, sexual assault and robbery committed by non­
members against Native Americans supported the findings o f the 1999 report. As Parry 
pointed out, ‘"American Indian victims were more likely to report the offender was from a 
different race, compared to blacks and white victims.”8j These Bureau o f Justice 
Statistics reports were supported by a National Congress o f  the American Indian concept 
paper, which held that 70% of violent crime committed against Native Americans was by 
non-members and 75% o f  domestic violence cases involved a non-member offender.84 
Despite the high levels o f  non-member crime within Native American reservations, the 
consequence o f  Oliphant meant that Native America did not have authority or jurisdiction 
to prosecute the large numbers o f  serious crimes committed by non-members against 
Native Americans.
Many tribal members from different tribes have highlighted how the Supreme Court 
opinion o f  Oliphant created and contributed to non-member crime in the reservations. In 
a question and answer session with Daniel Inouye, Chairman o f the Committee on Indian 
Affairs, John St. Clair explained that the increase in non-member crime was a direct 
result o f  the Oliphant case,
“The CHAIRMAN. You have indicated in your testimony that non-Indians on your 
reservation consider themselves to be above the law. Are you suggesting that, as a result 
of these Supreme Court decisions, the level o f  criminal activities among non-Indians has 
gone up?
Mr. ST. CLAIR. Yes; I think just crime in general, whether it’s Indians or non-Indians, 
has arisen on reservations. When an incident does occur, even if there is an extradition
m  I b i d -
4 N a t i o n a l  C o n g r e s s  o f  t h e  A m e r i c a n  I n d i a n ,  Concept paper, 2.
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procedure or agreement or a law enforcement assistance agreement between the tribes 
and the county or the State government, that just deals with how to handle the incident on 
the scene. It doesn’t deal with adjudication. Most o f the time, once that is completed, the 
non-Indian is not prosecuted. So the result is that only the Indian people are 
prosecuted.”83
Incidents o f domestic abuse by non-members have affected the Jamestown S’Klallam 
Tribe. As W. Ron Allen observed, the Oliphant case has resulted in an increase in 
domestic abuse over which the tribe has no control,
“ ...w e have a domestic violence problem with a non-Indian beating up an Indian woman, 
which we know is a common problem that we have throughout our communities, but we 
can’t do anything about it. So what are we to do? The courts come to us, our courts come 
to us as politicians and say, “ What are we going to do about this?” So we have some 
serious problems.”86
These problems created by the Supreme Court Justices were not only confined to the 
Jamestown S ’Klallam Tribe, they also affected the vast population o f  the Navajo Nation. 
Robert Yazzie, Chief Justice o f the Navajo Nation, explained that non-member crimes 
were affecting the Navajo reservation. In one incident during the mid-1990s, “ ...Bruce 
Williams, a non-Indian, raced through a community located within the territorial 
jurisdiction o f  the Navajo Nation just to demonstrate that the Navajo Nation did not have 
criminal jurisdiction over his activities.”87 The issue o f domestic violence also concerned 
the Navajo. The Navajo situation was similar to the Jamestown S ’Klallam Tribe because 
the Oliphant ruling had allowed many non-members to escape punishment for domestic 
violence crimes. Despite the Violence Against Women Act passed by Congress in 1994, 
Yazzie explained that it did not protect women against non-member acts o f domestic
83 S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e ,  Rulings o f the U.S. Supreme Court, 3 5
86 I b i d . ,  3 2 .
87 I b i d . ,  9 2 .
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violence; “ ...pursuant to the present federal statutory scheme in Indian country regarding 
jurisdiction, whenever a Navajo woman is beaten by a non-Indian spouse neither the 
State nor the Navajo Nation is presumed to have jurisdiction over the matter, only the 
federal government can prosecute.”88 Therefore, Oliphant had helped contribute to crime 
within the reservation, as there was little threat o f prosecution. Furthermore, if the victim 
was not severely injured or killed, the federal government, Yazzie said, “will generally 
decline the matter.”89 The high level o f non-member crime created by Oliphant stemmed 
from a lack o f  tribal authority inside the reservation. The everyday problems caused by 
the Oliphant judgm ent in Native American reservations was discussed by Tex Hall,
“ ...the  jurisdictional problems that were talked about previously created by the Oliphant 
decision denies tribal people the opportunity to protect our tribal people and that must 
change...it highlights the very real issues that tribes face every day...Tribal police need 
the tools to address crimes committed by non-Indians in Indian country. Domestic 
violence and alcohol and drug crimes are our biggest problems in sheer volume alone. 
The most important civil right we all have is the right to be safe in our homes.”90
The loss o f tribal criminal authority over non-members in 1978 was devastating for tribal 
reservations and their communities, leading to high amounts o f non-member crime and 
low amounts o f  non-member punishment.
The problems created by Oliphant were exacerbated with the failure o f the federal 
government and state governments to pursue and prosecute all non-member crimes. The 
Bureau o f Justice Statistics publication o f 1999 contained figures to support the non­
intervention o f  state and federal governments. In fiscal year 1996, United States
88 I b i d . ,  9 4 .
89 I b i d . ,  9 5
90 S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e ,  Tribal Government Amendments, 5 0 .
Attorneys investigated 1,927 suspects for crimes committed in Indian country.91 In fiscal
year 2000, U.S. Attorneys investigated 2,074 suspects (not all Native Americans) for
crimes in Indian country.92 However, each year there were approximately 30,000 violent
►
crimes reported by Native Americans victims.9^  With an investigation percentage o f 
approximately 6%, the federal authorities are neglecting to investigate thousands o f cases 
or 94% o f reported crimes. Individuals from Native America corroborated the statistics 
relating to the paucity o f federal and state investigations into on-reservation crime. Alvin 
Windy Boy, Jr., Chairman o f the Chippewa Cree Tribe, described the reluctance o f the 
federal authorities to prosecute non-member crime on the Chippewa Cree Reservation; 
“ . . . i f  we have a criminal violation by a non-Indian within our reservation, we turn the 
case over to the federal authorities...But they do not have the time and resources to cover 
what they already have on their plates.”94 W. Ron Allen supported the interpretation o f 
Windy Boy, explaining that domestic violence cases do not have priority in the eyes o f 
the federal justice system, particularly when it involves non-members within 
reservations; “ [federal government] generally only gets involved in major felony cases. 
As a result, domestic violence on Indian reservations goes unaddressed and offenders go 
unpunished. It is an enormous tragedy.”92 As well as the federal government’s dereliction 
o f duty, state governments have also failed to act. W. Ron Allen pointed out that the State 
o f Washington has little motivation to help the Jamestown S ’Klallam Tribe and prosecute 
non-member crime inside the reservation,
41 U .S .  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  J u s t i c e ,  American Indians and Crime, b y  L a w r e n c e  A .  G r e e n f e l d  a n d  S t e v e n  K .  
S m i t h ,  3 0 .
“2 U .S .  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  J u s t i c e ,  A BJS Statistical Profile, 1992-2002: American Indians and Crime, b y  
S t e v e n  W .  P a r r y ,  1 9 .
3 C u n n i n g h a m ,  “ D e p u t i s a t i o n  o f  I n d i a n  P r o s e c u t o r s , ”  2 1 9 8 .
4 S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e ,  Tribal Government Amendments, 2 0 9 .  
b  S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e ,  Rulings o f the U.S. Supreme Court, 5 3 .
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"‘...A re the county governments or State governments going to help out? No, they’re not. 
They have other priorities. They have no interest in spending their resources to deal with 
the problems on Indian reservations, and the attitude has not been very encouraging over 
the years, even though in some areas you will see some constructive success that is going 
on.”96
The lack o f  support given to the tribes by the state allowed non-members to escape 
punishment and possibly to re-offend. Furthermore, both federal and state governments 
were very reluctant to act within reservations to prosecute domestic violence cases. The 
NCA1 pointed out that the domestic violence arena was “a particularly difficult issue on 
Indian reservations because federal and state authorities most often decline to investigate 
or prosecute, and tribal governments have no authority to exercise jurisdiction over non- 
Indians.”97 The jurisdictional void created by Oliphant had created a vacuum with 
reluctance on the part o f  the federal government and the relevant state governments to 
support the tribes.
Consequently, elements o f  Native America have called for the reversal o f  Oliphant and 
the requisite authority o f tribal courts to be restored by the Supreme Court or Congress. 
The failure o f  federal and state governments to support the tribes and prosecute non­
members led the NCAI to call for the restoration o f tribal court authority over non­
members,
“Given the well-documented failure o f federal and state officers to prosecute reservation 
crimes, the court decisions curtailing tribal authority have left a law enforcement void. 
Visitors, as well as reservation residents, will benefit from improved tribal justice
96 I b i d . ,  3 2 .
97 N a t i o n a l  C o n g r e s s  o f  t h e  A m e r i c a n  I n d i a n ,  Concept paper, 2.
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systems where tribal governments are the primary authority and tribal, state, and federal 
officials work cooperatively under clearly established guidelines.”98
Only with the sginstatement o f tribal criminal authority over non-members will the tribes 
succeed in limiting and addressing non-member crime inside the reservation. Earl Old 
Person believed that the tribes and in particular the Blackfeet should have the right to 
control non-member activity, pointing out that the “Tribe should be the one that controls, 
not BIA, not FB I....The tribe needs to be given back what the United States Supreme 
Court has taken. Non-Indians choose to live on the Blackfeet Reservation. They must be 
subject to its criminal laws in order for the Blackfeet Nation to keep the peace.”99 Despite 
the calls for the reversal o f Oliphant, nothing has been forthcoming from either the 
Supreme Court or Congress.
Many tribes have successfully implemented schemes to circumvent the Oliphant decision 
o f 1978, including the Navajo Nation, the Jicarilla Apache Tribe, the Southern Ute Indian 
Tribe and the W innebago Tribe o f Nebraska Tribes. In order to get around the problem o f 
Oliphant, tribes have used tribal and state compacts, de-criminalised some offences into 
civil offences and excluded non-members from the reservation. Tribal and state compacts 
allowed the tribes to arrest non-members in the reservation. In 2001, the Winnebago 
Tribe o f  Nebraska signed a compact with the state o f Nebraska authorising tribal police 
and Bureau o f  Indian Affairs officers to arrest non-members in the reservation; “Any 
duly authorised and qualified law enforcement officer o f the Bureau o f Indian Affairs or 
of the W innebago Tribe o f Nebraska who has been Certified by the Nebraska
I b i d .
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Commission o f  Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice may be given special deputy 
status by the State o f Nebraska and the Nebraska State Patrol.” 100 This process o f  cross- 
deputisation agreement had been undertaken between numerous tribes and states, 
including the Navajo Nation and the state o f New Mexico, the Jicarilla Apache Tribe and 
New Mexico, the Eastern Band o f Cherokee and North Carolina, the Cherokee Nation 
and Oklahoma and the Choctaw Nation and various cities in the State o f Oklahoma.101 
Moreover, despite the success o f some agreements between the tribes and the states, 
many other tribes have not been successful and are still burdened by the practical 
limitations o f  Oliphant. As Thomas B. Heffelfinger observed,
“As an example, in response to Oliphant's constraints, some tribal law enforcement 
agencies have obtained cross-commissions from State, local and Federal authorities to 
expand their authority to arrest non-Indian criminal suspects under State or Federal law. 
Unfortunately, such cooperative arrangements are not made in many jurisdictions due to 
various factors such as local political issues or concerns over civil liability.” 102
While some tribes have managed to weaken the stranglehold o f Oliphant through tribal 
and state compacts, others have decriminalised some offences and turned them into civil 
offences.103 The Jicarilla Apache Tribe Tribal Code was re-written to allow the tribe to 
enforce the law against non-member poachers on the reservation and the Navajo Nation 
decriminalized the traffic laws.104 Robert Yazzie explained that the Navajo Nation
100 N a t i o n a l  C o n g r e s s  o f  t h e  A m e r i c a n  I n d i a n ,  “ C r o s s - D e p u t i s a t i o n  a g r e e m e n t  b y  a n d  b e t w e e n  t h e  B u r e a u  
o f  I n d i a n  A f f a i r s ,  t h e  N e b r a s k a  S t a t e  P a t r o l  a n d  t h e  W i n n e b a g o  T r i b e  o f  N e b r a s k a , ”  
h t t p : / / w w w . n c a i . o r g / n c a i / r e s o u r c e / a g r e e m e n t s / n e _ t a x _ m o t o r _ f u e l _ t a x _ a g r e e m e n t _ b e t w e e n _ w i n n e b a g o _ t r i  
b e _ o f _ n e b r a s k a _ a n d _ s t a t e _ o f _ n e b r a s k a j a n u a r y _ 2 0 0 2 . p d f  ( a c c e s s e d  2 1  M a y ,  2 0 0 6 ) .
101 N a t i o n a l  C o n g r e s s  o f  t h e  A m e r i c a n  I n d i a n ,  “ L a w  E n f o r c e m e n t  A g r e e m e n t s , ”  
h t t p : / / w w w . n c a i . O r g / L a w _ E n f o r c e m e n t _ A g r e e m e n t s . 1 0 0 . 0 . h t m l  ( a c c e s s e d  21  M a y ,  2 0 0 6 ) .
102 S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e ,  Tribal Government Amendments, 2 3 .
103 C h a n e y ,  “ T h e  E f f e c t , ”  1 8 6 .
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decriminalised offences out o f necessity and had successfully worked around Oliphant. l05 
In addition, the Navajo Nation had written into its legal code the right to exclude non­
members from the reservation. Although some tribes have been successful in 
undermining the ideology o f the Supreme Court in Oliphant, there were still strong 
constraints imposed on tribal criminal authority over non-members inside the reservation.
The Supreme Court’s silent revolution dramatically affected the practical workings o f the 
tribes within the reservations, severely limiting and nullifying the civil, criminal and 
taxation authority o f  the tribes. Although evidence for the impact factors o f Supreme 
Court case law was difficult to obtain, I believe that there is a strong correlation between 
the case law o f the silent revolution and the effects it has had on everyday tribal 
authority. The erosion o f  these key attributes o f tribal power have limited the collection 
o f tribal revenues from non-members and non-member companies inside the reservations, 
limited the authority o f  the tribes to define, protect and control the culture and character 
o f the reservations and prevented the tribes from enforcing the rule o f law over non­
members within the reservations. These limitations were a consequence o f Supreme 
Court case law. Robert Laurence discussed the negative impact o f  Supreme Court case 
law on the tribes within the reservations, pointing out that over the last few years “tribes 
have had increasingly unfettered power to do less and less” and “eventually the tribes will 
have entirely unfettered power to do essentially nothing.” 106 William C. Canby supported 
this negative assessment o f Supreme Court case law. He explained that the Supreme
103 Y a z z i e ,  “ " W a t c h  Y o u r  S i x , " ”  5 0 2 - 5 0 3 .
106 R o b e r t  L a u r e n c e ,  “ T h e  U n s e e m l y  N a t u r e  O f  R e s e r v a t i o n  D i m i n i s h m e n t  B y  J u d i c i a l ,  A s  O p p o s e d  T o  
L e g i s l a t i v e ,  F i a t  A n d  T h e  I r o n i c  R o l e  O f  T h e  I n d i a n  C i v i l  R i g h t s  A c t  In  L i m i t i n g  B o t h , ”  North Dakota 
Law Review  71  ( 1 9 9 5 ) :  4 1 3 .
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Court was developing a rule to nullify all tribal authority over non-members, “One way
of drawing a bright line, and that indeed seems the direction in which things are going, is
to say that a tribe has no power over noninembers at all. Such a rule provides certainty,
tc
but leaves the tribe with almost no governmental power at a ll ...” 107 Therefore, the effects 
o f the silent revolution on the everyday workings o f the tribe within the reservations are 
real and a cause o f serious concern.
Section 2 
The Silent Revolution and Writings on Native America History and the Law
This section shows how the silent revolution of the Supreme Court discussed in this 
thesis differs from the writings in Native American history, including Vine Deloria, 
Robert Berkhofer, Wilcomb Washburn, James Olson and Raymond Wilson, Stephen 
Cornell, John R. Wunder, Peter Iverson, Joane Nagel, Joseph P. Kalt and Joseph William 
Singer and Charles Wilkinson. These writings overemphasise the resurgence and positive 
image o f  Native America from the 1970s and do not fully consider the negative impact o f 
Supreme Court case law on the tribes. A revision needs to take place within Native 
American studies to addresses this imbalance contained within the writings on Native 
American history. Although a clear Native American revival took place from the 1970s, 
Supreme Court case law fundamentally weakened it from the beginning o f the 1970s. In 
order to provide context, this section briefly outlines the resurgence and positive image o f 
Native America from the 1970s-to the twenty-first century. In Addition, this section
107 S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e ,  Rulings o f the U.S. Supreme Court, 4 6 .
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demonstrates how this thesis differs from scholarly writings on the law, including work 
produced again by Vine Deloria, Charles Wilkinson, Frank Pommersheim, William C. 
Canby, David E. Wilkins, Joseph William Singer and Philip P. Frickey, arguing that they 
do not view the erosion o f tribal sovereignty by the Supreme Court as a continuous 
process from 1959 to 2001 and they do not discuss the practical effects o f Supreme Court 
case law on tribal authority in the reservations.
Writings on Native American History
The writings on Native American history generally interpret Native American history 
from the 1970s as one o f  hope and revival, without discussing Supreme Court case law. 
In order to show that the writings on Native American history generally rely on this 
interpretation, this section will briefly highlight the positive image o f  Native America 
from the 1970s to the twenty-first century. The resurgence o f  Native American political 
rights during the 1970s, influenced by the Red Power movement o f  the 1960s,108 saw the 
United States government establish the federal policy era o f tribal self-determination, 
Congress introduced larger amounts of Native American legislation and there was a 
growth in tribal incomes, tribal economies and the Native American population. This 
positive image o f the 1970s continued throughout the 1980s to the twenty-first century, 
highlighted by the re-affirmation o f  the government-to-government relationship between 
the tribes and the United States and the growth o f  reservation based economies and tribal
108 V i n e  D e l o r i a ,  J r . ,  Custer D ied For Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto ( 1 9 6 9 ;  r e p r i n t ,  N o r m a n :  U n i v e r s i t y  
o f  O k l a h o m a  P r e s s ,  1 9 8 8 ) .
revenues. This will provide sufficient context to assess the difference between this thesis 
and the writings on Native American history.
The Red Power movement o f the 1960s and 1970s forced the government to end its 
termination policy in 1970. Red Power was composed o f  divergent groups, divergent 
issues and divergent demands. There were differences between urban and reservation 
Native Americans as well as intra-tribal differences within both groups.109 Therefore, 
Native American activism was an umbrella movement built on many goals, including 
recognition o f  treaty and land rights, sovereignty rights and cultural rights. Activism and 
events ranged from the occupation o f  Alcatraz Island on November 9 o f 1969, the take­
over o f  M ount Rushmore in September o f 1970, the Trail o f  Broken Treaties from 
October to Novem ber o f 1972, Wounded Knee from February 27 to May 8 o f 1973, the 
Pine Ridge Shoot-out in 1975 and the Longest Walk on February 11 o f 1978.110 Native 
American activism directly influenced the United States government to end the 
termination era and recognise the sovereign rights o f Native America. As Stephen 
Cornell and Joseph P. Kalt explained, “Expansions in tribal sovereignty since the 1960s 
have come about largely as a result o f  the political activities o f tribes and national Indian 
organizations.” 111 According to Stephen Cornell, the success o f  the Red Power 
Movement was an important factor to prove that Native America had not vanished but 
“had returned to the political arena with unexpected, often defiant force, and in the
109 V i n e  D e l o r i a ,  J r .  a n d  C l i f f o r d  M . L y t l e ,  The Nations Within: The Past and Future o f American Indian 
Sovereignty ( A u s t i n :  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  T e x a s  P r e s s ,  1 9 8 4 ) .
110 D u a n e  C h a m p a g n e ,  e d . ,  Chronology o f North Native American History: From Pre-Columbian Times to 
the Present ( D e t r o i t :  G a l e  R e s e a r c h  I n c . ,  1 9 9 4 ) .
111 S t e p h e n  C o r n e l l  a n d  J o s e p h  P . K a l t ,  “ R e l o a d i n g  t h e  D ic e :  I m p r o v i n g  t h e  C h a n c e s  f o r  E c o n o m i c  
D e v e l o p m e n t  o n  A m e r i c a n  I n d i a n  R e s e r v a t i o n s , ”  c h a p .  1 in  What Can Tribes Do? Strategies and 
Institutions in American Economic Development, e d .  S t e p h e n  C o r n e l l  a n d  J o s e p h  P . K a l t  ( A m e r i c a n  I n d i a n  
S t u d i e s  C e n t r e ,  L o s  A n g e l e s :  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  C a l i f o r n i a  P r e s s ,  1 9 9 2 ) ,  1 2 .
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process had reversed the four-hundred-year trend o f declining Indian influence and 
power.” 11- President Richard Nixon introduced the federal policy o f tribal self- 
determination 4ri~l97Q,. after President Lyndon Johnson mooted the idea in 1968. On 
March 6, 1968, President Johnson articulated a new federal policy to be pursued by his 
administration, “ I propose a new goal for our Indian programs: A goal that ends the old 
debate about “termination” o f Indian programs and stresses self-determination; a goal 
that erases old attitudes o f paternalism and promotes partnership self-help.” 113 This 
statement began the end o f termination and within two years, President Richard Nixon 
had ended the termination policy. In a Special Message on Indian Affairs, Richard Nixon 
made clear his intentions to end termination and to move towards a federal policy based 
on tribal self-determination. By adopting tribal self-determination, Nixon pointed out that 
the “new and coherent strategy” 114 would allow more tribal autonomy and control over 
their lives and “ ...[it] must be the goal of any new national policy toward the Indian 
people to strengthen the Indian’s sense o f autonomy without threatening this sense o f 
community. We must assure the Indian that he can assume control o f  his own life without 
being separated involuntary from the tribal group.” 115 This policy was underpinned by the 
self-determination and preservation o f the tribes within the boundaries o f the United 
States. As John Fredericks observed, tribal self-determination “has been unwavering
112 S t e p h e n  C o r n e l l ,  The Return o f the Native: American Indian Political Resurgence ( N e w  Y o r k :  O x f o r d  
U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 8 8 ) ,  6 .
113 L y n d o n  B .  J o h n s o n ,  Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, 
v o l .  1 ( W a s h i n g t o n  D .C . :  G o v e r n m e n t  P r i n t i n g  O f f i c e ,  1 9 6 8 ) ,  3 3 6 .
114 R i c h a r d  N i x o n ,  Public Papers o f the Presidents o f the United States: Richard Nixon, 1970 ( W a s h i n g t o n  
D .C . :  G o v e r n m e n t  P r i n t i n g  O f f i c e ,  1 9 7 1 ) ,  5 7 5 .
115 I b i d . ,  5 6 6 .
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since the early 1970s, to promote and encourage tribal self-government.” 116 The policies 
o f the Executive were also supported by Congress.
The revival o f  Native America during the 1970s was evidenced by a greater amount o f 
Native American legislation passed by Congress. The legislation expanded tribal 
authority and granted federal recognition to many tribes. General federal legislation 
increased the authority and power o f the tribes, including the Indian Financing Act o f 
1974, the Alaskan Native Claims and Settlement Act o f 1971, the Indian Self- 
Determination and Education Assistance Act o f  1975, the Indian Child Welfare Act o f 
1978 and the American Indian Religious Freedom Act o f  1978. In the opinion o f John 
Wunder, the end o f  the 1970s symbolised a strengthened image o f  Native America as 
“By the end o f  the 1970s, a peace pipe had been figuratively passed between Native 
Americas and many institutions o f the United States. The tobacco was lit.” 117 Some tribal 
members also saw a visible strengthening o f tribal government on the ground. Philip 
Martin, leader o f  the Mississippi Band o f  Choctaw, explained that the late 1970s 
represented the culmination o f years o f hard work to develop and sustain a tribal 
economy, “The strengthening o f the tribal government was a gradual process that took 
place between the late 60’s and 1979.” ' 18 In addition, Congress enacted specific 
legislation to restore the Menominee, pursuant to the Menominee Restoration Act o f 
1973, to a federally recognised tribe. During the 1970s, a number o f tribes were federally
116 J o h n  F r e d e r i c k s  I I I ,  “ A m e r i c a ’ s  F i r s t  N a t i o n s :  T h e  O r i g i n s ,  H i s t o r y  a n d  F u t u r e  o f  A m e r i c a n  I n d i a n  
S o v e r e i g n t y , ”  Journal o f  Law and Policy 7  ( 1 9 9 9 ) :  4 0 2 .
117 J o h n  R . W u n d e r ,  “ Retained by the People” A Histoiy o f American Indians and the Bill o f Rights ( N e w  
Y o r k :  O x f o r d  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 9 4 ) ,  1 7 6 .
118 P h i l i p  M a r t i n ,  “ D i s c u s s e s  t h e  C h a l l e n g e s  o f  E c o n o m i c  D e v e l o p m e n t ,  1 9 8 8 , ”  c h a p .  15  in  Major 
Problems in American Indian History, 2 d  e d . ,  e d .  A l b e r t  L . H u r t a d o  a n d  P e t e r  I v e r s o n  ( B o s t o n :  H o u g h t o n  
M i f f l i n  C o m p a n y ,  2 0 0 1 ) ,  4 8 8 .
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recognised including the Alabama Creek, the Narragansett, the Ottawa, the Tunica- 
Biloxi, the M ashantucket Pequot, and the tribes o f M aine.119 As Laurence M. Hauptman 
and Jack Campisi observed, many more tribes were recognised in the 1970s because o f 
direct action by both Congress and the Department o f the Interior.120
Furthermore, the 1970s saw the growth o f tribal economies and the Native American 
population. Tribal economies grew from the development o f  tribal businesses as well as 
through increases in direct federal funding. As Jonathan B. Taylor and Joseph P. Kalt 
explained, “The growth in reservation Indians’ real per capita incomes in the 1970s was 
associated with increases in federal spending.” 121 Therefore, federal spending was 
important to develop tribal income and business. In addition, broad congressional policy 
allowed the tribes to build successful economies. Eric Henson and Jonathan B. Taylor 
pointed out that “Since the 1970s, when the Federal Government embraced the twin 
policies o f  self-determination and self-governance, a growing number o f tribes have built 
-  or are in the process o f  building -  sustainable econom ies...” 122 With sustained federal 
funding, the tribes had the opportunity to develop economies inside the reservations and 
improve poverty levels. R. L. Trosper argued that reservation poverty levels improved
119 L a u r e n c e  M .  H a u p t m a n  a n d  J a c k  C a m p i s i ,  “ E a s t e r n  I n d i a n  C o m m u n i t i e s  S t r i v e  f o r  R e c o g n i t i o n , ”  c h a p  
1 4  in  Major Problems in American Indian History. 2 d  e d . ,  e d .  A l b e r t  L .  H u r t a d o  a n d  P e t e r  I v e r s o n  ( B o s t o n :  
H o u g h t o n  M i f f l i n  C o m p a n y ,  2 0 0 1 ) ,  4 7 1 .
120 I b i d .
121 J o n a t h a n  B .  T a y l o r  a n d  J o s e p h  P . K a l t ,  “ C a b a z o n ,  T h e  I n d i a n  G a m i n g  R e g u l a t o r y  A c t ,  a n d  T h e  
S o c i o e c o n o m i c  C o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  A m e r i c a n  I n d i a n  G o v e r n m e n t a l  G a m i n g  a  T e n - Y e a r  R e v i e w ,  A m e r i c a n  
I n d i a n s  o n  R e s e r v a t i o n s :  A  D a t a b o o k  o f  S o c i o e c o n o m i c  C h a n g e  B e t w e e n  t h e  1 9 9 0  a n d  2 0 0 0  C e n s u s e s , ”  
H a r v a r d  P r o j e c t  o n  A m e r i c a n  I n d i a n  E c o n o m i c  D e v e l o p m e n t ,  J a n u a r y  2 0 0 5 ,  6 .
122 E r i c  H e n s o n  a n d  J o n a t h a n  B . T a y l o r ,  “ N a t i v e  A m e r i c a  a t  t h e  N e w  M i l l e n n i u m , ”  H a r v a r d  P r o j e c t  o n  
A m e r i c a n  I n d i a n  E c o n o m i c  D e v e l o p m e n t ,  A p r i l  2 0 0 2 ,  1 0 6 .
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during the 1970s because o f funding and tribal entrepreneurship.12j The Mississippi band 
o f Choctaw provided one example o f tribal success. The economic success o f  the 
Mississippi Band o f Choctaw began in 1975 when Chief Philip Martin sent out business 
proposals to attract private investment to the reservation in order to develop the 
reservation infrastructure and initiate solutions to the social and educational problems of 
the tribe. By the late 1970s, the Mississippi Choctaw succeeded in attracting business to 
the reservation and establishing reservation businesses. From 1978, the Mississippi 
Choctaw had “entered an era o f unprecedented economic growth” and by the twenty-first 
century, “the Mississippi Choctaws have virtually eliminated unemployment on their 
lands and must turn to non-Indians by the thousands to work in Choctaw-owned factories, 
enterprises, schools, and government agencies.” 124 The increase o f  the Native American 
population in the 1970s was also a symbol o f  resurgence. C. Matthew Snipp stated that 
“it was in the 1970’s that the American Indian population experienced its most 
spectacular increase; the largest o f the 20th century captured in the 1980 census.” 123 It was 
the first time in nearly two centuries that the Native American population had reached 
one m illion.126 The Native American population in 1970 stood at 792,730 and by 1980 it 
had reached 1,366,676, an increase o f 72.4%. This was in comparison to only a rise o f 
11.4% in the total population o f  the United States.127 The increase o f the Native
123 R o n a l d  L . T r o s p e r ,  “ A m e r i c a n  I n d i a n  P o v e r t y  o n  R e s e r v a t i o n s ,  1 9 6 9 - 1 9 8 9 , ”  c h a p .  8  in  Changing 
Numbers, Changing Needs: American Indian Demography and Public Health, e d .  G a r y  D .  S a n d e f u r ,  
R o n a l d  R .  R i n d f u s s  a n d  B a r n e y  C o h e n  ( W a s h i n g t o n  D .C . :  N a t i o n a l  A c a d e m y  P r e s s ,  1 9 9 6 ) .
124 S t e p h e n  C o r n e l l ,  M i r i a m  J o r g e n s o n ,  J o s e p h  P . K a l t ,  a n d  K a t h e r i n e  A .  S p i l d e ,  “ S e i z i n g  t h e  F u t u r e :  W h y  
S o m e  N a t i v e  N a t i o n s  D o  a n d  O t h e r s  D o n ' t , ”  H a r v a r d  P r o j e c t  o n  A m e r i c a n  I n d i a n  E c o n o m i c  D e v e l o p m e n t  
J o i n t  O c c a s i o n a l  P a p e r s  o n  N a t i v e  A f f a i r s  2 0 0 5 - 0 1 ,  2 0 0 5 ,  1.
125 C .  M a t t h e w  S n i p p ,  “ P o p u l a t i o n  S i z e :  N a d i r  t o  2 0 0 0 ”  ( p a p e r  f o r  p u b l i c a t i o n  i n  t h e  H a n d b o o k  o f  N o r t h  
A m e r i c a n  I n d i a n s ,  S t a n f o r d  U n i v e r s i t y ,  n . d . ) ,  1 6 .
126 I b i d .
127 R u s s e l l  T h o r n t o n ,  American Indian Holocaust and Survival: A Population History since 1492 ( N o r m a n :  
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  O k l a h o m a  P r e s s ,  1 9 8 7 ) ,  1 6 0 .
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American population to over a million represented the symbol o f revival. This positive 
image o f  Native America continued throughout the 1980s to the twenty first century.
The re-affirmation o f  the government-to-govemment relationship between the United 
States and the tribes was one symbol that confirmed the positive image o f Native 
America. On January 24, 1983, President Ronald Reagan re-affirmed the govemment-to- 
government relationship and continued the policy o f tribal self-determination,
“This administration honours the commitment this nation made in 1970 and 1975 to 
strengthen tribal governments and lessen Federal control over tribal governmental affairs. 
This administration is determined to turn these goals into reality. Our policy is to reaffirm 
dealing with Indian tribes on a government-to-govemment basis and to pursue the policy 
o f self-government for Indian tribes without threatening termination.” 128
The re-affirmation o f the government-to-govemment relationship continued with 
President William J. Clinton in 1994, 1998 and 2000 and with President George W. Bush 
on September 23, 2004. In his statement, President Bush Jr. and his administration 
supported tribal self-determination and tribal sovereignty and said, “My Administration is 
committed to continuing to work with federally recognized tribal governments on a 
govemment-to-government basis and strongly supports and respects tribal sovereignty 
and self-determination for tribal governments in the United States.” 1*"9 This re-affirmation 
o f federal government policy strengthened the positive image o f Native America. Writing 
in the 1980s, Stephen Cornell believed that tribal power and control had grown, “For the
128 R o n a l d  R e a g a n ,  “ S t a t e m e n t  o n  I n d i a n  P o l i c y ,  J a n u a r y  2 4 ,  1 9 8 3 , ”  T h e  R o n a l d  R e a g a n  P r e s i d e n t i a l  
L i b r a r y ,  h t t p : / / w w w . r e a g a n . u t e x a s . e d u / a r c h i v e s / s p e e c h e s / 1 9 8 3 / 1 2 4 8 3 b . h t m  ( a c c e s s e d  1 5  S e p t e m b e r ,
2 0 0 5 ) .
129 G e o r g e  W .  B u s h ,  J r . ,  “ M e m o r a n d u m  f o r  t h e  H e a d s  o f  E x e c u t i v e  D e p a r t m e n t s  a n d  A g e n c i e s ,  
G o v e r n m e n t - t o - G o v e r n m e n t  R e l a t i o n s h i p  w i th  T r i b a l  G o v e r n m e n t s , ’ T h e  W h i t e  H o u s e ,  
h t t p : / / w w w . w h i t e h o u s e . g o v / n e w s / r e l e a s e s / 2 0 0 4 / 0 9 / 2 0 0 4 0 9 2 3 - 4 . h t m l  ( a c c e s s e d  2 1  M a y ,  2 0 0 6 ) .
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first time, tribes today wield considerable control over development decisions and have 
used that power to launch a variety o f development strategies o f  their own. In other 
words, their effective power -  on the reservations and o ff -  has grown.” Furthermore, 
Cornell added that this sense o f strength was the product “ . . .o f  court decisions in favour 
o f tribal control” and “'new federal policies o f self-determination: a genuine turn to 
bilateral relations” 1 j0
The positive image o f Native America was facilitated by an increase in the number o f 
reservation-based economies and an increase in tribal income from the 1980s to the 
twenty-first century. One example included the Salish & Kootenai Tribes. The re­
generation o f  the reservation began during the 1980s and by the 1990s the Flathead 
reservation profited from a “thick private sector economy” in which the tribes owned 
many reservation industries.1 jl From the 1980s many tribes with natural resources also 
opened up their lands for exploitation.lj2 During the 1990s some reservations 
successfully established tribal enterprises and others attracted multi-national 
corporations. Enterprises owned by the Chickasaw Nation included petrol stations, bingo 
facilities and numerous shops as well as “motor fuel truck plazas” and a chemical 
finishing plant. All o f the enterprises contributed $3 million per month to tribal 
governm ent.133 The economic success o f the Winnebago Ho-Chunk Inc. tribal enterprise
130 C o r n e l l ,  The Return o f the Native, 2 0 5 .
131 C o r n e l l ,  J o r g e n s e n ,  K a l t ,  a n d  S p i l d e ,  “ S e i z i n g  T h e  F u t u r e , ”  2 .
132 J a m e s  S .  O l s o n  a n d  R a y m o n d  W i l s o n ,  Native Americans: In the Twentieth Century ( U r b a n a  a n d  
C h i c a g o :  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  I l l i n o i s  P r e s s ,  1 9 8 4 ) ,  1 8 1 .
133 M i k e  M c B r i d e  111, “ Y o u r  P l a c e  o r  M i n e ?  C o m m e r c i a l  T r a n s a c t i o n s  b e t w e e n  I n d i a n  T r i b e s  a n d  N o n -  
I n d i a n s  in  O k l a h o m a  -  N e w  R u l e s  f o r  T r i b a l  S o v e r e i g n  I m m u n i t y , ”  Oklahoma Bar Journal 6 7  ( 1 9 9 6 ) :  
3 1 8 3 - 3 2 5 6 .
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cut tribal unemployment from 70% to 13% in six years.Ij4 This positive image o f the 
1980s and 1990s, Hurtado and Iverson noted, “ ...demonstrated conclusively that in many 
ways a new century could be faced with optimism.” 133 The positive image o f  tribal 
economic success continued into the twenty-first century.Ij6 A 2005 Bureau o f the 
Census publication, “Preliminary Estimates o f  Business Ownership by Gender, Hispanic 
or Latino Origin, and Race: 2002,” highlighted the success o f tribal businesses and their 
profits from 1997 to 2002.Ij7 The publication established that from 1997 to 2002 the 
number o f  Native American businesses operating in the United States increased from 
197,300 in 1997 to 206,125 in 2002. Although the revenues, indicated by total sales and 
receipts, o f  Native American businesses decreased from $34,344 billion in 1997 to 
$26,396 billion in 2002, the Bureau publication held that the decrease in revenue was 
based on an aberration.lj8 In a 2006 Bureau o f  the Census publication, “American Indian- 
and Alaska Native-Owned Firms: 2002,” the estimates for Native American business 
revenues were updated. The revised figures for 2002 showed there were 201,387 
businesses that generated $26,873 billion.1 j9 Although these figures demonstrated the 
success o f  tribal entrepreneurship and tribal economies, these figures must be considered 
in light o f  the numbers o f  tribes in the United States, the numbers o f tribes that generate
134 K a l t  a n d  S i n g e r ,  “ M y t h s  a n d  R e a l i t i e s  o f  T r i b a l  S o v e r e i g n t y , ”  2 .
135 A l b e r t  L .  H u r t a d o  a n d  P e t e r  I v e r s o n ,  “ C o n t i n u i n g  C h a l l e n g e s ,  C o n t i n u i n g  P e o p l e s ,  1 9 8 1 - 1 9 9 9 , ”  c h a p .  
15 in  Major Problems in American Indian History. 2 d  e d . ,  e d .  A l b e r t  L .  H u r t a d o  a n d  P e t e r  I v e r s o n  ( B o s t o n :  
H o u g h t o n  M i f f l i n  C o m p a n y ,  2 0 0 1 ) ,  4 8 6 .
136 S t e p h e n  C o r n e l l  a n d  J o s e p h  P . K a l t ,  “ S o v e r e i g n t y  a n d  N a t i o n - B u i l d i n g :  T h e  D e v e l o p m e n t  C h a l l e n g e  in  
I n d i a n  C o u n t r y  T o d a y , ”  American Indian Culture and Research Journal 2 2  ( 1 9 9 8 ) :  1 8 8 .
137 B u r e a u  o f  t h e  C e n s u s ,  Preliminary Estimates o f Business Ownership by Gender, Hispanic or Latino 
Origin, and Race: 2002, p r e p a r e d  b y  C o m p a n y  S t a t i s t i c s  D i v i s i o n  in  c o o p e r a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  E c o n o m i c  
C e n s u s  B r a n c h ,  B u r e a u  o f  t h e  C e n s u s  ( W a s h i n g t o n  D .C . ,  2 0 0 5 ) .
138 I b i d .  T h e  r e p o r t  e s t i m a t e d  t h a t  b y  2 0 0 8  N a t i v e  A m e r i c a  w i l l  c o n t r o l  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  $ 6 3  b i l l i o n  o f  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  e c o n o m y .
139 B u r e a u  o f  t h e  C e n s u s ,  American Indian- and Alaska Native-Owned Firms: 2002, 2002 Economic 
Census, Survey o f Business Owners, Company Statistics Series, p r e p a r e d  b y  t h e  C o m p a n y  S t a t i s t i c s  
D i v i s i o n  in  c o o p e r a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  E c o n o m i c  C e n s u s  B r a n c h ,  B u r e a u  o f  t h e  C e n s u s  ( W a s h i n g t o n  D .C . ,
2 0 0 6 ) ,  1 .
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revenue from gaming and the small number o f tribes that alone raise billions, such as the 
Pequot. Furthermore, these profits have been dramatically cut by Supreme Court case 
law. Without the exclusive right to tax non-member businesses inside the reservation or 
the right to tax non-member businesses on non-member lands, the tribes have lost 
substantial profits since the 1980s.
This brief analysis o f Native American resurgence clearly shows that it began in the 
1970s and has continued to the present day. The writings on Native American history 
from the 1970s to 2005 overemphasise and generally concentrate on this process o f 
resurgence and positive image o f Native America without a full consideration o f Supreme 
Court case law and its impact on Native America from the 1970s.
Although Custer Died fo r  Your Sins by Vine Deloria was a 1969 publication, it 
symbolised the need and hope for Native American resurgence.140 Writing within the 
federal policy era o f termination, Deloria wanted Congress to change direction and once 
again acknowledge the autonomy o f  Native American tribes, “We need a new policy by 
Congress acknowledging our right to live in peace, free from arbitrary harassment... What 
we need is a cultural leave-us-alone agreement, in spirit and in fact.” 141 Having discussed 
the activities and successes o f the Red Power Movement, Deloria still saw the poverty 
levels in Native America but hoped for a revival in fortunes and believed that it would 
happen soon, stating that “At present the visible poverty o f  Indian tribes veils the great 
potential o f the Indian people from modern society. But in many ways the veil is lifting
140 D e l o r i a ,  J r . ,  Custer Died fo r  Your Sins.
141 I b i d . ,  2 7 .
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and brighter future is being seen. Night is giving way to day. The Indian will soon stand 
tall and strong once more.” 14- Deloria viewed the latter part o f the 1960s as a period o f 
hope for Native America, which changed into an actual revival o f Native American rights 
during the 1970s.
Writings on Native American history from the 1970s portrayed the resurgence o f Native 
America and failed to assess the impact and effects o f modern-era case law. Wilcomb 
Washburn in The Indian in America presented the 1970s and particularly Wounded Knee 
o f 1973 as the symbol o f  Native American resurgence, pointing out that they “symbolised 
the emergence o f a new and raucous Indian voice, a voice which celebrated separatism 
instead o f integration, political activism instead o f dignified acquiescence, repudiation o f 
white goals and values, and rejection o f existing tribal organisations.” 141 The events at 
Wounded Knee in 1973 involved the occupation o f Wounded Knee on the Pine Ridge 
Reservation by members o f the American Indian Movement (AIM) and many Lakota 
people. In an attempt to deal with the national crisis, the United States government sent in 
the army, the U.S. Marshalls and the FBI. However, these tactics led to a standoff 
between the groups for over seventy days. Another 1970s publication, The White Man's 
Indian: Images o f the American Indian from Columbus to the Present by Robert 
Berkhofer, took a different viewpoint. Rather than looking at Native American activism 
as the source o f hope and a new voice, Berkhofer considered federal policy from the late 
1960s and early 1970s as a catalyst for the revival o f Native American rights,
“  I b i d . ,  2 4 1 - 2 4 2 .
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‘"...[from] the Great society o f Lyndon B. Johnson and the New Federalism o f  Richard 
M. Nixon, Indian self-determination and political autonomy advanced. If Native 
Americans did not achieve as much home rule and freedom as their leaders sought under 
the slogan o f  tribal sovereignty, they escaped from the highly subordinated status o f the 
classic reservation to gain official governm ents...A lthough Native American factionalism 
continued, all sides o f  the political spectrum gained some voice, if  not their will, in policy 
making.” 144
The idea o f a new Native American voice within the American political system was an 
important concept to Berkhofer and Washburn. However, these writings as well as others 
from the 1970s did not address or consider the effect o f the nine Supreme Court cases 
examined by this thesis in Chapters 2 and 3 .145
The writings on Native American history o f  the 1980s generally portrayed the 1970s and 
beyond as a time o f Native American resurgence, without addressing the erosion o f  tribal 
sovereignty being undertaken by the United States Supreme Court.146 Despite more 
coverage and consideration o f Supreme Court case law, it was secondary to the revival o f  
Native American rights. Vine Deloria and Clifford M. Lytle portrayed the late 1960s and 
early 1970s as a time where Native American rights developed, arguing that “ ...the late
144 R o b e r t  F .  B e r k h o f e r ,  J r . ,  The White M an’s Indian: Images o f  the American Indian from Columbus to the 
P r e s e n t  ( N e w  Y o r k :  V i n t a g e  B o o k s ,  1 9 7 9 ) ,  1 9 0 .
143 S e e  a l s o ,  A n g i e  D e b o ,  A History o f the Indians o f the United States ( N o r m a n :  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  O k l a h o m a  
P r e s s ,  1 9 7 0 ) ;  a n d  W i l l i a m  T .  H a g a n ,  American Indians, r e v .  e d .  ( C h i c a g o :  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  C h i c a g o  P r e s s ,  
1 9 7 9 ) .  T h e  n i n e  l a w  c a s e s  i n c l u d e d ,  Kennedy  v . District Court o f Montana, 4 0 0  U .S .  4 2 3  ( 1 9 7 1 ) ;  
McClanahan v . Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 4 1 1  U .S .  1 6 4  ( 1 9 7 3 ) ;  Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 4 1 1  
U .S .  1 4 5  ( 1 9 7 3 ) ;  Tonasket v. Washington, 4 1 1  U .S .  4 5 1  ( 1 9 7 3 ) ;  Kahn v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 
4 1 1  U .S .  9 4 1  ( 1 9 7 3 ) ;  United States v. Mazurie, 4 1 9  U .S .  5 4 4  ( 1 9 7 5 ) ;  Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 4 2 5  
U .S .  4 6 3  ( 1 9 7 6 ) ;  Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe; a n d  United States v. Wheeler, 4 3 5  U .S .  3 1 3  ( 1 9 7 8 ) .
146 A r r e l l  M o r g a n  G i b s o n ,  The American Indian: Prehistory to Present ( L e x i n g t o n ,  M a s s a c h u s e t t s :  D .C .  
H e a t h  a n d  C o m p a n y ,  1 9 8 0 ) ;  R o g e r  L . N i c h o l s ,  The American Indian Past and Present, 2 d .  e d .  ( N e w  Y o r k :  
J o h n  W i l e y  &  S o n s ,  1 9 8 1 ) ;  D e l o r i a ,  J r . ,  a n d  L y t l e ,  The Nations W i t h i n ;  O l s o n  a n d  W i l s o n ,  Native 
Americans in the Twentieth Centwy; V i n e  D e l o r i a ,  J r . ,  e d . ,  American Indian Policy in the Twentieth 
Century ( N o r m a n :  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  O k l a h o m a  P r e s s ,  1 9 8 5 ) ;  V i n e  D e l o r i a ,  J r . ,  Behind the Trail o f Broken 
Treaties: An Indian Declaration o f Independence ( A u s t i n :  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  T e x a s  P r e s s ,  1 9 8 5 ) ;  P h i l i p  W e e k s ,  
e d . ,  The American Indian Experience A Profde: 1524 to the Present ( W h e e l i n g ,  I l l i n o i s :  F o r u m  P r e s s ,  I n c . ,  
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sixties and early seventies will always be remembered for the great expansion o f  tribal 
activism under the new policy o f self-determination.” 147 The gains and progress made by 
Native America were significant but as Deloria and Lytle suggested, it was made at a 
cost. They viewed this time period as a success for Native America but cautioned that it 
forced Native America to come into the mainstream o f American society; “ When the dust 
finally clears away and people evaluate the most recent period o f Indian history, they will 
realise that the progress o f the sixties and seventies was purchased at an enormous 
price...Indians had to pose as another American domestic racial minority.” 148 Deloria and 
Lytle believed that Native America was viewed by America as one combined race o f 
people fighting for rights within the American political system. James S. Olson and 
Raymond Wilson supported the opinion that the activism o f the 1960s and 1970s allowed 
the revival o f  Native American rights and the assertion o f  tribal control over reservation 
matters. They pointed out that “Native American leaders in the 1970s were determined to 
gain control over the medical, educational, and economic programs affecting them, as 
well as restoring tribal government to some semblance o f  real power.” 149 Based on this 
increased amount o f tribal power over numerous tribal programs they concluded that the 
“overwhelming and most visible development in Native American affairs in the 1970s 
has been the resurgence o f Native American tribalism.” 150 The theme o f Stephen 
Cornell’s book, The Return o f  the Native: American Indian Political Resurgence, 
revolved specifically around his interpretation about the undoubted resurgence o f  Native 
America in the 1970s, particularly after Wounded Knee o f 1973. This was similar to the
147 D e l o r i a ,  J r . ,  a n d  L y t l e ,  The Nations Within, 2 1 5 .
148 I b i d ,  2 1 6 .
149 O l s o n  a n d  W i l s o n ,  Native Americans in the Twentieth Century, 1 6 2 .
150 I b i d ,  2 0 6 .
interpretation made by Wilcomb Washburn in the 1970s. Cornell argued that Wounded 
Knee o f  1890 brought the era o f Native American military resistance against the United 
States military to a close, however, Wounded Knee o f 1973 began a new era o f  Native 
American rights. Cornell presented Wounded Knee as a significant factor in the 
development o f Native American political rights in the American system, pointing out 
that “The activists o f 1973 provided the most sensational evidence yet o f the return o f  
Native Americans to the political arena, o f their defiant claim to the right once again to 
make their own choices.” 131 In Cornell’s opinion, Native American activism forced the 
federal government to respect the demands o f the tribes and their members and to 
recognise tribal power. He explained that during the 1970s Native America “had returned 
to the political arena with unexpected, often defiant force, and in the process had reversed 
the four-hundred-year trend o f  declining Indian influence and power.” 132 His 
interpretation about the 1970s as a time o f renewal was steadfast, commenting that the 
“ ...the Indian is back. He lay in wait, biding his time, but now he’s back, knocking at the 
door not only o f the White House, but o f Congress, the courts, and the American 
public.” 133 Furthermore, Cornell believed that Native Americans gained more authority 
and control over decision making in the reservation as a direct result o f Congress and the 
Supreme Court, “For the first time, tribes today wield considerable control over 
development decisions...their effective power-on the reservations and off -  has grown. 
While much o f this is the result o f  court decisions in favour o f  tribal control, it also 
reflects new federal policies o f Self-Determination...” 134 Clearly, this opinion did not
151 C o r n e l l ,  The Return o f the Native, 4 .
152 iu-j CI b i d ,  6 .
153 I b i d ,  1 8 7 .
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take account of the devastation caused by modern-day Supreme Court case law on the 
powers o f the tribes, which he believed had been strengthened by Congress and the 
Supreme Court.
The Native American history writings o f the 1990s and the twenty-first century continued 
to overemphasise the renaissance o f Native America from the 1970s.133 In addition, these 
books quickly addressed Supreme Court case law and its erosion o f  tribal sovereignty, 
but unfortunately, it was once again secondary to the positive image and political strength 
o f Native America. In Indians in American History: An Introduction, Charles F. 
Wilkinson portrayed the 1970s as the beginning o f the Native American revival with the 
following decades characterised by the strengthening o f tribal sovereignty and tribal 
rights. The 1970s and beyond were in W ilkinson’s opinion one o f  continued political 
success and progress, “Rather than riding off into the sunset, Native Americans have dug 
in, insisted on choosing a measured separatism over assimilation, and have continued to 
press for their very existence as a discrete race. They, not white society, have dictated 
their place in constitutional law and history.” 136 Central to Wilkinson’s interpretation was 
the idea that resurgence was a choice taken by Native Americans. However, this idea 
disguises the fact that the Supreme Court fundamentally eroded key attributes o f  tribal
153 A l b e r t  L .  H u r t a d o  a n d  P e t e r  I v e r s o n ,  e d . ,  Major Problems in American Indian History ( L e x i n g t o n ,  
M a s s a c h u s e t t s :  D .C .  H e a t h  a n d  C o m p a n y ,  1 9 9 4 ) ;  L a u r e n c e  M . H a u p t m a n ,  Tribes and Tribulations: 
Misconceptions about American Indians and Their Histories ( A l b u q u e r q u e :  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  N e w  M e x i c o
P r e s s ,  1 9 9 5 ) ;  P h i l i p  W e a r n e ,  Return of the Indian: Conquest and Revival in the Americas ( L o n d o n :  C a s s e l l ,
1 9 9 6 ) ;  F r e d e r i c k  E . H o x i e  a n d  P e t e r  I v e r s o n ,  e d ,  Indians in American History: An Introduction, 2 d  e d .  
( W h e e l i n g ,  I l l i n o i s :  H a r l a n  D a v i d s o n ,  I n c . ,  1 9 9 8 ) ;  J a m e s  J .  L o p a c h ,  M a r g e r y  H u n t e r  B r o w n ,  a n d  R i c h m o n d  
L . C l o w ,  Tribal Government Today: Politics on Montana Indian Reservations, r e v .  e d .  ( C o l o r a d o :  
U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s  o f  C o l o r a d o ,  1 9 9 8 ) ;  T r o y  R .  J o h n s o n ,  e d . ,  Contemporary Native American Political Issues 
( W a l n u t  C r e e k ,  C a l i f o r n i a :  A l t a M i r a  P r e s s ,  1 9 9 9 ) ;  a n d  S t e r l i n g  E v a n s ,  e d . ,  American Indians in American 
History, 1870-200/: A Companion Reader ( W e s t p o r t ,  C o n n e c t i c u t :  P r a e g e r ,  2 0 0 1 ) .
156 C h a r l e s  F . W i l k i n s o n ,  “ I n d i a n  T r i b e s  a n d  t h e  A m e r i c a n  C o n s t i t u t i o n , ”  c h a p  5  in  Indians in American 
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power over which they had no choices. In contrast to Wilkinson, John R. Wunder 
believed that the resurgence o f Native America in the 1970s benefited from the influence 
o f domestic and international events on the political environment o f the United States. As 
Wunder explained, “out o f this political atmosphere [Vietnam and Watergate] emerged 
programs and laws o f great benefit to Native Americans. Modern tribalism was bom, and 
its emergence came as a result o f the strong presidential power and support that Richard 
Nixon devoted to it.” 137 Although Watergate would end the Nixon presidency, Wunder 
interpreted the actions o f Nixon as essential to the progression o f Native American rights. 
Indeed, Wunder described the 1970s as imperative to the changes that took place in 
Native America, pointing out that “Significant legal transformations o f Native American 
rights came in the 1970s, a period o f  change that rivalled the Indian New Deal.” 158 
Moreover, this publication briefly focused on the movement o f the Supreme Court to 
contain and limit tribal sovereignty during the 1980s and 1990s; however, the actions o f 
the court were not considered to be o f immediate concern. Wunder argued that the 
character o f the Supreme Court Justices in the 1980s limited the gains made by the tribes 
during the 1970s, “Native American rights, freshly won, soon were in retreat, caused by a 
new proacculturation majority on the Supreme Court” 139 and consequently the 
“protection o f Indian rights in the 1970s quickly came to a halt.” 160 After the 1970s, 
Wunder commented that “the masked angels [were] visible,” 161 however they had not 
greatly affected the change in outlook o f the Supreme Court. In “We Are Still Here,” 
Peter Iverson discussed the 1970s as a time o f  Native American political renaissance and
137 W u n d e r ,  "Retained By the People , ”  1 4 9 .
158 I b id .
159 I b i d . ,  1 7 7 .
160 I b i d . ,  1 7 9 .
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briefly outlined the limits imposed on tribal rights by the Supreme Court. Iverson 
explained that the power gained by Native America during the 1970s continued to 
prosper into the 1990s, “Just as the events, rulings, and decisions o f the era helped 
underline for all Americans that Indians were a force to contend with, the voices o f  and 
imaginations o f  Native writers, musicians, artists, and historians attested to that 
continuing presence.” 16~ Despite the progression o f tribal power, Iverson observed that 
the Supreme Court had begun to limit the development o f tribal power. The citation o f 
two Supreme Court cases, namely McClanahan and Oliphant, was an acknowledgement 
that “ ...the  Supreme Court began to delineate some o f the possibilities and limits o f 
contemporary sovereignty.” 16j This interpretation o f Supreme Court case law was not 
based on one, which considered the actions o f the Supreme Court to have dramatically 
eroded the powers o f the tribes and tribal sovereignty. Joanne Nagel, in American Indian 
Ethnic Renewal: Red Power and the Resurgence o f Identity and Culture, strongly 
supported the idea o f  the 1970s as a time that transformed the fortunes o f Native 
America. In particular, Nagel believed that the Red Power movement was instrumental to 
the renewal o f Native American rights and the transformation o f American governmental 
policy. As Nagel explained, the Red Power Movement was the “catalyst that sparked 
American Indian ethnic renew al...and prompted a surge in Indian self-identification, 
promoted a native cultural renaissance, and ultimately prompted a reversal o f  federal
162 P e t e r  I v e r s o n ,  “We Are Still H ere”  American Indians in the Twentieth Century ( W h e e l i n g  I l l i n o i s :  
H a r l a n  D a v i d s o n ,  I n c ,  1 9 9 8 ) ,  1 7 1 .
163 I b i d . ,  1 7 0 .
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Indian policy.”164 However, this analysis did not discuss Supreme Court case law or its 
effect on Native America.
The positive image and revival of Native America from the 1970s was present in a 2004 
publication by Joseph P. Kalt and Joseph William Singer and a 2005 publication by 
Charles Wilkinson. A Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development 
publication examined the question of tribal self-rule and tribal sovereignty, the success of 
tribal economies and briefly examined Supreme Court case law that affected tribal 
authority over non-members in the reservation.163 Kalt and Singer briefly discussed the 
erosion of tribal sovereignty by the Supreme Court from 1978 to examine the statement, 
“Tribes aren’t really nations; they 're more like clubs f  This erosion, Kalt and Singer 
argued, was based on principles inconsistent with federal policy and the suspicions of the 
Supreme Court regarding tribal authority over non-members. Despite analysis of these 
negative factors, the abstract and conclusion of the publication provided an over 
celebratory stance of Native America from the 1970s to the present day,
“The last three decades have witnessed a remarkable resurgence of the Indian nations in 
the United States. After centuries of turmoil, oppression, attempted subjugation, and 
economic deprivation, the Indian nations have asserted their rights and identities, have 
built and rebuilt political systems in order to implement self-rule, and have begun to 
overcome what once seemed to be insurmountable problems of poverty and social 
disarray. The foundation of this resurgence has been the exercise of self-government by 
the more than 560 federally recognized tribes in the U.S.”166
164 Joanne Nagel, American Indian Ethnic Renewal: Red Power and the Resurgence o f Identity and Culture 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 13.
165 Kalt and Singer, “ Myths and Realities of Tribal Sovereignty.”
166 Ibid., 1.
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This process of over-emphasis was also present in Blood Struggle: The Rise o f Modern 
Indian Nations'67 where the 1970s and beyond was portrayed as a time of Native 
American renewal. As Wilkinson explained, “By the Mid-1970s, therefore, tribal action 
on many different fronts had fundamentally reshaped the circumstances that held sway 
just a generation before.”168 For Wilkinson the 1970s were generally a time where tribes 
successfully asserted their rights as governments. He noted that “...the tribes had 
established the continuing validity of their treaties and their standing as governments. 
They also had earned the right to be heard and knew how to make the most of it”169 This 
positive image of Native America was used by Wilkinson to discuss and analyse 
Supreme Court case law, which he considered to be supportive of the tribes up to the mid 
to late 1970s. This gave an impression that the Supreme Court continuously protected 
tribal rights and all was fine within the workings of the court. Wilkinson pointed out that,
“Administrations heard out tribal views and regularly responded favourably to them. 
Judges, pulled into the highly specialised area of the law counterintuitive to most 
Americans (including the judges themselves), took the trouble to plumb the historical 
roots and true meanings of treaties and other laws that at first blush seemed to contradict
• 170American notions of equality.”
Furthermore, Wilkinson stated that the actions of the Supreme Court up until the late 
1980s were positive for tribal rights and Native America in general. This positive image 
subsumed the interpretation of Wilkinson when he said, “From the late 1950s through to 
the late 1980s, however, the tribes prevailed in the Supreme Court decisions numerically
167 Charles Wilkinson, Blood Struggle: The Rise o f Modern Indian Nations (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2005).
168 Ibid., 205.
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as in most of the highest-stakes cases.”171 However, as this thesis has discussed, Supreme 
Court case law from the 1950s to the 1980s fundamentally eroded tribal powers inside 
each and every reservation. Therefore, the Wilkinson analysis disguises the limitations 
placed on the key attributes of tribal power up to the late 1980s. The positive image of 
tribal sovereignty continued after the 1980s. Wilkinson stated that the Supreme Court 
case law might have changed direction, noting that the Supreme Court adopted a “new 
approach [which] may fundamentally change Indian law, or it may be an isolated 
aberration. Time will tell.”172 As this thesis has detailed, the Supreme Court 
fundamentally changed Indian law.
In contrast to the writings on Native American history, this thesis balances the resurgence 
of Native America and the positive image of Native Americans from the 1970s to the 
twenty-first century with an in-depth analysis of Supreme Court case law and shows that 
the Supreme Court Justices severely limited the key attributes of tribal power. 
Furthermore, in contrast to the writings on Native American history, this thesis argues 
that during the 1960s and early 1970s, the Supreme Court established the foundations of 
the silent revolution and after 1973, the silent revolution commenced, eroding the key 
attributes of tribal power over non-members in the reservation and at the same time, 
allowing state law to exist inside the reservation. These writings do not fully consider the 
impact of the movement of the court away from the sovereignty doctrine, which 
traditionally protected the reservations from state law and generally sanctioned exclusive 
tribal law over non-members in the reservation. Therefore, from Williams v. Lee (1959)
171 Ibid., 251-252.
172 Ibid., 257.
282
the Supreme Court gradually turned away from tribal sovereignty in favour o f 
congressional power to protect the tribes from state authority inside the reservation and to 
allow the tribes to have authority over non-members. The idea o f congressional power 
was mooted in Williams and was used by the Supreme Court in Kake v. Egan (1962), 
Metlakatla Indians v. Egan, Warren Trading Post v. Tax Commission (1965) and 
Kennerly v. District Court o f Montana (1971). In 1973, the Supreme Court used 
congressional power as a bona fide principle in the sister taxation cases o f McClanahan 
v. Arizona State Tax Comm n (1973) and Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones (1973).173
Supreme Court case law from the 1960s and 1970s weakened the resurgence o f Native 
America. From the outset, gains made by the protests o f the 1960s were undermined by 
the principles used by the Supreme Court. The National Indian Youth Council (NIYC) 
was established in 1961 and sponsored demonstrations and “fish-ins” to protest against 
the abolition o f  treaty fishing rights. During the Red Power movement and the fish-ins o f 
the 1960s the Supreme Court decided Kake Village v. Egan, Metlakatla Indians v. Egan 
and Warren Trading Post. The principle o f the court undermined tribal sovereignty as a 
means to protect the tribe and tribal lands from state law. The court moved away from 
tribal sovereignty to the principle that state law applied in the reservations unless it was 
explicitly prohibited by congressional legislation. Despite the success o f protests, such as 
Mount Rushmore in 1970 and the Trail of Broken Treaties in 1972, and the public gains 
made by Native America during the 1970s, the Supreme Court undermined these gains. 
Native American history scholars considered the 1970s and Wounded Knee in 1973 to be
173 Kake Village v . Egan, 3 6 9  U .S .  6 0  ( 1 9 6 2 ) ;  Metlakatla Indians v. Egan, 3 6 9  U .S .  4 5  ( 1 9 6 2 ) ;  Warren 
Trading Post v. Tax Com m’n, 3 8 0  U .S .  6 8 5  ( 1 9 6 5 ) ;  Kennerly v. District Court o f Montana ( 1 9 7 1 ) ;  
McClanahan v . Arizona State Tax Comm ’n ( 1 9 7 3 ) ;  a n d  Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones ( 1 9 7 3 ) .
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a watershed period that marked the rebirth o f Native America and tribal sovereignty. 
However, as this thesis has argued, 1973 also represented the beginning o f the silent 
revolution o f the United States Supreme Court. The public perception o f  tribal 
sovereignty was one o f strength, constantly being reinforced by Native American 
activism and Congress. This public resurgence o f tribal sovereignty pointed towards the 
re-affirmation o f  Native American rights in the Supreme Court. However, in the corridors 
o f the Supreme Court, tribal sovereignty was only strong enough to protect tribal 
members inside the reservation. Tribes required congressional authorisation to exercise 
authority over non-members in the reservation. Furthermore, state law was allowed into 
the reservation and could be used over non-members until Congress acted to prohibit 
state authority. The cases o f the 1970s included United States v. Mazurie (1975), Moe v. 
Salish & Kootenai Tribes (1976) and Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe (1978). From 
this point onwards, the protections o f the law over the tribes were undermined. As 
Chapters 2 and 3 o f this thesis have discussed, this period, from the 1970s turned the 
protection o f the sovereignty doctrine and a hundred and fifty years o f  legal precedent on 
its head.
Writings on the Law 
Books
In general, the legal books give detailed and useful accounts o f Supreme Court case law 
and the effects o f  the case law on the law itself. Many books view the movement o f  the
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court away from the sovereignty doctrine as an aberration in principle, some portray the 
actions o f the court in a positive way designed to protect the tribes while others examine 
the idea o f racism as a principle used by the Supreme Court over time to divest tribal 
sovereignty. However, the books do not view the erosion o f tribal sovereignty by the 
Supreme Court as a process begun in 1959 and continuing through to 2001. In addition, 
they fail to assess the practical effect o f the case law on tribal authority within the
174reservations.
Case law books normally give detailed accounts o f the case law and the effects o f the 
case law on the law itself. These are useful tools for lawyers and students o f  the law. The 
seminal book in this area o f the law is Felix S. Cohen’s Handbook o f Federal Indian 
Law .l7:) Cohen examined the effect o f treaties, Supreme Court case law, federal statutes 
and United States governmental policy on the tribes up to 1941. Therefore this 
voluminous study outlined the powers removed from the tribes and highlighted the 
powers which remained with the tribes. This work in essence codified the position o f 
Native America within the legal system o f the United States o f America. This work has 
been amended and updated a number o f  times to take account o f tribal authority, federal 
legislation and Supreme Court case law since the 1940s. A number o f  other books offer a
174 S i d n e y  L . H a r r i n g ,  Crow D og’s Case: American Indian Sovereignty, Tribal Law, and United States Law 
in the Nineteenth Centioy  ( N e w  Y o r k :  C a m b r i d g e  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 9 4 ) .  H a r r i n g  e x a m i n e d  t h e  w a y  in  
w h i c h  f e d e r a l  l a w  o v e r  N a t i v e  A m e r i c a  w a s  d e f i n e d  b y  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  d u r i n g  t h e  n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  
a n d  h o w  t r i b a l  c u l t u r e  a n d  t r i b a l  l a w  a l s o  h e l p e d  d e f i n e  t h i s  a r e n a .  A s  a  c o n s e q u e n c e  t h e r e  w a s  l i t t l e  o n  t h e  
m o d e r n  e r a  e x c e p t  f o r  a  b r i e f  c i t a t i o n  o f  Williams a n d  Oliphant w h i c h  h i g h l i g h t e d  t h e  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  in  t h e  
l a w .  D a v i d  E . W i l k i n s  a n d  K . T s i a n i n a  L o m a w a i m a ,  Uneven Ground: American Indian Sovereignty and 
Federal Law ( N o r m a n :  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  O k l a h o m a  P r e s s ,  2 0 0 1 ) .  W i l k i n s  a n d  L o m a w a i m a  l o o k  a t  d o c t r i n e s  
a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  r a t h e r  t h a n  a t  a r e a s  o f  l a w  a n d  c a s e  l a w .  T h e  d o c t r i n e s  
e x a m i n e d  i n c l u d e d ,  t h e  d o c t r i n e  o f  d i s c o v e r y ,  t h e  t r u s t  d o c t r i n e ,  t h e  d o c t r i n e  o f  p l e n a r y  p o w e r ,  t h e  d o c t r i n e  
o f  r e s e r v e d  r i g h t s ,  t h e  d o c t r i n e  o f  i m p l i e d  r e p e a l s ,  d i s c l a i m e r  c l a u s e s  a n d  s o v e r e i g n  i m m u n i t y .
175 F e l i x  S .  C o h e n ,  Handbook o f  Federal Indian Law ( W a s h i n g t o n ,  D .C . :  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  G o v e r n m e n t  
P r i n t i n g  O f f i c e ,  1 9 4 1 ) .
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contemporary insight into the opinions o f the Supreme Court and its effect on the 
precedents and the principles used in Federal Indian law. Writings on the law by Monroe 
E. Price,176 William C. Canby,177 Stephen L. Pevar178 and David H. Getches, Charles F. 
Wilkinson, and Robert A. Williams, Jr.,179 provide a good reference point for the 
determination o f contemporary tribal rights. The writings give detailed accounts o f 
Supreme Court case law and the effect o f the case law, federal legislation and treaties on 
the law as a whole. However, these general case law books do not assess the effect o f 
Supreme Court case law from 1959 to 2001 on the practical workings o f the tribe in the 
reservation and neither do they consider the movement o f the Supreme Court away from 
the sovereignty doctrine to have fundamentally eroded the key attributes o f  tribal power 
inside the reservation.
Other authors have interpreted Supreme Court case law in a positive manner designed to 
protect the tribes. Although this viewpoint considers some erosion o f tribal sovereignty it
does not consider the fundamental erosion o f the key attributes o f tribal power. Charles F.
180Wilkinson in American Indians, Time, and the Law is one author who generally 
viewed the actions and the case law o f  the Supreme Court from 1959 in a positive light. 
Although Wilkinson acknowledged that criticism o f the court in the modern era was 
“well founded,” he instead stated that “ ...on balance, I drew a somewhat different set o f
176 M o n r o e  E . P r i c e ,  Law and the American Indian: Readings, Notes, and Cases ( I n d i a n a p o l i s :  B o b b s -  
M e r r i l l ,  1 9 7 3 ) .
177 W i l l i a m  C .  C a n b y ,  J r . ,  American Indian Law: in a Nutshell ( S t .  P a u l ,  M i n n e s o t a :  W e s t  G r o u p ,  1 9 9 8 ) .
178 P e v a r ,  The Rights o f Indians and Tribes.
179 D a v i d  H . G e t c h e s ,  C h a r l e s  F .  W i l k i n s o n ,  a n d  R o b e r t  A .  W i l l i a m s ,  J r . ,  Federal Indian Law: Cases and 
Materials, 3 d  e d .  ( S t .  P a u l ,  M i n n e s o t a :  W e s t  P u b l i s h i n g  C o . ,  1 9 9 3 ) .
180 C h a r l e s  F . W i l k i n s o n ,  American Indians, Time, and the Law ( N e w  H a v e n :  Y a l e  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 8 7 ) ,  
4 .
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conclusions. These conclusions were based on a positive assessment o f Supreme 
Court opinions and an acknowledgment that the court had developed policies to protect 
the interests o f  the tribes, “Purely on the basis o f ordering a complex field o f law, the 
Court has made important strides; during this work o f more than two decades, the 
Justices have laid down a large number o f clearly stated rules that have resolved 
conceptual issues o f great significance to Indian law and policy.” 182 In conclusion, 
Wilkinson contended that the decisions o f the court from 1959 to 1986 “have been 
principled, even courageous.” 183 Another positive interpretation o f Supreme Court case 
law was found in American Indians, American Justice, where Vine Deloria, Jr., and 
Clifford M. Lytle briefly discussed the impact o f Supreme Court case law on tribal 
governments and tribal courts. Their deliberations in the area o f  taxation case law 
concluded that the Supreme Court was attempting to protect tribal authority. Rather than 
considering the movement o f the court to be one that was limiting tribal sovereignty, 
Deloria and Lytle believed that it was a harmless new trend towards using congressional 
authority. As they observed, the process o f the Supreme Court involved “a tightening o f 
the relationship between federal and state interests rather than an erosion o f tribal status. 
There has not been a hint that the movement has assumed catastrophic forms” 184 
However, as this thesis argues, the movement o f the Supreme Court towards 
congressional authority was deliberately used to fundamentally limit tribal sovereignty 
and support state law inside the reservation. In general, Deloria and Lytle believed that 
the court protected the tribes from state law; “The fact remains that the Supreme Court
181 I b i d . ,  4 .
182 I b i d .
183 I b i d .
184 V i n e  D e l o r i a ,  J r . ,  a n d  C l i f f o r d  M . L y t l e ,  American Indians, American Justice ( A u s t i n :  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  
T e x a s  P r e s s ,  1 9 8 3 ) ,  5 6 - 5 7 .
and the lower federal courts continue to offer tribal governments formidable protection 
against state intrusions into Indian country and there is every reason to believe that this 
disposition will continue into the immediate future.” 183 This positive image o f  the 
Supreme Court continued even when Deloria and Lytle acknowledged that the court had 
sometimes voted against the tribes. In general, they both held that the Supreme Court was 
in general, a friend o f Native America, “The pendulum has swung in a contrary manner 
on many an occasion but it has generally righted itself before too much damage has been 
done. On the whole, the Court has been a friend, not a foe, and the last bastion o f 
sympathetic understanding in the American political system available to the tribes.” 186 
Petra T. Shattuck and Jill Norgren also weighed up good and bad opinions o f  the 
Supreme Court to determine whether it was a supporter or an opponent o f  the tribes. 
Partial Justice: Federal Indian Law in a Liberal Constitutional System examined the use 
o f the law by Congress and the Supreme Court from the early nineteenth century to the 
1980s and its effect on Native America. Shattuck and Norgren explored whether “the law
187ought to be praised or cursed for what it has done to the Indian.” The work viewed the 
rulings o f the Supreme Court to be full of contradictions, which both protected the tribes 
and eroded tribal sovereignty. The actions o f the court were not considered to have 
severely limited tribal authority inside the reservations. During the modern era, Shattuck 
and Norgren pointed out that “The United States Supreme Court has encouraged a more 
positive climate for economic development and tribal revenue collection. 188 However, as 
this thesis has explained the effect o f Supreme Court case law has undermined and
185 I b i d . ,  5 7 .
186 I b i d .
187 P e t r a  T .  S h a t t u c k  a n d  J i l l  N o r g r e n ,  Partial Justice: Federal Indian Law in a Liberal Constitutional 
System ( P r o v i d e n c e ,  L o n d o n :  B e r g  P u b l i s h e r s ,  I n c . ,  1 9 9 3 ) ,  2 .
188 I b i d . ,  1 1 .
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limited tribal revenue raising powers inside the reservation. Overall, Shattuck and ► 
Norgren believed that the Supreme Court had taken a middle course, sometimes 
protecting the tribes and at other instances limiting tribal authority. They explained, 
“ ...the  legal treatment o f Native American tribes by the United States has resulted, at 
best, in partial justice” 18; and “...it is not surprising that Federal Indian law is both 
praised for its protection of Indian rights and resources and condemned for its failure to 
protect their land and autonomy.” 190 This interpretation o f Federal Indian law fed into 
their belief that the law was full o f contradictory precedent and principles. Despite these 
inconsistencies, the tribes had to use the law in an attempt to protect their sovereignty and 
their rights, which at times did not always work. As Shattuck and Norgren pointed out, 
“ Federal Indian law ought to be praised for inspiring the Indians’ faith in the law but 
cursed for betraying their believer.” 191 As with the case law books, these books did not 
interpret the workings o f  the Supreme Court to be based on a trend that undermined tribal 
sovereignty.
Other legal books have determined that the Supreme Court undermined the Indian 
sovereignty doctrine based on a random set o f principles and had created doctrinal 
uncertainty in Federal Indian law.192 David E. Wilkins in American Indian Sovereignty 
and the U.S. Supreme Court: The Masking o f Justice193 examined fifteen United States 
Supreme Court cases from 1823 to 1992 in considerable detail. This analysis contained
189 I b i d . ,  1 3 .
190 I b i d . ,  1 2 .
191 I b i d . ,  1 9 7 .
192 E r i n  H o g a n  F o u b e r g ,  Tribal Territory, Sovereignty, and Governance: A Study o f the Cheyenne River 
and Lake Traverse Indian Reservations ( N e w  Y o r k :  G a r l a n d  P u b l i s h i n g ,  I n c . ,  2 0 0 0 ) .
193 D a v i d  E .  W i l k i n s ,  American Indian Sovereignty and the U.S. Supreme Court: The Masking o f  Justice 
( A u s t i n :  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  T e x a s  P r e s s ,  1 9 9 7 ) .
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five cases from the modern-era o f Federal Indian law, including Oliphant. From this 
study, Wilkins made it clear that the Supreme Court had invented new principles to 
deliberately undermine the sovereignty doctrine, noting that the “justices o f the Supreme 
Court, both individually and collectively, have engaged in the manufacturing, redefining, 
and burying o f  “principles,” “doctrines,” and legal “tests” to excuse and legitimise 
constitutional, treaty, and civil rights violations o f tribal nations and, in some cases, o f 
individual Indians.” 194 Wilkins was damning in his assessment that individual justices 
and the institution o f the Supreme Court had buried principles and doctrines relating to 
Federal Indian law. Frank Pommersheim in Braid o f Feathers: American Indian Law and 
Contemporary Tribal Life examined the development o f tribal courts by various tribes 
within reservations. Although Pommersheim briefly examined the case law o f  the 
Supreme Court from 1959, he argued that the opinions o f the court were unprincipled, 
consisting o f “diverse strands,” 193 and an aberration to the traditionally used Indian 
sovereignty doctrine. Neither Wilkins nor Pommersheim considered the period from 
1959 to 2001 as one, which continuously limited the sovereignty doctrine.
Some legal books argue that the Supreme Court had undermined tribal sovereignty 
because o f the inherent racism o f the court towards Native America. Robert A. Williams, 
Jr., in Like A Loaded Weapon: The Rehnquist Court, Indian Rights, and the Legal History 
o f Racism in America, 196 explained how the decisions o f the Supreme Court over time 
relied on the idea o f racism to divest elements o f tribal authority. Williams recognised the
194 I b i d . ,  2 9 7 .
I9" F r a n k  P o m m e r s h e i m ,  Braid o f Feathers: American Indian Law and Contemporary 77 ihal Life 
( B e r k e l e y :  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  C a l i f o r n i a  P r e s s ,  1 9 9 5 ) ,  1 4 6 .
196 R o b e r t  A .  W i l l i a m s ,  J r . ,  Like a Loaded Weapon: The Rehnquist Court, Indian Rights, and the Legal 
History o f  Racism in America ( M i n n e a p o l i s :  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  M i n n e s o t a  P r e s s ,  2 0 0 5 ) .
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need to confront and change the racist attitude as well as the racist language employed by 
the court. As he pointed out, to challenge “the marginalisation o f Indian rights concerns 
in America today” there must be “first bringing to the fore and then confronting the racist 
judicial precedents and language o f Indian savagery that the Supreme Court has 
insistently relied upon and perpetuated ever since the early nineteenth century to justify 
its Indian law decisions.” 197 This racism was affecting the court’s perception o f Native 
Americans as capable citizens able to manage the power o f tribal governments and 
regulate non-members and non-member companies inside the reservation. Therefore, as 
soon as this racism was identified, Williams, Jr. observed that it would facilitate “a 
degree o f "measured separatism," that is, the right to govern their reservation homelands 
and those who enter them by their own laws, customs, and traditions, even when these 
might be incommensurable with the dominant society’s values and ways o f doing 
things.” The use o f racism in Supreme Court decisions was also examined by James E. 
Falkowski in Indian Law/Race Law: A Five-Hundred-Year History^99 and Robert A. 
Williams, Jr., in The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourse o f 
Conquest?00 Once again, these books did not view the erosion o f tribai sovereignty to be 
based on a set o f  principles developed by the Supreme Court from 1959 to 2001.
197 I b i d . ,  x x v i i .
1 8  I b i d . ,  x x x v .
199 J a m e s  E . F a l k o w s k i ,  Indian Law/Race Law: A F ive -Hundred-Year History ( N e w  Y o r k :  P r a e g e r ,  1 9 9 2 ) .
200 R o b e r t  A .  W i l l i a m s ,  J r . ,  The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourse o f Conquest 
( N e w  Y o r k :  O x f o r d  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 9 0 ) .
291
5^ , *  t-
Legal Articles
Generally, the articles discuss the movement o f the Supreme Court away from the 
sovereignty doctrine but it is not based, as this thesis argues, on principles developed 
between 1959 and 1973 and applied from 1973 to 2001. Although some articles assess 
the movement o f the court in terms o f trends and theories, it is portrayed only as an 
aberration in principle randomly chosen in the mid to late 1970s or late 1980s. Other 
articles argue that the movement o f  the court was not based on any trend, theory or 
principle and instead has caused uncertainty in the law itself. In addition, the articles do 
not discuss the effect o f Supreme Court case law on the everyday authority o f the tribes 
within the reservations.
This thesis builds on the general opinions o f David H. Getches and L. Scott Gould, who 
argued that the movement o f  the Supreme Court away from the sovereignty doctrine was 
based on a definitive trend, but challenges the underlying factors involved in those trends. 
These articles did not view the erosion o f the sovereignty doctrine as a process where the 
Supreme Court laid the foundations from 1959 to 1973 and applied them from 1973 to 
2001. David H. Getches pointed out that the Supreme Court relied on what he termed “a 
subjectivist trend,”201 principles used by the justices to mould tribal authority into what 
they considered it to be rather than use traditional precedent; “ ...tribal powers according 
to policies, values, and assumptions prevalent in non-Indian society.”202 Furthermore, 
Getches believed this subjectivist trend was a recent phenomenon, “The Supreme Court
201 D a v i d  H .  G e t c h e s ,  “ C o n q u e r i n g  t h e  C u l t u r a l  F r o n t i e r :  T h e  N e w  S u b j e c t i v i s m  o f  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  in  
I n d i a n  L a w , ”  California Law Review 8 4  ( 1 9 9 6 ) :  1 5 7 5 .
202 I b i d . ,  1 5 9 4 .
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has recently begun to depart from this traditional standard, abandoning entrenched 
principles of Indian law in favour o f an approach that bends tribal sovereignty to fit the 
C ourts perceptions o f  non-Indian interests.”203 However, Getches examined only four 
cases and pointed out that this subjectivist trend began during the 1980s. As I have 
previously mentioned, the movement of the court away from tribal sovereignty began a 
lot earlier and in order to identify a trend there needed to be analysis o f more than four 
cases. L. Scott Gould also identified a trend in the workings o f the Supreme Court from 
1975 to 1990, what he termed a “consent paradigm,” and argued that the Supreme Court 
only allowed tribal authority over non-members if it appeared the non-member had 
consented to it. Gould was steadfast in his belief that his theory had replaced the 
sovereignty doctrine, pointing out that “The consent paradigm that has emerged in the 
past two decades largely replaces the doctrine of inherent sovereignty, the conceptual 
underpinning o f  tribal power over territory that had endured for more than 160 years.”204 
However, the Gould interpretation did not take account o f the Supreme Court cases that 
relied exclusively on tribal sovereignty and therefore had nothing to do with non-member 
consent. In fact, Philip Frickey, in Adjudication and its Discontents: Coherence and 
Conciliation in Federal Indian Law, reviewed the Gould article and noted that it was 
impossible to reduce the numerous cases and complexity o f  Federal Indian law into one 
workable trend.203
204 L . S c o t t  G o u l d ,  “ T h e  C o n s e n t  P a r a d i g m :  T r i b a l  S o v e r e i g n t y  a t  t h e  M i l l e n n i u m , ”  Columbia Law Review 
9 6 ( 1 9 9 6 ) :  8 9 4 .
205 P h i l i p  P . F r i c k e y ,  “ A d j u d i c a t i o n  a n d  I t s  D i s c o n t e n t s :  C o h e r e n c e  a n d  C o n c i l i a t i o n  in  F e d e r a l  I n d i a n  
L a w ,”  Harvard L av Review 1 1 0  ( 1 9 9 7 ) :  1 7 5 4 - 1 7 8 4 .  S e e  a l s o ,  P h i l i p  P . F r i c k e y ,  “ A  C o m m o n  L a w  f o r  O u r  
A g e  o f  C o l o n i a l i s m :  T h e  J u d i c i a l  D i v e s t i t u r e  o f  I n d i a n  T r i b a l  A u t h o r i t y  o v e r  N o n m e m b e r s , ”  Yale Lav  
Journal 1 0 9  ( 1 9 9 9 ) :  1 - 8 5 .  F r i c k e y  a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  d i v e r g e n c e  b e t w e e n  o n e  s t r a n d  o f  l a w  r e p r e s e n t e d  b y  t h e  
o p i n i o n s  o f  Oliphant a n d  Montana a n d  t h e  s e c o n d  s t r a n d  o f  l a w  r e p r e s e n t e d  b y ,  Williams, Colville a n d  
Merrion, c r e a t e d  d o c t r i n a l  p r o b l e m s  w i t h i n  t h e  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  o p i n i o n s .
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Some scholars have argued that the opinions o f the Supreme Court were unprincipled and 
decided on an ad hoc basis, thereby causing doctrinal uncertainty in the law. Philip P. 
Frickey argued that the actions o f the court were unprincipled and therefore the reduction 
o f the case law into one theory or trend was impossible. Frickey pointed out that doctrinal 
incoherence resulted from two competing narratives, the American desire to colonise the 
continent and the Native American desire to resist and survive colonisation. As Frickey 
explained, “These two competing narratives make up the dominant, received readings o f 
the field o f federal Indian law today.”206 Therefore, Native Americans had to find another 
way o f  redressing problems. Frickey argued that scholars should lean away from focusing 
only on case law, legal doctrines and the use o f ‘adjudication’ in the judicial system 
because it will not result in the “decolonization of federal Indian law.”207 However, with 
little alternative, as Frickey himself acknowledged, analysis o f case law and doctrines has 
formed, and continues to form, the basis o f understanding Federal Indian law. Finding 
trends in Supreme Court case law provides a way o f understanding the thinking o f the 
justices and forms a weapon with which to fight and overturn this line o f thinking. In 
Sovereignty and Property, Joseph William Singer agreed that the opinions o f the court 
were unprincipled and removed from precedent, "Yet from reading the language o f the 
Court's opinions, one would have no idea that anything had changed. The Court presents 
the recent cutbacks on tribal rights as the straightforward application o f settled 
precedent...If the Court were honest about the law in this area, it would be an occasion
06 F r i c k e y ,  “ A d j u d i c a t i o n  a n d  I ts  D i s c o n t e n t s ,  1 7 5 5 .
207 I b i d . ,  1 7 7 7 .
2 9 4
tor shame. Furthermore, John Fredericks agreed that the Supreme Court was actingo.n 
an ad hoc basis but in a manner contrary to federal governmental policy, “Since the dawn 
o f the modem era o f  self-determination, however, with few exceptions Congress has 
refused to expressly limit the exercise of tribal sovereignty. Ironically, in the last two 
decades the Supreme Court has failed to follow Congress' lead in this respect.”209 To 
some, the result o f  the Supreme Court’s unprincipled action was the creation o f doctrinal 
uncertainty in Federal Indian law.~10 N. Bruce Duthu believed that Supreme Court 
opinions in the areas o f  criminal, civil and taxation law were devoid o f doctrinal 
coherence,
“This analysis o f  nearly two decades o f the Court's Indian law jurisprudence reveals that 
the Court's legal views o f tribal sovereignty lack internal consistency... The Court's 
jurisprudence, on the other hand, contains enough conflicting doctrine to allow litigants 
effectively to exploit and undermine congressional intent...This often leads to decision­
making which emphasizes limited or narrow rulings even at the expense o f doctrinal 
consistency.”211
Some scholars concurred with this interpretation about the doctrinal incoherence o f the 
court but were more ferocious in their assessments. Sarah Krakoff concurred, suggesting 
that the Supreme Court acted in an unprincipled and schizophrenic way from the mid to 
late 1970s to 2001. As Krakoff explained, beginning in the 1970s the Supreme Court
208 J o s e p h  W i l l i a m  S i n g e r ,  “ S o v e r e i g n t y  a n d  P r o p e r t y , ”  Northwestern University Law Review 8 6  ( 1 9 9 1 ) :  3 .
209 F r e d e r i c k s  I I I ,  “ A m e r i c a ’ s  F i r s t  N a t i o n s , ”  3 8 8 .
210 R o b e r t  N .  C l i n t o n ,  “ S t a t e  P o w e r  o v e r  I n d i a n  R e s e r v a t i o n s :  A  C r i t i c a l  C o m m e n t  o n  B u r g e r  C o u r t  
D e c i s i o n s , ”  South Dakota Law Review 2 6  ( 1 9 8 1 ) :  4 3 4 - 4 4 6 ;  R o b e r t  L a u r e n c e ,  “ S y m m e t r y  a n d  A s y m m e t r y  
in  F e d e r a l  I n d i a n  L a w , ”  Arizona Law Review 4 2  ( 2 0 0 0 )  8 6 1 - 9 3 4 ;  B l a k e  A .  W a t s o n ,  “ T h e  T h r u s t  a n d  P a r r y  
o f  F e d e r a l  I n d i a n  L a w , ”  University o f Dayton Law Review 2 3  ( 1 9 9 8 ) :  4 3 7 - 5 1 4 ;  R o b e r t  A .  W i l l i a m s ,  J r . ,  
“ T h e  A l g e b r a  o f  F e d e r a l  I n d i a n  L a w :  T h e  H a r d  T r a i l  o f  D e c o l o n i z i n g  a n d  A m e r i c a n i z i n g  t h e  W h i t e  M a n 's  
I n d i a n  J u r i s p r u d e n c e , ”  Wisconsin Law Review 1 9 8 6  ( 1 9 8 6 ) :  2 1 9 - 2 9 9 ;  a n d  A l e x  T a l l c h i e f  S k i b i n e ,  T h e  
C o u r t ' s  U s e  o f  t h e  I m p l i c i t  D i v e s t i t u r e  D o c t r i n e  t o  I m p l e m e n t  I t s  I m p e r f e c t  N o t i o n  o f  F e d e r a l i s m  in  I n d i a n  
C o u n t r y , ”  Tulsa Law Journal 3 6  ( 2 0 0 0 ) :  2 6 7 - 3 0 4 .
211 N .  B r u c e  D u t h u ,  “ T h e  T h u r g o o d  M a r s h a l l  P a p e r s  a n d  t h e  Q u e s t  f o r  a  P r i n c i p l e d  T h e o r y  o f  T r i b a l  
S o v e r e i g n t y :  F u e l i n g  t h e  F i r e s  o f  T r i b a l / S t a t e  C o n f l i c t , ’ Vermont Law Review  2 1  ( 1 9 9 6 ) .  1 0 7 .
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continued to act schizophrenically in Indian cases throughout the 1980s and 1990s.”212 
Indeed, Daniel I.S.J. Rey-Bear appeared to agree that the opinions o f  the Supreme Court 
were out o f the ordinary, noting that “Overall, the Court's recent opinions in the field o f 
Indian law tend to suffer from haphazard and incoherent doctrinal approaches that seem 
to correspond to a view o f it as a legal backwater.”21, Frank Pommersheim was damning 
in his interpretation about modern-day Supreme Court opinions and the uncertainty that 
they had caused. He noted “ ...recent developments in Indian law, particularly at the 
United States Supreme Court, threaten this well understood and precarious balance with a 
new, almost vicious, historical amnesia and doctrinal incoherence.” This doctrinal 
incoherence Pommersheim explained “ ...spawns unpredictable ad hoc decision making 
with increasing potential to destabilize and to capsize modest tribal efforts and 
accomplishments in the area o f the self-determination that is allegedly at the heart o f 
federal policy in the modern era.”214 Despite the opinions o f  many scholars about the 
incoherence o f  the Supreme Court, it is clear, as this thesis makes clear, that within the 
mindset o f  the justices there developed a trend that fundamentally eroded key tribal 
powers.
212 S a r a h  K r a k o f f ,  “ U n d o i n g  I n d ia n  L a w  O n e  C a s e  a t  a  T i m e :  J u d i c i a l  M i n i m a l i s m  a n d  T r i b a l  
S o v e r e i g n t y , ”  American University Law Review 5 0  ( 2 0 0 1 ) :  1 2 0 7 .
213 D a n i e l  I .S . J .  R e y - B e a r ,  “ T h e  F l a t h e a d  W a t e r  Q u a l i t y  S t a n d a r d s  D i s p u t e :  L e g a l  B a s e s  f o r  T r i b a l  
R e g u l a t o r y  A u t h o r i t y  O v e r  N o n - I n d i a n  R e s e r v a t i o n  L a n d s , ”  American Indian Law Review 2 0  ( 1 9 9 6 ) :  1 5 5 .
214 F r a n k  P o m m e r s h e i m ,  “ C o y o t e  P a r a d o x :  S o m e  I n d ia n  L a w  R e f l e c t i o n s  f r o m  t h e  E d g e  o f  t h e  P r a i r i e , ”  
Arizona State Law Journal 31  ( 1 9 9 9 ) :  4 3 9 - 4 4 0 .
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Conclusion
There is no doubt that the silent revolution o f  the United States Supreme Court had 
dramatically affected the everyday and practical authority and workings o f tribal 
governments and tribal councils within the reservations. Various tribal members have 
highlighted these severe limitations on tribal civil, criminal and taxation authority over 
non-members inside the reservation. Despite a clear correlation between Supreme Court 
case law and a direct effect on tribal authority, this issue has not been addressed by 
writings on Native American history or the law.
The writings on Native American history were generally silent on the fundamental 
erosion o f the key attributes o f tribal power. The idea o f resurgence and hope as well as 
key events like Wounded Knee o f 1973 appeared to have been a catalyst for scholars to 
overemphasise the positive nature o f Native American history from the 1970s to the 
twenty-first century. As this thesis has shown, the gains made by Native America in the 
1970s were fundamentally weakened by the ideology o f the Supreme Court Justices and 
their written opinions. The writings on the law did not view the period between 1959 and 
2001 as the time when the Supreme Court eroded the Indian sovereignty doctrine. 
Therefore, what this thesis terms a “Silent Revolution” challenges and differs from the 
scholarly writings in Federal Indian law.
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Conclusion
The Silent Revolution: Entrenched in Supreme Court Case Law and Proliferation in 
Congress?
The erosion o f  the Indian sovereignty doctrine began with the foundations o f the silent 
revolution from 1959 to 1973, in which the Supreme Court Justices allowed more state 
law into the reservations. This process fundamentally undermined the Indian sovereignty 
doctrine and the principle o f Worcester, which prohibited all forms o f  state law from the 
reservation. Although Williams v. Lee (1959)1 was a victory for inherent tribal 
sovereignty, the memoranda contained in the private papers o f the Supreme Court 
Justices from the Williams case revealed that the Supreme Court considered moving away 
from the Indian sovereignty doctrine and the principles established in Worcester v. 
Georgia (1832)" to a position where congressional legislation was required to oust state 
law from the reservation/ Memoranda from the William O. Douglas, William J. Brennan 
and Earl Warren papers showed how individual justices including Earl Warren were 
comfortable with the use o f congressional authority but were concerned about the 
complete absence o f state law inside the reservation.4 The movement away from the 
sovereignty doctrine coincided with the views o f the Justices who wanted to address the 
constant power struggles over authority in the reservations, between the federal
1 Williams v. Lee, 3 5 8  U .S .  2 1 7  ( 1 9 5 9 ) .
2 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U .S .  5 1 5  ( 1 8 3 2 ) .
3 B o x  1 8 8 ,  E a r l  W a r r e n  P a p e r s ,  M a n u s c r i p t  D i v i s i o n ,  L i b r a r y  o f  C o n g r e s s ,  W a s h i n g t o n ,  D .C . ,  “ B e n c h  
M e m o ,  N o . 3 9 ,  1 9 5 8  T e r m ,  W i l l i a m s  v . L e e , ”  M A F ,  4 ,  5 ,  8 .
4 B o x  1 2 0 1 ,  W i l l i a m  O .  D o u g l a s  P a p e r s ,  M a n u s c r i p t  D i v i s i o n ,  L i b r a r y  o f  C o n g r e s s ,  W a s h i n g t o n ,  D .C . ,  
“ 1 9 5 7  T e r m  N o . 8 1 1 ; ”  B o x  1 :1 5 ,  W i l l i a m  J .  B r e n n a n  P a p e r s ,  M a n u s c r i p t  D i v i s i o n ,  L i b r a r y  o f  C o n g r e s s ,  
W a s h i n g t o n ,  D . C . ,  “ P a u l  W i l l i a m s  a n d  L o r e n a  W i l l i a m s ; ”  B o x  1 2 0 1 ,  W O D  P a p e r s ,  “ C o n f e r e n c e  
N o v e m b e r  2 1 ; ”  a n d  B o x  1 8 8 ,  E W  P a p e r s ,  “ B e n c h  M e m o ,  N o . 3 9 ,  1 9 5 8  T e r m ,  W i l l i a m s  v .  L e e , ”  M A F ,  2 .
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government, tribal governments and state governments. The Supreme Court Justices, 
therefore, began to view Federal Indian law cases ^fcerm s o f federal versus state 
authority, with the welfare o f the tribes purportedly being protected by the federal 
government.
After Williams, the Supreme Court Justices continued to move away from the sovereignty 
doctrine to the primacy o f Congressional authority in order to prohibit state law in the 
reservation. The private papers of Brennan, Warren and Douglas showed how the Kake v. 
Egan (1962)5 and Metlakatla Indians v. Egan (1962)6 cases revolved exclusively around 
the idea o f congressional authority7 and how the Warren Trading Post case used the idea 
o f congressional authority to prevent the application o f state law inside the reservation.8 
This argument was further developed in Kennerly v. District Court o f Montana (1971)9 
and applied as a principle in the sister taxation cases o f McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Comm’n (1973)10 and Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones (1973).11 The principle, 
developed in a line o f case law from 1959, was highlighted in a Thurgood Marshall 
memorandum to conference in 1973.12 Furthermore, the positions o f Justices Rehnquist
5 Kake Village v. Egan, 3 6 9  U .S .  6 0  ( 1 9 6 2 ) .
6 Metlakatla Indians v. Egan, 3 6 9  U .S .  4 5  ( 1 9 6 2 ) .
7 B o x  2 1 8 ,  E W  P a p e r s ,  “ B e n c h  M e m o , N o .  3 2 6 ,  1 9 5 9  T e r m ,  M e t l a k a t l a  I n d i a n , ”  M H B ,  n .d . ,  1 ; B o x  1 2 6 5 ,  
W O D  P a p e r s ,  “ N o .  2  -  M e t l a k a t l a  I n d i a n  C o m m u n i t y  v .  E g a n ,  C o n f e r e n c e  D e c e m b e r  1 5 , 1 9 6 1 ,”  1; B o x  
1 :6 0 , W J B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o .  2 , M e t l a k a t l a  I n d i a n  C o m m u n i t y  v .  E g a n ;”  a n d  B o x  2 1 8 ,  E W  P a p e r s ,  “ B e n c h  
M e m o . N o .  2 ,  1 9 6 1  T e r m , ”  R G G ,  1 3 .
8 B o x  1 :1 1 3 ,  W J B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o . l  1 5 . W a r r e n  T r a d i n g  P o s t  v .  A r i z o n a  S t a t e  T a x  C o m m i s s i o n ;”  B o x  1 3 3 2 ,  
W O D  P a p e r s ,  “ W a r r e n  T r a d i n g  P o s t  C o .  v .  A r i z o n a  S t a t e  T a x  C o m m ’n / 6 4  T e r m  N o .  1 1 5 ;”  B o x  2 6 3 ,  E W  
P a p e r s ,  “ B e n c h  M e m o , N o .  1 1 5 ,  1 9 6 4  T e r m ,  W a r r e n  T r a d i n g  P o s t  C o . , ”  1 1 ; a n d  B o x  2 6 3 ,  E W  P a p e r s ,  
“ B e n c h  M e m o ,  N o .  1 1 5 ,  1 9 6 4  T e r m ,  W a r r e n  T r a d i n g  P o s t  C o , ”  D M F ,  7 .
9 Kennerly v. District Court o f Montana, 4 0 0  U .S .  4 2 3  ( 1 9 7 1 ) .
10 McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 4 1 1  U .S .  1 6 4  ( 1 9 7 3 ) .
11 Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 4 1 1  U .S .  1 4 5  ( 1 9 7 3 ) .
12 B o x  1 5 6 ,  H a r r y  A .  B l a c k m u n  P a p e r s ,  M a n u s c r i p t  D i v i s i o n ,  L i b r a r y  o f  C o n g r e s s ,  W a s h i n g t o n ,  D .C . ,  “ R e : 
N o .  7 1 - 1 2 6 3  -  K a h n  v .  A r i z o n a  S t a t e  T a x  C o m m i s s i o n , ”  m e m o r a n d u m  t o  t h e  C o n f e r e n c e  f r o m  T h u r g o o d  
M a r s h a l l ,  M a r c h  2 8 ,  1 9 7 3 .
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and Stewart and the views o f tribal counsel, who argued on behalf o f  the Navajo in the 
McClanahan case, also supported the application o f general state law in the reservation, 
which in turn sanctioned state law over non-members in the reservation.Ij Therefore, in 
1973, the views o f the Supreme Court Justices fundamentally limited the Indian 
sovereignty doctrine and the Worcester principles.14
The silent revolution was underpinned by, what this thesis has termed, the integrationist 
trend, which was composed o f four principles that worked in tandem to turn the Indian 
sovereignty doctrine on its head. Rather than the tribes having sovereignty over all people 
and lands within the reservations, from 1973, the Supreme Court Justices believed that 
tribal authority was limited to tribal members and subsequently tribal authority over non­
members inside the reservation existed only after an explicit delegation o f congressional 
power. The corollary o f this view was that the Justices believed that the states had 
authority inside the reservation and over non-members inside the reservation until it was 
reversed by Congress. The justices concluded that the removal o f inherent tribal 
sovereignty over non-members meant its replacement by inherent state sovereignty. The 
opening up o f the reservations to the application o f state law over non-members inside 
the reservation thus served to integrate, rather than preserve the separated notions o f the 
reservations.
13 B o x  1 5 6 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ B e n c h  M e m o ,  N o . 7 1 - 8 3 4 - A S X ,  M c C l a n a h a n ,  e t  a l . , ”  R I M ,  4 - 5 ;  B o x  1 5 6 ,  H A B  
P a p e r s ,  “ N o .  7 1 - 8 3 4  -  M c C l a n a h a n  v .  S t a t e  T a x  C o m m i s s i o n  o f  A r i z o n a ,  A r g u e d :  D e c e m b e r  1 2 , 1 9 7 2 ; ”  
a n d  B o x  1 5 7 4 ,  W O D  P a p e r s ,  “ 71  - 8 3 4  -  M c C l a n a h a n  v .  S t a t e  T a x  C o m m ’n .  o f  A r i z o n a .”
14 B o x  1 5 6 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ B e n c h  M e m o ,  N o .  7 1 - 8 3 4 - A S X ,  M c C l a n a h a n ,  e t  a l .  v .  A r i z o n a  S t a t e  T a x  
C o m m ’n , ”  R I M .
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The fundamental erosion o f  the key attributes o f tribal power by the Justices o f the 
United States Supreme Court from 1973 to 2001, termed a “Silent Revolution” in this 
thesis, eroded the Indian sovereignty doctrine established in Worcester v. Georgia (1832) 
and re-affirmed by Williams v. Lee (1959). It dramatically limited inherent tribal 
sovereignty over non-members inside the reservation and allowed the states to have 
general authority over non-members within the reservation. Today, tribal sovereignty 
over non-members survives through a delegation o f congressional power while inherent 
state authority exists inside the reservation and over non-members in the reservation until 
reversed by Congress. However, the states generally have no authority over tribal 
members in the reservation because the Indian sovereignty doctrine protects the tribes 
from state law and only explicit congressional legislation removes this protection over the 
tribes.
Specifically, the silent revolution impacted on three key areas o f tribal authority over 
non-members, namely taxation, criminal and civil authority. After the sister taxation 
cases o f  McClanahan and Mescalero Apache Tribe in 1973, the Supreme Court Justices 
continued the silent revolution in United States v. Mazurie (1975) and Moe v. Salish & 
Kootenai Tribes (1976).15 The Mazurie case applied the principle established in the sister 
taxation cases that tribal authority over non-members after 1973 was based on 
congressional authority. The Blackmun and Brennan Papers revealed that the Supreme 
Court considered tribal authority to be limited to tribal members only and therefore only 
authorisation from Congress would allow the tribes to have authority over non­
15 United States v. Mazurie, 4 1 9  U .S .  5 4 4  ( 1 9 7 5 ) ;  a n d  Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 4 2 5  U .S .  4 6 3  
( 1 9 7 6 ) .
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m em bers.16 The Indian sovereignty doctrine was not considered by the Justices to be 
strong enough to support the idea o f inherent tribal sovereignty as a way to control non­
member activity. The Justices in the Moe case applied the principle that the states had 
authority in the reservations and authority over non-members in the reservations. The 
Blackmun and Brennan Papers showed how the Justices refused to use the Indian 
sovereignty doctrine to protect tribal reservations from state law .17
In criminal case law, the Supreme Court Justices nullified the application o f  tribal 
criminal authority over non-members inside the reservation and had limited tribal 
criminal authority to tribal members only. In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe (1978) 
and United States v. Wheeler (1978),18 the Supreme Court developed the principles 
formed from the sister taxation cases o f McClanahan and Mescalero Apache Tribe 
(1973). The private papers o f  Harry A. Blackmun showed how the Justices believed that 
the sister taxation cases had limited tribal sovereignty to tribal members and as a result, 
tribal sovereignty could not be applied over non-members and was dependent on 
congressional authority.19 Therefore, the principle applied by the Justices in criminal law
16 B o x  1 9 7 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o  7 3 - 1 0 1 8 ,  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  v .  M a z u r i e ,  C e r t  t o  C A  1 0 ,”  A G ,  N o v e m b e r  6 ,  1 9 7 4 ,  
1 7 , 1 8 ; B o x  1 9 7 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o .  7 3 - 1 0 1 8  -  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  v .  M a z u r i e . ”  H .A .B .  N o v e m b e r  1 0 ,  1 9 7 4 ,  4 ;  
a n d  B o x  1 :3 3 8 ,  W J B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o .  7 3 - 1 0 8 , U n i t e d  S t a t e s  v .  M a z u r i e ,”  n .d .
17 B o x  2 2 5 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o . 7 4 - 1 6 5 6 ,  M o e  v .  C o n f e d e r a t e d  T r i b e s  7 5 - 5 0  -  C o n f e d e r a t e d  T r i b e s  v .  M o e ,”  
2 - 3 ,  5 ;  B o x  2 2 5 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o .  7 5 - 1 6 5 6 ,  M o e  v .  C o n f e d e r a t e d  S a l i s h  a n d  K o o t e n a i  T r i b e s ,  N o .  7 5 - 5 0  
C o n f e d e r a t e d  S a l i s h  a n d  K o o t e n a i  T r i b e s  v .  M o e ,  A p p e a l  f r o m  t h r e e - j u d g e  d i s t r i c t  c o u r t  ( D .  M o n t a n a ) , ”  
B l o c k ,  J a n u a r y  1 7 ,  1 9 7 6 ,  2 ,  1 1 ;  a n d  B o x  2 2 5 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ M o e  v .  C o n f e d e r a t e d  S a l i s h  a n d  K o o t e n a i  
T r i b e s ,  N o s  7 4 - 1 6 5 6  a n d  7 5 - 5 0 ,  R e :  P r o p o s e d  d r a f t  b y  J u s t i c e  R e h n q u i s t , ”  W H B ,  A p r i l  2 ,  1 9 7 6 ,  1 - 2 .
18 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 4 3 5  U . S .  191  ( 1 9 7 8 ) ;  a n d  United States v . Wheeler, 4 3 5  U . S .  3 1 3  
( 1 9 7 8 ) .
|q B o x  2 7 0 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ 7 6 - 5 7 2 9 ,  S u q u a m i s h , ”  J a n u a r y  5 ,  1 9 7 8 ;  B o x  2 7 0 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ 7 6 - 5 7 2 9 ,  
O l i p h a n t  a n d  B e l g r a d e  v .  S u q u a m i s h  I n d i a n  T r i b e , ”  C r a n e ,  J a n u a r y  3 ,  1 9 7 8 ,  2 2 ;  B o x  2 6 8 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  
“ P r e l i m i n a r y  M e m o ,  S u m m e r  L i s t ,  9 ,  S h e e t  1 , N o .  7 6 - 1 6 2 9 ,  U .S .  W h e e l e r ” , C a m p b e l l ,  A u g u s t  8 ,  1 9 7 7 ,  7 ;  
B o x  2 7 0 ,  H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ 7 6 - 5 7 2 9 ,  O l i p h a n t  a n d  B e l g r a d e  v .  S u q u a m i s h  I n d i a n  T r i b e , ”  2 2 - 2 3 ;  B o x  2 7 0 ,  
H A B  P a p e r s ,  “ N o . 7 6 - 5 7 2 9 , O l i p h a n t  v .  S u q u a m i s h  I n d i a n  T r i b e , ”  J a n u a r y  1 1 , 1 9 7 8 ;  a n d  B o x  2 7 0 ,  H A B
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was that if tribes were to have criminal authority over non-members it would have to be 
delegated by Congress. The Oliphant case ruled that the tribes did not have authority over 
non-members because it was not authorised by Congress. The limitations placed on tribal 
criminal authority over non-members were confirmed in Wheeler when the Supreme 
Court Justices re-affirmed that tribes only had inherent criminal authority over tribal 
members inside the reservation.
The taxation case law throughout the silent revolution dramatically affected the tribes. In 
taxation case law, the Supreme Court Justices had eroded the Indian sovereignty doctrine 
and established the rights of the states to tax non-members and non-member companies 
inside the reservation unless it was prohibited by congressional authority. Moreover, 
between 1980 and 2001, the Supreme Court Justices had also allowed the tribes to tax 
non-members inside the reservation. This contrasted significantly with the development 
of the case law, which had limited tribal sovereignty over non-members. However, in 
Atkinson Trading Co., v. Shirley (2001)20 the Supreme Court Justices dramatically 
changed course and ruled that the tribes did not have inherent sovereignty to tax non­
members on non-member lands of the reservation.
The erosion of the Indian sovereignty doctrine in civil case law was a gradual process. In 
Montana v. United States (1981), the Supreme Court applied the principle that the tribes 
did not have inherent civil sovereignty over non-members on non-members lands of the
P a p e r s ,  “ M e m o r a n d u m  t o  t h e  C o n f e r e n c e ,  N o .  7 6 - 5 7 2 9 ,  O l i p h a n t  v .  S u q u a m i s h  I n d i a n  T r i b e .”  f r o m  
T h u r g o o d  M a r s h a l l  o n  M a r c h  3 ,  1 9 7 8 .
20 Atkinson Trading Co., v. Shirley, 5 3 2  U .S .  6 4 5  ( 2 0 0 1 ) .
reservation unless it was authorised by Congress.21 This was based on the development of 
the principles applied in the sister taxation cases of McClanahan and Mescalero Apache 
Tribe (1973) and applied in Mazurie and Oliphant. Although the ruling of the court 
adopted a broad rationale that tribes did not have any civil jurisdiction over non-member 
unless authorised by Congress, the sovereignty doctrine allowed the tribes to have 
authority over non-members on tribal lands. However, between 1981 and 2001 the 
Supreme Court Justices had further eroded the Indian sovereignty doctrine and 
fundamentally eroded tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members in the reservation. Then 
in 2001, in the case of Nevada v. Hicks, the Supreme Court Justices denied the 
application of tribal authority over non-members on .tribal lands and consequently the 
states were ruled to have inherent sovereignty over non-members within the reservation.22
The silent revolution was a legal process undertaken by the United States Supreme Court 
which dramatically affected the practical and everyday workings of tribal authority inside 
the reservation. However, as the introduction pointed out, obtaining evidence of the 
effects of Supreme Court case law on tribal authority was difficult and serves as a point 
of reference for a future research project. The effect of the silent revolution on tribal 
taxation authority resulted in a loss of tribal revenues to the states and provided little
23incentive for economic investment." It also limited the amount of tribal revenue
21 Montana v. United States, 4 5 0  U .S .  5 4 4  ( 1 9 8 1 ) .
22 Nevada v. Hicks, 5 3 3  U .S .  3 5 3  ( 2 0 0 1 ) .
23 N a t i o n a l  C o n g r e s s  o f  t h e  A m e r i c a n  I n d i a n ,  Concept paper, 2003 Legislative Proposal on Tribal 
Governance and Economic Enhancement 25 July 2002 ( W a s h i n g t o n  D .C . :  N a t i o n a l  C o n g r e s s  o f  t h e  
A m e r i c a n  I n d i a n ,  2 0 0 2 ) ,  2 ;  J o s e p h  P .  K a l t  a n d  J o s e p h  W i l l i a m  S i n g e r ,  “ M y t h s  a n d  R e a l i t i e s  o f  T r i b a l  
S o v e r e i g n t y :  T h e  L a w  a n d  E c o n o m i c s  o f  I n d i a n  S e l f - R u l e , ”  H a r v a r d  P r o j e c t  o n  A m e r i c a n  I n d i a n  E c o n o m i c  
D e v e l o p m e n t  J o i n t  O c c a s i o n a l  P a p e r s  o n  N a t i v e  A f f a i r s  2 0 0 4 - 0 3 ,  2 0 0 4 ;  Washington v . Confederated 
Tribes, 4 4 7  U .S .  1 3 4  ( 1 9 8 0 ) ;  Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 4 9 0  U . S .  1 6 3  ( 1 9 8 9 ) ;  a n d  S t e p h e n  P .
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available to support tribal governmental programs and services to both tribal members 
and non-members in the reservations.24 The effects of the silent revolution had also 
resulted in non-payment of tribal taxes by non-member businesses. The effect of civil 
case law on tribal civil authority limited the rights of the tribes to protect elements of 
tribal culture and welfare on non-member lands of the reservations.23 In addition, 
Supreme Court case law had eroded tribal civil authority over non-members on tribal and 
trust lands of the reservations and had caused an increase in the number of incidents 
where state police forces entered reservations without tribal consent.26 The effect of the 
silent revolution on tribal criminal jurisdiction created a jurisdictional gap, limiting tribal 
criminal authority over non-members in the reservations. This led to a sense of tribal 
powerlessness inside the reservations27 and contributed to significant amounts of crime 
committed by non-members in many Native American reservations.28 In addition, the 
federal government and state governments have been reluctant to step in and assume 
responsibility for the jurisdictional gap created by Oliphant (1978). In order to address
M c C l e a r y ,  “ A  P r o p o s e d  S o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  P r o b l e m  o f  S t a t e  J u r i s d i c t i o n  t o  T a x  o n  I n d i a n  R e s e r v a t i o n s , ”  
Gonzaga Law Review  2 6  ( 1 9 9 1 ) :  6 2 8 .
"4 S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e  o n  I n d i a n  A f f a i r s ,  Rulings o f the U.S. Supreme Court as They Affect the Powers and 
Authorities o f the Indian Tribal Governments: Hearing on the Concerns o f Recent Decisions o f the U.S. 
Supreme Court and the Future o f  Indian Tribal Governments in America, 1 0 7 th  C o n g . ,  2 d  s e s s . ,  2 7  
F e b r u a r y  2 0 0 2 ,  3 - 4 ,  9 ,  2 8 - 3 8 ,  5 1 - 5 4 ,  5 8 ;  a n d  S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e  o n  I n d i a n  A f f a i r s ,  Tribal Government 
Amendments to the Homeland Security Act o f 2002: S. 578 to Amend the Homeland Security Act o f2002 to 
Include Indian Tribes Among the Entities Consulted with Respect to Activities Carried out by the Secretary 
o f Homeland Security, 1 0 8 th  C o n g . ,  1 s t  s e s s . ,  3 0  J u l y  2 0 0 3 ,  3 3 - 3 6 .
25 Montana v. United States', Brendale v . Confederated Yakima Indian Nation, 4 9 2  U .S .  4 0 8  ( 1 9 8 9 ) ;  South 
Dakota v. Bourland, 5 0 8  U .S .  6 7 9  ( 1 9 9 3 ) ;  a n d  Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 5 2 0  U .S .  4 3 8  ( 1 9 9 7 ) .
26 S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e ,  Rulings o f the U.S. Supreme Court, 2 6 - 2 8 ,  3 0 - 3 3 ,  3 5 - 3 6 ,  5 3 ,  8 8 - 9 0 ,  9 3 - 9 5 .
27 S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e ,  Tribal Government Amendments, 2 3 ,  1 8 6 ;  S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e ,  Ridings o f the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 3 1 - 3 2 ,  4 2 ,  4 4 ;  a n d  C h r i s t o p h e r  B . C h a n e y ,  “ T h e  E f f e c t  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  S u p r e m e  
C o u r t ’ s  D e c i s i o n s  D u r i n g  t h e  L a s t  Q u a r t e r  o f  t h e  N i n e t e e n t h  C e n t u r y  o n  T r i b a l  C r i m i n a l  J u r i s d i c t i o n , ”  
Brigham Young University Journal o f  Public Law 1 4  ( 2 0 0 0 ) :  1 8 0 .
28 U .S .  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  J u s t i c e ,  B u r e a u  o f  J u s t i c e  S t a t i s t i c s ,  American Indians and Crime, b y  L a w r e n c e  A .  
G r e e n f e l d  a n d  S t e v e n  K .  S m i t h  ( W a s h i n g t o n ,  D . C . :  G o v e r n m e n t  P r i n t i n g  O f f i c e ,  1 9 9 9 ) ;  U .S .  D e p a r t m e n t  
o f  J u s t i c e ,  B u r e a u  o f  J u s t i c e  S t a t i s t i c s ,  A BJS Statistical Profile, 1992-2002: American Indians and Crime, 
b y  S t e v e n  W .  P a r r y  ( W a s h i n g t o n ,  D .C . :  G o v e r n m e n t  P r i n t i n g  O f f i c e ,  2 0 0 4 ) ;  N a t i o n a l  C o n g r e s s  o f  t h e  
A m e r i c a n  I n d i a n ,  Concept paper, S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e ,  Rulings o f the U.S. Supreme Court, 2 6 - 3 8 ,  9 2 - 9 5 ;  a n d  
S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e ,  Tribal Government Amendments, 2 3 ,  3 7 ,  4 2 - 4 3 ,  5 0 .
305
this gap, many Native American tribes had successfully circumvented and ameliorated 
the limitations imposed on the criminal authority of the tribes over non-members.29 The 
practical effects of the silent revolution have considerably limited tribal taxation, civil 
and criminal authority over non-members in the reservations and allowed inherent state 
law to operate inside the reservations.
The assessment of Supreme Court case law within this thesis together with the 
undeniable effects of the Supreme Court’s rulings on everyday tribal authority have not
t
previously been addressed. The writings on Native American history from the 1970s to 
the twenty-first century have tended to portray an overly celebratory perspective of 
Native American history from 1973 and have failed to consider the negative impact of 
Supreme Court case law on Native American tribes and the reservations/0 Therefore, to 
address the omission, I have argued that the resurgence of Native America during the 
1970s was severely weakened by Supreme Court case law in the 1970s and beyond. My 
findings suggest that a deeper consideration and integration of Supreme Court case law 
needs to be undertaken by scholars in their analysis of Native American history.
20 S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e ,  Tribal Government Amendments, 2 3 ;  C h a n e y ,  “ T h e  E f f e c t , ”  1 8 5 - 1 8 8 ;  a n d  R o b e r t  
Y a z z i e ,  “ " W a t c h  Y o u r  S i x " :  A n  I n d i a n  N a t i o n  J u d g e ’ s  V i e w  o f  2 5  Y e a r s  o f  I n d i a n  L a w ,  W h e r e  W e  A r e  
a n d  W h e r e  W e  A r e  G o i n g , ”  American Indian Law Review  2 3  ( 1 9 9 9 ) :  5 0 2 - 5 0 3 .
0 R o b e r t  F . B e r k h o f e r ,  J r . ,  The White M an’s Indian: Images o f  the American Indian from  Columbus to the 
Present ( N e w  Y o r k :  V i n t a g e  B o o k s ,  1 9 7 9 ) ;  J o a n n e  N a g e l ,  American Indian Ethnic Renewal: Red Power 
and the Resurgence o f  Identity and Culture ( N e w  Y o r k :  O x f o r d  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 9 7 ) ;  S t e p h e n  C o r n e l l ,  
The Return o f  the Native: American Indian Political Resurgence ( N e w  Y o r k :  O x f o r d  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  
1 9 8 8 ) .  ) ;  J a m e s  S .  O l s o n  a n d  R a y m o n d  W i l s o n ,  Native Americans in the Twentieth C entw y  ( U r b a n a  a n d  
C h i c a g o :  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  I l l i n o i s  P r e s s ,  1 9 8 4 ) ;  J o h n  R .  W u n d e r ,  "Retained by the People”  A History o f  
American Indians and the Bill o f Rights ( N e w  Y o r k :  O x f o r d  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 9 4 ) ;  P e t e r  I v e r s o n ,  "We 
Are Still H ere” American Indians in the Twentieth Century ( W h e e l i n g  I l l i n o i s :  H a r l a n  D a v i d s o n ,  I n c ,  
1 9 9 8 ) ;  a n d  C h a r l e s  W i l k i n s o n ,  Blood Struggle: The Rise o f  Modern Indian Nations ( N e w  Y o r k :  W .  W . 
N o r t o n  &  C o m p a n y ,  2 0 0 5 ) .
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Similarly, the assessment of Federal Indian law and the erosion o f the Indian sovereignty 
doctrine and of the key attributes of tribal power contrasts significantly with the 
interpretations and writings in books’1 and articles,j2 by leading scholars in the field o f 
Federal Indian law. In contrast to the legal books and articles written by scholars such as 
Charles F. Wilkinson, William C. Canby, David E. Wilkins, Joseph William Singer,
31 F e l i x  S .  C o h e n ,  Handbook o f  Federal Indian Law ( W a s h i n g t o n ,  D . C . :  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  G o v e r n m e n t  
P r i n t i n g  O f f i c e ,  1 9 4 1 ) ;  C h a r l e s  F .  W i l k i n s o n ,  American Indians, Time, and the law  ( N e w  H a v e n :  Y a l e  
U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 8 7 ) ;  W i l l i a m  C .  C a n b y ,  J r . ,  American Indian Law: in a Nutshell ( S t .  P a u l ,  M i n n . :  W e s t  
G r o u p ,  1 9 9 8 ) ;  V i n e  D e l o r i a ,  J r . ,  a n d  C l i f f o r d  M .  L y t l e .  American Indians, American Justice  ( A u s t i n :  
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  T e x a s  P r e s s ,  1 9 8 3 ) ;  P e t r a  T .  S h a t t u c k  a n d  J i l l  N o r g r e n ,  Partial Justice: Federal Indian Law 
in a Liberal Constitutional System  ( P r o v i d e n c e :  B e r g  P u b l i s h e r s ,  I n c . ,  1 9 9 1 ) ;  R o b e r t  A .  W i l l i a m s ,  J r . ,  Like 
a Loaded Weapon: The Rehnquist Court, Indian Rights, and the Legal History o f  Racism in America 
( M i n n e a p o l i s :  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  M i n n e s o t a  P r e s s ,  2 0 0 5 ) ;  J a m e s  E .  F a l k o w s k i ,  Indian Law/Race Law: A Five- 
Hundred-Year History  ( N e w  Y o r k :  P r a e g e r ,  1 9 9 2 ) ;  a n d  R o b e r t  A .  W i l l i a m s ,  J r . ,  The American Indian in 
Western Legal Thought: The Discourse o f  Conquest ( N e w  Y o r k :  O x f o r d  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  1 9 9 0 ) .
J o r d a n  B u r c h ,  “ H o w  M u c h  D i v e r s i t y  I s  T h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  R e a l l y  W i l l i n g  t o  A c c e p t ? ”  Ohio Northern 
University Law Review  2 0  ( 1 9 9 4 ) :  9 6 5 - 9 6 6 ;  J o h n  A r a i  M i t c h e l l ,  “ A  W o r l d  w i t h o u t  T r i b e s ?  T r i b a l  R i g h t s  o f  
S e l f - G o v e r n m e n t  a n d  t h e  E n f o r c e m e n t  o f  S t a t e  C o u r t  O r d e r s  i n  I n d i a n  C o u n t r y , ”  University o f  Chicago 
Law Review  6 1  ( 1 9 9 4 ) :  7 1 1 - 7 1 2 ;  L .  S c o t t  G o u l d ,  “ T h e  C o n s e n t  P a r a d i g m :  T r i b a l  S o v e r e i g n t y  a t  t h e  
M i l l e n n i u m , ”  Columbia Law Review  9 6  ( 1 9 9 6 ) :  8 9 5 ;  J o s e p h  W i l l i a m  S i n g e r ,  “ C a n o n s  o f  C o n q u e s t :  T h e  
S u p r e m e  C o u r t ’ s  A t t a c k  o n  T r i b a l  S o v e r e i g n t y , ”  New England Law Review  3 7  ( 2 0 0 3 ) :  6 5 0 ;  F r a n k  
P o m m e r s h e i m  a n d  J o h n  P .  L a V e l l e ,  “ T o w a r d  a  G r e a t  S i o u x  N a t i o n  J u d i c i a l  S u p p o r t  C e n t e r  a n d  S u p r e m e  
C o u r t , ”  Wicazo Sa Review  1 7  ( 2 0 0 2 ) :  1 9 5 ;  W a l l a c e  C o f f e y  a n d  R e b e c c a  T s o s i e ,  “ R e t h i n k i n g  t h e  T r i b a l  
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and Policy Review  1 2  ( 2 0 0 1 ) :  1 9 4 ;  S a r a h  K r a k o f f ,  “ U n d o i n g  I n d i a n  L a w  O n e  C a s e  a t  a  T i m e :  J u d i c i a l  
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Law Journal 2 7  ( 1 9 9 5 ) :  4 4 ;  P e t e r  C .  M a x f i e l d ,  “ O l i p h a n t  v .  S u q u a m i s h  T r i b e :  T h e  W h o l e  i s  G r e a t e r  t h a n  
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S u p r e m e  C o u r t  in  I n d i a n  L a w , ”  California Law Review  8 4  ( 1 9 9 6 ) :  1 5 7 5 ;  R o b e r t  N .  C l i n t o n ,  “ T h e  D o r m a n t  
I n d i a n  C o m m e r c e  C l a u s e , ”  Connecticut Law Review  2 7  ( 1 9 9 5 ) :  1 0 5 7 ;  R a l p h  W .  J o h n s o n  a n d  B e r r i e  
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Philip P. Frickey and David H. Getches, 1 have argued that the Supreme Court Justices 
first began to move away from the Indian sovereignty doctrine in 1959 and this 
contributed to the gradual erosion of tribal taxation, criminal and civil authority over non­
members inside the reservations and the movement of state law into the reservations. It is 
further contended that these scholars do not view the erosion of inherent tribal 
sovereignty and the Indian sovereignty doctrine as a process where the foundations were 
laid between 1959 and 1973 and carried out from 1973 to 2001. Furthermore, these 
scholars have failed to address and discuss the practical effects of Supreme Court case 
law on tribal authority inside the reservations.
Overall, the silent revolution has become embedded in the case law of the United States 
Supreme Court and the legal paradigm established by the Justices of the Supreme Court 
also shows signs that point towards its application in congressional legislation.
The Silent Revolution: Proliferation within Congress?
The United States Congress has the authority to reverse Supreme Court case law and has 
exercised this right on several occasions between 1884 and 2004. However, Congress has 
not intervened to reverse Supreme Court case law dealing with the limitations o f inherent 
tribal sovereignty over non-members in the reservation and the issues of state rights over 
non-members in the reservation. In 2003, the United States Senate introduced S.578, a 
bill to amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 but contained in the controversial 
Section 13 of that bill was a re-affirmation of the principle of inherent tribal sovereignty
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and the congressional definition o f ‘Indian country,’ with provisions to reverse the silent
i  • * ,revolution o f the Supreme Court. Therefore, Bill S.578 brought about ideological condign 
between the United States Congress and the United States Supreme Court. As S.578 
threatened to overturn the case law of the Supreme Court’s silent revolution, many 
groups and individuals called for its abandonment including lawyers, the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS)3j and anti-tribal groups. Then in 2005, Congress introduced a 
similar bill, S.477, without the provisions to reverse the case law of the silent revolution. 
The fact that S.578 was not introduced by Congress points towards the continuation of 
the Supreme Court’s silent revolution in congressional legislation.
Congress has reversed the case law of the United States Supreme Court on more than one 
occasion. In Ex parte Kan-gi-Shun-ca, (Crow Dog) (1883)j4 the Supreme Court held that 
the United States did not have criminal authority to try a tribal member for the killing of 
another tribal member in a reservation. However, in 1884 Congress introduced the Major 
Crimes Act and explicitly overruled the Crow Dog opinion. This process occurred again 
in the twentieth century. In the Supreme Court case of Duro v. Reina (1990), Anthony 
Kennedy, the author of the opinion held that “An Indian tribe may not assert criminal 
jurisdiction over a nonmember Indian.”35 However, in 1991 Congress passed specific 
legislation, explicitly reversing the Duro decree/6 The impact of the 1991 legislation was 
the focus of a 2004 Supreme Court case.
33 T h e  C R S  i s  a n  i n d e p e n d e n t  b o d y  o f  C o n g r e s s  w h i c h  a s s e s s e s  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  b i l l s .
34 Ex parte Kan-gi-Shun-ca ; ( C r o w  D o g ) ,  109 U . S .  556 (1883).
35 Duro  v . Reina , 495 U . S .  676 (1990), 677.
36 P u b l i c  L a w  102-137, 102nd C o n g . ,  1st s e s s . ,  (28 O c t o b e r  1991), t h e  ‘ D u r o  F i x , ’ o v e r t u r n e d  Duro  v . Reina
a n d  r e - i n s t a t e d  t h e  r i g h t  o f  t r i b e s  t o  c r i m i n a l l y  p r o s e c u t e  t r i b a l  m e m b e r s  a s  w e l l  a s  n o n - t r i b a l  m e m b e r s ,  
N a t i v e  A m e r i c a n s  n o t  a  m e m b e r  o f  t h e  t r i b e  in  q u e s t i o n .
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In United States v. Lara (2004),j7 the Supreme Court confirmed that the legislation 
introduced by Congress in 1991 was constitutional and it provided tribes with inherent 
sovereignty to prosecute non-tribal members who committed crimes within the 
reservation. The Lara court held that “Congress has the constitutional power to lift the 
restrictions on the tribes’ criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.”38 The 7-2 
majority held that the actions of Congress overruled the 1991 Supreme Court case. 
Furthermore, the Lara court ruled that Congress had plenary power over tribal affairs and 
consequently had the authority to restrict or relax the limitations imposed on tribal 
sovereignty.39 The key question answered by the Supreme Court was whether the 
legislation extended congressional authority to allow the tribes to prosecute tribal non­
members or whether the legislation re-affirmed inherent tribal sovereignty. As Justice 
Stephen Breyer explained,
“Section 1301(2) "recognize[s] and affirm[s]" in each tribe the "inherent power" to 
prosecute nonmember Indians, and its legislative history confirms that such was 
Congress’ intent. Thus, it seeks to adjust the tribes’ status, relaxing restrictions, 
recognized in Duro, that the political branches had imposed on the tribes’ exercise of 
inherent prosecutorial power.”40
Breyer concluded that the source of tribal power was inherent sovereignty, a separate and 
independent source of power from Congress, rather than a congressional delegation of
’7 United States  v . Lara, 5 4 1  U . S .  1 9 3  ( 2 0 0 4 ) .  
’8 United States v. Lara, 1 9 4 .
39 I b i d . ,  1 9 4 .
40 I b i d .
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power, which was an extension of congressional authority.41 Despite these Congressional 
steps to overrule certain Supreme Court cases, Congress has yet to reverse any o f the case 
law from the period of the silent revolution. Similarly, Congress has neglected to 
introduce S.578, a bill that would have re-invigorated tribal sovereignty and reversed the 
case law o f silent revolution.
The S.578 bill, developed in co-ordination with the Senate Government Affairs 
Committee, was announced in a Senate session on March 7, 2003 by Senator Inouye and 
on behalf o f Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Senator Daniel Akaka and Senator Maria 
Cantwell. S.578, also known as the ‘Hicks fix,’42 was designed to amend the original 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 and to allow the tribes to have the appropriate 
jurisdiction and authority inside the reservations and to respond to acts of terrorism in 
light of the attacks on New York, Washington and Pennsylvania on 11 September, 
2001.4j A s  Senator Inouye explained, the purpose o f the bill was to “amend the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 to include Indian tribal governments amongst the 
governmental entities that are consulted with respect to activities carried out by the 
Secretary o f the Department of Homeland Security.”44 In order for the tribes to be viewed 
as governmental entities under the auspices o f the Homeland Security Act, they also had 
to have the requisite authority to counter terrorism inside their reservations. Senator
41 I n  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  s e n s e ,  i f  c o n g r e s s i o n a l  l e g i s l a t i o n  a l l o w s  t r i b e s  t o  d o  s o m e t h i n g ,  w h e t h e r  i n h e r e n t  
s o v e r e i g n t y  o r  n o t ,  i t  a p p e a r s  t o  a g r e e  w i t h  t h e  r a t i o n a l e  o f  t h e  m o d e r n  d a y  S u p r e m e  C o u r t  w h i c h  a r g u e s  
t h a t  C o n g r e s s  m u s t  a c t  t o  a l l o w  t r i b a l  a u t h o r i t y  o v e r  n o n - m e m b e r s .
42 A bill to amend the Homeland Security Act o f 2002 to include Indian tribes among the entities consulted  
with respect to  activities carried out by the Secretary o f  Homeland Security, and fo r  other purposes, 1 0 8 th 
C o n g . ,  1st s e s s . ,  S . 5 7 8 .  T h e  e q u i v a l e n t  b i l l ,  H .R .  2 2 4 2 ,  w a s  i n t r o d u c e d  in  t h e  H o u s e  o f  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o n  
2 2  M a y  2 0 0 3 .
43 T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  b i l l  w a s  d e s i g n e d  t o  a m e n d  e x i s t i n g  s t a t u t e s  in  o r d e r  t o  c o m p l y  w i t h  H o m e l a n d  S e c u r i t y  
i s s u e s  a n d  p o l i c i e s .
44 Congressional Record, 1 0 8 t h  C o n g . ,  1 s t  s e s s . ,  2 0 0 3 ,  1 4 9 ,  3 7 : 3 3 7 2 .
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Inouye believed that Congress had to re-instate tribal sovereignty to counter acts of 
terrorism, commenting that S.578 “...makes clear that for purposes of homeland security, 
the United States recognizes the inherent authority of tribal governments to exercise** A--,*’ 
jurisdiction currently with the Federal government to assure that applicable criminal, civil 
and regulatory laws are enforced on tribal lands.”45 Senator Inouye’s words were in direct 
conflict with the Supreme Court’s silent revolution and formed the underlying principles 
of Section 13 of Bill S.578, entitled Congressional Affirmation and Declaration o f Tribal 
Government Authorities,
“(a) IN GENERAL- For the purpose of this Act, Congress affirms and declares that the 
inherent sovereign authority of an Indian tribal government includes the authority to 
enforce and adjudicate violations of applicable criminal, civil, and regulatory laws 
committed by any person on land under the jurisdiction of the Indian tribal government, 
except as expressly and clearly limited by—
(1) a treaty between the United States and an Indian tribe; or
(2) an Act of Congress.
(b) SCOPE- The authority of an Indian tribal government described in subsection (a) 
shall—
(1) be concurrent with the authority of the United States; and
(2) extend to—
(A) all places and persons within the Indian country (as defined in section 1151 of title 
18, United States Code) under the concurrent jurisdiction of the United States and the 
Indian tribal government; and
(B) any person, activity, or event having sufficient contacts with that land, or with a 
member of the Indian tribal government, to ensure protection of due process rights.”46
It was clear that Section 13 supported the extension of tribal sovereignty over reservation 
lands and all of the people within those lands, subject only to federal law.
45 Congressional Record, 1 0 8 t h  C o n g . ,  1 s t  s e s s . ,  2 0 0 3 ,  1 4 9 , 3 7 : 3 3 7 2 .
46 S.578.
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Furthermore, Section 13 re-affirmed the congressional definition of indian country.’ As 
noted in Chapter 2, Congress had introduced this definition in 1948 and thereafter it 
formed part of the United States legal code and recognised the jurisdictional definition of 
tribal authority within Indian country. This re-affirmation conflicted with and was 
antithetical to the principles of the Judiciary.
The dissonance between Section 13 of S.578 and the silent revolution mirrored the battle 
from 1973 between the application of the integrationist trend and the Indian sovereignty 
doctrine by the Supreme Court. The Congressional declarations and affirmations of 
Section 13 explicitly adhered to the application of the sovereignty doctrine rather than the 
integrationist trend which had been the key rationale of the silent revolution. The 
rationale of the integrationist trend arose from the presumption that tribes did not have 
inherent sovereignty until Congress specifically acted to allow tribal authority over non­
members. Conversely, the rationale of the sovereignty doctrine began from the 
presumption that the tribes had inherent sovereignty unless or until Congress expressly 
legislated and reversed tribal sovereignty or it was reversed by treaty. Section 13 did not 
conform to the silent revolution but adhered to the application of the traditional 
sovereignty doctrine applied in Williams v. Lee (1959). Therefore, the Legislature was 
doctrinally at odds with the Judiciary regarding the relevant tribal powers over 
reservation lands and over non-members in the reservation. However, this conflict of 
principles ended when S.578 and its controversial section thirteen was not passed into 
law.
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The primary reason for the withdrawal of Section 13 was that it threatened to overrule 
Supreme Court case law which had protected non-members from tribal sovereignty and 
allowed state law to operate inside the reservation. Lawyers, the Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) and anti-tribal groups interpreted Section 13 as directly overruling 
Supreme Court case law, namely Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe (1978) and Nevada 
v. Hicks (2001). Thomas B. Heffelfinger, United States Attorney for the District of 
Minnesota believed that Section 13 overruled case law, pointing out that it was “a 
legislative overturn”47 of Oliphant and was “an attempt to deal with the Oliphant issue 
head-on.”48 Furthermore, Heffelfinger explained that in 2003 the Native American Issues 
Subcommittee (NA1S) formed an Oliphant Working Group. This group concluded that 
“section 13 as currently written is too broad.”49 M. Maureen Murphy, legislative attorney 
in the American Law Division of the Congressional Research Service, believed that 
Section 13 overturned specific case law, stating that bill S.578 “raised concern in some 
quarters that it would overturn Nevada v. Hicks...or otherwise expand Indian tribal 
sovereignty.’00 Furthermore, Murphy was concerned that the expansion of tribal 
sovereignty in S.578 was contrary to the limitations imposed by the Supreme Court in 
criminal and civil case law. She noted that Section 13 of S.578 “appeared to endorse a 
view of tribal criminal and civil jurisdiction inconsistent with Supreme Court rulings on 
the subject of tribal jurisdiction.’01 Furthermore, while in 2003, a CRS report was 
ambivalent about the overall effect of Section 13, it, in part supported the view that
47 S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e ,  Tribal Government Amendments, 2 3 .
48 I b i d . ,  2 4 .
49 I b i d .
50 U . S .  L i b r a r y  o f  C o n g r e s s ,  C o n g r e s s i o n a l  R e s e a r c h  S e r v i c e ,  Indian Tribal Government Amendments to 
the Homeland Security Act: S. 578 and Indian Tribal Sovereignty, b y  M . M a u r e e n  M u r p h y  ( W a s h i n g t o n  
D .C . :  G o v e r n m e n t  P r i n t i n g  O f f i c e ,  2 0 0 5 ) ,  1 .
51 I b i d . ,  1 .
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Section 13 overruled case law. It was pointed out in the CRS report that Section 13 was 
in conflict with certain Supreme Court cases, “Some language in the legislation that 
appears to endorse a view of tribal sovereignty that seems inconsistent with Supreme 
Court rulings on the subject.”32 The CRS believed that this conflict revolved around the 
fact that the way the legislation was drafted allowed the tribes to have authority over non­
members inside the reservation, contrary to the case law of the silent revolution. The CRS 
report noted that Section 13 appeared “...to confer, reinstate, or delegate to tribes 
authority over nonmembers and non-Indian fee land that the courts have found to have 
been divested.”33 However, the CRS believed that Section 13 was limited by the words, 
“For the purpose of this Act” and intimated that Section 13 “may be found to be limited, 
should the courts be called on for interpretation.”34 In addition, some anti-tribal groups 
such as the Citizens Alliance interpreted Section 13 as an overturn of Supreme Court case 
law which protected the constitutional rights of American citizens in the reservations. 
The Citizens Alliance believed that Section 13 would allow arbitrary tribal authority to 
exist over state and American citizens in the reservation and pointed out that Congress 
was absconding on their moral and legal duty to protect approximately 500,000 non­
members living on the reservations. Specific concerns included not being able to vote in 
tribal elections or participate in tribal or reservation life. The Supreme Court upheld these 
concerns in Oliphant (1978) and ruled against the tribes accordingly.33
52 U.S. Library o f Congress, Congressional Research Service, Indian Tribal Government Amendments to 
the Homeland Security Act: S. 578 and Indian Tribal Sovereignty, by M. Maureen Murphy (Washington 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2003), 5.
53 Ibid, 5.
54 Ibid.
55 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe. V
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Despite the concerns expressed by many people, in reality, Section 13 was limited by its
*
own terminology and did not sanction unchecked tribal sovereignty over non-members 
within the reservations. Although Section 13 appeared to return tribal authority over non­
members in the reservation to pre-1973 standards, in fact, it was explicitly qualified in 
stating that tribal authority existed “ ...except as expressly and clearly limited by’° 6 two 
important caveats, a treaty or an act of Congress. Therefore tribal sovereignty existed 
unless or until Congress acted to reverse tribal sovereignty. This qualification 
undermined the dominant perception of exclusive tribal authority over parts of American 
society. Inherent tribal authority over state and American citizens in the reservations 
would have worked alongside the authority of the United States. As Senator Maria 
Cantwell commented in 2004, “The bill affirms general tribal sovereignty and provides 
that federal and tribal court have concurrent jurisdiction over Indian crimes on tribal 
lands, within the Homeland Security Act of 2002.’° 7 In fact, Section 13 was explicit 
about the concurrent nature of the law where non-members were concerned and defined 
inherent tribal authority as authority over “any person, activity, or event having sufficient
<ro
contacts with that land, or with a member of the Indian tribal government.” However, 
this form of tribal authority over reservation lands and the people on those lands was 
guaranteed to be “ ...under the concurrent jurisdiction of the United States.”59 The 
importance of concurrent tribal and federal jurisdiction was “to ensure protection of due 
process rights.”60 Therefore inherent tribal sovereignty was limited not only by treaty and 
by acts of Congress but it was to be exercised in a concurrent manner with federal laws to
56 S . 5 7 8 .
S e n a t o r  M a r i a  C a n t w e l l ,  L e t t e r  t o  a u t h o r ,  M a y  1 4 , 2 0 0 4 .
58 S .5 7 8 .
59 I b i d .
60 I b i d .
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ensure the protection of the rights of due process. The fears of unabridged tribal authority 
over non-members in the reservation were cautioned by the explicit terminology within 
Section 13 to the contrary.
On March 1 2005, Congress introduced bill S.477 as a direct replacement for S.578 and 
resolved the ideological conflict between the Supreme Court and Congress. This process 
suggests the beginnings of the establishment of the silent revolution in Congressional 
legislation.61 As a result of the conflict between Congress and the Judiciary and the 
diverse interpretations of Section 13, Congress introduced a new bill without the 
contentious Section 13 of S.578. The introduction of S.477 solved the conflict between 
the two institutions of government. Although the current federal governmental policy era 
of tribal self-determination had been re-affirmed by both the Legislature and the 
Executive from 1970, it had been limited by the silent revolution. However, Congress 
refused to redress the issue. In contrast to S.578, M. Maureen Murphy pointed out that 
S.477 did not contain a “direct statement specifically granting or delegating a particular 
law enforcement authority to tribes or overruling any named Supreme Court case.”62 The 
purpose of the new S.477 bill was not to overrule Supreme Court case law but to ensure 
the participation of the tribes in the protection of the United States against terror.6^  
Although Congress bowed to pressure to withdraw Section 13 of S.578, by introducing a 
new Bill S.477, it still retained the ultimate authority to overrule Supreme Court case law.
61 A bill to amend the Homeland Security Act o f2002 to include Indian tribes among the entities consulted 
with respect to activities carried out by the Secretary of Homeland Security, and fo r  other purposes., 109th 
Cong., 1st sess., S.477.
62 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Indian Tribal Government Amendments to 
the Homeland Security Act: S. 578 and Indian Tribal Sovereignty, by M. Maureen Murphy, 2005, 1.
63 Ibid.
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Unless the Supreme Court changes direction, the survival of Native American 
sovereignty and possibly Native America itself relies on representations to ©ongress. As 
John R. Wunder said, “Indian legal strategy must necessarily turn to Congress to hold off 
the Supreme Court’s 1990s forced acculturation charge.”64 Without congressional 
modification of the Supreme Court’s silent revolution or a change in direction by the 
Supreme Court, the current situation and impact of Supreme Court case law, as William
C. Canby said, “...leaves the tribe with almost no governmental power at all.”65 Although 
the silent revolution has impacted on the politics of Congress, there remains the hope that 
Congressional legislation or decisive action from Native America can overturn the effects o f lu  
silent revolution.
64 W u n d e r ,  “Retained by the People, ”  1 8 0 .
65 S e n a t e  C o m m i t t e e ,  Rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court, 4 6 .
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